Bachelor’s thesis
Clothes Trading and Issue Ownership, a Strategic Countermove

A case study about Hungary; Fidesz’s intrusion into the Far-right

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Preface

This study was managed under stressful circumstances with network connection errors, and the sacrifice of May’s beautiful sunshine.

I wish to thank my beloved mother, who granted me a roof over my head while I was writing this thesis.

And to my old friend and cousin Harald, the only sunshine I could ever wish for.

A special thanks to my tutor Kjetil who has helped me to engage deeper in the subject and guided me through the world of populist literature...a rather depressing world.

Abstract:
This research touches the basics of a clothes-trading process. The process occurs as an outside-party is being politically absorbed by a mainstream party which aim is to oust the smaller party from the electoral arena. The outside-party would ensure survival by dismiss its policy dimension, thus moving towards an opposite strategic direction away from the incoming mainstream party. The toolkit is taking from the PSO-theory by Bonnie M. Meguid (2008) in order to describe the clothes-trading process by each step as a party strategy. It is a defeat fire with fire type of conflict, with the end not yet discovered, but assumed to be a total exchange between the parties’ issue ownership. So far it is too early to predict the outcome. Further studies have to be made on the future elections in order to elaborate the clothes-trading process more in detail. But the research has set the basics of how and why such a process would occur.

Keywords: Party strategies, PSO-theory, Fidesz, Jobbik, far-right, clothes trading

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Addressing the subject

Around the years of the post-materialist era (1960’s / 70’s), Europe would face an altering of its traditional political cleavages. No longer were they based on solely socio-economic issues, but a new division came to run in parallel with the older one. The old division be the traditional set up of interests reflected by the class struggle: collectivism vs. individualism; labour rights vs. business favoring etc. The new division brought forth the contemporary issues regarding environmentalism, feminism and libertarianism on the left, and conservative national value-
based policies on the right. This led to a rise of outside- and niche-parties, parties that are single-issue based. The Greens calling for actions towards the environment, and the national-conservative parties calling for a preservation of family values, national identities being threatened by migration etc, ‘the new left’ versus ‘the new right’.

With the rise of ‘outside’ parties calling for ‘inhumane’ politics (as the public notion recognizes it)- the traditional established parties faced a challenge: how would they encounter them?

Various examples have sprung up as the years passed. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats would face a tremendous resistance by the other parties as they invoked a cordon sanitaire against them- meaning sanitary zone in French, and is meant to build a barrier between oneself and the threat. In Denmark, at the time of writing, one can observe of the Social Democrats and the Danish People’s Party (the Danish equivalent to the Sweden Democrats) are open for negotiations between them. The Liberals and Christian Democrats in Sweden is about to do the same with the Sweden Democrats.

In Hungary, different strategies were made. The well-established party Fidesz enjoyed a greatly increased popularity among the Hungarian voters after the failures of the center-left socialist coalition (MSZP and SZDSZ). The 2006 incident followed up by the 2008 economic crisis left voters disappointed at the government and called for a change. Henceforth, Fidesz would gain a two-third representation into the National Assembly (the Hungarian Parliament) and Jobbik would also increase tremendously, taking the role as Fidesz’s greatest opposition. Victor Orbán, president of Fidesz and the Hungarian prime-minister would transform a once stable party system with shifting governments into a single-party system, with a ultra-nationalist party as almost the only oppositional force. Differently from the strategies made by the Swedish or Danish mainstream parties, Fidesz would fully acknowledge the policies of Jobbik and even steal many of them to present them in a more ‘moderate’ way. As Jobbik learned that they would not stand a chance against Fidesz in a competition for their own policies, they adopted a divergent strategy to move closer to the center. This is to be the goal for the study to highlight and learn about a ‘clothes-trading’ strategy, a process that might have started to occur in Hungary between Fidesz and Jobbik.

1.2 Issue

To what extent has a clothes-trading process begun between Fidesz and Jobbik?
1.3 Purpose

The achievements this study is set to make is to define a ‘clothes-trading’ strategy made by Jobbik as a counter-move against Fidesz’s ‘clothes-stealing’ strategy. The goal is to provide an understanding about the concepts of the ‘clothes-trading’ and how it happened between the Hungarian parties Fidesz and Jobbik. The study will adopt the terminology from Meguid’s PSO-theory, to grant the research a pattern of party strategies. The purpose is to begin a development of an alternative perspective regarding Fidesz’s movements towards the far-right, and Jobbik’s movements towards the center.

1.4 Demarcation

The study will not tend to explain a whole scenario about the outcome of ‘clothes-trading’ strategies since the clothes-trading progress has nearly just begun (according to the thesis). It will solely focus to bring forth some of the main concepts of the strategy and counter-strategy between the two parties, and try to define the strategies as ‘clothes-trading’- a process which Jobbik started with Fidesz growing within the right of the political scale and starting to adopt many of Jobbik’s core policies.

1.5 General definition

For the study to be as clear with its terminology as possible, this part will aim to unbox and present the broader terms that are used in order to adapt them to the analysis.

1.5.1 Established traditional parties

These parties are also called mainstream parties and are the main political players in the current electoral competition of a state. These may vary between states as well as states differ in ideology and traditional electoral competitors. The most accurate category to systematize them in per ideology is center-left and center-right, meaning for example; Social Democrats versus Christian-Democrats or classic liberal parties. A more general definition of being mainstream or established is a party that has a stable representation in the parliament, meaning a traditional set of voters, a common player in the electoral arena and is traditionally representing and participating in the parliament.
1.5.2 Niche (Single-issue) parties

The niche-parties as one can observe differ as much in ideology between themselves as any other established party. Although, they all share a bond of a political core to set their common nature. According to Bonnie M. Meguid (2005) niche-parties are all small parties at start, bringing an atypical political matter (single-issue) to the traditional discourse, a matter which is not yet recognized in the electoral competition between the well-established parties. Some relevant examples of such politics originating from niche-parties are environment, gender equality (feminism) and ethnotorrialism (Scotland, Flanders, Catalonia).

1.5.3 Outside parties

Outside parties share similar aspects as the niche-parties, although they are not typically bound to a single issue. Outside parties are instead based on reactions, being founded when established parties do not fulfill the public demands. Taking the example of migration. When the public interests is to reduce migration due to that it followed by socio-economic impairments, whilst the ruling parties tend not to cohere with the public, outside parties such as the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s party or the Austrian Freedom Party rises to answer to- and carry out the public’s interests to the electoral arena. Mostly, outside parties tend to have a more structured agenda than niche-parties, including a broader spectrum of policies rather than a specific issue (Stanley, 2008). They are players of socio-economic issues that is related to migration (to follow up on the example) and in Europe there is a political fashion of outside parties to call for an enhancement of a traditional value system and national identity. The Sweden Democrats present an ultimatum based on a value system: are we going to prioritize our swedish elders and swedish homeless, or migrants; is it our duty to make sure that migrants from another culture than our own is enjoying the swedish welfare?

The study will consider Jobbik as an outside-party rather than a niche-party due to its wider set of policies and has a wider insight in political matters, while niche-parties are, as mentioned, single-issue based parties.

1.5.4 Fidesz and Jobbik

Fidesz will be seen as a mainstream party because it has been established in the National Assembly since the early 90’s with a stable voter-rate and political support. Hence, it is an
experienced player in the political arena, and have held majority in the parliament, been acting as an opposition in it, thus having greater knowledge of being a governing force and an oppositional force.

Jobbik is considered as an outside-party due the fact that it is rather newly established as a political player with a representative role in the parliament. Prior to the 2010 election, Jobbik was one of the biggest non-representative parties, but lacked the vital voters to be participating in the National Assembly. It is also a party based of non-traditional policies, meaning that it has challenged the traditional cleavage-based politics: center-left and center-right rivalness about socio-economic issues, since the party brought nationalist values and national identity-politics to the competitive stage (politics regarding Hungarians, Hungarian corporations, Hungarian produce, Hungarian workers etc.).

1.5.5 Clothes stealing & trading

These two strategies are connected to one another to a certain extent. Clothes-stealing can be interpreted according to Meguid (2005, 2008) as a party that is seeking to replace another party’s policy-dimension and ownership of the its issue. The clothes-stealing as a political or scientific term is very limited, and if it is used at all it can be more commonly found in media or non-scientific articles. Since the clothes-trading strategy process is tied to it, the study is aware that the vague acknowledgement of clothes-stealing might have a negative affection the definition of clothes-trading as well. A more developed explanation of the clothes-trading strategy will be presented in the analysis, but to give a brief introduction: the clothes-trading strategy is circled around its complex concepts. It shares similar aspects and goals of ‘clothes-stealing’ strategies but covers more of the PSO-terminology apparatus, which in first sight can be confusing and hard to clarify. In short, the concept of clothes-trading is the process of two rival parties adopting clothes-stealing strategies against each other, with the goal to replace the rival party’s former position in the traditional political scale (left, center, right). What makes the clothes-trading strategy such a complex phenomena are the circumstances, which are mostly based on the behaviour of the electorate. The voters need to be flexible. The long-term alignment has to be undermined to the point that the voter would find itself attractive to different parties and cast its ballot rationally and according to how it currently is comprehending the political situation- meaning that it would vote according to the
circumstances and contemporary issues and not by loyalty. What follows may result in different
party commitments per election. This might improve the chances for the parties to move more
freely within the political scale without any greater risks of voter-losses, although these losses
will be more based on if the party addresses the right issue to what the electorate is calling for.
This is an underlying circumstance for the clothes-trading process to take place. As mentioned,
the strategy is tied to the goals of the clothes-stealing strategy: to adopt another party’s policy-
dimension of its issue. With the framework of the PSO-theory and the usage of its terminology
apparatus, the study will seek to explain the pattern of clothes-trading.

