

The Establishment of Semi-Presidential Regimes

To
Theo, Elma and Sigrid

Örebro Studies in Political Science 43



JENNY ÅBERG

**The Establishment of Semi-Presidential Regimes
A Mixed Methods Approach to Why and How**

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Title: The Establishment of Semi-Presidential Regimes: A Mixed Method
Approach to Why and How

Publisher: Örebro University 2020
www.oru.se/publikationer

Print: Örebro University, Repro 08/2020

ISSN 1650-1632
ISBN 978-91-7529-345-2

Abstract

Jenny Åberg (2020): The Establishment of Semi-presidential Regimes: A Mixed Method Approach to Why and How. *Örebro Studies in Political Science* 43.

One of the crucial constitutional choices made in a democratizing or recently independent state is the structure of executive-legislative relations that forms into a parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential regime. Even so, only a few studies have sought the reasons for the establishment and least of all is known when it comes to the most recent of them: the semi-presidential one. The thesis aims to increase our knowledge on why and how semi-presidential regimes establish. This aim is approached through the use of three theoretical perspectives, including diffusion from abroad, the legacies incorporated in the domestic context, and the elites strategic bargaining expected by the perspective of transitional bargaining. Through its nested mixed methods approach, including two large-N and one single-case study, this thesis finds that semi-presidential establishment stem from all three perspectives: It is influenced by diffusion from international state networks, by legacies of post-communism and post-colonialism, as well as by the preferences of elite actors who attempt to act in a strategic manner. Semi-presidential establishment is thus a complex process and the application of the theoretical perspectives seem to depend on the level of uncertainty in the domestic context.

Through its findings, this thesis increases our knowledge on why and how semi-presidential regimes are established. In addition, they contribute to the field of diffusion, semi-presidentialism, but also to the larger field of institutional studies. Future studies should test the application of the conclusions on parliamentary and presidential regimes and on all semi-presidential regimes part of the post-colonial context.

Keywords: Semi-presidentialism, regime type, constitutional choice, diffusion, legacies, transitional bargaining.

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List of articles

1 Åberg, J., & Denk, T. (2020). Diffusion and the choice of democratic government system at the time of democratisation. *Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft*, 14(2), 75-98.

2 Åberg, J., & Sedelius, T. (2018;2020). Review article: A structured review of semi-presidential studies: Debates, results and missing pieces. *British Journal of Political Science*, 50(3), 1-26.

3 Åberg, J. & Denk, T. Semi-presidential regimes and subregimes: When, where an why? Submitted.

4 Åberg, J. Ukraine's process of regime type establishment: Manoeuvring a constitution amidst diffusion, legacy and elite preferences. Submitted.

Note:

- a) The published articles are reprinted with the authorisation of the respective publisher.

Acknowledgements

Academic work is often a team effort. This thesis is no different. Since starting as a doctoral student in 2015 I have met many individuals to whom I am most grateful.

Thanks to my supervisor Thomas Sedelius for enabling this project altogether and for co-authoring the first and crucial article of the thesis. Your pragmatic outlook and critical remarks have had a profound influence, also, on the end product. Thank you for your pessimistic sense of humour which has given us both many laughs along the way. I am also grateful to my supervisor Joachim Åström who has remained a sharp reader of this work and who has, on many occasions, helped me to find a constructive path forward. A special thanks goes to my supervisor and co-author Thomas Denk, for stepping in at this project's mid-way point. I am deeply grateful for our working partnership and for your challenging yet supportive feedback that has improved my methodological understanding and this thesis as a whole in countless ways. Your friendship and unerring ability to ask the right questions at the right time have been invaluable to me. Many of my colleagues at both Dalarna University and Örebro University have contributed to my thesis and to my years as a doctoral student. I would like to extend particular thanks to my colleagues at the higher seminars in both Falun (TICS) and Örebro. Your constructive critique of my work have improved also my understanding of what it means to be part of academic society. I also want to say thank you to my lunch companions at the university campus in Falun. Thanks for so many laughs and trivial debates, but also for the truly interesting and challenging discussions on everything from the theory of science and current social developments and for (almost) educating me in popular culture. A warm thanks also goes to my fellow doctoral students in Örebro. Your friendship and our 'little' seminar have eased the tensions built into this endeavour. Your comments have often highlighted the positive aspects of this crazy life as a doctoral student in a way that has re-energized my work at the times it was most needed.

Many individuals have provided me with practical support. My Kyiv guides deserve my particular gratitude. Olga Mashtaler, Bogdan Bondarenko, and Yevheniy Kuzmenko, without you, I would never have found my interviewees, nor would I have enjoyed my time in Kyiv the way I did. To the librarians at Högskolan Dalarna, I fear that my repeated requests for curious titles may have been a serious over-use of your services, but I continue to be impressed by, and thus indebted to, your flawless ability to deliver!

Not least, I would like to thank Jean-Marie Skoglund and Anna Parkhouse for sparking my early interest in political science and international relations and for giving my confidence the boost it needed to dare take the first steps towards academia. Your teaching still inspires mine!

And lastly, but never leastly, my personal thanks. To my closest friends and my dear sister, your love and friendship has been beyond words. I am simply lucky to have you all in my life! To my parents, Sven-Åke and Birgitta, thank you for your love, support, and encouragement right from the beginning. To my brother Linus, you are, as you say, 'världens bästa lillebror'. To my husband, Tobias, you have heard more about this thesis than anyone should have to. Thank you for standing by my side. As we say: Tack och förlåt! I love you!

Because my children Theo, Elma and Sigrid have grown up with semi-presidentialism and the ups and downs of life as a doctoral student, this thesis is dedicated to them.

Jenny Åberg
Falun, June 2020

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1. Introduction

“Among the most important – and, arguably, the most important – of all constitutional choices that have to be made in democracies is the choice of electoral system,... and the choice of relationship between the executive and the legislature” (Lijphart, 1992:207).

Despite Lijphart’s comment, now nearly 30 years ago, we still know little about why and how a country establishes its structure of executive-legislative relations - what we call a parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential regime. Ironically, we know the least about the establishment of the most recent of these three regime types: semi-presidentialism. Why and how are semi-presidential regimes established?

Throughout the main bulk of world history, democracy has been the exception and not the rule. The dominant position of authoritarian rule did not budge until what Huntington famously termed ‘the third wave’ (1991) of democratization commenced in the 1970s. Beginning with the military coup in Lisbon in 1974, the third wave of democratization reestablished democracy not only in the European countries of Portugal, Greece and Spain but also crossed the ocean to transform Latin America and Africa. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the wave returned to Europe to sweep across the Central and Eastern parts of Europe in what Doorenspleet (2000) terms the ‘explosive’ phase (1990-1994). During these five years a virtual democratic tsunami occurred, with 34 states choosing democratic systems. Not only did this third wave make democracy more common than authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1991:7), it formed a convincing image of the temporal and geographical clustering of the democratization process as well as a vivid reminder that democratization is an international phenomenon.

Just as the global mix of democratic and authoritarian regimes has been transformed in the post-war years, so too have new “constitutions [arisen] from the ashes of World War II” (Galligan & Versteeg, 2012:3). From the constitutions of West Germany and Japan, instated by the allies, new constitutions have emerged with the de-colonialization in Africa, Asia and the Middle East and later the collapse of the Soviet Union. For example, of the new democracies established after 1945, almost two-thirds have adopted a new constitution or made far-reaching changes to their existing one (Jung & Deering, 2015). These new constitutions seem to have followed the temporal and geographical patterns of democratization. Even so, scholars have rarely studied the crucial aspects of these new political arrangements, such

as executive-legislative relations, as phenomenon with an international character.

This flowering of democracy and democratization from the 1970s and onwards soon formed a center of scholarly attention. And as it flourished, it diverged into several subfields (Bunce, 2000), one being the diffusion of democracy and another investigating the recently transformed institutional landscape. In the beginning of the 1990s, however, there were still very few systematic analyses of presidential regimes, other than the functioning of the US presidential system.¹ Therefore, Linz' (1990; 1994) early comparison of the effects stemming from parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes filled a void. Based on developments in post-Peronist Argentina, Linz formulated an influential critique of presidential (and semi-presidential) regimes. In particular, he argued (1990:53) that a presidential government has two main characteristics: duality and rigidity. "The first is the president's strong claim to democratic, even plebiscitarian, legitimacy; the second is his fixed term in office." Combining these two meant that the division into winner and loser lasts for the whole term, building a whole culture of 'tension and polarization' (Linz, 1994:18-19). Linz' bold argumentation spurred scholars to take a renewed interest in political institutions.

While many scholars adhered to Linz' reasoning (Kirschke, 2007; Shoemsmith, 2003; Skach, 2005), others, such as Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), Shugart and Carey (1992), contradicted his claims. The latter emphasized that there are many types of presidential (and semi-presidential) regimes and that each type incorporates particular incentive formations that in turn cause different levels of democratic performance. Not *all* presidential or semi-presidential regimes, as Linz argued, are perilous. Empirical findings, though, have since been inconclusive (Elgie, 2016). Studies like Roper's (2002) and Moestrup's (2007), which make a distinction between the subtypes of semi-presidentialism, have produced results indicating that premier-presidential regimes fair better democratically than do president-parliamentary regimes. The findings of Sedelius and Linde (2018), who compare

¹ Linz (1994:4) argues that this was because "most of the stable democracies of Europe and the Commonwealth have been parliamentary regimes [...] while most of the countries with presidential constitutions have been unstable democracies or authoritarian regimes".

the democratic performance² of all four regime types³, corroborate such conclusions. There are, thus, empirically founded reasons to argue that each of the three main regime types (presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary regimes) comes with a distinct level of democratic performance and that *institutions matter*. The claim of Lijphart (1992), that the choice of regime is crucial, thus seems well founded.

