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Introduction
The classic novels of Lewis Carroll *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*^1^ recount the story of a little girl, Alice, the protagonist, who after falling asleep, is plunged into her own unconscious. Carroll’s literary fabrication of a narrative based on the unconscious has been the major representation on which popular culture relied when using Lewis Carroll as a reference. For example, the game industry Spicy Horse made a game entitled *Alice Madness Return*, using Alice’s unconscious as the platform of the game. Similarly, the Wachowski Brothers’ film *Matrix*, presenting a science-fiction world in which the mind is the main tool for control, used Lewis Carroll as an intertextual element.

Carroll uses language in a playful way to construct Alice’s dream worlds, Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, which have the particularity to present worlds in which language is presented differently, in the form of games. This playfulness with language has been defined as nonsense literature, which Anna Barton explains as follows

Nonsense is, therefore, literature that complicates or obstructs the relationship between word and world, or word and meaning, rather than using words as a conduit to the world they describe. Nonsense might do this by drawing attention to language as a thing in itself, with its own sonic and visual qualities, or it might use puns, which demonstrate how easily meaning can be turned upside-down by a slip of the tongue.

Nonsense literature by “drawing attention to language as a thing in itself”, that is in conscious speech, permits the construction of new meanings that would have otherwise stayed hidden somewhere inaccessible, that is in the unconscious.

Carroll’s narrative is a literary fabricated dream work, using language playfully from which hidden meanings are revealed. Therefore, it seems appropriate to infer that his work

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^1^ The shorter forms *AAW* and *TLG*, to refer to the titles will be used to avoid wordiness
presents the secret language of the unconscious subject. This aspect of the novels has inspired several psychoanalytical analyses of Carroll’s novels, using the interpretation of symbols. Antal Bokay enumerates some general psychoanalytic interpretations, in his essay “Alice in Analysis: Interpretation of the Personal Meaning of Texts”, which relies on the meaning of symbols and originates from a Freudian approach: “when Alice descends to Wonderland through a rabbit hole. This, like the house with small and big doors, the curtain before the door, and the key that fits in one of them has been understood as a symbolic expression of coitus and birth” (Bokay 82). He also cites William Empson, another disciple of Freud, who interpreted the pool of tears as “‘salt water of the sea from which life arose’ and the ‘amniotic fluid’ from which each person was born” (Bokay 82) that Alice produces after she drinks a mysterious bottle and starts to increase considerably in size. Some scholars have adopted a psychoanalytic approach and interpreted Carroll’s novels in a more negative way; for example, Flair Donglai Shi quotes psychoanalytical symbolic interpretations of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to highlight the anti-feminist message of these novels:

Rachel Falconer has suggested that the rabbit hole and its long tunnel are symbols of the vagina and the womb, and the endless falling of Alice in its darkness signifies her entering the female world of illogicality and chaos (Falconer 2009). A. M. E. Goldschmidt also notes that the big locked doors and the hidden small door in the hall are symbols that indicate Carroll’s interest in the sexuality of little girls rather than that of adult women (Goldschmidt 1933). (Shi 189-90)

All these interpretations, however, have been described by Bokay as “lack[ing] therapeutic background” (Bokay 82); that is, an analysis of the author himself through his novels cannot be possible because “Freud believed that the meaning of a dream or a symptom could be articulated only by its owner” (Bokay 82). Consequently, these interpretations, by missing the fact that they do not have a real psychoanalytic session with the author, miss one
of the most important rules of Freudian psychoanalysis. Also, these interpretations did not bear any attention to Carroll’s playful language. In his book entitled *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud notes that dream, “implies assigning a ‘meaning’ to it—that is, replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest” (Freud 124). Based on Freud’s argument, dreams are meaningful and their interpretation reveals something about the unconscious subject, that is something hidden, which must be deciphered by using language as a tool. Psychoanalysis, as it is based on an interpretation of the human psyche, hence highlights the inextricable character of language in this field.

This interest which Carroll bears on language has caught the attention of many scholars, who adopt a structuralist approach. Carroll’s work has served as a model for a book by the French linguist Marina Yaguello, *Alice aux Pays du Language*, in which she uses the same playfulness of language as Carroll and invites the reader to explore language, introducing linguistics through games. This joins what Maria Giovanna Tassinari, in his essay “Texts and Metatexts in Alice”, says about Carroll’s novels when she concludes that “Alice can thus be read as a fantastic adventure in and through language … Carroll invites us to go beyond the appearances of language, its comprehensibility, its common use, and to be aware of its illogicality, ambiguity, but also of the great potential for linguistic game” (154). The language aspect of Carroll’s novels has also interested Robert D. Sutherland who, in his book *Language and Lewis Carroll*, explains the importance of sign in language in order for the individual to reach an interpretation of the world. As he explains, signs are “a stimulus [in our nervous system] which, once perceived and identified, is INTERPRETED” (Sutherland 71). These signs are thus responsible for our interpretation of the world; Sutherland uses Carroll’s novels to illustrate this process of subjective interpretation. However, focusing on language as a system, that is as a universal, at the expense of the subjective meaning that Alice’s dream
represents is to miss the particular character of Lewis Carroll’s novels which made these novels classic. In other words, exploring the subjective aspect of language does not permit access to the encrypted language of the unconscious subject which Lewis Carroll uses to reach every one of his readers in the same profound way, that is, as human beings and as subjects.

Carroll’s novels should then be approached carefully, so that the dream content should not be confused with the author’s personal hidden desires but with the more universal forming process of what it means to become an individual. In other words, although each individual is particular, the forming process that the subject goes through while individuating itself and becoming an individual is a universal process. It is this universal process of subjectivity that is relevant in Lewis Carroll work and not only the universal system of language. It is this subjective process that Carroll presents through the evolving characterization of Alice. Carroll’s novels recount the story of subjectivity inscribed in the movement of Alice’s dreams and in which its nonsense language is the key to deeper understanding of the unconscious subject. An individual is part of a social environment, such as society, in which language is the raw material; therefore, an individual is understood as a cultural being. In Carroll’s novels, language is the producer of action, narrative temporality and characterization; it is the producer of subjectivity itself, that is of the unconscious subject, for it is in the unconscious that subjectivity begins.