Chapter 2: Theory & Theoretical framework
Bonnie M. Meguid (2008); Position, Salience & Ownership

This theory is specifically designed to structure an analysis about party behaviour in the arena
of electoral competition. It applies to niche-parties versus mainstream parties and how they
interact with the presence of one-another. The tools given by the design enables the study to
collect data from the processes of three different methods parties are using in order to gain
electoral support from the voters in the political competition. These methods are defined as
strategic counteracts and will be applied to Fidesz’s political competition against Jobbik. In
order to get a wider picture of observation regarding niche-parties’ areal of mobilization in the
electoral competition arena, Bonnie M. Meguid (2008) argues that it is of a necessity to witness
the counter movement of the of the established traditional parties. This is done by POS-theory
(Position, Salience & Ownership Theory) which provides a narrative to study regarding how
well-established parties put up strategic counter-moves against rising niche-parties, that are
rejecting the prominent mainstream debates to instead focus on new matters which challenges
the traditional electoral competition. These new matters as alien to the electoral competition,
set the basis of niche-party success, seeming attractive for voters since they are technically
symbolising: we are not going to give in to the mainstream competition based on traditional
ideologies, we are here to open up new issues to debate and hence challenge the left-right
division. This changes the methods on how established parties traditionally encounter political
rivals. The common methods and tools used are, according to Meguid (2008; 24) the based on
three primary conditions. The first one is regarding how the party successes in convincing the
voters that their issue is relevant, important- that it is Salience. Secondly, how does the party
position itself towards this issue, what is the ideological characterization of the party’s solution
to the issue (may it be decrease och increase taxes). Thirdly, and last, that the party is recognized as the rightful owner of that position towards the salient issue (Social Democrats and increased taxes to reduce poverty and give a universal acceptable standard of a living via an enhanced welfare-system). These criterias are the basics of mainstream parties’ success in the electoral competition. Meguid argues further that:

If any of these conditions fails to hold – if the party’s issue dimension is considered irrelevant, its issue position is unappealing, or the party lacks credibility on that issue position – the voter will not support the party on the basis of that issue.
(Meguid, 2008; 24)

With the rise of a niche-party presence, that is not competing but rather challenging the centre-left/right division, mainstream parties find themselves in a position of hardship by using the same methods and tools to encounter the new issues addressed, since they are not yet established in the traditional political discourse. Henceforth the mainstream parties need to change their strategy to encounter niche-parties in the electoral competition. This is a dilemma which has been a subject for many political scientists to study to what extent mainstream parties changes their approach and their traditional agenda in order to compete more effectively against niche-parties. The transformation goes through three phases as Meguid (2008) refers as Altering Party Position, Altering Issue Salience and Altering Issue Ownership - and are the methods to set up strategic encounters against niche-parties. By first altering the party position, mainstream parties move closer to policy positions characterizing the mainstream competitors (policy convergence) or move farther away from them (policy divergence) (Meguid, 2008; 24). Since each party’s set of supporters vote for them in the belief that the party is speaking to the most extent of their political interests and values, mainstream parties can attract voters who support the competitive party to itself through policy convergence. This is a tactic to increase their chances to gain voters from either the niche-party or other mainstream parties. Secondly, voters are politically rational, and are set to support a party which addresses the most relevant issue regarding the current state of the political society. That follows that parties can alter the salience of issues to fit according to what the voters recognize as the most important one, may it be gender equality, migration or environmental matters for example. This could be observed to the characteristics of every election which are changing with the most current topic of debate. The parties observes this and make rational political choices to adapt their party agenda according to what the voters are currently asking for. Almost like the range of selection of
goods that are being requested in the market by consumers. Niche-parties, that are mostly single-issue based (as mainstream parties tends to address multiple political issues), have the most weakness in this matter. If multiple mainstream parties choses to adapt themselves closer to the issue being addressed by the niche-party- it can be easily absorbed and consumed by the established ones. Similar outcome can be seen in the opposite of the latter. Since the niche-party is only a player within the dimension of its issue, a downgrade of the salience of that issue will end in a loss of party-supporters. Thirdly there is the altering of ownership of a certain issue. Long has left-winged parties been characterized to oppose a reduced welfare-system, conservative liberal parties to be more characterized as to value individual freedom of choice and corporations. The issues might be presented as the left’s ownership of collective aspects, poverty and solidarity, whilst the conservatives owns issues regarding family structure and national basic values such as religion etc. Once a mainstream party claims an issue that is being characterized to a niche-party, it is up the mainstream party to convince the voters that it is the best political choice to make to address that issue. Then again, similar to the other methods, the voters gravitate away from the niche-party to the more established one.

2.1 The tool kit of party strategies

The dismissive, accommodative and adversarial strategy

In parallel with the PSO-theory, mainstream parties set up strategies to follow up on it, and thus further the understanding how they converge or diverge themselves to a niche-party issue. One tool is to convince the voters that the niche-party issue simply is not relevant or important by neglecting it. This is defined by Meguid (2008) as the dismissive strategy. The mainstream party refuses to address the issue either because it finds the issue not important enough or that it is too alien, hence it is too difficult for the mainstream party to acknowledge the issue. If this success, the obvious conclusion is that the niche-party will not gain electoral support. This run in parallel whether a mainstream party acknowledge or ignore the salience of the niche-party issue, rather than competing about the ownership of it. This leads to the strategy where a mainstream party actually does acknowledge the salience of the niche-party issue. The results by this strategy, also referred as the accommodative strategy (Bonnie M. Meguid, 2008), are creating a platform of choice between parties taking a similar stance to the issue. The voters are then set to choose whether to follow up on either the niche-party or the mainstream party,
a strategy that is meant to drain political support from the niche-party that has more to lose since it is a political player solely to that particular issue. The underlying competition within this strategy is the political fight to achieve the legitimate ownership of the issue, with the goal to oust the niche-party from the ownership-competition, thus oust it from the electoral competition. The most plausible outcome by the accommodative strategy is that voters decide to support the mainstream copy of the issue. Meguid (2008) argues that it is due to the greater legislative experience possessed by the mainstream party, that has been within the process of law-making and decision-making far longer that the niche-party. Voters that acknowledge the new issue as important want to see an action towards it and thus are more likely to support the well-established mainstream party.

The adversarial strategy share one main aspect with the accommodative one: the boost of issue salience (Bonnie M. Meguid, 2008). But in the differ with the earlier strategy which goal is to converge an agenda towards a new issue, the adversarial strategy aims to diverge from it. This plays out by that the mainstream party counter-positions itself against the niche-party’s position towards the issue. A political hostility. Since a political party tries to assimilate itself as close as it can with its primary voters, the party functions by their interests and tries to reflect them to the greatest extent possible. When a mainstream party challenges this niche-party issue by taking a diverge position towards it (similar to cordon sanitaire) the ownership of the issue is greatly enhanced for the niche-party, thus increasing its political support by voters who sympathize with the issue. This could be observed in the Swedish political system and serve as an explanatory pattern regarding the tremendous increase of political support for the Sweden Democrats as the mainstream parties took a hostile position against the party’s main issue, leaving voters who also saw the migration (a head issue for the Sweden Democrats) as a threat to the socio-economic system (or simply to the culture).

2.1.1 Theoretical relevance

Although Meguid talks about niche-parties in her PSO-theory, the study will focus on outside-parties, but with the same atypical attributes as a player in the competitive arena. Jobbik is not a niche-party (as mentioned in the definition section) since the party is not single-issue based, but has a wider set of issues. The study will implement the Convergent and Divergent strategy on the strategy and counter-strategy between Fidesz and Jobbik. It will be assumed that the parties have adopted both strategies, but for different reasons and ment outcomes. Fidesz has used the convergent strategy to move closer to Jobbik and taking a position farther into the
right-wing scale. It also used the divergent strategy to move away from center, undermining its former liberal-conservative issue. The end was to oust Jobbik for the electoral competition and become the sole party in the right-political scale. The right-conservative and nationalist issues have been deemed salient to the voters after 2006 and 2008 when the socialist coalition ‘failed’ to govern the state. So, the general public tended to move from the left to the right- where now the biggest collection of voters exists, which Fidesz is ought to use to prolong its role as a ruling party by converging closer to them and the issues that attract them.

Chapter 3: Earlier research and theoretical starting points

This section explores the earlier research and theoretical starting points. In addition to Meguid’s PSO-theory, the research will be developed by the notions of each part of this chapter. Panebianco (1988) will set the basics of party organisation and development, thus giving the research a base of understanding how parties develop ideological reflections and alter these
according to internal or external influences (sponsors or charismatic leaders). Then different types of party models will review from Peter Mair (1997). These models are setting up the basics of a party system. This is followed by Dalton (1996) description of cleavage-based politics, and it functions as an explanatory background to the rise of the ‘new left’ and the ‘new right’ like Greenish parties and Nationalist-conservative parties. That section is ended with a minor awareness that CEE (Central East European) post-communist states might not share the same history of the emergence of cleavage-based politics (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 2009). Although, the rise of the ‘new left / new right’ is an important part to give a certain understanding about the contemporary rise of nationalist-conservative outside-parties and is connected with Meguid’s explanation of niche-parties, since both types are atypical in the traditional competition. Ultimately, the populist ideology will be addressed (Stanley, 2008). Because of that the general public is recalling the two parties as practitioners of populism, the study will unbox that statement in order to be able to objectively address them as such as well, and in addition give a general understanding of what populism means. Although the study will mainly use the PSO-theory as a framework, the earlier research

2.3. Party organisation development

With the theory presented, the study will now aim to amalgamate literature of how parties organise and establish themselves into the electoral environment (which has an impact to the process) (Panebianco, 1988). The party organisation evolves in its structure dynamically according to modifying external factors of the electoral arena. In order to make the process of evolvement more transparent and observable there are two main historical essentialities to be looked at. Panebianco (1988) claims that a party’s organisation is path-dependent, meaning that its origin could have a major impact to the structure even decades later. The first one is recalled as the genetic model and it follows by institutionalization.