As most of the studies feeding into the Linzian debate also adhere to Linz' treatment of regime types as an explanatory variable (Elgie, 2016), only a few studies have focused on the issue of how those regimes came to be. Considering the crucial influence attributed to the three regime types, we know surprisingly little about their origin and the reasons for their formation. Of the few studies there are, most of those that *have* focused on the establishment of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes (such as Geddes, 1996; Lijphart, 1992; Jung & Deering, 2015) have treated them as results of a decision-making process characterized by the domestic context. Jung and Deering (2015) expect the adoption of parliamentary regimes to take place in contexts of high uncertainty and presidential regimes to emerge in contexts of lower uncertainty. Curiously, "the uncertainty-centred logic of constitutional choices does not, however, explain how mixed [or semi-presidential] systems are adopted" (2015:70). Instead, Jung and Deering (2015) posit that the whole process of semi-presidential adoption is 'seriously under-theorized'. Considering that semi-presidentialism is the most recent of the three regime types, this is not surprising. Still, little is known or explained when it comes to the establishment of parliamentary and presidential regimes, and even less is known about the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Therefore, this thesis places its focus upon the establishment of semi-presidential rather than on all types of government systems.

In particular, this thesis plans to address the international dimension of semi-presidential systems. Existing studies have not followed developments in the general field of democratization, particularly research into the 'diffusion of democracy' (see, for example Gunitsky, 2014; Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016; Starr, 1991). As many new parliamentary, presidential, and

² Democratic performance is a term referring to the qualitative aspects of democratic regimes, such as the level of democracy (Elgie, 2011), but sometimes also including other aspects such as governmental efficiency (Sedelius & Linde, 2018).

³ The parliamentary, presidential, premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes of the semi-presidential regime.

semi-presidential regimes are closely related to democratization processes, they are likely to exhibit similar geographical and temporal features. Furthermore, it is a common assumption that newly drafted post-colonial constitutions commonly resemble their former colonial ruler's and that post-communist countries tend to choose a semi-presidential regime, both implying the influence of a legacy (Amorim-Neto & Costa-Lobo, 2014; Wu, 2011). Overall, there are cogent reasons to expect the structure of executive-legislative relations to follow, not only the strategic preferences of domestic elites, but also the patterns in the country's external context or its previous institutional legacies.

This lack of knowledge may have serious consequences. First and foremost, if we are unaware of the reasons for regime type establishment, we may simply not know as much about institutional influences as we would like to claim. “[W]hile we might appear to have identified certain institutional effects, it might be argued that we have actually identified the effect of the preferences of the actors who were involved in the original process of institutional choices” (Elgie & Moestrup, 2016:209). What's more, if semi-presidential establishment is a complex story of elites' strategic preferences and international sources of reference, the solution to bad institutions is not just a matter of pointing out the good ones. In addition, if scholars treat the institutions of semi-presidentialism as a mere independent variable that produces effects, there may be remnants of the influences that caused these institutions invested, hidden even, in what seems to be institutional effects. There is, thus, a serious risk of endogeneity: that institutions are not only causal influences, but themselves caused by the same variables we treat as results of institutions (Przeworski, 2007). For example, democratic quality may not only be influenced by a regime type. Instead, the level of political competition, which form one of the indicators of democratic quality, is also a potential reason for establishing a regime type. Thus, if political competition affects the choice of regime, is regime type the result or the cause of democracy? To answer questions of this kind, we need a thorough understanding of the establishment of regimes, not just knowledge about their effects.

And while it will continue to be important to learn more about the establishment of parliamentary and presidential regime types, it is essential to learn more about the establishment of semi-presidential regimes as we know so little about it. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to turn the existing research on its head and focus, not on the effects of a semi-presidential system, but on its establishment.

The main research question of this dissertation is: **Why and how does a state establish a semi-presidential regime?** Apart from the potential empirical knowledge gained, such a focus promises to add to the theoretical understanding of semi-presidential regime establishment in particular and to regime type establishment in general. Subsequent studies may thus compare results of this thesis to the establishment patterns of the other two regimes.

1.1 Introducing the perspectives

To study why and how semi-presidential regimes are established, this thesis uses a theoretical framework consisting of three main perspectives. Although studies rarely focus on the reasons for establishing a particular form of executive-legislative relations, those that do most often adopt a perspective anchored in rational choice institutionalism (RCI). This thesis takes a similar approach, but combines its institutionalist emphasis with the notions of diffusion from abroad and domestically anchored legacies.

Studies of institutional origin first centered on the influence of personal networks (Easter, 1996; 1997) or elite actor choices (Benoit & Schiemann, 2001; Frye, 1997; Geddes, 1996; Lijphart, 1992). As the latter approach became mainstream, the main bulk of studies adhered to rational choice institutionalism (RCI) which views “institutions as the outcome of strategic bargaining between goal-oriented actors” (Jones Luong, 2000:565).

In that vein, it is assumed that “preferences for institutional alternatives [is] based on the distributive payoffs” generated by that institution (Benoit & Schliemann, 2001:155). In other words, actors are self-interested and their choices strategic. Together with these expectations of actor orientation, a few additional assumptions have formed the core of institutional origin studies.

1.2 The RCI perspective

Crucial to what can be termed the ‘transitional bargaining’ approach, self-interested actors find themselves in a period of uncertainty (Frye, 1997; Geddes, 1996; Jung & Deering, 2015). These periods are labelled ‘critical junctures’ and “refer to choice points when a particular institutional option is adopted and a certain direction of change is established” (Jung & Deering, 2015:62). The critical juncture thus constitutes a break with preexisting historical and institutional legacies that enable strategic actors to choose a new institutional setup.

Scholars have noted that constitution making tends to take place in the aftermath of a “cataclysmic event of some kind” (Ginsburg, 2012:40). As leading actors consider new institutional setups in such a context, the outcome of the process can be uncertain and the future position of the actors unknown. Applying these assumptions to the choice of presidential powers, Frye (1997:546-547) separates between actor opportunities in circumstances of high and low uncertainty and concludes that “when uncertainty is low, actors can use existing institutions to translate their current political power into favorable institutional outcomes... Under uncertainty, powerful actors tend to hedge their bets and create institutions that are less biased in their favor than if they were operating under perfect certainty”. Applied to regime type origins, Jung and Deering (2015) argue that in a context of high uncertainty, a parliamentary regime will be preferred. When there are lower levels of uncertainty and elite actors who feel confident they will win the upcoming elections, those actors will opt for a regime type that concentrates power in the executive. That is, a presidential regime.

When put to the test, however, the results of these hypotheses are mixed.⁴ None of the uncertainty markers ends up having a significant impact on the choice of a mixed or semi-presidential regime. Instead, it is region (especially Eastern Europe and Asia) as well as being a former French colony that is most likely to influence the decision to choose a mixed regime type. As a result, we cannot be confident that the hypotheses deduced from the transitional bargaining perspective to a sufficient degree explain the establishment of a parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential regime. To answer the question of regime type establishment, we must use a broader theoretical umbrella.

1.3 Broadening the theoretical approach

Democratization studies adopting the theoretical framework of diffusion have traced the way the larger process of democratization is influenced by international phenomena. Research has shown that democracy spreads in clusters in both time and space: countries tend to democratize at the same time as other neighbor countries or as countries within close social or cultural proximity (see, f. ex. Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2015; Huntington, 1991; Wejnert, 2014). As the establishment of regime type is often made as part of a democratization process (Jung & Deering, 2015), there are reasons

⁴ Jung and Deering (2015) control for the effects of time, regional area, colonial legacy and level of development.

to expect that diffusion plays a similar influence upon the process of regime type adoption. To study regime type establishment, the theoretical umbrella should include perspectives that incorporate the international context as potentially influencing domestic political decisions.

In addition, although the term critical juncture is used to mean a break from the previous institutional setting, studies have found that even within a period of a critical juncture, elite actor decision making may not be completely free from previous experiences (or pathways) within the domestic context. There is, for example, a tendency to re-establish previously attempted regime types (Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010; Geddes, 1996; Møller 2013) and there is an obvious resemblance between the regime types of colonizers and their former colonies (Amorim-Neto & Costa-Lobo, 2014; Persson & Tabellini, 2003; Wu, 2011). This thesis will therefore study the making of regime type establishment with a theoretical umbrella that stretches beyond the transitional bargaining perspective.

1.4 Aim and research questions

The main aim of this thesis is thus to **increase our knowledge of why and how semi-presidential regimes are established**, using a set of three theoretical perspectives. For this purpose, four separate studies have been carried out. From the general tests of theoretically deduced causes on all cases of regime type establishment examined in Article I to an in-depth study of the process of regime type establishment in Article IV, each study acts as another piece in the puzzle. In the quest for improved knowledge, the thesis aims for both generally applicable answers to the reasons for regime type establishment as well as an in-depth understanding of how the process of regime type establishment evolves. The main aim is therefore divided into four specific research questions:

RQ 1: To what extent is regime type establishment influenced by the country-external influences of diffusion (or is it primarily a result of domestic influences)?

RQ 2: What do we know about semi-presidentialism and what does the field say about the establishment of a semi-presidential regime?

RQ 3: Where, when and why have semi-presidential regimes been established?