The inextricable character of language as being responsible for subjectivity, which finds its source in the unconscious subject, has been used as the foundation of an entire novel psychoanalytic theory by the post-modern French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who defines his theory as a return to the roots, that is a return to Freud. Lacan insists on the fact that Freud has always relied on language to construct his theory, as his particular interpretation of dreams suggests. Freud uses images that appear in dreams as a combination of phonemes with
which he constructs his interpretation and which Lacan compares to the interpreting work of a rebus (Chaitin 123). Saussure’s linguistic theory treats specifically this aspect of language by arguing that every word is a sign which is constituted of two parts. On the one hand, the signifier which corresponds to a word reduced to its phoneme, like Freud’s method of interpretation; on the other hand, the signified, which corresponds to the image associated with the hearing or voicing of these phonemes. However, for Lacan, the signifier superimposes the signified for it is the former that can produce several signifieds for the same signifier. As Freud’s interpretations of dreams are based on language in which displacement and condensation are the tool for interpretation, Lacan adapts the concepts of condensation and displacement that he inserts into Jakobson’s theory of conscious speech in which metonymy and metaphor are the two figures of speech responsible for verbal expression, placed in two different axes. The former, referring to metonymy, corresponds to the vertical axis and expresses a contiguity in the same field which Lacan associates with displacement, while the horizontal one, referring to metaphor, expresses a similarity by replacing one thing by another under the process of substitution, which Lacan associates with condensation. Lacan adapts this theory to explain the unconscious forming process of meaning responsible for conscious signification which Gilbert D. Chaitin explains as a relation of signifier to signifier because unconscious meaning, like in dreams, presents “both the manifest images and latent thoughts [as] signifiers, since the latter are always a series of words” (Chaitin 118). For example, dreaming of a tree can be interpreted as the signifier tree, that is the phonemes /t/ /r/ /i/. It can also be interpreted as what the tree is associated with, that is, life or nature. Therefore, dream works demonstrate the metaphorical nature of meaning, so that interpretation, that is the production of meaning, should follow the same dynamism. This explains the famous dictum of Lacan, saying “the unconscious is structured like language” insofar that, to Lacan, phonemes represent signs; that is “sounds [that] function like the
alphabet, or syllabary, of a writing system, in that the images can be juxtaposed to form the sounds of other words- those which constitute the dream thoughts” (Chaitin 119). This whole system provides a structure for the individual living in a social environment ruled by language.

The connection between language and the individual made by Lacan is responsible for the subject’s desire which Lacan defines as the essence of the subject, in the sense of the subject’s wants-to-be. The subject’s desire incessantly desires something else, in the form of an endless loop. In return, this implies that the subject is thus always lacking something, which justifies Lacan’s foremost claim that the subject is based on an ontological form of lack. This desire produces fantasies, which Mari Turi explains as follows: “fantasies constitute the elementary gesture of ideology, positing the symbolic order [language] as a dependable structure that ensures the solidity of meaning and cultural life” (Turi 2). These fantasies are produced in the unconscious, which Lacan names also fundamental fantasy. If desire can be seen as the fuel or energy of the subject, the fundamental fantasy is the foundation of the subject’s psychic life, the sustaining engine that permits everything to function accordingly. Carroll offers a similar view about subjectivity in his novels, for the desire of Alice to individuate herself and becomes an individual in a world based on language is the main action of the narrative. The reader is immersed in Alice’s unconscious, her fundamental fantasy, and has access to her deepest thoughts normally hidden in the external world.

However, because language provides a structure for the subject it can also be a problem for the freedom of the subject. As Lacan states, “language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each subject at a certain point in his mental development makes his entry into it” (qtd. in Hart 739). That is why, Angela Hart observes Lacan’s definition of language as dichotomous, as it is both “provid[ing] a framework to work within, while also
confining creativity” (Hart 428). She is one of the few who applies Lacan’s theory to Lewis Carroll’s work, in her essay “Do Words Have Meanings? Lacanian Theory on Carroll’s Writing”, in which she demonstrates the importance Carroll bears on the connectivity shared between language and individuals. She argues that language is associated with societal norms which restrict people’s creativity because, even though language is ambiguous and meaning is subjective, people tend to expect one interpretation. This lack of creativity can be solved through the same connectivity between language and individuals which, as she notes, represents the essence of Carroll’s nonsense literature for “creating a new order of language” (Hart 428) and allows the reader to “develop a creative mindset” (Hart 428). In other words, Lewis Carroll produces his own system of language, or to use Lacan’s vocabulary, his own symbolic order. This provides new meanings for the subject, that is, the obliteration of the subject into language, which Lacan sees as fundamental for the individual to avoid self-alienation in the symbolic Other.

This paper will thus focus on the interdependent relationship between language and subjectivity, that is, how one is responsible for the existence of the other. This interdependency is summarised by Mari Turi as follows: “Even if the signifier robs us of our sense of ontological security, we at the same time owe our capacity for meaning production and creativity to this very signifier” (Turi 7). This paper will examine how Carroll uses this interdependent relationship using nonsense as a tool “to treat language as a thing in itself” (Anna Barton), and recount the coming-to-be of Alice as a subject. As Lacan declared in a podcast of the French radio France Culture, “[c’est] la psychanalyse qui peut rendre compte le mieux de l’effet de cette oeuvre [psychoanalysis is the only field that can transcribe truthfully the effect of this literary work]” (qtd. in Combis-Schlumberger “150 ans d’Alice: Lacan au Pays des Merveilles”). This paper will explore the subjective process that language undergoes, that is its particularization, during the process of individuation of the subject, in
Lewis Carroll’s two texts, by erasing the already established meanings attached to signifiers in the symbolic order and reattaching new meanings to these signifiers with which the subject will be able to define herself. Carroll, by creating new meanings with nonsense, shows that language and subjectivity entertain an interdependent relationship in which language must always remain a medium used by the subject to assert itself.

The interdependent relationship between language and subjectivity will first be discussed through Carroll’s exhibition of language as a system of lack on which the subject depends, that is, a system failing at representing the subject’s truthfully. This dependency will show that the subject’s true nature is constructed on an ontological lack. In other words, the subject’s lack is the reason for its desire, its wants-to-be, and the possible existence of the unconscious. The way the subject constructs itself will then be discussed in terms of the subject’s temporality. Due to the subject’s dependence on language, its own signification is temporally constructed on the same retroactive structure than meaning in language. Finally, the interdependent relationship between language and subject will be examined through Carroll’s discussion of the naming process between objects and subjects, responsible for their possibility to exist, that he defines as metaphorical.