2.4. The genetic model

This model could provide the definition of a party’s genetic characteristics, the internal heritage in a party from its past structure to its present. This takes mostly a formation to be historical decisions made by historical party leaders regarding administration and structure. It is a complex study, and relies mostly on facts and data collected by political historians rather than political thinkers (Panebianco, 1988).

To define the party’s genetic characteristics- three factors plays a crucial role:
1. Organisation construction, diffusion or penetration
2. External sponsorship
3. Initially charismatic leadership.

How a party develops its organizing structure is depending on territorial diffusion and/or territorial penetration. Territorial diffusion is explained as when ‘development results from spontaneous germination: local elites construct party associations which are later only later integrated into a national organization’ (Panebianco, 1988). It portrays how a party develops through an emerging of associations from different parts of the country.

When the center has a main affection on the periphery, may it be direct access of controlling it, stimulating it and direct its development it is recalled as territorial penetration. This is set to politically penetrate regions where party associations are not yet existing, and establish such associations there. Parties that are founded through territorial diffusion tends to face a challenge in internal competition for party leadership, since the party consists of multiple associations which are all governed by their own leader- causing a longer and more complex process in the leadership formation. Parties that are mostly associated with territorial diffusion tends to be center / center-left. Since these parties are more ideology based on collectivism which are seen in i.e labour unions or other groups within the civil society.

External sponsors are often institutions working as the party’s ‘political arm’ (Panebianco, 1988: 51). The external sponsor is a source of legitimization of party leadership, and causes an indirect support for the party by the loyalties to the sponsor.

A charismatic leadership depends whether the party is a vessel of a particular leader. This has an affection on party development to the degree it was founded by a charismatic leader who claimed that it represented the true nature of the party, thus forming a symbolism for the party to represent along the way its development, and acts as the fundamental pillar for the party’s existence; without a constant reference to its former leaders, the party loses its fundamental origin. Panebianco (1988) juxtapositions fascist and communist parties (National Socialist Party in Germany, the Italian Fascist Party and the Communist party under Stalin), that are all mostly dependent on a charismatic leader, and situational-charisma which could be found in liberal states by Churchill and Roosevelt. Historical charismatic leaders as Hitler, Stalin or Mussolini could bend and alter the key positions of their parties to whatever extent they wanted. Whilst semi-charismatic leaders have a greater framework to act within, since they are representing a party which was founded by multiple factors- which leads them to bargain to a
large extent. Regarding charisma, the leader plays a key role in leading the party to a certain direction. It is has task that includes the selection and gathering of values which the party is going to represent, and it is mostly done by its definition of an ideology. During a party’s institutionalization phase, the party is incorporating its founders political values, aims and goals. This process is a complex one, and adherents to the survival of the party. To ensure a preservation and survival, the party has to shape the party’s interests according to its elites and supporters, and implement a structure of ‘selective incentives’ - an internal system that allows members to climb to ‘prestigious positions’ and ‘career possibilities’ (Panebianco, 1988: 54). These frames for party development could be explaining Orbán’s long lasting role as a leader of Fidesz. First of all, the party along with its characteristics and values was founded by him. Secondly, the party followed as he went from the center to the political right, adopted more conservative values and interests- which came to make the base of the party’s new set of policies. As Fidesz became established in the political right, intellectuals and traditional right-wing politicians saw an opportunity in Fidesz. These were the remaining actors within the right after the socialist coalition took power in the late 90’s. Fidesz offered them a new political career and to rebuild the political right’s strength once again. Orbán would now find himself with a stronger set of political members who had been well-established in the right political scale, and was able to legitimize his leadership and strengthen a conservative agenda since the intellectuals and right-wing politicians would see the opportunity with Fidesz- that was tightly connected with the rule of Orbán.

2.4 Party Organisations and Party Systems

To continue the topic of party development, Peter Mair (1997) argues that when a new party type is developed, it is followed, as a reaction, by another new party type being developed.

2.4.1 Mass parties

The mass party model is a platform that is based on specific social groups, in which between them, the political competition and conflict take place. The political parties are but political agents as dimensions where these social well-defined groups are participating in policy-making. The parties are the medium that transfers the political and social interests and demands between the groups and the state. Each group has its own political interests which is reflected in its party’s agenda. The individual is then linked by a party and the state through these groups.
Here party mobilization is the key in the electoral competition. That the party will aim to gather those who are within its social constituency, and ensure their commitment.

The mass party model occurred as the societies became further industrial advanced and established the cleavage between ‘working-class’ and the ‘business-owners’ (Mair, 1997). The mass parties used ‘class’ consciousness in order to gain votes from their type of groups. The involvement of politics is tightly connected to the individual’s social group. Labour unions and other interests groups became the main tools for the mass parties to constantly engage the individual in the political debates and policy-making.

2.4.2 Catch-all parties

When the mass consciousness of a certain collective identity became less accurate due to a further developed society, the mass parties had harder to identify the social groups in order to commit them, and henceforth had to rethink their party organisation. It was thus harder to reassure long-time alignment by the voters. The development of the welfare state also undermined the collective identity as it tended to serve according to the interest of everybody. Also, party leaders was granted a broader platform of communication between them and the people as a whole by mass media. Henceforth, the politics became less dependent of class ideology, and focused more on the electorate as a whole, making every party to talk for the whole electorate’s political interests (Mair, 1997).

2.4.3 Cartel-parties

Cartel-parties are in the most definition of the party system of Sweden, where a collusion of parties merges into political blocs. These parties within their bloc has an ideological agreement of certain goals, values and political interests. In Sweden, the party system it built by two blocs as center-left and the center-right. The center-left parties are similar to the degree that if one of the bloc’s parties win a majority, the others will gain from that- since they all share a political plan of the society’s economic structure (even though they enter the electoral arena as individual parties, hence being each other’s competitors). Mair (1997) claims that parties such as cartel-parties are most likely to spring up in countries such as those of northern Europe, for the reason that these states have a long tradition of funding its political parties. Whilst the United Kingdom, where state support are generally limited, cartel-parties would not benefit from that typical party system. Also, in the first mentioned states, it has been a long tradition
of mutual pluralism and inter-party cooperation, thus making the platform easier for cartel-parties to emerge.

The case relevancy regarding these sections is that Hungary would tend to stand between the mass-party and the cartel-party model. Prior to the 2010 election, Hungary would have coalitions within both left and right, with parties that share a common ideological system of values and the same end, a party system based on the cartel-model. But the argumentation that the Hungarian party system is also mix with the Catch-all model, is that Fidesz is trying to broaden its electorate and constituency to the far-right. Jobbik is also becoming more and more characterized as a catch-all party since it also trying to move from a specific identified electorate to a more conservative ‘traditional’ one based voters of different classes, education, gender and minorities. Prior to the 2010 election, the Jobbik agenda was mainly affiliated with ‘white-middle aged Hungarian men’. The Catch-all model might be cohered with the Cartel-model since a cartel of a common ideology with aim for a catch-all basis. But with the case of Hungary, both Fidesz and Jobbik are making their progression without any further involvement with another sympatic party. Although Fidesz is ruling in a coalition with the Christian Democrat KDNP, the party could plausibly direct whatever political move it wished without any bigger loss since Fidesz alone gained 227 seats in 2010, when KDNP got 36 seats- an amount that was reduced by a half the following elections (Hungarian election statistics 2010, 2014, 2018). In practical for this study it gives an underlying notion regarding the contemporary changes in the Hungarian party system. These changes being as mentioned- from a stable party system with shifting governments, a cartel-model system based on coalitions, to a single-party system under a shifting cartel-model being replaced by a catch-all model.

2.5 Cleavage-based politics

As parties establish themselves in the electoral arena, they are set up in a competition for political support and votes. The main definition of a functioning democracy is that of an allowance of parties freely participate in this competitive arena. As Dalton (1996) claims: ‘Elections crystallize the political interests in a society and provide a mechanism for the public to decide between political opinions.’ This has lead to social and political cleavages. Historically, these cleavages were based on class and religion, measuring different interests, opinions and values to be reflected in the electoral competition. Both class and religious cleavages were the traditional rifts between societies. Class cleavages are as common known a
competition of interests between the ‘working class’ and the ‘capital owners’. Weber introduced in his work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905) the differences between societies according to their religious branches. Catholic societies would tend to think more collectively, where the welfare was based on the family and the community. This would produce a more socialist society. In the meanwhile, societies of Protestantism would highlight the individual and the freedom of choice. It meant that a protestant would strive to assure wealth and success for itself thus minimizing the need of collective welfare, instead, he or she would build up their own capital to ensure his/her own survival. In the contrasts to that, Catholics cared more for the community, and saw a strength in having a collective thinking. If one would fall behind, the others would help. The individuals sacrificed an individual economic development by aiming to strengthen the collective. These historical cleavages has been challenged by a new set of interests; new politics that do not focus on socio-economy distribution, but issues that are reflected in environmentalism, quality of life, pro-choice, pro-life, women’s right etc. These are recalled in postmaterialist agendas that derived from a higher standard of living- allowing people to focus more on these ‘new’ subjects and to an extent on the issues of economical distribution. With these postmaterialist interests, the former political cleavages were expanded thus expanding the electoral arena to make room for single-issue (niche) and outside- parties.

The term postmaterialism was coined by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel (2005). The theory runs along with the advancement of the industrial society and the rise of self-expression values, also recognized as emancipative values. A portraying of this theory could be seen in Maslow’s pyramid of needs that is based on: the more needs that are fulfilled, from physiological ones to a secured social network- the more libertarian the individual will become in the practice of an increasing tolerance (towards other cultures, religions, ethnicities, sexualities etc.) and notion of equality of rights (a dissolution of a patriarchy and an enhancement of feminism and anti-discriminatory means).