RQ 4: How does a decision-making process unfold into regime type establishment?

The first article of the dissertation answers the first research question, the second article the second question and so forth. Each research question and

each article supports the main aim of the thesis but in a different manner. Whereas Articles I, III, and IV are empirical studies of different sets of countries, Article II adds to the general aim through a review of the field of semi-presidential studies. While this latter article is based on a set of research questions, it investigates, not country-cases, but academic studies. Through this review, more thorough knowledge on the regime type whose establishment patterns are the most complex is gained. While Articles I and III study the reasons for regime type or semi-presidential establishment (in other words, the ‘why’), Article IV targets the process of semi-presidential establishment (in other words, the ‘how’).

The first article “Diffusion and the choice of democratic government system at the time of democratization” originates in the lack of explanatory power within the mainstream theory of transitional bargaining. It centers on the hypothesis that diffusion also influences regime type establishment. This proposition is tested by a large-N study of all cases of regime type establishment from 1946 onwards. Although the results alter depending on the regime type in question, they demonstrate that diffusion from the country-external context to a large extent influences the establishment of parliamentary, semi-presidential, and presidential regimes. It leads to the conclusion that regime type establishment is not only a story of domestic influences.

From their study of the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes, Jung and Deering (2015) gain knowledge on regime type establishment in general, but their contribution to the knowledge on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes is limited. The second article “A Structured Review of Semi-Presidential Studies: Debates, Results and Missing Pieces” therefore aims to trace what we know about semi-presidential regimes and to form a well-founded understanding of this regime type. It further identifies its main research themes, theories, definitions and case samples as well as for the main lessons learnt and the knowledge yet to be retrieved. The findings emphasize the field’s focus on democratic survival and performance, a primary focus that does not include the establishment of the regime. Furthermore, many of its scholars have emphasized the empirical usefulness of the semi-presidential subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Not only have they promoted increased knowledge about key issues such as democratic performance and survival, they also incorporate the crucial dimension of executive-legislative power distribution.

The third article “Semi-presidential Regimes and Subregimes: When, Where, and Why?” aims to describe and explain the establishment of semi-

presidential regimes including its two subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. It studies 83 cases of semi-presidential regime type establishment and tests the reasons for regime type formation through a broad spectrum of theoretically derived hypotheses. Its descriptive analyses illuminate temporal and spatial clusters as well as similarities in the circumstances characterizing the period of establishment. The regression analysis tests the application of three theoretical perspectives (diffusion, legacies, and transitional bargaining). Although some reservations emerge concerning the application of the transitional bargaining perspective, the results illuminate the application of all three perspectives.

The fourth article “Ukraine’s Process of Regime Type Establishment: Maneuvering a Constitution Amidst Diffusion, Legacy and Elite Preferences” aims to deepen our understanding of the process and outcome of the establishment of a semi-presidential regime in one selected case. The case of the Ukraine regime type, established in 1996, is a most likely case for diffusion influences. The aim of the article is to study the temporal sequence of events to find the mechanism that brought about the president-parliamentary regime of Ukraine. The study finds that this is the outcome of a long process of intertwined influences. Ukraine’s post-communist legacy formed the scope conditions, most obviously in the form of the elite formations active in the subsequent political process. Coercive diffusion triggered the move to a semi-presidential system whereas the process itself was, in the initial period, shaped by demonstration effects (diffusion) and the uncertainty of recent independence and, subsequently, by the strategic actions of the elite actors (transitional bargaining). In other words, all three of the theoretical perspectives identified in Article III were behind the establishment of Ukraine’s president-parliamentary system. In general, this thesis finds that diffusion, legacies, and elite strategic action are all essential elements in semi-presidential regime establishment, even though they operate and interact on different levels and arenas in the establishment process.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. The next section will introduce and define key terms and theories. The following section will introduce each method as well as the combined methodological approach. This section concludes with a summary of the method adopted in each article. The results of each article will then be presented followed by the discussion and summary of the over-all results of the thesis. The five main conclusions of the thesis will be reiterated and a few recommendations for further study suggested.

1.5 Regimes as part of the political system

This thesis aims to study the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Before defining the meaning of semi-presidential regimes, the general concept of a regime must first be explained and defined. A regime is less than the whole of a political system, but larger than its formal constitutional content (Easton, 1967). According to Easton's seminal definition, regimes are "sets of constraints on political interaction" (1967:193). The constraints consist of values, specifying what can be taken for granted, norms that identify expected and acceptable procedures and regime structures that comprise relationship patterns between authority roles. The regime types that emerge can reflect not only how power is distributed within a political system, but also condition the structures of that power.

However, most types of political regimes, such as democracy, authoritarian regimes, federalism, or majoritarian electoral systems, refer to only some part of the regime structure. In that manner, the concept of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes mainly describes the type of power distribution between the executive and legislative functions (1967). As emphasized by Cheibub, Elkins, and Ginsburg (2014: 518), the "defining distinction between presidentialism and parliamentarism concerns the degree of dependence of the executive on the legislature, specifically with respect to the selection and dismissal procedures of the executive". The definition of semi-presidential regimes thus captures the essence of executive-legislative power distribution whereas other aspects of power distribution as well as the incorporated norms and values are excluded. It only "provide partial guidance in understanding the allocation of powers within all types of systems" (Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2014: 539). That is to say; the regime studied in this thesis is but part of the over-all political regime.

1.6 Organization of the dissertation

The thesis consists of five chapters. Following the introduction, the theoretical perspectives are presented, including definitions of the particular regime types. The third chapter introduces the methods of each article as well as the combined methodological approach of the thesis as a whole. In the fourth chapter, the analyses and results of the individual articles and of the thesis are presented and discussed. The fifth and final chapter presents the conclusions and some suggestions for future studies.

2. Theories on regime type formation

Even though there are only a few empirical studies on the establishment of regime types, there are more than one theoretical perspective of relevance to the study of regime type establishment. Before describing and contrasting these perspectives, this section will present the definitions of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes. Due to the particular interest in semi-presidential regimes, its definition will be more thoroughly discussed. These definitions will be followed by a short summary of the early understanding of the origins of each regime type. Furthermore, a few relevant perspectives and knowledge gained from the larger field of constitution making will form a background for the subsequent theoretical descriptions. Finally, the three main theoretical perspectives of transitional bargaining, diffusion, and legacies, will be discussed and will form the basis of the theoretical models that will guide the empirical studies.

2.1 Defining regime types

As presented above, this thesis generally refers to regime type in the sense patterns of executive-legislative relations. The distribution of power among the executive and legislative branches of government forms the main criteria deciding whether a state is categorized as a parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential regime.⁵ These are the three main regime types used in the thesis, although the latter is also divided into two sub-types.

In the parliamentary regime type, “the executive is accountable, through a confidence relationship, to any parliamentary majority” (Müller, Bergman & Strøm, 2000:12). Since the government relies on the confidence of the parliament alone, parliamentarism has been described, in the terms of the principal-agent perspective, as a regime type of joint origin and survival. Within parliamentarism, the parliament and government have the same electoral origin and the survival of the government rests upon the parliament, and therefore on ‘fused’ powers (Shugart & Carey, 1992; Strøm, 2000).

In a presidential regime, the popularly elected president appoints the government and both the president and parliament serve for fixed terms (Shugart & Carey, 1992). Compared to the parliamentary regime, presiden-

⁵ On the few occasions where ‘regime type’ does refer to the democratic/hybrid/autocratic regime types, this will be specified.

tialism separates the origin (election) as well as the survival of the parliament and the president. That is, “citizens separately elect both the executive and legislative branches of government – usually through direct universal suffrage” (Samuels & Shugart, 2010:4). As the legislative majority “cannot remove the head of the executive branch”, their survival is also separate (Samuels & Shugart, 2010:4).

A semi-presidential regime, finally, resembles the presidential regime in that it separates the origin of the parliament and the president. In semi-presidential regimes, however, the prime minister and government (but not the president) are responsible to the legislature and, therefore, the separation of survival is not as profound as in presidential regimes (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010; Shugart, 2005).

Semi-presidentialism, as both an actual regime and a regime type, emerged at a later date than the previous regime types. Maurice Duverger defined semi-presidentialism as combining “three elements: (1) the president of the republic is elected by universal suffrage; (2) he possesses quite considerable powers; (3) he has opposite him, however, a prime minister and ministers who possess executive and governmental power and can stay in office only if the parliament does not show its opposition to them” (Duverger 1980:166). In the 1990s, the growing field of semi-presidential studies served to revitalize the definitional debate. In particular, the woolly formulation of ‘quite considerable powers’ led scholars to identify different sets of countries as semi-presidential. Consequently, the results of these studies fell short of accumulation. Because Duverger’s definition emphasized the powers of the president, semi-presidential states were often discussed as states suffering from the baleful influence of strong presidents (Elgie, 2016). In the late 1990s therefore, Elgie (Elgie, Moestrup & Wu, 2011:3) defined semi-presidentialism as “the situation where a constitution makes provision for both a directly elected fixed-term president and a prime minister and cabinet who are collectively responsible to the legislature”. Table 1 illustrates the three definitions of the regime types.