**Untruthful Nature of Language Responsible for Subjective Nature of Lack**

In his novels, Carroll shows that language is the principle medium which Alice uses to go through her adventures in both Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass world. Alice needs to use language properly, that is truthfully, to make herself understood with other creature or animals present in her dream worlds. However, mistakes in interpretation and understanding are recurrent in Alice’s adventures, which Carroll illustrates in a playful manner through the intentional use of homophony and synonymy, that is, the mistake of the same in language. When considering that “[L]anguage is a differential system in which the
signification inherent to one sign emerges exclusively through the opposition that exists between all signs” (Chiesa 47), the mistake of the same present in a system based on differences and opposition becomes significant for it reveals a contradiction. Carroll exposes this contradiction as the reason for the failure of language in its role of medium, that is to represent the subject truthfully.

The use of homophony illustrates the mistake made during the signification due to the same pronunciation. Carroll explores this mistake in the scene where Alice listens to the mouse’s tale, shortly after her arrival in Wonderland. The mouse describes its tale as long and sad, but Alice misunderstands the signifier ‘tale’ with ‘tail’ and consequently the mouse’s tale physically appears as a tail made of words in which the mouse’s tale resides (Carroll AAW 37) and forming a sign in Alice’s unconscious. As explained in the introduction, according to Lacan, signification is performed through the formation of signifying chains in the unconscious, according to the same linguistic law as conscious speech, that is, following the process of metonymy and metaphor (Chiesa 50). Hence, what happened in Alice’s unconscious is that she has metonymically understood the signifier ‘tale’ in contiguity with the signifier ‘mouse’ so that, to her, it should be ‘tail’, as the mouse’s body part, rather than the mouse’s story. As Angela Hart remarks, Carroll draws the reader’s attention to the text (Hart 435) and more especially to Alice’s expectation during signification, based on her experience in the real world. Similarly, when the mouse interrupts Alice’s representation of the mouse’s long tail by saying to her: “‘You’re not attending!’… ‘What are you thinking of?’” (Carroll AAW 38), it interrupts Alice’s free association on the signifier ‘bend’ which refers to the mouse’s tail. She thus answers to the mouse “‘I beg your pardon’, … ‘you had got to the fifth bend, I think?’” (Carroll AAW 38), to which the mouse responds “‘I had not!’” and which Alice understands this time as ‘knot’ (Carroll AAW 38). Alice’s misunderstanding appears as comical for she did not choose the right context for the meaning of the words. This
shows how meaning is subjective and thus how the mistake of the same in language, such as homophony, indicates the untruthful nature of language. Hence, Alice’s mistake during interpretation is a mark of her subjectivity. The mistake made by Alice reveals something about her individuality, that is, her dependency on language for both interpreting the world and for expressing herself in the most truthful way.

In the same playful manner, Carroll uses synonymy to express the mistake happening during signification due to the shared closeness in meaning. Carroll illustrates these subjective mistakes when, in *Through the Looking Glass*, Alice meets the Red Queen with whom she attempts a discussion, but which in fact results in the Red Queen’s constant contradiction with Alice’s word choice:

“‘I only wanted to see what the garden was like, your Majesty—’ ‘That’s right’, said the Queen … ‘though when you say “garden”, - I’ve seen gardens, compared with which this would be wilderness’. Alice didn’t dare to argue the point, but went on: ‘- and I thought I’d try and find my way to the top of that hill –’ ‘When you say “hill,”’ the Queen interrupted, ‘I could show you hills in comparison with which you’d call that a valley.’ ‘No, I shouldn’t’, said Alice … ‘a hill can’t be a valley, you know. That would be nonsense--’ The Red Queen shook her head. ‘You may call it “nonsense” if you like’, she said, ‘but I’ve heard nonsense, compared with which that would be as sensible as a dictionary!’ (Carroll *TLG* 39)

In the first intervention of the Queen, the signifiers ‘garden’ and ‘wilderness’ are put close to one another in terms of their opposition, they work as antonym. The same applies for the last intervention of the Queen in which the signifiers ‘nonsense’ and ‘sensible’ as a dictionary work also as antonyms. The antonyms create a clear cut in the meaning of the signifiers so that each, through its difference with the other, becomes more precise, more unique. This
process of signification follows the differential and oppositional system of language, as explained above. However, the intervention of the Queen, in which the signifiers hill and valley are brought so close as to be nearly synonyms, is presented as problematic. As Alice claims, one signifier should not be able to be replaced by another if it were completely truthful, but the ambiguity in language shows its own untruthfulness. This ambiguity affects Alice and shows again her dependency on language. The intentional ambiguity produced by Carroll thus shows that language is failing to represent the world truthfully for the subject. This goes in the same direction as Angela Hart’s argument that Carroll draws his reader’s attention onto the conformism of language (Hart 433) so that individuals should not follow language blindly but, rather, call it into question.

The idea that subjectivity appears in signification and more precisely in mistakes has been discussed in psychoanalysis first by Freud and then by Lacan. According to Freud and Lacan, these mistakes are failed acts attempted by the subject to express itself truthfully. According to Lacan, Freud determined these failed acts as representative of the unconscious’ manifestation in conscious speech. More specifically, he states that the unconscious is the cause of mistakes in the sense that “there is a cause only in something that doesn’t work” (Lacan 22). In other words, according to Lacan, the unconscious shows the disfunction of language as a truthful medium for the subject to express its individuality. Gilbert D. Chaitin observes that Freud’s choice of words to express the unconscious holds a “fundamental ambiguity” (133), for, on the one hand, it is “an act that fails to achieve its goal” (Chaitin 133), which corresponds to the lack in representing the subject truthfully, while, on the other hand, it is “a performance that is lacking but whose lack is indicated by that very failure” (Chaitin 133). These failed acts represented by the unconscious thus reveals that the unconscious resides in the mistake and is accessible because language is untruthful. Consequently, the failure of language indicates a lack which indicates the manifestation of the
unconscious so that the mistake of the same in synonymy and homophony can be seen as the manifestation of the unconscious. When Angela Hart says that the ambiguity of language created by Carroll “cannot make the reader but question the importance of language” (Hart 433), this can also be inferred that Carroll makes the reader question the manifestation of the unconscious and its ensuing meaning.