2.5.1 Class cleavages

Prior to the postindustrial advancement (1960’s/70’s), it was the social cleavages (the rift between classes) which sat the structure for political competition. The electoral arena was based on parties that reflected opinions and interests between certain groups and classes consisting

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1 This being a topic of the postmaterialism era of the 60’s and 70’s.
of workers and entrepreneurs. Parties on either side of the politics based their agenda mainly on wealth-distribution and economic matters, thus collecting political support from these issues (Dalton, 1996). These were the most basic issues based on center-left and center right conflicts, marxian versus capitalist views:

providing for the economic security of all citizens and ensuring a just distribution of economic rewards. Issues such as unemployment, inflation, social services, tax policies, and government management of the economy reinforce class divisions.
(Dalton, 1996: 322)

2.5.2 Religious cleavages

Sociologists such as Weber provided the image of how democracies focus their attention to either collectivism or individualism through their domestic religion. Catholics tend to think more collectively, whilst Protestants are more focused on individualism. These two religious branches have their own system of values, and when they are reflected in an electoral arena they set up the basis of another type of political conflicts. Today, religious cleavages are mainly based on secularisation versus religion. Religious values are more reflected in conservative parties recognized mainly as Christian Democrats, and tend to enlight family structure, traditions and culture. Although, in a state with a majority of the population being catholics, these parties aim to conserve different values from those states with a protestant majority: collectivism or individualism, center-left or center-right. This leads to an issue of distinction between conservative parties to the right, or conservative parties that want to conserve a left-value based system (Dalton, 1996). The Christian parties in states that varies between these two branches adheres to the value-system based upon the dominant branch. Although, in states such as USA, with a majority mixed between these two branches, Christian parties focuses on the core of the religion to rise questions regarding abortion, family values and same-sex marriage.

2.5.3 New political cleavages (new left & new right)

Dealignment and realignment, voter volatility

When the postmaterialist era sprung up new topics to be debated in the electoral arena, the original cleavage was expanded to host a new set of parties such as conservative Christian Democrats, or environmentalist Green parties. The original cleavage was not solely based on
socio-economic issues anymore due to the establishment of the welfare state. Hence, voters would start to align themselves with parties characterized by a conservative value-system or Green environmentalist parties. As the study presented earlier in the presentation of Meguid’s PSO-theory, postmaterialist topics would often be adopted by single-issue parties and thus being further adopted by established parties to henceforth be a part of the electoral arena. A process that weakened the traditional topics, as mentioned to be of socio-economics. It was weakened because the voters did not have to ensure material needs anymore and could focus on more non-economic issues. This reduced the political and social attachments to older parties, being players in the electoral competition between the original cleavages. The voters would be more of a higher volatility. When the public became more knowledgeable to the postmodernist issues, they demanded an enhanced participation in the decision-making and thus sought to reinforce democratization. Because, no longer would they vote for socio-economic issues, but issues that reflected a greater extent of their own identity such as values of family structure, gender equality, same-sex marriage, religious tolerance, pro-life, pro-choice etc. The democratic system would therefore go through a further development for people to vote and participate regarding these new issues that were closer to their personal everyday life, and no longer would individuals vote accordingly to their professional identity as a worker or a capital holder. As the postmaterialist perspective is ought to explain the correlation between a rise emancipative values and a higher standard of living, these new politics mainly belonged to the young (those raised by the values), the new middle class (that rose with postmaterialism), the higher educated (since political knowledge tends to increase tolerance and rational thinking) and the nonreligious (who were not stuck in traditional value-systems). In time, these postmaterialist issues were adopted by rational concepts to sustain a society and were expanded from advanced industrial societies where they were first recognized, to societies that were farther behind the industrialization. Environmental issues were framed in terms of a conceptualization of a sustainable society; gender issues and minority programs were a part of a larger image of human rights; empowerment became a symbol for expanding participation opportunities.


A minor detailed summary. The older cleavage of left versus right politics (labour interests versus business interests) was broaden with a new set of left and right values. The new left was entering the electoral arena with libertarian and egalitarian values as the new right did so with a conservative framework of social values and life-choices such as the traditional family
structure, abortion, same-sex marriage, national identity and unity etc. (Dalton, 1996). Hence, the new right would present values and issues belonging to far-right conservative parties as ‘‘French National Front, the German Republikaner, and the Austrian Freedom party.’’ (Dalton, 1996: 333). On the other side of the division, the left would be represented by left-green and left-libertarian parties that spoke for feminism, increased tolerance and increased actions for a better environment.

2.5.4 The outcome: New electoral behavior

The impact this set of changes had on the voters lead to a abolishment of long-term affiliation with a certain party, thus making the electoral competition more based on short-term affiliations to the extent that the voters change their sympathies per election: ‘‘such as candidate image (mainly in USA) and issue opinions’’ and ‘’performance-based voting increases, such as judging the government by the performance of the economy’’(Dalton,1996: 335).

Dalton argues that the undermining of long-term alignment to certain parties, allowed an increase notion among the public to recognize elections per issue instead. As mentioned earlier in the study, elections can be emphasized by different issues, making the former election to differ than the upcoming one. This has lead to that many elections are based on issue-voting and thus making a wider room for single-issue parties to participate much easier.

In summary, political support has become more transferable between issues due to elections tend to emphasize different matters. The long-time alignment has been undermined greatly, and replaced by an increased rate of voter volatility. It has lead to this since social cleavages can no longer predict how voters will make their electoral choice. The cleavages were, in the past (pre postmaterialist era), based on traditional class and/or religious rifts. But due to an increase of non-economic set of issues, such as equality of gender, environmentalism and migration etc, the traditional cleavages based on the former left and right division are now, in addition, hosting a new left and a new right that consist of Green parties of libertarian and egalitarian values versus nationalist conservatives caring for national unity and identity and a religious/traditional value system (Dalton, 1996). These sections will serve as an undergird for the continuing part. Dalton (1996) presents general perceptions of cleavage-based politics and the new left / new right. But the Central East European states (CEE) were still under a process to form their own party systems after the fall of Soviet Union. The argument for Dalton is that he has provided with a notion of how long-term, short-term, party-alignment and voters’
volatility affect the political cleavage. The case relevancy is how parties set up strategies to maintain and ensure long-term commitment and party-alignment. As Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) points out: ‘‘Political cleavages are important because of their role in providing bases of support for parties and thus in structuring the content of party competition and political conflict more generally.’’(Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009; 283). Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) emphasize the former nature of the Soviet Union as it affected the emergence of political cleavages within its former union states. It lead to a delayed development of the party organisations, issue formation, party positions and ideological reflections that all are set to be the components in a party system within the CEE states. But once the party systems were established, they did not recognize the democratic structure accordingly to the perception of older democracies’ party systems. The political cleavage in CEE states coheres with a democratic understanding of the market structure, where parties of market reformation belong to the right, and those who oppose reformation and thus take a pro-communist stance against democracy would be on the left. This is contrary to the Western understanding of democracy, where party systems of older democracies would seek leftist socio-economic approaches. But in CEE post-communist party systems it was the right-wing parties which spoke for a liberal free market that were the pro-democracy players, since they wished to reform the whole institutional structure to begin the process of Western integration (Rohrschneider & Whitefield, 2009). As Fidesz started as an anti-communist movement, they later took a center-right approach once the movement became established as a political party, and portrayed the socialist parties of the center-left for impeding the democratization. The relevancy of Dalton’s cleavage-based politics is then applicable to the Hungarian case as it will serve as a platform of the contemporary Hungarian party system where both Fidesz and Jobbik are based on Christian values to also be included in an Hungarian traditional value system and national unity among the Hungarians (the new right).

2.6 Populism ideology

The general public’s portraying of Fidesz and Jobbik is that both claim a populist agendas. Although it may be correct, both parties use the attributes of populism differently, as it will be argued within this section. According to Ben Stanley (2008), populism as an ideology is a widely debated topic whether if it can tell us anything about politics of necessary measures. The general notion about the term is that it is recognized as a pathological political strive. Hence, it could be defined to be a further application onto an traditional established ideology,
an ideology that is recognized in the various political debates and party politics—"full ideologies" (Stanley, 2008). Müller (2016) describes populism as a protest ideology—a resistance against the elites by the people. That description could be a perspective when looking at the relationship between the elite and the people, which creates a notion about populism being further recognized as an antagonism (Stanley, 2008)—a relationship of hostility (the humble people versus the evil elite). It is crucial to understand that populist aspects can emerge from either side of the left-right division. Populism can be found in a political discourse that consists of a collective interest that counterpositions against an elitist governing, which in return is discrepant to the collective interest, making the elites “antagonistic to ‘the people’” (Stanley, 2008). Jobbik takes on this particular role; an anti-established player in the electoral arena that is opposing the government that is impeding the people’s development by its corrupted structure. The legitimacy of Jobbik’s accusations are ironically found in Müller’s (2016) description of how populist parties tend to “colonize” the state once they are in power. One of the first actions Orbán did once he was elected in 2010 was to alter the law of civil service in order to fill non-party affiliated bureaucratic positions with party loyalists. The courts were also reformed to stand loyal to the parties by appointing new judges who were chosen by the party. Another relevance of this part to the study is argued indirectly by Stanley as he points out that populism has becoming more common in political practice around the western democracies due to a popular media which has enjoyed an increase of independence and commercialisation, as well as a more effective and efficient education system which has “increased cognitive mobilisation” (Stanley, 2008) of a public possessing more factual political knowledge and a reflective political mass-consciousness. Populism could be a reaction of, as a byproduct, when certain demands by the people are not being fulfilled; the failure by the elites to implement certain public demands. Orbán takes on the role as a populist leader as he aims to produce a proximity to the people. Every Friday he participates in interviews channeled by radio. He strives for a conservative value system based on a Christian-national culture to bring unity and devotion to the Hungarian nation.

In the system of various interests, if the elites manage to sustain an acceptance of differentiations between them and the people, a logic of difference springs up. This is when certain demands are satisfied to a degree that the people recognize the elites as legitimate. The nemesis is the logic of equivalence whereas the people do not legitimize the elites as the governing entity and is a result when the elites fail to fulfill the demands. This follows by an antagonism in the relationship between the elites and the people (Stanley, 2008). Henceforth is
the rise of outside parties (Similar to Meguid’s niche-parties) that are entering as a player for the demands that are not being adopted by the established decision-makers. In parallel with the PSO-theory, this challenges the mainstream parties to finally react upon the issue consisting within the demands: their reaction “with the deployment of populist discourses of their own.” (Stanley, 1988).