Table 1: Regime Type Competences

	Elections	Competences
Parliamentarism	Singular	Government rests on parliament for its survival
Presidentialism	Dual	Fixed terms, separate origin and survival
Semi-presidentialism	Dual	Government rests on parliament for its survival Fixed president

2.2 Adding the subtypes

Although Elgie’s definition enabled the construction of an agreed and commonly used set of semi-presidential countries (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2009), the definitional debate persisted. Some country specialists working on, for example, Ireland, Russia and France have refrained from classifying the country of their expertise as a semi-presidential case (Elgie, 2007). Other scholars have articulated a critique that has emphasized two main issues. Substantial variations in the level of presidential powers in actual countries (see Elgie, 2016) and the gap between *de jure* and *de facto* powers (see Duverger, 1980) leads to two types of questioning: do semi-presidential countries really constitute a common regime type and does a definition based on mere constitutional features capture its essence?

First, there is a well-known discrepancy in the level of presidential powers among the semi-presidential regimes. Semi-presidential countries are infamous for the divergent distribution of presidential powers and that the “prominence of presidents, prime ministers, and assembly parties vis-a-vis the cabinet can vary tremendously” (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010:1416). An easy answer to the issue of such discrepancies would be to point the finger at the variation that exists among parliamentary or presidential countries (Elgie, 2007). A more substantial way to address the issue is to use a two-step process of logic. Starting with Elgie’s taxonomical definition, a distinguishing line can be drawn between semi-presidentialism on the one side and parliamentarism and presidentialism on the other. Still, this “reveals nothing about the actual distribution of presidential power”. A second step, therefore, is “to generate some basic distinctions within the set of semi-presidential countries in a way that captures variation in actual presidential power” (Elgie, 2016:52). To do so, scholars have used more thorough descriptions of the actual regimes and also metrics of presidential powers. The first alternative risks reintroducing “the inherent ambiguity present

in Duverger's original formulation" whereas the latter risks capturing only constitutional powers while, at the same time, losing track of the actual functioning of the regime (Elgie, 2016:52). A third alternative is to instead "distinguish between semi-presidential countries on the basis of a further constitutional rule". The premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes developed by Shugart and Carey (1992) are commonly used for this purpose (Elgie & Moestrup, 2016).

According to Shugart and Carey (1992), premier-presidential regimes are those in which "the president selects the prime minister who heads the cabinet, but authority to dismiss the cabinet rests exclusively with the assembly majority" (Shugart, 2005: 333). In the president-parliamentary system, the president also selects the cabinet but the ability to dismiss it is shared by the president and the parliament (Shugart, 2005). Although a minor discrepancy at the surface level, this difference in the conditions for government survival has been found to cause substantial differences in the democratic survival and functioning of the two subtypes (Sedelius & Linde, 2018; Shugart & Carey, 1992).

As a second definitional step, there are several advantages to using these two regime subtypes. First, they fit neatly with Elgie's (1999) constitutional definition. Second, the distinction between them is based on constitutional rules that are easily and reliably distinguished, thus avoiding a step back into a mishmash of different categorisations. As the subtypes incorporate key dimensions of actual functioning, their use also addresses the critique that since Elgie's definition (1999) removes the dimension of power, there is a risk of squeezing too diverse regimes into one single container. Shugart and Carey's (1992) subtypes re-introduce at least one dimension of power. Crucially, their concept of government survival is central to the functioning of semi-presidential regimes, which "do not locate the power to control the government as unambiguously with either president or assembly as presidential or parliamentary constitutions do" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010:1418). From a principal-agent perspective, therefore, "the delegation of authority from voters (the ultimate principals in democracies) to elected politicians such as president and assembly (their agents)" and from those to the government" suggests that the political composition of semi-presidential governments is decided by the president and assembly" (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010: 1417). This ability to affect government survival is by no means a remote implication but rather captures some of the essence of the semi-presidential system (see Raunio & Sedelius, 2020). The subtypes portray a core dimension in the relationship between the main agents. They

help answer the question whether the government rests on the parliament or the president. That is, which of these three types of actors features as centre of power?

Introducing two semi-presidential subtypes thus answers the main critique against Elgie's post-Duvergerian definition. These subtypes incorporate a core dimension of presidential power that is central to the actual functioning of semi-presidential regimes: government survival. This allows different regimes to be compared within their own category rather than to all semi-presidential cases. Even so, these two subtypes may not form an ultimate solution. "At the very least, Shugart and Carey's distinction between premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism can serve as the basis for potentially valid conclusions about the effect of the variation in presidential powers within semi-presidential regimes. Perhaps better still, a more fine-grained measure of presidential power should be used" (Elgie, 2016:54). If such a fine-grained measurement were to be used, it would once again risk losing track of the actual functioning of the regimes. In any case, a measurement with such high validity and reliability has yet to be constructed. Doyle and Elgie (2016), for example, identify 45 individual measurements of presidential powers. From these, they construct a measurement combined out of 28 measurements - all based on constitutional features. Although they, in a transparent manner, report standard errors and confidence intervals, they do not properly address the earlier critique of Fortin (2013:108) who argues that "even if we hypothesize that the concept of presidential power is unidimensional, which probably is not the case, some items might be too independent to warrant inclusion in a composite index". In particular, to blend legislative and non-legislative powers⁶ in one single construct is questionable, as they do not form a common institutional construction in the sense that they vary in independent ways. Instead, the recent studies of Araújo, Silva, and Vieira (2016) or Doyle and Power (2020) are examples of attempts to study more specific presidential or executive powers. Their use of the subtypes and some specific dimension of presidential powers thus more closely follows the call by Fortin (2013) than the use of combined and potentially blurry measurements of common presidential powers.

⁶ Legislative powers are: package veto, partial veto, decree powers, exclusive introduction of legislation, budgetary powers, and the powers of referenda. The non-legislative powers are: cabinet formation, cabinet dismissal, censure, and the power to dissolve parliament (Fortin, 2013).

To conclude, this thesis will generally rely on the aforementioned definitions of parliamentarism, presidentialism and semi-presidentialism discussed here, with the latter further divided into the sub-categories of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Table 2 illuminates the definitions of the two subtypes.

Table 2: Semi-presidential Regime Type Competences

	Competences
Premier-presidentialism	Government rests on parliament for its survival
President-parliamentarism	Government rests on parliament and president for its survival

Not everyone is happy with the adoption of these two subtypes. Critics have emphasized that the premier-presidential regime type, in which government survival also relies on parliamentary parties, risks being too similar to parliamentarism. Since “the only criterion that separates parliamentary systems from semi-presidential ones is that the president is popularly elected in semi-presidential systems but not in parliamentary systems” (Anckar, 2019:328), a regime with a figurehead president may thus be argued to be in essence parliamentary. One way to address the issue is to look at some of these ‘figurehead’ presidents. A case in point is the semi-presidential regime of Slovakia. Although the Slovakian president is weak and in fact was given reduced powers when a semi-presidential regime was introduced (Anckar, 2019), President Gašparovič has been active in using his veto powers (Elgie, 2013). The recently established semi-presidential regime of the Czech Republic is another case in point, where the Czech president is known to have used his veto on no less than 63 occasions between 2003-2013 and to have used his powers of amnesty to cause a political storm (Elgie, 2013). Although weak, these presidents are more than just mere figureheads.

Another criticism maintains that the actual functioning of semi-presidential regimes are often far from their constitutional descriptions: there is too wide a gap between *de jure* and *de facto* powers or between the constitutional prerogatives and their actual use. The consequence may therefore be that any definition based on mere constitutional content does not capture the full functioning of the regime. Such a critique often refers to countries such as Austria and Iceland. In 1929 the Austrian constitution established a semi-presidential system in which a president is placed alongside a prime minister. The elected president has the capacity to appoint and dismiss the

government and to dissolve parliament. The president is also the commander-in-chief. Despite such an extended set of presidential prerogatives, the Austrian president is generally considered to be “strong only on paper” (Sartori, 1997:106). In practice, Austrian presidents have not utilized their competencies of government dismissal or parliament dissolution and with one exception (in 1949) have chosen to accept that cabinet ministers are selected according to party preferences (Müller, 1999). At the same time, the Austrian constitution was never intended to form a system revolving around a president. Instead, it was formed out of a compromise between the Social Democrats, who feared the legacy of a powerful Habsburg emperor, and the Christian Socials, who preferred a strong presidency. This compromise resulted in a weak president.

In a similar vein, the Icelandic president is commonly perceived as “a figurehead and symbol of unity rather than a political leader”. This perception deviates from the constitutional prerogatives of the president, who on paper has the ability to convene and dissolve the Althingi [parliament], appoint ministers, appoint state officials and conclude international agreements (Kristinsson, 1999:86, 89). Even so, it was “never the intention of the Althingi to create a strong presidency which might undermine its supremacy and parliamentary rule” (1999:89). Drafted in the swift move towards independence in 1944, when the occupying Danish government and monarch had ceased to perform their functions, the constitution of Iceland modelled its presidency on the already weak privileges of the Danish monarch. The limited powers of the Danish monarch were passed on to what became a weak president.

Both cases are valid examples of the discrepancy between *de jure* and *de facto* powers. Despite extended *de jure* powers, the game played seems to be a parliamentary one. The two examples emphasize that constitutional prerogatives only capture part of the political reality. Still, there are reasons to consider Austria and Iceland as examples of semi-presidential regimes in which the presidency has actual relevance. At the very least, their selection by popular election affords them a mandate of *potential* use. Accordingly, both presidencies are perceived as reserves of powers (Müller, 1999; Kristinsson, 1999). Even such weak *de facto* powers have been known enough to influence political realities. The Austrian president, for example, has acted to constrain government formation and “Icelandic presidents have undoubtedly believed in their constitutional right of refusing to countersign legislation.... When President Vigdis Finnbogadóttir delayed signing a par-

ticular legislative act for nearly three hours as a symbolic protest, the minister in question stated that he would have resigned had there been any further delay” (Kristinsson, 1999:92). Although both Austria and Iceland are examples of semi-presidential regimes in which *de jure* powers deviate from *de facto* powers, with presidents who are strong in theory and weak in practice, both presidents *have* the capacity to interfere in politics. They may be weak, but they are more than just figureheads. The potential to flex presidential muscles is occasionally demonstrated and not just implied.