The manifestation of the unconscious hidden in the mistake hence reveals a truth about the subject that Gilbert D. Chaitin expresses as follows: “when it comes to stating the truth of the subject the word is always lacking” (Chaitin 133). This phenomenon is explained by the contradictory relationship between language and subject, for the former represents a differential system while the latter stands for what is unique and particular. Carroll illustrates this paradox between language and subject through the use of homophony, in the discussion between Alice and the Duchess in Wonderland: “‘You see the earth takes twenty-four hours to turn round on its axis’ ‘Talking about axes’, said the Duchess, ‘chop off her head!’” (Carroll AAW 71). Here, the signifier ‘axis’ is mistaken with the signifier ‘axes’, the tool to chop off trees, resulting in the association with the signifier ‘chop off her head!’ This last signifier illustrates the lack of the subject which can be translated as the disembodiment of the self in the metaphorical sense of lacking something. This lack is explained by the subject’s dependency on the symbolic Other. As Mari Turi notes, “we owe our very existence to the Other in the sense that, without the Other’s orienting influence, we would not have a fully human life; we would have neither a sense of identity nor the desire or capacity for intersubjectivity” (Turi 5). Language is lacking, meaning that it is not truthful, so that when the subject uses language as a medium to express itself, the subject is in turn affected by this lack.

Alice’s metaphorical lack is represented through her dream in which her unconscious manifests itself under the form of a willing act to assert her identity. As Mario Turci remarks
in his essay “What Is Alice, What Is This Thing, Who Are You?”, Wonderland is the place where “others’ ‘power’, … can exert an effective control on the assertion of [Alice’s] identity… through transiency, produced by the everlasting ambiguity of situations” (Turci 71). This sense of identity as lacking reveals that the subject’s truth is paradoxical for “the truth of meaning is built upon something meaningless, or better, on (mis-)recognition of the lack of meaning” (Chaitin 96). In other words, the disembodiment of the subject implied in the expression ‘chop off her head’ reveals the true representation of the subject, that is, a fragmented representation, a representation lacking unicity.

Homophony, also called the mistake of the same, creates ambiguity and demonstrates that language is not truthful. That is why homophony can be seen as “the primordial mistake… which exploits the fundamental ambiguity of language” (Chaitin 133). Carroll cultivates this fundamental ambiguity with homophony so that, by playing with this mistake in discourse, he brings the reader into the process in which signifiers have not yet reached signification. In other words, homophony permits a signifier to be detached from its signified and be seen in terms of what Lacan calls a letter; that is, the pre-signification state of the signifier which Lorenzo Chiesa defines as “meaningless signifiers” (Chiesa 57) that “does not signify anything” (Chiesa 58) and which precedes symbolization.

Carroll’s use of homophony can be seen in terms of the Lacanian letter, for the ambiguous meaning produced by Carroll brings the reader into what precedes symbolization, that is a void, a nothingness, a non-sense. As Chaitin explains, “subjective truth necessarily emerges from error, because it can come to existence only where and because ordinary discourse fails. It escapes the process of symbolization” (Chaitin 143). This is exemplified when Alice is made queen at the end of Through the Looking Glass and she is asked all sorts of questions by both the Red Queen and the White Queen. One of those question is about the fabrication of bread:
‘I know that!’ Alice cried eagerly. ‘You take some flour –’ ‘Where do you pick the flower?’ The White Queen asked. ‘In a garden, or in the hedges?’ ‘Well, it isn’t picked at all,’ Alice explained: ‘it’s ground – ‘How many acres of ground? said the White Queen. ‘You mustn’t leave out so many things.’ (Carroll TLG 150)

Here, the pair “flour” and “flower”, working as homophones, and the pair “ground”, in the sense of grinding, and “ground”, in the sense of a certain space covered by the floor, working both as homonyms and homophones, are once more responsible for a mistake in understanding, that is an ambiguity in the interpreting process. In fact, it seems that, for the White Queen, bread would not be fabricated in the sense of manufactured but produced as “breeding”, so that there is a substitution of the signifier of the manufactured process of bread with the natural process of breeding. In this mistake, the white Queen, who is a part of Alice’s dream and thus unconscious, considers bread as a being. This shows how Alice introjects her subjectivity into her understanding of the world by treating objects as subjects. Here lies the particularization the language undergoes when a subject uses it to express itself in the most literal sense, that is to press itself out into something else, the symbolic Other. In this example, Carroll uses mistake in discourse to reveal the truth about a subject that needs language to individuate itself; that is, Carroll, in using homophony and homonymy, shows “the impossibility of capturing the particular of the being of the subject in a language constituted on universals” (Chaitin 144). In other words, Carroll’s use of homophony in the sense of the Lacanian letter, that is a meaningless signifier, invites the reader to acknowledge the void that is subjectivity. This void appearing in the absence of meaning of the subject shows what Lacan states about the truth of the subject as being formed on a lack.

Therefore, homophony in Carroll’s novels recounts the process of subjectivity which can be associated with Lacan psychoanalytic theory that the truth of the subject lies in mistake, where the unconscious manifests itself. That is, every time there is a mistake
language, every time language fails in being truthful for the subject, this is the manifestation of the unconscious. The dependency the subject shares with language affects the subject to the extent that it reveals the coming to be of the subject. In other words, the subject comes to be from this lack, which has been identified through the mistake in language, that is the unconscious. This lack hence represents the coming to be of the unconscious subject. As it was noted in the introduction, this lack, according to Lacan, implies, in the same manner, the coming to be of desire, the essence of the subject, its wants-to-be. Mari Turi explains “that it is precisely to the extent that we experience ourselves as internally lacking that we feel compelled to generate new forms of life” (Turi 9). In other words, because the subject is formed on a lack, it means that its essence is desire itself, which is also called its wants-to-be, in order to fill this ontological lack. The subject’s motivation to be can only be reached through the knowledge of its unique signification. Carroll illustrates this by showing that the subject needs to incorporate its particularity into the universality of language to reach a possible truthfulness, a possible meaningfulness. That is, because meaning is subjective then the subject’s own meaning, its unique signification, will be established in following the same mechanism.