2.6.1 A ‘thin’ ideology

How is populism, as an ideology, function in these outside parties? Ideologies are a particular set of ideas that presents a blueprint of the socio-economic and political society. These ideas carry different approaches depending on which arena they are presented in, i.e. solidarity, collectivism and equality of outcome are a set of ideas addressed in various arenas but all belong to socialism (center-left), whilst individualism and equality of choice belongs to the liberal ideologies (center-right). These ideologies count as ‘full ideologies’ (Stanley, 1988). They tend to answer as many political questions and issues a society generate as possible, i.e. national security, welfare structure, what to prioritize, how to distribute the resources, market structure etc. When a set of ideas lacks the ability to comprehensively answer the questions it becomes a ‘thin ideology’. These ideologies are too narrow and restricted within themselves, focusing mainly on a core issue or core idea, which makes them undermined to the traditional full ideologies.

2.6.2 The set of ideas - concept and core

What makes populism hard to put in practice by the function as a whole ideology is that populist leaders or parties do not share any specific ideological characteristic. To be more precise, full ideologies share some characteristics among their practicers; the ideology is similarly recognized by different leaders who are reflecting it. A liberal party tend to not differ from another liberal party in another party system; a socialist leaders would use similar rhetorics when approaching issues regarding welfare and taxes. But populism does not possess that form unity among its practitioners. As mentioned already, Jobbik and Fidesz use populist rhetorics differently. Jobbik claims the people versus the elite-perspective while Fidesz would claim that it is protecting and serving the people from an elite class to occur. The same logic outcome would be if Chavez of Venezuela and Victor Orbán of Hungary were put in a juxtaposition. They would to an extent agree with each other that the main concept is ‘the people’, but as Chavez is claimed to be a socialist and Orbán a conservative, there would
be more room for differences than similarities. What unites populist leaders despite their ideological affiliations are the main concept of populism: the people, and a certain pattern of ideas regarding their relationship with the governing elite which was mentioned above: the only unity of populism is the notion of antagonism in the relationship between the concept of ‘the people’, which are ought to be good and humble, reflect honesty and solidarity, and ‘the elite’ that are oppressing the people with irrationality, selfishness and ignorance as to keep ‘the people’ at bay, not to enjoy growth. This part is meant to unbox the general public’s notion about Fidesz and Jobbik to be of populist nature and to give a more detailed reason of why the notion exists. Populism is a complex term to use on political actors and players since it can be either misused or exaggerated like many other pathological terms such a fascist, neo-nazi, imperialist, racist etc etc. But the undergirded reason why the study added this part was to assure that if it would address the parties as populists practitioners, it is still objective and not falling under subjective, personal interpretations.

Chapter 4: Methodology

The research aims to study the strategies used by Fidesz and Jobbik that make them move in opposite directions in the political scale where Fidesz is dragged further into the political right and Jobbik towards the political center. It will be considered as a deductive case study to propose an additional explanation about the parties’ move on each direction away from and towards the political center accordingly to their strategies. The idea is that when a well-established mainstream party moves closer to an outside-party with the end to oust (or consume) the outside-party, it could dodge and maneuver the incoming mainstream party in order to ensure its survival. Both parties will make a sacrifice of their issue ownership to make a step towards another direction in the political scale. If the idea is proven to be true, it will be
able to reveal a *defeat fire with fire*-strategy which this study will recognize as the ‘clothes-trading’ strategy. But to use correct language and to minimize confusion the research will still make a theory-consuming analysis to use the tools and terminology of the PSO-theory to ease the explanations of each step the parties are doing. The research design will be based on the bibliographies S. Halperin & O. Heath (2017); *Political Research Methods and Practical Skills*, and Robert K. Yin (2007); *Case Study Research- Design and Methods*.

4.1 Case study

A case study is a type of research, similar to a comparative study, that enables a specific case to be observed under different contexts and circumstances. Case studies are somewhat comparative researches although they tend to focus a big amount on a chosen case and apply different contexts to observe the differences how the case behaves or changes between them. Comparative researches focus more on applying two (or more) different cases in one context in order juxtaposition the cases and make comparative analysis of them under the same context. They can take the attributes of either a quantitative or qualitative analysis. As Yin (2007) defines the necessity of case studies: ‘’the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena.’’ The approach of the research is based upon two main ways it can be proceeded by.

Yin (2007) presents the main critique against case studies, and gives the notion beheld by other social scientists that case studies work best as a *preliminary research strategy and cannot be used to describe or test propositions*. The concept of this study is that it could take the form as a preliminary research, but so to start a constructive analysis regarding the concepts of ‘clothes-trading’. The main goal is not specifically tended to give a full legitimate description of ‘clothes-trading’ to be generalized furtherwards. But to describe the party strategies of convergence and divergence used simultaneously when to start a process to conquer a specific issue that has not been traditionally owned by the challenger, and as an alternative counter-move made by the targeted party that owns the issue.

The study will characterize the case as an extreme one. This is according to the *Encyclopedia of Case study Research* by Mills, Durepos and Wiebe. Studies of extreme cases aim to explain an unusual phenomena as something that seldom occurs in the area of research. The case of
Fidesz and Jobbik can be argued to be a unique one, at least in the political research of European established mainstream parties versus far-right presences. It is rare in the way Fidesz, as a mainstream party, has approach Jobbik- and how Jobbik, as a far-right extremist party has made a slight progress to distance itself from its former policy-dimension- as a strategic counter-move against Fidesz.

4.2 Qualitative content analysis

The research will employ a qualitative analysis to study its case. Qualitative analysis make a wide platform of sources to be explored, where the research is determined to find a specific source that can provide data to investigate. The concept of a qualitative analysis is to investigate the case in order to provide an illustration of a phenomena. This is done by gathering data from relevant sources such as interviews, documents, journals, articles and newspapers (Halperin & Heath, 2017). The strength with qualitative analyses is that they are able to gather data from numerous different sources of information. The research is interested to find certain patterns from the sources of information that can be of theoretical relevance. The process of a qualitative analysis is to spiral around a source to find data that can take the analysis to a new source of information. Qualitative analysis can either be aimed to be of a inductive or deductive nature. That is, that data will either provide the basis for a theory to be emerged, or that a theory will set the framework for determined set of data to be analyzed. This study will approach the case with a theory-consuming deduction in order to explain the context of the case. Although, the analysis is set with data to provide information to recognize a certain pattern to explain an assumption that ‘clothes-trading’ is a process that has occurred between Fidesz and Jobbik. As Yin (2007) points out, there three main techniques of analyzing: the pattern-matching, explanation-building and the time series analysis. To elaborate the pattern-matching technique, the research is ought to find patterns within the empiry to predict a certain outcome according to a theory. In this case, the outcome is not yet clear to predict. But the goal is to create a concept of a party strategy process that could lead to a certain prediction of an outcome. Thus, the case study is not entirely dependent on a deductive framework, but is granted a flexibility to develop the case of ‘clothes-trading’ to be further examined (Evers & van Staa, 2010; Qualitative Analysis in Case Study).

To investigate the clothes-trading thesis the analysis will approach the material according to a content analysis, with the aim to analyse the Fidesz and Jobbik’s political transformations
through external actors’ perspective. These analyses gather their data with an hermeneutic approach, thus interpreting a meaning, the essence and the structure of ideas within the texts by variables tied to the issue (Halperin & Heath, 2017). In qualitative analyses, the variables are used to frequently ask the texts whether how they can provide data and information regarding the issue. The qualitative variables differs from those of quantitative analyses in the way that they are not ought to measure anything in numbers or frequences. Instead, they act as underlying approaches tied to the study’s issue (Halperin & Heath, 2017). This analyzation will examine the texts with the variables whether Fidesz has done an approach to the far-right, and if Jobbik has started a process to become more centralized in the political scale. The analysis will focus in structuring a pattern of movement of the two parties in the political scale as the authors give structures of ideas regarding the parties’ behaviour. These are then being presented and connected to the PSO-theory in an empirical discussion to clarify the pattern of movement of the parties. The PSO-theory is the main terminology the study will use in this discussion whereas the theoretical starting points will favour the conclusion whether the clothes-trading process is bound to happen, or if it is vulnerable and dependent on the earlier researches’ theses.

4.3 Empirical material

The chosen sources of information are articles and journals written by political observers as individual authors with a specialized insight on the subject, or organisations that is examining the Hungarian party system. The parties themselves might not be as much of reliable sources since the party programs could undermine or hide important ideas of structure and processes of a clothes-trade. Then it is a matter of language. Jobbik proves that they want to reach out internationally, hence editing english translations of every document they publish on the party program. Fidesz for that matter seems less attractive to that, with no option for english translations, and documents that are in english are less relevant for the study. The material is authored and edited mainly by Hungarian actors, minimizing the distance between the material and the case. The authors have studied and analysed the parties’ movements and actions, and are keeping a constant observation on the Hungarian political system.

4.4 Empirical Critique

This study will be well-aware to criticize the sources that are used. Especially in a political research, with the matter of a clash between many different opinions, this study will try to
abolish any subjective opinions- if they deem not to be necessary to the research. In some cases, attitudes can be helpful to study a certain case- as for example to measure political support. And, although it may not seem as a direct threat for the researcher, he/her may (or may not) become angled towards a political spectrum, meaning that he/she is being affected by the message of a certain text and henceforth taking a slightly subjective stance towards it. This can damage the results directly (Halperin & Heath, 2017). Biologist or physicians may stand before a harder challenge in order to bend the nature according to what they wish to see in the results. It is rare that the nature lies, for it is a platform of truths where the scientists are set to discover them by theories and experiments and proofs. It is arguably that the biologist may interpret its experimental results in a particular way if it had, from the start, a certain vision and wish for how the result would take form. It is of uttermost importance that the design of the experiment is as clear as possible- so that another scientist, unknown to the first one, can structure the same experiment and hence observe the same results. The scientific department of political science is thus a much harder platform (the social world) to discover the truths, since the objectives the research is analyzing are mostly human behaviour, opinions, political patterns, political phenomena etc etc… which are much more fragile and easier to manipulate due to that the researcher is a human with certain opinions as well and is also participating in the social world (Popper, 1963).