2.2.1 Early descriptions of regime type origins

Moving away from definitions of regime types and closer to the understandings behind the establishment of regimes, we can note that regime types were for a long time a matter of choice between two ‘pure’ forms - the presidential and the parliamentary. In early descriptions of their formation, different characteristics of regime type origins appear. In particular, the characterization of parliamentary origins seems to differ from those of the presidential and semi-presidential types.

The term ‘parliamentary government’ originated in Britain in 1832. To be sure, British parliamentarism as such did not appear in 1832. It had, instead, evolved over several centuries, during which time the “authority over the cabinet shifted from the hands of the monarch to the parliament” (Shugart & Carey, 1992:6). British parliamentary government was, therefore, not a “product of deliberate institutional design” but rather a “historical accident” (Strøm, 2000:263), although a rather prolonged and gradual one. Given its long and early development, it became the archetypical example of parliamentarism. The second half of the nineteenth-century saw many other European countries such as Belgium, Italy, Norway, and Spain adopt parliamentary regimes (Strøm, Müller, & Bergman, 2006) and through the British Commonwealth, this regime type eventually ended up far beyond the boundaries of Europe (Strøm, 2000).

The idea of British, and by extension, parliamentarism in general as a process that evolves over time differs greatly from contemporary understandings of the origins of presidential regimes. Scholars of presidential regimes, such as Shugart and Carey (1992), describe constitution formation as a conscious quest over a limited period. Our current understanding of

the origins of presidentialism originates in the Federalist Papers,⁷ a series of essays that form the basis for the American constitution. Taken together these documents express the assumption that institutions shape actor preferences and behaviour. Since individuals were expected to be self-interested and power seeking, institutional incentives should constrain such ambitions among the most powerful institutional inhabitants (see Shugart & Carey, 1992). Presidential regimes should therefore incorporate attempts to preserve freedom through limited powers and mutual checks. In the U.S. Constitution, the separated origin and survival of parliament, cabinet and president are combined with the abilities of each branch to check the power of the other. The cabinet and the parliament were each enabled to “impose checks on the other without fear of jeopardizing its own existence” (Shugart & Carey, 1992:19). Compared to the gradual formation of British parliamentarism, the US presidential regime resulted from a limited period of formation guided by a strong and specific rationale. In summary, the British process of gradual regime formation does not obviously correspond to the transitional bargaining perspective on regime type establishment. It seems far more closely related to the descriptions of presidential regime type origins.

The semi-presidential regime was identified and acknowledged much later than the parliamentary and presidential regimes. The quest for common ground regarding definition and effects has been a journey that has continued well into the 2000s. When first described in the 1970s (Duverger, 1970), Duverger labelled only four regimes as semi-presidential: Austria, Finland, France and the Weimar Republic (Elgie, 2016). Not until the beginning of the 1990s, when the number of semi-presidential regimes grew exponentially, was the academic field established as its own.

With the general definition of Elgie (1999), the subtype definitions of Shugart and Carey (1992), and the triggering argument of Linz (1990), semi-presidential studies found (somewhat) stable ground. Alongside the wave of studies that debated and challenged the definitional components, there was a second wave of studies targeting the performance of the semi-presidential regime as part of the emerging scholarly interest in the new democracies of the post-communist region (Elgie, 2016). A third wave of research looked to combine studies of regime type effects with more in-depth elements of the particular “parties, power, and parliaments”, found among

⁷ The Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Madison and Jay later “drafted and then campaigned for the ratification of the U.S. Constitution ...” (Shugart & Carey, 1992:14).

both new post-communist and old established Western democracies (Elgie, 2016:58). This three-wave characterization of semi-presidential studies implies that the reasons for the establishment of semi-presidential regimes has not formed part of the focuses.

As seen above, there were, for a long time, only a few semi-presidential regimes. The first semi-presidential regimes were established European democracies that, between 1919 (Finland) and 1976 (Portugal), increased slowly in number. After this date, semi-presidential systems started to proliferate, especially in post-colonial and post-communist settings (Wu, 2011). The discrepancies in the origins of the presidential and the parliamentary regimes suggest that not all regimes may be formed out the same rationale. The description of semi-presidential origins even suggests that individual regime types may not have similar origins. Combined with the less than satisfactory empirical support for the transitional bargaining perspective, there are reasons to expect that more than one type of explanation is needed to capture the reasons for regime type establishment.

2.3 Theoretical origins of the rationalist perspective

Parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regime types are often established as part of a larger constitution-making process. To some degree, then, studies of regime type establishment are part of a larger field of constitution making studies. Some of the theoretical foundations of regime type establishment, therefore, reflect the assumptions developed for this field.

From the eighteenth century onwards, having a constitution as a single written document stating the main functions of the state became standard practice. “Constitutional design in its contemporary sense is associated with the rise and spread of the written constitutional form, conventionally understood to have emerged in full flower in the late eighteenth century” (Ginsburg, 2012:2). A constitution “establishes a system of government, defines the powers and functions of its institutions, provides substantive limits on its operation, and regulates relations between institutions and the people” (Galligan & Versteeg, 2012:6). In summary, a constitution defines the rules and principles that guide the governing of the state.

Constitutions are also responsible for the formal distribution of state powers through “a set of inviolable principles to which future lawmaking and government activity must conform” (Galligan & Versteeg, 2012:6). As the Federalist Papers demonstrate, the formal distribution of powers and functions both constrains the future exercise of power and articulates the way power *should* be exercised and constrained. Such norms center on the

protection of individuals' rights and the need to constrain majority rule in order to protect minorities (Elster & Slagstad, 1988). These are the basic ideas of *constitutionalism*. A constitution is, therefore, a mix of formal statements, values and "aspirations for the future" (Galligan & Versteeg, 2012: 11).

Although constitutional studies can indeed be traced back to Aristotle's systematic analysis of the Greek city states (Ginsburg, 2012), it was modernity and the spread of written constitutions in states such as the U.S., France, and Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that brought about constitutional studies as a comparative field of research (Blount, Elkins & Ginsburg, 2012). Within the past half-century, scholars have taken a renewed interest in individual agents as embedded in institutions (Galligan & Versteeg, 2012; Ginsburg, 2012). To state that there are no or very few studies of constitutional choice would thus be to belittle the scholarly achievements made. Studies of constitutional choice include the broader study of state building (Easter, 1996; 1997; Horowitz, 2002), democratization (Bunce, 2000; Gel'man, 2008; Hassan, 2013; McFaul, 2018; Pop-Eleches, 2007), and combined formal-informal dynamics (Hale, 2011; 2012; Kaplan, 2013; Knight, 1992).

Even closer to the aim of this thesis are the institutional studies centering on the choice of electoral system (Benoit, 2004; 2007; Chan, 2001; Kinsey & Shvetsova, 2008; Lijphart, 1992; Jones Luong, 2000), and the extent of power invested in the presidential seat (Frye, 1997; Lin, 2017; Lucardi & Almaraz, 2017; Negretto, 2009; Remington, 2012; Shugart, 1998; Van Cranenburgh, 2008). From the latter two groups in general, and the early studies of Easter and Elster in particular, lessons can be drawn which apply to the study of regime type formation (see Easter, 1996; Elster, 1995).

2.3.1 On to a study of elite actors

Within studies of constitution making, Elster narrows the unit of analysis to the study of small elite groups and frames the perception of constitution making as a strategic enterprise. In his early writings, Elster uses the French moralists to sketch three main motivations for constitutional engineering: *interests*, *passion* and *reason*. Taken together, these motivations shape the preferences of decision-makers. In his later writings, Elster argues that all three motivations ultimately do and should form part of the constitution-making process. Although subsequent studies within the transitional bargaining perspective continued the analysis of *interests*, motivations such as *passion* and *reasons* seem to have been left behind (Elster, 2012).

Easter's writings focus on constitution making as guided by interests. Studying why the structurally weak Bolshevik party managed to form the Soviet Union, Easter (1996; 1997) utilizes an analytical framework that centers on both informal and personal networks. Easter argues these networks are key to outcomes because within them "information was exchanged, resources were obtained, and activities were coordinated" in a way that extended the capabilities of the state (1996:23). Furthermore, Easter's studies directed attention toward constitutional origins as a matter of elite actor choices. In his writings, there was "a discrete emphasis on constitution making as an act of purposive institutional design" (Ginsburg, 2012:2), guided by micro-level dynamics. From the studies of Elster, but particularly of Easter, we can see the tendency to understand constitution making as a strategic choice made by elite actors.

2.4 The transitional bargaining perspective

Though still a sparsely populated terrain, many of the later studies of the establishment of electoral systems, presidential powers, and regime types adhere to the perspective of transitional bargaining (see Geddes, 1996; Frye, 1997; Jung & Deering, 2015). Among them, the studies of Rokkan (1970) and Lijphart (1992) were seminal.