**The Retroactive Process of Signification Responsible for the Subject’s Temporalization**

As the residue of wakefulness, Alice’s dreams represent all which Alice does not symbolize in her waking life. This forms the structure of the narrative and it follows a certain temporality. This temporality corresponds to the movement of Alice’s unconscious in its desire to reach its own signification, as a unique individual. Because Alice’s individuation proceeds through language, it affects her in different ways. First, Alice seems not to always understand the words she uses. For example, when Alice tries to determinate her location while falling down the rabbit hole she says to herself: “I wonder what Latitude or Longitude I’ve got to?” (Carroll AAW 13) and the narrator addresses directly his readers as follows:
“(Alice had no idea what Latitude was, or Longitude either, but thought they were nice grand words to say.)” (Carroll AAW 13-4). In the same way, the words Alice uses seem to act independently of Alice’s will. As James A. Williams remarks in his essay “Lewis Carroll and the Private Life of Words”, “Alice’s attempt at recitation is suffused with the suggestion of linguistic autonomy. She does not ‘say it differently’, rather, ‘the words did not come the same’; her voice ‘sounded hoarse and strange’, as she seems to hear someone else speaking through her mouth” (Williams 659). This linguistic autonomy, which seems so estrange to Alice, is called by Lacan the discourse of the Other, which he defines as “…There is also the Other who speaks from my place, apparently, this Other who is within me” (qtd. in Chiesa 37). This explains why Alice cries at the idea that she might be someone else, because of the estrangement of the discourse of the Other, which makes her feel alienated to herself and affects her own individuation. Alice’s estrangement to language is also visible when she is faced with the poem of the Jabberwocky, which to Alice “seems very pretty” (Carroll TLG 30) but “rather hard to understand!” (Carroll TLG 30). As Angela Hart remarks, the Jabberwocky poem is part of Alice’s imagination and being a seven years old child, she cannot conceive a well-written poem so that the nonsense of this poem represents her lack of knowledge (Hart 436). This leads to the second way language affects Alice. Although Alice does not understand this poem fully, it affects her: “Somehow, it seems to fill my head with ideas – only I don’t exactly know what they are!” (Carroll TLG 30). Here it is explicit that Alice does not understand fully the meaning of all the signifiers in the poem but that they touch her “at what Freud calls the navel -the navel of the dreams, … [the subject’s] ultimately unknown centre” (Lacan 23).

The effect of estrangement of the discourse of the Other, which exerts a power over Alice for trying “to translate the Other’s signifiers into meaning” (Turi 5), resulting in affecting Alice’s subjectivity, affects her own individuation, that is, her own signification. By
generating her own signification through language, Alice follows the same mechanism as the forming process of meaning in language, that is, through “the retroactive action that gives the sentence a meaning at all times” (Chaitin 197). The retroactive character of meaning is also determined by Lacan through the concept of repression. As Chaitin explains when he discusses the subject’s own signification, repression is the result of choosing one signifier over the others, which fits the image of the ego as a building process. This choice implies the discarding of all the other signifiers (205). That is why Chaitin identifies the link between repression and the unconscious as follows: “if there were no repression, if symbolization were perfect, then there would be no unconscious, for everything could be contain within conscious meaning” (Chaitin 198). Dr. Roberto Harari offers a definition of the concept of repression through etymology, he explains that repression is the action of pressing again, which implies that the significant repressed signifiers return “in a disguised way” (Harari 96). For example, the mouse’s tale in Wonderland, to which Alice did not pay attention because she chooses the signifier ‘tail’ instead, becomes significant retroactively because the content of the tale is repressed by Alice, as all the signifiers inside it. As Angela Hart notes, the mouse’s tale “is foreshadowing the trial that Alice must attend due to the Queen charging her with absurd crimes. The Mouse holds a grudge against the dog, having unresolved feelings towards him for the unfair actions he took. The story is trying to convey that there should be fairness and justice in the world” (Hart 435).

The signifier ‘tale’ thus caused an interruption in the mouse’s tale, that is the mouse’s discourse, for the mouse has to stop to ask Alice to cut short her musing and to pay attention. This interruption of the discourse is defined by Lacan as a proof of repression because the word is lacking to the subject (Chaitin 50). As it was previously explained, the lacking word correspond to the subjective truth, that is, the manifestation of the unconscious, which indicates something significant for the subject’s own signification. When Alice is asked to
indicate where the mouse’s tale stopped, the word is indeed lacking when she should mention it is about justice, so that the signifier ‘justice’ is significant for Alice’s individuation. According to Lacan when the word is lacking, the best way to replace it is by allusion, that is by metonymy (Chaitin 50). The Queen’s trial is an allusion to the mouse’s tale in which justice and fairness are implied. Alice has repressed the signifier ‘justice’ for she did not symbolize it, she did not fully understand it. The signifier ‘justice’ returns in a disguised way during the Queen’s trial where it touches Alice’s subjectivity for she feels “dumbfounded” by the lack of fairness in the justice performed during the trial (Hart 434). The signifier ‘trial’ can thus be seen as the metonymic part of ‘justice’ in Alice’s unconscious, because it is an allusion to the signifier ‘trial’. Similarly, the signifier ‘justice’ is always put in relation to the signifier ‘tale’ for it is always associated with the mouse’s tale in which justice and fairness resonate in Alice’s unconscious. The signifier ‘tale’ can thus be defined as the metaphorical substitution of the signifier ‘justice’ in Alice’s unconscious and which she tries to translate the meaning by identifying with it. As Lacan observes, metaphor is not a matter of comparison but of identification, it is the structure of the signifier that enables the transfer of meaning (45). This explains why Alice is able to transfer the meaning of justice onto herself, for she symbolically identifies with the ambiguity of the signifier ‘justice’. This ambiguity corresponds to Alice’s primal repression, for, as Harari explains, primal repression “ensures the possibility of existence of the psyche apparatus” (77). The ambiguity of language has been said to reveal a mistake in which the unconscious resides, so that the ambiguity of the signifier ‘justice’ is significant in Alice’s unconscious. The ambiguity of the signifier ‘justice’ thus touches the essence of Alice’s subjectivity for both rely on a paradox. Alice’s symbolization is possible at the expense of her being and justice is performed at the expense of fairness. That is to say, justice in order to be fair must also be unfair, which results in the purely subjective meaning of justice. From this, the ambiguity in the word “justice” has been
repressed by Alice during the mouse’s tale because it unconsciously rememorates her the ambiguity of her symbolic signification, that is, the limitless possibilities that her unconscious represent. This limitless possibilities of being disrupts the subject’s desire to form a unique unicity and causes anxiety which explains why it has been repressed in the first place. The primal repression of Alice concerning her own paradox, due to her reliance on language for her individuation, is responsible for the possible constitution of Alice’s unconscious, in other words, her psyche.