4.5 The validity, reliability and generalization (of a case study)

The research is heavily dependent on the awareness that it is analyzing what it is ought to analyze, and that it is a relationship between the indicator of operalization and the theoretical definition of the case. The validity of this study is focused on to what extent the presentation of the research objectives has been transparent (and has not left out any relevant segments). Secondly, the ability of the analysis of build a certain pattern of the context and textual content is a factor of great critique of validity. If the textual content does not provide evidences to provide a valid and legitimate explanation to the context- the analysis has failed to function according to a discourse analysis, thus creating a void of confusion (Halperin & Heath, 2017). The same dilemma can be based on “subjective judgements” (Yin, 2007)- that the gathering of data becomes irrelevant due to the researcher’s judgement of what the phenomena is defined as.
If the validity is high, and the research is without any systematic errors- the validity of results is good and answers correctly that the research is doing what it is ought to do. But this is only doable if the reliability is high, which is that the research is without any random errors. These errors might be harder to detect, but if they sustain in the proceedings of the research- they can affect and manipulate the results. The process in generalize the results in this specific case study will be one of great hardship since case studies are mainly focused on a single case- do they provide enough general knowledge that the result can be applied to other cases? This is a dilemma regarding the measure of external validity (Yin, 2007). This study has to be able to become further developed by the analysis of other cases similar to this. But it demands a certain type of case, where a mainstream party is on the trajectory to adopt an outside-party with similar policy and issue dimension as Jobbik. It does not have to be the same policy and issue dimension, but further studies must take it to account to examine an established and experienced mainstream party’s accommodative strategies to oust an outside-party from the electoral arena, whilst that party is making a similar approach to the mainstream party.
Chapter 5: Analysis

This section will aim to carefully explain the ‘clothes-trading’ assumption. First an introduction about the two parties’ political history will be given, to give a deeper insight of the struggles and achievements both parties have endured, which have lead to their position from where they started the strategies to move on the political scale. Then, an empirical overview together with a theory-based discussion will be made in an amalgamation of articles written by observers whom the study will use as recordings of the parties’ movements in the political scale.

5.1 Empirical starting points

Hungary has faced many political challenges due to its path-dependency as a post-communist regime. The transition from a communist regime to a modern democracy is never an easy task. There are multiple criterias to fulfill, i.e the abolishment of clientelism and corruption. As Hungarian parties took the path towards a more autonomous Hungary, the conservative spectrum became the main conflict between pro-communist parties and liberal-conservative parties (which are engaging in the political competition as anti-communist parties). The conflict and its debate were based on: what is it to actually conserve, the communist politics or a new refounded baseline for Hungarian national identity and traditional values?

(György Schönflin, 2013).

The task of the centre-right was always going to be a hard one in the aftermath of communism. What, after all, did it mean that one was a conservative when the relevant past to be conserved was the communist one from which the conservatives sought to distance themselves?

This is a part that mostly involves Fidesz, since the party started as an anti-communist player in the late 80’s, whilst Jobbik was not founded until the mid-90’s.
Secondly, both parties have faced different kinds of political struggles in the competitive arena. As for the case of Fidesz, it had a long time struggle with the Socialist coalition (MSZP), whilst Jobbik was put to encounter another far-right party: the ‘Life and Justice Party’. Although each struggle lead to the position that they had during the 2010 elections, an election where both parties enjoyed a massive increase in political support. If the conflicts would have ended up differently, there is no assurance that Hungary would have been in the situation it contemporary is (György Schöpflin, 2013).

5.1.1 Fidesz
Fidesz started out as radical youth movement with Victor Orbán as one of the fundamental founders. The organisation was heavily characterized as an anti-communist establishment with Orbán at the peak of the spear. He managed to create a strong political image that would endure along his political careers when he held his famous speech at the Heroes’ Square, condemning the presence of communist troops (Rajcsányi, Viktor Orbán’s Regime). All along with Fidesz’s political history, the Socialist Party (MSZP) has always been the most threatened opposition against Fidesz. The MSZP participated in the 2006 election with a wide social and liberal manifesto. They called for a broader definition of the Hungarian identity, increased birth-rate, and rage of widening responsibilities for Hungarians living outside the hungarian borders. The MSZP even stressed it to the degree to include Hungarian minorities living abroad. All who spoke Hungarian and claimed themselves to value the Hungarian culture and values were ought to be identified as Hungarians. In a coalition with the liberal party SZDSZ, the MSZP would win a majority in the 2006 election. It was a strategy to uphold and ensure a political majority from the 2002 election. Along the line Fidesz struggled together with its coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) to gain power, a struggle that would soon be transformed into the most glorious period of Fidesz politics in history. On the 26th May 2006, a month after the election, the MSZP-prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány gave a speech (the Öszöd speech) before his political party fellows, where he accused and admitted lies he and the party had bestowed upon the voters, in order to be reelected. The speech is said to have been dramatic, and many of the party fellows were confused by this (Rajcsányi, Viktor Orbán’s Regime). In the following September, the speech was leaked to the public, causing the massive 2006 protest, and ended the political careers of many left-wing politicians. Due to the protests in the new image of the MSZP, the liberal SZDSZ withdrew from the socialist-liberal coalition. The 2006 protest was an event of riots causing a number of 150 people injured due to police dispersing methods, but also a high
number of police officers were critical injured as well. It was disaster followed as an outcome by Gyurcsány’s confession, who defied the demands of his resignation. In 2008, the financial global crisis took hold unto Hungary’s domestic economy. Although the crisis may have sprung up from financial reasons, it could have been less dramatic if it was not for an institutional structure that was not constructed for the crisis outcome. The banking system was not coherent with ruling state institutions, and together with lack of control and economical misconceptions, it was disenchanted tremendously (Kis, Schweitzer, Palcsu, Futó, Balogh & Di Gléria, 2012). Numerous traces regarding the crisis leads to the financial stock market of Wall Street (New York, USA). The following year of 2009, prime minister Gyurcsány finally resigned and was replaced by the party colleague Gordon Bajnai. As Dalton presented the electoral behavior of judge-performance, Fidesz would enjoy a massive increase of political support, and won a two-third majority the following election of 2010. Every since, the party has been the ruling party of the National Assembly, the Hungarian parliament.

5.1.2 Jobbik

The party is lead by Gábor Vona, and has attributes to be defined as a populist party. In their manifesto, (Jobbik, Manifesto), the party announce the corruption of the current government which the Hungarians are suffering from in a great extent. Jobbik adapts the main core of populism; the good and humble people against an evil elite. They see the failureship of the contemporary establishment, that is based on the failures of the integration system, the elites total control.

Jobbik started out in 1999 in the form of the patriotic and conservative organisation Conservative Youth Community. It was founded with the end to unite university scholars with like-minded political sympathies. The organisation was later transformed into a political party in 2003, after the members felt that the set of right-wing parties did not satisfy their political values and interests. Under the leadership of Gábor Vona in 2006, the party managed to push the right-policy tides and was granted the position as the third most popular party in the 2010 election, achieving 16 % of the votes (Bíró-Nagy & T. Boros, 2016).

The historical struggle the party endured was against the alternative nationalist party, the Justice and Life Party (MIÉP). Although, the political campaign against each other did not last for a longer period and in 2006 election, the two parties joined forces to create the ‘Third Way’
coalition, a political collaboration which outcome presented Jobbik as the sole far-right party. Jobbik absorbed political support from the MIÉP, and eventually members from MIÉP would desert the party and be converted into members of Jobbik. Prior to the 2006 election, Csurka, the leader of MIÉP announced a clear hostility against Jobbik, calling the leadership of the party to be agents of center-right or center-left. This could provide a notion that there was another cleavage within the far-right stands of the political system, but only until the parties formed the third way-coalition. The political struggles of Jobbik have been mostly internal of the far-right arena until the election of 2010, when the party started to compete in a more serious matter against the Fidesz and MSZP coalition (Bíró-Nagy & T. Boros, 2016; Murer, 2015).

5.2 Empirical discussion

Here the empiry is presented and discussed within the framework of Meguid’s PSO-theory and will use the terminology and pattern of its toolkit. First of all, the assumption of a ‘clothes-trading’-strategy will be elaborated. Then the empirical data will be discussed according to it.

5.2.1 Clothes-trading

This is a concept of basically dodging an incoming attack, reposition, and counter move. The research got in notion of it as it first tended to be a study of ‘stealing clothes’. This is another concept of the PSO-theory and is based on the adoption of another party’s issue, yet competing against it in order to convince the electorate that the party is not valid nor legitimate to represent the issue. The goal for the study was to highlight the influence populist and nationalist niche and- outside-party has on a mainstream party in the rare occasion that the mainstream party would adopt populist and ultra-nationalist values and interests. Previous research would prove that feminism and environmentalism would be brought to representative institutions by niche-parties that later were politically absorbed by the mainstream parties, thus creating a more gender equal and environmentally conscious decision-making in the parliament. The research would have continued along this path if it was not for the strange appearance of Jobbik moving in the political scale as well, and away from its original position in the far-right. The research then summoned an assumption that it was a defeat fire with fire-strategy: a mirror-move to counter the attack.