According to Rokkan (1970:157), PR⁸ electoral systems were chosen "through a convergence of pressures from below and from above" where above referred to the old established parties and below to the rising working class. When applied to the post-communist setting, Lijphart modified Rokkan's original theory so that the term 'old-established class' refers to the Communist party whereas the 'rising working class' is translated into the forces for democratization. As the elites and their self-serving preferences were the driving force behind the institutional choices, Lijphart concludes that this is a rational choice type of explanation. Lijphart's study (1992) is therefore an early example of what was later termed the transitional bargaining perspective.⁹

In transitional bargaining, the assumption of a rationalist actor orientation unites with the assumptions that the period of constitutional choice can be framed as a critical juncture, a period that breaks with the common situation in which continuity is favored (Soifer, 2012:1573). Within these

⁸ Proportional representation.

⁹ The term can be found in Jones Luong (2000), but the exact term used is the 'transitional bargaining game'.

studies (for example Frye, 1997; Geddes, 1996; Jung & Deering, 2015), a critical juncture is a period “where existing institutional arrangements become malleable and subject to fundamental reconsideration” (Jung & Deering, 2015:62). A critical juncture thus constitutes a break with preexisting cultural and historical legacies that enable institutional genesis. This creates opportunities for institutional reorientation in ways that are utilized by elite actors. Closely related to the game theory analysis of Tsebelis (1990), Lijphart (1992), Geddes (1996) and Frye (1997) assume that actors will use the critical juncture to “maximize their individual political power by securing office and by designing institutions that will allow them to exercise their power to the greatest extent possible” (Frye, 1997:532). For these scholars, therefore, constitution making became a process forged within critical junctures and decided by elite actor bargaining founded on actors’ strategic rationale (Jung & Deering, 2015).

There is an obvious risk that the portrayal of elites in the transitional bargaining perspective gives the sense that they form a homogenous group. However, both Rokkan (1970) and Lijphart (1992) refer to at least two groups - the old and the new elites - and incorporated within those, the political majority and minority. In this dichotomy, in circumstances of uncertainty, majorities are expected to behave in a one manner and minorities in another. Neither the elites nor their preferences are thus perceived as homogenous. However, what happens within the specific negotiations is rarely spelled out (Frye, 1997; Geddes, 1996). The assumption seems to be that the majority will have the final call; the theoretical accounts seem to favor the preferences of the majority actors.

Although a critical juncture is therefore a period of opportunity for elite actor influence, the period also poses a challenge for actors and their rational calculations. Early on, scholars noted that constitution making seems to evolve after a “cataclysmic event of some kind, such as war, coup, economic crisis, or revolution” (Ginsburg, 2012:40). Spurred by such events, scholars theorized that a critical juncture emerged when the institutional framework had ceased to exert its stabilizing function. This critical period is therefore not only characterized by opportunity but also by upheaval and uncertainty and the related risks of miscalculation and misperception. The critical juncture, therefore, is also a period in which actors have fewer clues about the results of their decisions (Jung & Deering, 2015). When uncertainty is high, actors seem to “hedge their bets and create institutions that

are less biased in their favor than if they were operating under perfect certainty” (Frye, 1997:547). High levels of uncertainty are therefore expected to lead to ‘risk-averse behavior’ (Jung & Deering, 2015).

From empirical studies, we can conclude that elite actors are expected to experience high uncertainty in the following circumstances (Frye, 1997; Geddes, 1996):

- A fast pace of transition
- Low prior levels of political competition
- When the transition coincides with the turmoil of state-building
- When the transition coincides with an economic recession
- In low levels of prior media freedom
- In low levels of prior opportunities for opposition formation
- If no prior national elections or when prior elections were far away or did not produce an obvious winner

The outcome of elite actor strategies related to the level of uncertainty has been somewhat debated. At the moment of transition, both old and new elites feel uncertain about the effects of the first post-transition elections (Geddes, 1996). For Lijphart (1992), conditions of uncertainty lead elite actors to choose presidential systems, because they involve a constitution of separated powers which enables them to limit their risk. For Geddes (1996), this is a misconception. The risk that needs to be managed is not the overall functioning of the regime itself, but the electoral process and the nature of its outcomes. The ‘zero-sum nature’ of regimes with a popularly elected president is thus contrasted with parliamentary systems that require a coalition government if the winner does not gain the majority of votes (Jung & Deering, 2015). For the elites who risk becoming the losers of a presidential election, being part of the opposition in a parliamentary regime is to be preferred. Presidentialism is therefore favoured by majority actors in circumstances of lower uncertainty and parliamentarism by all elites in circumstances of high uncertainty (Geddes, 1996).

What should we expect when it comes to semi-presidential regime establishment? To Jung and Deering (2015), semi-presidential regimes incorporate a popularly elected president and may thus be expected in circumstances of low uncertainty. However, given the vast differences between the power and status of presidents within semi-presidential regimes and the different incentive formation of the two semi-presidential subtypes as portrayed in the principal-agent perspective (Schleiter & Morgan-Jones, 2010;

Shugart & Carey, 1992), such a conclusion is debatable. Although the executive of a president-parliamentary regime includes both a president and a prime minister, the regime *de facto* concentrates powers on the president, who appoints the prime minister and can dismiss the government (Sedelius & Linde, 2018; Shugart & Carey, 1992). The elections of presidents within president-parliamentary regimes should thus be seen as winner-take-all events. In premier-presidential regimes, on the contrary, the government rests solely on parliament, ensuring it and its opposition maintain influential roles throughout the mandate period. Presidential elections in premier-presidential regimes are not, to the same extent, winner-take-all events. The hypothesis that lower levels of uncertainty will favor a presidential regime also applies to the president-parliamentary regime whereas the expectation that higher levels of uncertainty will favor a parliamentary regime also holds for the premier-presidential regime. As the general category of semi-presidential regimes consists of both subtypes, the level of uncertainty does not render expectations in any particular direction. Instead, the influence of the level of uncertainty on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes should be neutral.

In the thesis, the main components of the transitional bargaining perspective form a model that will function as a base model. Each theoretical perspective will elaborate this model in its respective way. The base model as well as the elaborated theoretical models will, finally, be compared to the empirical results of the thesis.

Contextual conditions → Uncertainty → Actor preferences & negotiations
→ Regime type establishment

However, we know that regime formation can take place in situations of either high or low uncertainty. Using the transitional bargaining perspective, again, regime formation under these two differing conditions is hypothesized as in these two theoretical models:

Context of low uncertainty → Actors prefer winner-take-all regime type → A presidential or president-parliamentary regime is established

Context of high uncertainty → Actors prefer regime type of low concentration of powers → A parliamentary or premier-presidential regime is established

The theoretical perspectives below will be used to form respective theoretical models. The empirical results will subsequently form empirical models to be related back to these theoretical models.

2.5 Uncertainty and recent independence

Studies of the transitional bargaining perspective have suggested that the level of uncertainty conditions actors' regime type preferences. In the transitional bargaining perspective, different variables are used as proxies for uncertainty. One of those variables is recent independence.

In general, new states suffer from higher levels of uncertainty than older established ones (Denk & Anckar 2014; Denk & Lehtinen, 2019; Svoblik, 2008). "Newly independent states face uncertain political futures. Their leaders must quickly choose myriad institutional arrangements" (Rost & Booth, 2008: 635). This means that elite actors must concurrently form the state, set up its core institutions and establish new organizational routines, all in circumstances where the structure of old and new elite relations is not yet stable (Denk & Anckar, 2014).

Uncertainty levels surrounding regime formation are, therefore, likely to be higher for states experiencing recent independence than for other cases of regime establishment. The uncertainty created by recent independence may even constitute other expectations on regime type outcome than those commonly expected during the context of a critical juncture. In recent independence, uncertainty implicates the issue of state survival. When elite actors cannot take state survival for granted, it may not even be relevant to engage in a literal struggle for future powers. Instead, the key priority for elite actors becomes ensuring the state's survival and establishing a regime that promotes and protects it. In actuality, this regime is often one with a strong and popularly elected president (Harasymiw 2001; Van Cranenburgh, 2008; Wolczuk 2001), the opposite of what might be expected in high levels of uncertainty, according to transitional bargaining. Therefore, this thesis will treat the perspective of recent independence as a subcategory to the common transitional bargaining perspective. A theoretical model of recent independence might therefore be:

Context of recent independence → High uncertainty → Actors prefer regime type that preserves state → A presidential or president-parliamentary regime is established

2.5.1 Drawbacks of a singular focus

A theoretical framework directs the scholarly focus towards certain aspects while leading it away from others. Studies within the transitional bargaining perspective center on elite actor preferences as shaped by the uncertainty in the domestic context as part of a critical juncture. This uncertainty-centered logic developed for good reasons. Critical junctures were, as a concept, formulated to allow for the analysis of periods which broke with pre-established long-term and historical trajectories and in so doing constructed a theoretical perspective that could account for institutional change and reorientation (Jung & Deering, 2015). At the same time and as part of the larger transitional bargaining perspective, the analysis of regime type establishment was narrowed down. The following section will discuss the implications of such a narrowed focus.

First, the focus of transitional bargaining on the *strategic* choices of elite actors has identified elite actor interests as the main motivation behind regime type choices. According to an early description of actor motivations (Elster, 1995), interests are accompanied by *passion* and *reasons*. Although passion might seem a bit far-fetched, transitional bargaining favors the analysis of interests while neglecting other types of motivation such as reasoning, learning, or norm formation.

Second, although the sub-perspective of recent independence to some extent incorporates the lingering effects of a former external ruler, scholars of the transitional bargaining perspective have focused on constitutional choices made by elites who are constrained by the level of uncertainty within their *domestic* context. Focusing on the domestic context implies, to an extent, an over-simplification of the environment in which regime type establishment takes place. Studies of democratization have long shown that the spread of democratic regimes has obvious international patterns. The current field of democratization studies is replete with studies showing that democratization has developed in temporal waves and spatial clusters. As the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regime types seems to follow these democratizing patterns, studies of regime type establishment should study the potential effect of the international context.