Alice’s retroactive symbolization is also marked by the repression of her fictitious nature. When Alice tries to answer the fundamental question ‘What am I?’ the word is again lacking. Her repressed fictitious nature returns in the guise of the signifier “pack of cards” to reveal one of Alice’s significant experiences. When Alice is on her way to the White Rabbit house in Wonderland and becomes so big she does not have enough space, this makes Alice feel “uncomfortable” and thus “unhappy” (Carroll AAW 42). While being stuck in the White Rabbit’s house, Alice acknowledges her fictitious nature when she says: “…it’s rather curious, you know, this sort of life! I do wonder what can have happened to me! When I used to read fairy-tales, I fancied that kind of thing never happened, and now here I am in the middle of one! There ought to be a book written about me, that there ought!” (Carroll AAW 43). This fictitious character of her subjectivity is repressed and only comes back when she meets the Queen in the garden during the croquet games and says to herself: “they’re only a pack of cards, after all” (Carroll AAW 95), which raises the unconscious question, what then is Alice? Toward the end of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, when she addresses the Queen at the trial the signifier returns as “you’re are nothing but a pack of cards!” (Carroll AAW 145). The idea that Alice’s existence could be only fictitious triggers anxiety and breaks Alice’s fantasy, her dream, so that she wakes up. This disappearance of the dream represents Alice’s experience when she shrinks and describes it as follows: “‘What a curious feeling! …
‘I must be shutting up like a telescope.’” (Carroll AAW 18). This worries her for it makes her realise her possible death, which she expresses as “‘for it might end, you know… ‘in my going out altogether, like a candle. I wonder how I should be like then?’” (Carroll AAW 18). This image of the blown-out candle is significantly traumatic for, as Chaitin notes, “the subject can assign [it] no meaning” (Chaitin 198). This anxiety reappears in Through the Looking Glass when she meets Tweedledee and Tweedledum and the latter tells Alice she is only part of the Red King’s dream: “‘When you’re only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you’re not real.’ … ‘I am real!’ said Alice, and began to cry.” (Carroll TLG 71). This traumatic event, translated by Chaitin as the “uncomprehended discourse of the Other” (Chaitin 198), is retroactively significant and reveals the symptom of the subject, that is, “its true identity”, “its wants-to-say” (Miller “The Symptom: Knowledge, Meaning and the Real”), which Harari defines as an “articulation of signifiers” (228). That is, the articulation of signifiers forms the true identity of the subject and is called the symptom. It is not a retroactive process but it helps to understand the latent meaning of the repressed signifiers, for it acts instantaneously on the subject’s own signification process. As “the testimony of the action of repression” (Harari 230), the symptom “acts as a question about herself that she asks of the Other” (Chaitin 209). Alice’s questions, first about who she is (Carroll AAW 24), then what she is (Carroll AAW 63) and about the degree of her realness. The question, is it the Red King dreaming and Alice a part of it or is it Alice who is dreaming, corresponds to the questioning of Alice’s ontological truth, that is, her own meaningfulness as a subject.

This question about the subject’s origin and meaningfulness is answered by Freud’s sentence Wo es war, soll Ich werden (‘where it was I must become’), which Lacan translates as “Here, in the field of dream, you are at home” (Lacan 44). According to Lacan, the Ich used by Freud represents the network of signifiers, which dreams are made of and thus indicates where the subject originally was (Lacan 44). From this, Alice’s unanswered question
about who was dreaming, her or the Red King, indicates Carroll’s symptom which is translated by the sentence “Life, what is it but a dream?” (Carroll TLG 173). In other words, Carroll’s symptom is to point out to his readers that the subject’s true place is in dreams where creativity is at work. Carroll’s narrative, which points out to the mistakes and the lack of the symbolic Other by constantly playing with it, shows that the truth of the subject is somewhere else. In fact, as soon as the truth of the subject appears to the subject this truth present in the unconscious always disappears (Lacan 33). The fleeting nature of subjective truth is explained by Freud’s statement “whatever it is, I must go there” which Lacan clarifies as “…because, somewhere, this unconscious reveals itself” (Lacan 33). This somewhere corresponds to the network of signifiers, the Freudian Ich which is found in dreams. This explains why Freud claims that dreams are “the royal road to the unconscious activities of the mind” (Freud 604). Therefore, because language is lacking in nature and the process of symbolization is based on negation, that is the discard of signifiers even though they are all significant, the subject must always attempt to fill this lack, created by the discarded or repressed signifiers, with another signifier, as it is exemplified in the return of the repressed. As a subject, Carroll’s symptom of constantly pointing out that the truth of the subject is somewhere else, thus corresponds to what Lacan calls the sinthome. The latter is explained by Miller as follows: “his literary production allows him to relocate himself in the meaning he lacked” (qtd. in Chiesa 189), the individual’s own forming of Symbolic. Lewis Carroll, through Alice’s subjective story, has created his own symbolic order to compensate for his lack of subjective meaning as a subject. His narratives reach all individuals, for he addresses their unconscious subject, located in dreams.

In sum, the process of Alice’s own signification is temporal, more precisely, retroactive, for it shares the same mechanism as the action of meaning in a sentence. It corresponds to the process of repression, in which primal repression is fundamental to the
establishment of the forming process of the unconscious. Angela Hart is therefore correct when she states that Carroll demonstrates how order can be a good thing (Hart 435), this order here represents the structure which language brings to the subject’s forming process of subjectivity, its own signification. The interdependent relationship between language and subject is demonstrated in the fact that the subject needs language to individuate itself, to symbolize itself, but in order to produce its own meaning it must act onto language as it did to produce meaning in the first place so that language can only be a medium and nothing more. In other words, language is not a truthful medium, as it was said, but it can serve the subject to construct its own true signification, which leads to the last step to the subject’s own signification: identification.

**The Naming Process as Identification: The Most Subjective Metaphor**

As previously explained, Alice’s dream, on which the narrative is formed, represents all the repressed signifiers she encounters in her waking life but which she did not symbolize. The repressed signifiers are significant for Alice’s process of individuation, which relies on the symbolic Other, that is, “language as a structure [and] the symbolic order as the legal fabric of human culture...” (Chiesa 35). Marina Yaguello describes this phenomenon in relation to children and notes that the social norm which language carries goes against the creativity, the freedom and the playfulness in the relation the child entertains with language, because she must learn to speak like adults to fit in (30). Carroll, through the character of Alice, brings back the freedom, creativity and playfulness with language in the recurrent discussions with anthropomorphised animals or creatures constituting the narrative. One of the main discussions in Carroll’s novels is about the naming process in terms of identification, that is the function of nouns and proper names. According to Lacan, the metaphoric process is responsible for symbolization, which ultimately leads to identification. It is the second and
last process after metonymy, because “it is left to metaphor to fill the gap in being opened up by language, by knotting signifiers together” (Chaitin 54).