The formula of clothes-trading is describing a rather complex process, but the study will try to apply it on the strategies of Fidesz vs. Jobbik.
parties can actively compete with the new party by adopting a position on its issue dimension. The salience of that issue increases as the mainstream party acknowledges the legitimacy of the issue and signals its prioritization of that policy dimension for electoral competition. Given that the adoption of a new policy position is a costly endeavor for a political party, requiring a diversion of its resources away from existing policy commitments, this action should be viewed as a credible signal of the issue’s importance to the party. (Meguid, 2008; 28).

Clothes-trading is a process based on when two rival parties are setting up strategies against each other to the point that both of them are moving towards each other in the political scale, and eventually will replace each other’s former policies and issue dimensions. The occurring of clothes-trading in the Hungarian case of Fidesz and Jobbik is assumed to happened as Fidesz acknowledged the salience of Jobbik’s issue dimension. Fidesz is then competing within the same issue dimension as Jobbik with the end to oust Jobbik from the electoral arena. It is done through a dismissive stance towards the former policy dimension of Fidesz, that would instead adopt the core elements of Jobbik’s policy dimension. In the term of the PSO-theory, Fidesz is setting up a competition of issue ownership. As a response, Jobbik is then dismissing its own issue dimension to an extent that it can manipulate its policies and thus claim a new position in the political scale. This follows with a renewed issue dimension, calling for a new (and in this case, a more including) electorate. It is a strategy based on the notion that the party would not stand a chance against Fidesz by competing within its own issue dimension of the issue ownership. Fidesz has a longer experience in governing and have been an established player in the traditional competition longer than Jobbik. According to Meguid (2008) and Walgrave et al (2009), the voters would chose the greater experienced mainstream party to carry out Jobbik’s issue. So, as described, Jobbik would rearrange its policies, issue dimension, aim for a wider voter-base to start a process to leave its former position in the far-right to become more ‘centralized’ in the political scale by reestablish itself as a conservative people’s party.

5.2.2 Fidesz, from liberal to populist conservative

The 2010 elections plays a major role for both Fidesz and Jobbik. It was the election where both parties grew tremendously, and in its aftermath Fidesz would start the process of converging to Jobbik’s issue. But the process towards the far-right did not specifically start there and then. As mentioned, Fidesz was founded on the basics of liberal values. But there was no sudden leap from that position to the contemporary one. The process began as an
opening within the right wing occurred, a room for Orbán to reestablish his party as a liberal party with a conservative value-system. The void was created after the 1994’s election when the socialist MSZP would leave the right parties in a devastating state after achieving a great majority into the National Assembly (Rajcsányi, (y?); Viktor Orbán’s Hungary: Orbanist Politics and Philosophy from a Historical Perspective.). It was followed by Fidesz being abandoned by doctrinaire liberal group, one that Orbán also was historically included in, to join the liberal party SZDSZ that had made collusion with the socialist MSZP. But, just before the 1998 election, Fidesz would host new personalities and intellectuals belonging to the political right, moderate conservatives being urbanised from the countryside and right-wing politicians who all would acknowledge a new chance to restore the political right after the political massacre by MSZP in 1994 (Rajcsány, Viktor Orbáns Hungary). Along with the party development according to charismatic leadership and career offerings by Panebianco (1998), these new members would granted a new political home in Fidesz and were dependent on Orbán’s leading of the party ‘ whose leadership in the party became unquestionable to this day’ (Rajcsány; 128). Due to this new set of political figures, the party would enjoy a win in the 1998 election. Rajcsányi argues that this win established the party’s ideological characteristics. Together with a small group of political consultants, Orbán would apply an elitist liberal-conservative agenda. In the 2002 election, Orbán would recognize the agenda as a failed one as the MSZP took power once again. The following transformation of the party is either deemed as a re-establishment as a people’s party, or the adoption of populist attributes (depending between the notion of a party loyalist or a critic). The party would recall the importance of the people once again, to bring the party closer to them. In summary: ‘He [Orbán] breaks out from doctrinaire liberalism to adopt conservatism, and then leaves behind the conservative elitism in favour of popular national politics and successful mass communication’ (Rajcsányi; 128). In its rivalness with the MSZP, Fidesz altered its position further to the right in order to establish a more genuine opposition, since many of Fidesz politicians came to ‘abandon the ship’ to join the other liberal party SZDSZ that had made a successful coalition with MSZP. Orbán managed to higher the contrasts between Fidesz and the center-left by establishing Fidesz as a conservative and elitist party due to a new set of professional intellectuals and politicians seeking refuge after the 1994’s devastating blow. Together, they would readvance and shape Fidesz into winning the following 1998’s election. So far, Orbán has altered party position in a chronological order from the political center to the right, using the dismissive strategy to drag the party further away from the political center and the left- altering position and issues. And, after the 2002’s election, which brought the MSZP
back to a governing position, Orbán would adopt a populist dimension rather than alter position again. The goal was to remove the elitist cloak from the party and ‘reinvent’ a stance to become a sharper reflection of the people. Although the party would not recognize it yet, it would learn that these previous dismissive steps had placed the party in a winning position. Hence, the 2006 socialist inter-war after the incident of Gyurcsány and the 2008 economic crisis, the electorate fled from the unstable center-left and called for a radical reconstruction in the National Assembly. What followed was a tremendous political growth of Fidesz, and in 2010 the party was installed in the parliament with a two-third majority.

5.2.3 The emergence of Jobbik, 2010

It is to say that from the socialist-liberal breakdown in 2006 and 2008 Jobbik rose to be bestowed its first representative role in the National Assembly, being one of the biggest non-representative parties to the third biggest party in the parliament. Murer (2015) reveals the identity of Jobbik’s political support. It is important to understand to whom the party was communicating to and what kind of rhetorics the party used to gain certain correspondents. Mainly, the party has been (and still is to a certain degree, but a topic that will be touched later) portrayed as a ultra-nationalist and populist party with paramilitant sub-groups (the Hungarian Guard). Jobbik proclaimed itself as a party with radical methods, something that is reflecting in its own electorate that is mostly based on individuals calling for anti-minority sentiments and targeted the Jews and the Roma-community. The Jews because that they were pictured as the main actor to spread and control a global capitalism, something that was breaking the Hungarian economic system with international trade with expensive import and cheap export. The European Union was a capitalist force that exploited Hungarian businesses and firms by establishing multinational corporations to compete in the Hungarian market, which weakened the domestic players. The Roma-community has always been targeted. They are seen as misusers of the welfare state and are henceforth pictured as lazy and unmotivated to carry the Hungarian society by working and paying taxes. Also, the stigma is including a life of crime, picturing the Romas as thieves and sly people. Jobbik presents the remedies of these issues in a rather moderate way (Murer, 2015). The answer to the global capitalism is the establishment of an eco-national socialist economy system, making the system enhancing the Hungarian role in its market by advertising and strengthen the Hungarian farms and firms, Hungarian produce, Hungarian Industry and the protection of the Hungarian natural resources like forest and gas.

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2 The former liberal character
land and water. The case with the Romas is to be solved with a reinforced security system and an established Guardamiere (a militant police force, often governed by the national defence). This is to reduce the crime-rates and protect the Romas, since the most victims of Roma-related crimes are Romas themselves, as Jobbik points out in the their 2010 Manifesto. Jobbik entered the National Assembly with these issues; issues that had not yet been a part in the traditional left-right discourse. Jobbik brought ultranationalism to the table, and sought to compete against Fidesz accordingly, by addressing ‘real’ Hungarian issues and remedies. With Jobbik as a new-established rival, Fidesz sought new strategies in order to oust the outside-party from the electoral competition. The socialist coalition became more and more insignificant, thus allowing Fidesz to spend more energy on the conquering of the far-right. According to Meguid (2008), a mainstream party cannot compete against a niche(outside)-side party with the same set of strategies the party uses against another mainstream party. The mainstream parties have developed their issue position, salience and ownership during a long period of time, and established themselves accordingly to the three criterias mentioned, which the electorate will recognize them as. It would not be gainful to alter these and break the general public’s affiliation with them and their certain issue, which is an ideological approach. Henceforth, every election emphasizes different political subjects, and it is up to every party to convince the electorate that their issue is salient to the subject. This is all included in a certain given policy dimension, where the mainstream parties are presenting their issues, and thus competing against other mainstream parties. The traditional policy dimension is the traditional political cleavage between the left and the right divisions where issues regarding taxes, wealth and profit distributions and the structure of the welfare are being debated. Since outside and niche-parties are based on issues that is not yet being a topic of debate, these parties enter the electoral competition, but do not play within the frame of the traditional policy dimension. So, Fidesz needed another type of party strategy to oust Jobbik from the competition. This is where the process of Fidesz moving towards the far-right is beginning.

5.2.4 Fidesz moves towards the far-right
By using the accommodative strategy (also known as the convergent strategy), Fidesz manipulated its former issue policies to adopt a position in Jobbik’s issue dimension. According to Meguid (2008), that signals that Fidesz is acknowledging the salienceship of Jobbik’s issues. What follows is that Fidesz is creating an internal competition [in the far-right] of issue ownership. Walgrave, Lefevere and Nuytemans (2009) presents Issue Ownership as “If voters think about the issue, they think about the party” (Walgrave et al, 2009; 154). Issue
ownership, as a part of the PSO-theory, claims the matter of reputation. The voters are recognizing the credibility of certain issues to their party owner. To return to the Fidesz vs. Jobbik far-right competition, it could be labeled as a ‘clothes-stealing’ session. As many historical feminist and environmentalist niche-parties become politically absorbed by the mainstream parties, Fidesz sought to do the same with Jobbik. As mentioned earlier, outside-parties possesses a greater set of policies to communicate a wider range of issues in contrast to single-issue based niche-parties. So, in order for Fidesz to try and politically absorbed Jobbik it would not be enough to adopt a particular issue, Fidesz had to acknowledge Jobbik to a full extent, starting with adopting the symbolic core elements of Jobbik. Bíró-Nagy and Boros (2016) explains Fidesz move as a way for the party to convince the electorate under support of Jobbik that they were the rightful representative of these core elements.