Finally, as a concept, critical junctures, were largely developed to enable the study of institutional change or adaptation. Scholars have therefore focused on the period's potential for institutional reorientation and the influence that elite actors have on this process. Their focus on institutional reor-

ientation, however, runs the risk of exaggerating the decrease in institutional stability or the general influence of previous historical experiences. Although a critical juncture may thus increase an actor's influence on the new institutional setup, institutional legacies of various kinds can still have an impact. Actor preference formation or strategic actions may thus not be as free as is sometimes expressed in the transitional bargaining perspective (Amorim-Neto & Costa-Lobo, 2014; Capoccia & Ziblatt, 2010; Wu, 2011).

2.6 Diffusion from abroad

Although studies on the diffusion of parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential regimes are rare, the idea that developments in the international arena can have an influence on constitutional origins is not. Initially, when the early examples of modern constitutions were formed in the United States, France and Poland, these documents received considerable international attention in other states that were on the verge of institutional reorientation. When Latin American constitution making took off, it became even more obvious that constitution-makers actually borrowed from other contexts. "The persistence of presidentialism in Latin America, the use of French and Westminster models of government in former colonies, and the recent use of national conferences in Francophone Africa" all portrayed the diffusion of constitutions (Ginsburg, 2012:39). Early constitution making made it clear that political institutions were able to travel and that the ideas which generated them could spread across oceans.

Referring to the rapid growth of democratic countries since 1973, the idea of democratic diffusion became popular with Huntington's seminal contribution (Huntington, 1991; Starr, 1991). Huntington, and many scholars since him, have demonstrated that democracy spreads, or diffuses, in both geographical clusters and temporal waves (Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016). Compared to regime type adoption, studies of democratic diffusion target a related though not identical phenomenon. Using the theories developed to explain democratic diffusion thus calls for a certain awareness. First, the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes often form part of a larger transition process (Jung & Deering, 2015). Even so, the establishment of executive-legislative relations is only part of the democratization process, a part that begins at a later phase of the larger democratization process, namely when the old regime has already broken down and the new institutions are to be decided (Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016). Whereas the breakdown of the old regime may involve actors

at both mass and elite levels, the setting up of new institutions is mainly an elite level process (Jung & Deering, 2015; Rost & Booth, 2008). As regime type adoption is therefore a more narrow process in terms of both phase and actors, the active mechanism driving diffusion in this case may differ from the mechanism behind the diffusion of democracy more widely.

Modern democracy first took shape as a result of the American and French revolutions. Democracies are regimes in which the “most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote” (Huntington, 1991:7). This modern form of political governance then spread across Western Europe. Democratic transformation started in the first and slow wave of 1893-1924 and continued through two additional waves (1944-1957, 1973-).¹⁰

Early research into the geographical and temporal patterns of democratization concluded it was caused by ‘diffusion’. Although the lexical meaning of diffusion is simply “to spread in many directions” (Cambridge Dictionaries Online, 2013), the theoretical understanding of diffusion is more complex. Originating in various academic disciplines such as culture and folklore studies, psychology and sociology (Sriwannawit & Sandström, 2015), the shared emphasis was on spatial connections and their ability to spread a phenomenon. However, later studies by urban geographers and economists emphasized the social meaning of the term. Rogers (2003:5) describes diffusion as “the process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. In that way, Rogers emphasizes, not only that diffusion plays out among actors within a common *social* system, but also that it is *communicated* among those actors, a communication that has a certain *temporal* component. Diffusion, as these studies make clear, is not a natural phenomenon that evolves automatically. It is a social phenomenon that spreads across time and through the communication of people in a shared social system.

Although Rogers’ definition was frequently used in studies of democratic diffusion, the operationalization they adopted was far more simplistic. The main aim of these studies was simply to establish the occurrence of democratic diffusion: that there *is* such a thing as the diffusion of democracy. Most of the time, their operationalization of this process settled for results that illuminated the temporal cascading and spatial clustering of the democratic regime type (O’Loughlin et al. 1998). Although such findings did

¹⁰ When and if the last wave ended is still debated.

make the point that “the hard shell of the nation-state is permeable” (Starr, 1991: 377) and its governance structures can be changed, they did not inform the reader on *how* or *why* diffusion relates to the adoption of democracy.

A second wave of diffusion studies in the early 2000s began to explore particular aspects of diffusion in greater depth. Topics that were explored include the phases of democratic diffusion (Houle, Kayser & Xiang, 2015; Weyland, 2014; Huntington, 1991), the actors of diffusion (Houle, Kayser & Xiang, 2015), political instabilities (Goldstone et al., 2010) or the geographical region in which diffusion plays out (Wejnert, 2006). These studies have served to emphasize the complexity of democratic diffusion. For example, scholars have pointed out that the diffusion of democracy may operate in different ways depending on the particular stage a democracy is in (Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016), or the region in which it evolves (Wejnert, 2006). Research has shown that timing also matters. For example, whereas the early period of ending the old regime is often characterized by mass level protests, the later period of setting up the new regime is mainly a process handled by elite actors (Elkink, 2011; Houle, Kayser, & Xiang, 2016). What is clear is that the patterns and forces of democratic diffusion do not come in one shape only. The patterns of regime type diffusion are related to time, place, and stage.

As a critique against the earlier studies of diffusion, later diffusion studies also reclaimed the social meaning of diffusion as part of their empirical studies. Wong and Woodberry (2015), for example, criticize the way geographical proximity has been used as a proxy for diffusion. They argue that dense geographical patterns may not explain why some geographical neighbors are emulated while others are not. Instead, it is different types of state networks, such as cultural, colonial, or intergovernmental, in which diffusion is the most likely to develop (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Torfason & Ingram, 2010; Wong & Woodberry, 2015). Although these networks do not capture the way diffusion evolves, they can be seen as *vessels* for the development of diffusion. International state networks of different kinds, therefore, facilitate diffusion. They enable the formation of established relations that increase communications between a particular group of countries. Later diffusion studies have, therefore, come to utilize the notion of state networks as part of their empirical studies. This thesis will do the same.

Drawing on the fields of anthropology, economy, and sociology, Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett (2006) rejected a perfunctory use of the diffusion concept. Instead, they identified a number of mechanisms through which diffusion could evolve:

- **Coercion** stems from power asymmetries which give powerful countries the opportunity to influence less powerful countries. Coercive diffusion appears in a hard or forceful version as well as in a soft or ideational version.
- **Competition** stresses the potential of improved competitive advantage that spurs the international diffusion of a phenomenon, meaning, for example, that new policies may diffuse as a way to improve the country's ability to attract international resources.
- **Learning** "refers to a change in beliefs or change in one's confidence in existing beliefs, which can result from exposure to new evidence, theories, or behavioral repertoires" (1006: 795). Learning can be seen in both objective and intersubjective terms.
- **Emulation** emphasizes the change of norms. It can be based on sociological theories of social construction, emphasizing that membership in a certain epistemic community can change the extent to which a policy is seen as socially acceptable. Accounts of emulation can also originate in psychological reference group theory, which suggests that actors "emulate the behavior of their self-identified peers, even when they cannot ascertain that doing so will in fact be in their best interests" (2006:800). In this sense, emulation is not based on the strategic interests of the actor.

Other efforts to pin down the mechanism of diffusion can be seen in studies by Houle, Kayser and Xiang, (2015) or Maggetti and Gilardi (2015).

2.6.1 Diffusion or confusion? Some clarifications

First, the terms diffusion and interdependence are sometimes used interchangeably. Although their respective meaning overlap, they are not identical. Interdependence means "contexts in which the outcomes of interest...in some units of analysis...directly affects others" (Franzese & Hays, 2008:771). Because diffusion necessitates communication between actors, something not always part of interdependent relations, diffusion is more than just interdependence, even though it has an interdependent component. Interdependence, however, may not on every occasion mean diffusion. Diffusion and interdependence are, therefore, closely related and should not be seen as contradictory.

Do cognitive shortcuts stemming from striking international events, such as a coup d'état or the democratization of a powerful country, really constitute diffusion? In an orthodox sense, they may not. The swift and non-reflective manner in which political actors can emulate actions taking place in another country seems to break with the orthodox view of what diffusion is. Using Rogers' (2003:5) definition, diffusion is a process of communication across established social patterns that also has a temporal component. That pattern does not have to be slow and it does not stipulate that actors must communicate in a face-to-face situation. Rather, communication may mean that information is shared from a distance and in a swift manner. When communication is understood in this broad fashion, rapid waves of change can be seen as diffusion.

2.6.2 Comparing perspectives

The understanding of regime type establishment differs between the transitional bargaining and the diffusion perspectives. First and most obviously, they look for influences in different contexts. While the former treats the establishment as a domestic-level event, diffusion theory expects establishment to take place as a result of country-external influences. That is, while diffusion theory may agree with the transitional bargaining perspective that a regime is ultimately chosen by elite actors, diffusion theory expects those choices to be influenced by the international arena to an extent not seen in transitional bargaining.