This metaphoric process is used by Alice for the naming of some of the animals and creatures of Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass dream worlds, which Fiona MacArthur explicates as coming from ordinary speech’s expression under the form of figures of speech. For example, in Wonderland, the Cheshire Cat which always grins, the Mad Hatter, the Mock Turtle, the Mad March Hare are ordinary speech expressions of the British language which Alice tries to understand in her own way, through a metaphoric process. Winfried Nöth, in his essay “Alice’s Adventures in Semiosis”, discusses the metaphorical function present in language. He introduces the concept of “Magical pseudo-remetaphorization”, which consists in “reviving a dead metaphor by reminding us of its original but now forgotten metaphorical motivation” (18). In order to illustrate this, he takes the example of the Through the Looking Glass world’s creatures Rocking-Horse-fly and Bread-and-butter-fly, which Carroll created from the already existing horse-fly and butterfly. In doing so, Carroll reminds his readers how signification is a metaphorical process. The creatures’ names, which here work as compound words, undergo a metaphorical process. The identification aspect of metaphor, as it was previously discussed, creates new meanings and a new identity (Chaitin 46). The creatures’ names as compound words create identification by giving an information about what they are physically. As Alice says when she sees Humpty Dumpty, a character with the shape of an egg, “…as if his name were written all over his face” (Carroll TLG 93).

The function of names as an indication of what it represents is discussed by Alice and the Gnat, in Through the Looking Glass: “What’s the use of their having names,’ the Gnat said, ‘if they won’t answer to them?’ ‘No use to them,’ said Alice; ‘but it’s useful to the people that names them, I suppose. If not, why do things have names at all?’” (Carroll TLG 51). This question is later answered in the discussion between Alice and Humpty Dumpty, in
which the latter rejects the meaningless character of Alice’s name: “It’s a stupid name enough!’ Humpty Dumpty interrupted impatiently. ‘What does it mean?’ ‘Must a name mean something? Alice asked doubtfully. ‘Of course it must,’ Humpty Dumpty said with a short laugh: ‘my name means the shape I am…With a name like yours, you might be any shape, almost.’” (Carroll TLG 94-5). Here, the name functions as a physical clue so that the creatures of *Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass* are identified in what Lacan calls the imaginary order. The stage in which identification and signification is made through shapes and form, resumed by the German term *Gestalt*.

As Fiona MacArthur explains, to Alice, the figures of speech ‘grin like a Cheshire cat’, ‘Mad like a Hatter’, ‘Mock Turtle Soup’ “are all semantically opaque utterances whose incongruities she attempts to resolve in very similar ways” (MacArthur 53). Alice tries to make sense of these similes, she tries to translate the meaning of the symbolic Other. She does so by bringing ordinary speech expression or words belonging to a class like mouse, lion, unicorn, gnat to life through anthropomorphised characters. The latter is defined by Boldrini, Nocentini and Ricci under the concept of antonomasia, that is, “turning small letters into capitalized letters and the name of a class into a proper noun” (47), so that it results in characters named The Mouse, The Lion, The Gnat, The Unicorn and many more. As Fiona MacArthur remarks, Alice translates the figures of speech by “…free[ing] a fixed element in a verbal string and allows it movement: she “embodies” it, generating an episodic, narrative and active construct” (MacArthur 54). In other words, Alice, in making a category into a proper noun and in personifying figures of speech, introjects her subjectivity into language, the symbolic Other. This introjection corresponds to the metaphoric process and permits the formation of new meanings and identity. As Lacan says, the verb ‘to be’ can be compared to the “creative spark of metaphor” (qtd. in Chaitin 108), that is, “the ‘being’… which appears in a lightning moment in the void of the verb ‘to be’” (qtd. in Chaitin 108). In doing so, Carroll
creates this creative spark by introjecting subjectivity, that is, bringing language to life, for a short moment, the moment of a dream. That is, he demonstrates the important role of subjectivity into language for the subject’s own signification, its identification.

The metaphoric process particularises the symbolic Other to the extreme which implies that the use of metaphor for names does not only function as a clue, but as a mark of subjectivity. According to Lacan, the metaphor is the function of predication (46) which he defines as aporetic for it “both separates subjects from their predicates (attributes) and enables them to acquire new ones” (46). That is, predication is aporetic due to “the lack of self-identity of the things in a world of movement and change” (Chaitin 135). This corresponds to the incessant sliding of meaning during the process of signification which Boldrini, Nocentini and Ricci discussed through the concept of proper names in Carroll’s narrative. They argue that proper names in Carroll’s novels represent “the obsessive pursuit of the remotivation of the sign” (46), for it must give an information. Boldrini, Nocentini and Ricci conclude that proper names in Carroll’s novels “seem[] to be a prerogative of the ‘surface’ world…” (47), like the slippage of meaning which can only caress the surface of the being because it always ends up vanishing. This process of signification is illustrated through the incessant substitution of Alice’s name into another signifier, which indicates her process of signification while representing the vanishing aspect, the ungraspable subjective truth. That is, the substitution of Alice’s name represents her identification through language. As Humpty Dumpty says, Alice’s name is meaningless for it gives no information.

Alice’s name as meaningless is due to the incomplete process of her symbolization, responsible for undermining her sense of self. Carroll represents the process of Alice’s symbolization gradually. Alice’s symbolization starts shortly after her arrival in Wonderland, she undergoes a change of size several times, resulting in the questioning of her own identity: “But if I’m not the same, the next question is, Who in the world am I?” (Carroll AAW 24).
Here, Alice’s loss of sense of self is characterized by her physical change, so that Alice’s individuation is made through what Lacan calls the imaginary order. The imaginary order is defined as the first step for the formation of the subject in which identification is made through shapes and forms, that is Gestalt, which Lacan uses every time he mentions the imaginary order. This affects Alice’s sense of self for she does not respond to her name anymore. This phenomenon is explained by Chaitin’s discussion on “the fragmentation of the names into its constituent letters” (199) caused by a “traumatic event” (199). Here, Alice’s change of size is the traumatic event responsible for Alice’s fragmented name into “a signifier like any other” (Chaitin 200), that is, a signifier before the process of signification, which must reattach itself to another signifying chain to “suture the hole over” (Chaitin 200). In other words, Alice’s meaningless name undergoes “pure nomination… which produces that incessant sliding of meaning characteristic of differential linearity” (Chaitin 54).