Viktor Orbán strongly believes that if they adopt the most significant and symbolic elements of Jobbik’s programme and implement it in a softer, more moderate manner, then Fidesz can effectively stop Jobbik’s momentum. (Bíró-Nagy & Boros, 2016; 254).

Some of these adopted core elements were the implementation of the Holy-Crown and the Cardinal laws to the constitutional changes in 2010. The new constitution was named The Fundamental Law, and was based on Jobbik’s proposal to replace the 1949 Constitution with historically national Hungarian and Christian values. The hidden argument here is the spoken notion Fidesz used to deny the legitimacy of Jobbik to represent these policies due to the party’s radical nature. Fidesz saw itself as a more moderate entity, and possessed a greater experience in political communication and had a better advantage of mass communication, a long-time experience in the traditional policy dimension and thus having a greater knowledge about governing. Jobbik will come to learn that these characteristics play a major role in the process of voter-decision, a topic that will be elaborated in the following section.

But first, to continue Fidesz’s movement towards a far-right establishment, the party sought to create a ‘safety net’ for itself by transforming the Hungarian party system, one of the more successful and stable systems of the post-communists states, to a single-party based system. Critics observed this transformation, that happened by the altering of the 1949 Constitution and state laws, as a departure from a liberal democratic structure to an authoritarian rule (Buzogány, 2017). The process is witnessed in the changes of i.e service laws that are protecting important political bureaucratic positions from being party influenced. Fidesz abolished these laws and
aimed to fill these positions such as court-judges, institutional administrative and financial posts with party loyalists. A strategy Müller (2016) referred as ‘colonize’ the state. This reformation of the state is motivated by Orbáns vision to establish an ‘illiberal’ democracy. Orbán possesses an understanding of liberal democracy to be a threat to the nation in his fight against the ‘pro-communist’ socialist coalition. To ensure that the left does not come out victorious from another election, he claims to ‘illiberalism’ as a measure to keep the Hungarian nation safe, thus protecting Hungarian national values and the people's' interests (Buzogány, 2017). As this might touch the populist dimension more than it is describing a further move to the far-right, the nationalist perspective is undergirded and rooted in the motives of these alterations of laws. Orbán might as well use the populist dimension to apply it on the strive for nationalist ends: to protect the Hungarian nation, Hungarian values and Hungarian interests. Henceforth, Orbán is establishing a nationalist consciousness in every corner of the state structure by the replacing nonpartisan positions with party loyalists. The only threatening opposition in the National Assembly is Jobbik, a party that Orbán has sat up a competition against- a competition in its own dimension.

5.2.5 Jobbik moves to the center

With the Fidesz’s intrusion into the far-right, Jobbik learned that it would not be fruitful to play in its own dimension against Fidesz. As mentioned earlier, Fidesz is a much bigger and established party. Meaning that Fidesz possesses a longer experience in playing in the electoral competition, governing and communicating. Both Meguid (2008) and Dalton (1996) claim that the national electorate will tend to choose the better experienced party when the voter-decision regarding an issue is between a mainstream party and an outside(niche)-party. Jobbik perceived that, and thus reshaped itself in the trajectory towards the political center. The study has to acknowledge here- that this progression is based on tiny evidences, and a lot of Jobbik’s core elements are still being upheld. But, if the idea of this certain pattern of ‘clothes-trading’ is true, then Jobbik will take on the role as a moderate people’s party in due time, which can be seen as the idea in contemporary Jobbik rhetorics.

In the beginning Jobbik’s party development started by diffusion rather than being a process made by a charismatic leader. The party diffusion ran in parallel with an increasing significance of the party issue, being more acknowledge around the country’s regions. In the earlier days, most of Jobbik’s supporters were centralized within the Eastern regions, now being expanded nationwide (Biró-Nagy & Boros, 2016). It is relevant to mention since the basic voter of Jobbik
is portrayed as a militant ‘skinhead’, and also because of the the idea that a party is seeking to reflect its voters and political supports to the greatest extent plausible. This is not meant to imply that the ‘skinhead’-culture expanded from the eastern to the western regions, but that the issue grew more and more significant to be acknowledged by a wider extent of the national electorate. This is seen in the 2014 election, when Jobbik grew to become the second largest party in the National Assembly and thus being the biggest entity of opposition of Fidesz. This increase of popularity and support was an outcome of the election Fidesz had not foreseen. One explanation could be, according to Meguid (2008), that Fidesz took a risk by acknowledging Jobbik’s issue, that symboled the issue to be of uttermost importance, hence what was following was a transfer of voters from Fidesz to Jobbik in a backlash of Fidesz’s accommodative strategies. The study is undermining that explanation’s credibility, but it is not what entirely had happened. Prior to the 2014 election, during the preparatory periods, Jobbik worked against its former core elements to run a ‘positive’ campaign (Bíró-Nagy & Boros, 2016). Instead of participating in the mass communication of policy advertising and debates as a party of ‘bad news’ and ‘negative approaches’- Jobbik wanted to bestow the electorate with another picture of itself to go against the notion of Jobbik as a party of ‘skinheads’. This was a process made by Gabór Vona to change the party’s political trajectory to become more ‘humane’ and ‘moderate’, abolishing the radical rhetorics and messages made by him and his party fellows, and raise posters with a normal middle-class family smiling under the slogan ‘‘Us, Jobbik supporters’’(Bíró-Nagy & Boros, 2016; 244). This campaign by Jobbik came to be referred as the ‘cuteness campaign’ in Hungary due to its positive and hopeful approach (Gábor Győri, 2018). It was not a coincidence Gabór Vona directed his party on this path. As Jobbik’s electorate grew, Vona saw the need in making the party more ‘moderate’ and less ‘radical’ to include a wider segment of the national electorate. This was also a strategy to counter Fidesz. In order to ensure the party’s survival, and set the platform of a continuing increase of political support, Vona took a chance by starting a process to transform the former ultra-nationalist Jobbik into a people’s party (Bíró-Nagy et al, 2016; Krekó et al, 2018). To elaborate this, Jobbik took a dismissive approach to its former core elements and ultranationalist dimension, to start a process to become a people’s party. By this new strive towards moderate conservative embracive values, the party will include ‘more’ of the electorate than it had done in the past. It aimed to commit voters from the middle class, people with education (university degrees), women, elders and even minorities. Henceforth, even if Fidesz would come to conquer the former electorate of Jobbik, Vona wanted to make sure that his party embraced a widened political support. After the 2018 election, Gabór Vona resigned as
party president, but his newfound process to strive for the position as a people’s party is passed to the former vice-president and now Vona’s successor: Tamás Sneider.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

With the starting point after the 2010 election, where Fidesz first achieved a two-third majority, and Jobbik came from nowhere to the third biggest representative party in the National Assembly, the concepts of the ‘clothes-trading’ process is assumed to be found. Although some acknowledgements have to be made to the relevancy of the past. With Orbán as the party president, Fidesz would act accordingly to political circumstances during the 1990’s and the earlier years of the twentyfirth century and reshaped its ideology claim as well as the party values. And, it is arguable that it was due to these alterations that granted Fidesz the position that is has today. For, if Orbán would have had stayed at the liberal-center, Fidesz might not have been as successful in the 2010 election.

Prior to the adoptions of Jobbik’s core elements of its issue dimension, it is clear that Fidesz would have taking an accommodative strategic approach to them. By absorbing them, Fidesz signaled the legitimacy and salience of Jobbik’s issues. Henceforth, Fidesz would manipulate its former policy dimension to provide a basis for the new issues. Fidesz took a position closer to the far-right as Orbán intertwined the nationalist spectrum from Jobbik’s issues with the alteration of state and service laws, including the establishment of The Fundamental Law document and nonpartisan posts to be replaced by party loyalists. The more Orbán would have converged Fidesz towards Jobbik, the more the situation would turn out to be pictured as ‘clothes stealing’. But it is the strategic countermove Jobbik responded with that enlightens the final concepts of ‘clothes-trading’. The first concepts are Fidesz’s accommodative approach on Jobbik’s issue dimension, the final concepts are the strategic maneuver by Jobbik to use the same tools to counter Fidesz. As Fidesz once had the role as a moderate conservative player in the electoral arena, Jobbik is striving to take on that role, especially when the ‘cuteness campaign’ was proven fruitful after the 2014 election when Jobbik replaced the MSZP as the second largest party in the National Assembly. The concepts of clothes-trading is yet to be fully elaborated, especially in order to provide further evidence that Jobbik will adopt former policies Fidesz have dismissed. But there is limited data on that yet, which makes this topic relevant for
future studies. But, if Fidesz and Jobbik would follow the pattern of the clothes-trading process, future elections could provide enough evidence to in detail describe the parties ‘trading’ of policy and issue dimensions; exchanging issue ownership. Because Jobbik did not take the trajectory deeper into the far-right as Fidesz approached that division. That would have put Jobbik in a losing situation where it narrowed its electorate even more. The party had to maneuver Fidesz; altering its policies to the extent that it would ensure survival even though Jobbik would come to lose many of its former supporters who could easily picture the party as a traitor. What this analysis provided was a notion that a ‘clothes-trading’ was put in progress. If the process continues, it will result in an exchange of issue ownership between the two parties. But it is too soon to draw those conclusions. To further and elaborate the study it is of importance to observe the upcoming elections and examine the parties’ strategies. But with Fidesz’s adopting the former issue dimension of Jobbik, and Jobbik itself reduced its extreme far-right radicalism to become slightly more moderate in its conservative manner, one could say that the parties have exchanged ties with each other.

Hungary is rather unique in this case. It was one of the most successful post-communist states to develop a rather stable party system. Now the country is one of the most illiberal democracies in Europe. The case is also a rather unique one to be compared to other mainstream parties around Europe. There is almost no other mainstream party that has approached a far-right outside-party in the same way as Fidesz did with Jobbik. Personally, as an individual raised in Sweden, it is rather impossible to think that one of my own government’s parties would converge towards an extremist far-right party.
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