This is illustrated when Alice is wondering if she has been changed into other little girls she knows: Ada and Mabel. Both names are signifiers which correspond to the fragmented representation of Alice’s name into what Lacan calls the double spectrum of a word through its vowels and consonants (Chaitin 18). The vowels [a], [e] and the consonants [l] are part of Alice’s name as fragmented letters. The second episode of Alice’s individuation takes place during her encounter with The Pigeon, which first calls her a serpent. This signifier contains the consonant [s] and when Alice answers to The Pigeon she identify herself as a little girl, so that the vowel [i] appears. This indicates that Alice is slowly regaining her identity through the reattaching altogether of the letter of her name. Mario Del Ninno, in his essay “Naked, Raw Alice”, describes this regaining of identity through Alice’s refusal to eat raw eggs. He describes this act as “giv[ing] up the state of nature and recognis[ing] herself as a civil being, by refusing the raw” (Del Ninno 40). This illustrate the evolution of Alice’s individuation from imaginary identification into symbolic one, that is, as a cultural being, a
unique individual. In the next episode of the narrative she uses her name to present herself to the Queen: “‘My name is Alice, so please your Majesty’” (Carroll AAW 95), which indicates her symbolic identification. As Lacan argues, “the relation of the subject to predicate, that is identification, …. [is] a function in the logical and mathematical sense of the term” (Chaitin 108-9). Carroll illustrates this mathematical and logical identification when Alice meets The Unicorn, in *Through the Looking Glass*. The latter addresses Alice under the general signifier ‘little girls’: “I always thought they were fabulous monsters!’…. ‘Is it alive?’” (Carroll TLG 120) and Alice replies: “Do you know, I always thought Unicorns were fabulous monsters, too! I never saw one alive before!’ ‘Well, now that we have seen each other’, said the Unicorn, ‘if you believe in me I’ll believe in you. Is that a bargain?’” (Carroll TLG 120), but then Alice is called “Monster” (Carroll TLG 121). Here Alice’s name is substituted into the signifier ‘monster’ for the logical reason that if the Unicorn is a fabulous monster because Alice never saw one alive and the same applied to Alice from the Unicorn’s perspective, if both are alive they are not fabulous anymore. Negating the signifier ‘fabulous’ to the identification of the name, leaves the signifier ‘monster’. Alice’s name being meaningless in *Through the Looking Glass* and *Wonderland*, she is left to be identified as a monster. That is why, names must refer to a fixed meaning, they must refer to what Lacan calls the letter, that is “[the] exemption from the rule of the endless circulation of meaning which … thus [is] not subject to the play of differences of the symbolic system” (Chaitin 145).

Carroll discusses the identifying function of names when Alice enters the wood of no name, a place where the naming process is impossible, so that Alice is unable to name things with signifiers: “‘after being so hot, to get into the – into the – into what?’ she went on rather surprised to not being able to think of the word” (Carroll TLG 56). In this place Alice’s own name is also absent and she only remembers the letter L: “L, I know it begins with L!” (Carroll TLG 56). Alice’s name being only a letter permits Alice to escape the differential and
oppositional system of the symbolic Other. This is illustrated by her encounter with the Fawn, which is not afraid of Alice for it, too, has forgotten its name. Names stand for the subject’s identity or what Lacan calls unitary traits, so that when Alice forgets her name she forgets her identity and the same applies for The Fawn. Carroll, by creating a place in which names are erased, removes Humpty Dumpty’s rule that names must mean something and shows that names are the most particularized form of signification in language, to the extreme that it “eludes expression” (Chaitin 144). The function of the letter L in Alice’s name represents this absence of expression, for it represents Alice’s identification through this letter as “a unit in its very uniqueness, being by nature symbol only of an absence” (qtd in Chaitin 200). This absence is the unconscious, which as it was said in the beginning, reveals a truth about the subject for it unveils something about the subject: its uniqueness. The name represents the limit of the limitless possible beings which Alice could be during her individuation. This limit is the metaphor of the subject, its identity, which permits to sealing of the process of signification, and allows the proper individuation of the subject. In other words, by identifying with its name “the subject realizes that particularity is necessary if there is to be universality, it is here that the particular turns into the universal” (Chiesa 191).

**Conclusion**

This thesis has focused on the interdependent relationship between language and subject which Carroll shows through his novels, recounting the story of Alice’s individuation through her dream worlds. For this study, Lacan’s theory, which incorporates linguistic values into psychoanalysis, has been used to explain the notion of the unconscious, which plays a major role in the constitution of subjectivity and which is necessary to explore Carroll’s novels, in which he offers a glimpse of Alice’s unconscious.
Alice’s forming process of subjectivity has first been discussed in terms of the origin of the unconscious. It has been demonstrated that the unconscious resides in the mistake present in language, due to the latter lack of truthfulness in representing the subject. This lack has been said to affect the subject, due to the interdependent relationship between language and subject, which results in the subject’s desire, its wants-to-be. Then, the subject’s desire to reach its own signification through language, leading to its individuation as a unique being, has been discussed in terms of a retroactive process, called repression, in which the symptom appears as the subject’s true identity. Finally, the last step of individuation has been discussed through the metaphorical process of signification, more particularly, the naming process. This has been said to represent the last step for the subject’s individuation, for the subject realises the importance of the little part, that is the subject, onto the bigger part, the universality of language, to produce signification. In other words, language is a medium to shape our world, but it should not be a mean that would generate complete alienation to ourselves.

Carroll’s writing offers this possibility of using language as a medium, in which Alice’s story recounts the story of all the individuals, that is, it reveals the existence of the unconscious, which, as it was said, is similar to Lacan’s dictum: “the unconscious is structured like a language”. In doing so, Carroll brings subjectivity forward and invites his readers to acknowledge their own subjectivity. This allows the reader to become aware of the alienation produced by language. In sum, Carroll’s writing about subjectivity as being located always somewhere else, that is in dreams, in the unconscious, represents Carroll’s greatness for being able to create his own symbolic Other, his own system of language, always renewing itself through creativity.
Work Cited