In addition, while transitional bargaining is, at its core, a rationalistic perspective in which actor's motivations are strategic, democratic diffusion may or may not have an agreed understanding of the motivation for elite preferences.¹¹ Scholars such as Braun and Gilardi (2006) portray diffusion as a rationally based process driven by expected utility and decided by the payoffs and the expected effectiveness of the new system. However, as the mechanism of emulation (Simmons, Dobbins & Garrett, 2006) suggest, decision-making actors may undergo a transformation of their normative orientations. An example of this is the convergence that forms within the networks constructed by a colonial power's former colonies (Coppedge,

¹¹ As a result, I have decided to frame my dependent variable as 'the establishment of regime types' rather than as 'regime type choices' (see Jung & Deering, 2015) because the latter configuration only connotes the rationalist perspective. If not part of descriptions stemming from rational choice institutionalism or discussions of actual choices, the term 'establishment' is consequently used.

Tiscornia, & Lindberg, 2015:2). In those postcolonial networks, shared norms can evolve out of a “common history, shared language and religion” and because of their shared migration flows. In its more psychological form, emulation may form out of dramatic events in another but related country. A revolution in a neighboring country may, as another example, cause actors to make the hasty conclusion that the same measures will be equally successful in their own country. In this way, cognitive shortcuts induce actors to “attach a rationally unjustified degree of significance to particularly vivid, striking, [and] easily accessible events” (Weyland, 2014:7). Diffusion does not entirely rest on rationalistic assumptions.

Furthermore, if some cases of regime type establishment are caused by diffusion and others by strategic elite action (as transitional bargaining would suggest), the two groups of cases may not exhibit similar temporal patterns. Elster (1995) and Sajó (1999) have already argued that constitutions are often formed in the wake of some sort of international crisis or fundamental change. The temporal pattern of democratic transformations, for example, are known to depart from the ordinary s-curve of innovations. Wejnert (2014), in turn, demonstrates that societies with low levels of organizational capacity may be particularly susceptible to the psychologically overwhelming influences of striking and dramatic events in their international context. Regime type establishment caused by diffusion may thus exhibit different characteristics compared to those expected by the transitional bargaining perspective.

2.6.3 A theoretical model of diffusion

In a rare study of the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes, Jung and Deering (2015) include diffusion as one of their variables. Their results give only partial support for its effect. That said, they used an older type of operationalization in which geographical proximity (being a country neighbor) is used as a proxy for diffusion. Because of this approach, we still know little about the potential effects of diffusion stemming from different types of international networks. The theoretically deduced model of regime type establishment gained from the field of democratic diffusion and used in this thesis, accordingly, incorporates a few main assumptions:

1. The influences of diffusion upon regime type establishment typically stem from macro level phenomena occurring in the international arena.

2. Diffusion is a social phenomenon that causes visible patterns in the shape of temporal waves and geographical clusters.
3. These patterns of diffusion can be expected within state networks of different kinds.
4. Diffusion may cause slow or explosive patterns of establishment.
5. The elite actor responses to such international phenomena may or may not be rationally founded depending on the type of diffusion mechanism involved.

From these assumptions, a general model of regime type establishment can be formed as a basis for a subsequent operationalization of diffusion as follows:

International context → actors prefer same regime type as in international state network → The regime type common in the international state networks is established

2.7 Legacies of the past

As part of political science, studies of legacies¹² today form an important part of the larger field of democratization (Pop-Eleches, 2007; Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017). Because of the many post-colonial and post-communist semi-presidential countries, the legacies of colonialism and communism naturally form part of the potential influences upon the establishment of semi-presidential regime. Soviet communism, for example, “was arguably history’s greatest experiment in trying to reorganize the fundamental tenets of political, economic, and social life in a radical fashion. Moreover, the ‘treatment’ was of a long and continuous duration: over 40 years in east-central Europe and close to 70 years in most of the republics of the former Soviet union” (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2017:281). That is, communism had the explicit aim of creating a legacy and although the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, its ambition to shape social relationships lingers.

In spite of the many studies on legacies, the actual meaning of the term has yet to receive a common definition (Simpser, Slater, & Wittenberg, 2018). A legacy can mean anything from *the outcome* of a critical juncture (Collier & Collier, 1991), a durable causal relationship in general (Kotkin

¹² Although the term legacy may be specified, its effects often form packages of historical, institutional, economic or cultural types. In this thesis, the term legacy is not given a specification such as ‘historical’ or ‘institutional’.

& Beissinger, 2014), or the aftereffects of causes that have seized to operate (Wittenberg, 2015). Still, Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg (2018: 421) argue that there *is* “broad agreement on what constitutes a legacy argument even if there is disagreement on which part of the argument is labeled the legacy”. In their view, legacy studies both “entail a commitment to causal explanation” and generally treat a legacy as a systemic political transformation that creates a path leading to a particular outcome (2018:420). According to Wittenberg (2015:369), legacy arguments tend to have at least three components: “an outcome that is not fully explainable from causes contemporaneous with that outcome, a cause or correlate that existed prior to the outcome, and potential (or at least speculative) links between the antecedent and the outcome”. The antecedent should thus appear in one time period and the legacy it forms in another and later period. Between the two there should be some kind of link (Wittenberg, 2015). At the very least, a legacy is the outcome of a cause situated in an earlier period of time. The temporal dimension thus forms the core of the term.

Just as the definition of a legacy varies, so does the type of study utilized to capture it.¹³ In the review carried out by Simpser, Slater and Wittenberg (2018), legacy studies can be grouped into two main traditions: the comparative-historical analysis (CHA) and the tradition of modern political economy (MPE). Whereas the former tends to be qualitatively and macro-historically oriented, the latter has a quantitative and micro-historical orientation. “CHA research is often able to delve into chains of causation in great detail within a relatively small number of cases, while MPE work tends to benefit from larger data sets and statistical inference (2018:434).” As stated above, semi-presidential regimes are often situated in post-colonial or post-communist contexts, both of which form key subjects for the CHA and the MPE traditions. As this thesis also has the ambition to include both micro and macro level influences, it will combine the assumptions and knowledge retrieved from both traditions

¹³ Pop-Eleches (2007), for example, identifies five different legacy dimensions. Geographical legacies, emphasize location, such as proximity to the West. Cultural-religious legacies refer to predominant religious affiliation or a particular imperial legacy. Economic legacies refer to the impact of a particular type of economy. Social condition or modernization legacies mainly refers to the level of development within the country in question. Institutional legacies mean the type of bureaucracy the country functioned under, and the length of time it spent operating with this model.

2.7.1 Homogenizing effects

Several decades of research into authoritarian and colonial regimes has furthered our knowledge of their political legacies. The first is that a colonial or authoritarian past seems to produce lingering effects even after the colonial and authoritarian rulers have long gone. Among the studies of colonial legacy, Hayek's (1960) was formative in its recognition of the influence of a particular colonial ruler. First and foremost, Hayek distinguishes between the effects of British and French rule, arguing that the legacy of British common law was superior to that of French civil law. In a similar vein, Kohli (2004) describes the way British and Japanese colonial rule may have increased development and North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000) show that a colonial legacy reflects both the institutional setup and the ruling ambitions of the particular colonizer. A particular colonizer can thus create a distinct legacy, setting the country being ruled off on a certain trajectory (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2012). This means that countries that share the experience of being ruled by the same colonizer also share a similar memory of that ruler. A former colonial ruler is thus known to cause homogenizing effects on future prospects of their former colonies.

Just as studies of colonial legacy have emphasized the homogenizing effect of colonialism on post-colonial political systems, so also have legacy studies targeting authoritarian legacies in general, and the post-communist legacy in particular, identified similar results. Jowitt (1992) describes a distinct Leninist legacy (Pop-Eleches, 2015). For Jowitt, the countries who spent several decades under Leninist rule began to show signs of intra-regional similarities which fostered the comparative uniqueness of the region. Bunce (1995:981) suggests that post-communist countries in general "share a similar economic, political and social history as a consequence of the homogenizing effects of state socialism; they evidence many similarities in their agendas of transformation." The conscious attempts to transform political, economic, and social life have demonstrated strong and coherent effects.¹⁴ Colonial and communist regimes both left considerable legacies on their former dependent states. These can differ depending on the nature of the colonial ruler or the local particularities of the communist context, but a particular legacy is expected to have a homogenizing effect within the previously ruled countries through its particular combination of social dimensions.

¹⁴ For additional and recent contributions see Bustikova and Corduneanu-Huci (2017) or Way and Casey (2018).

Are colonial and communist legacies comparable? Should they be treated as separate categories? In general, the answer is yes. Studies rarely consider the two systems together, but taken as a whole their legacies are sometimes similar and often comparable. As described above, the ideological ambition of communism and its aspiration for political, economic, and social transformation calls for separate treatment of a post-communist legacy. On the other hand, the distinction should not be exaggerated. In a study comparing Eastern European communism with African authoritarianism “[c]ommunism in Eastern Europe was both an imperial and an authoritarian political system. African democracies feature authoritarian legacies arising from postcolonial regimes that imposed their authority over local political actors in ways that resonate strongly with practices of communism and imperialism” (Simpser, Slater, & Wittenberg, 2018:422). What a colonial legacy is and what an authoritarian legacy is thus are not always diametrically different.¹⁵ Although this thesis tests the effects of communist and colonial rule separately, it also holds the assumption that the results can be compared.

There are reasons to expect that the establishment of regime type are made ‘in the shadow of the past’: that a colonial or communist legacy produces particular effects on subsequent regimes established. A general model of legacy impact might look like this:

A post-communist or post-colonial antecedent in a state → Actors’ preferences for institutional solutions are related to that particular antecedent → The established regime type reflects the shared legacy

However, studies of colonial and post-communist legacies have been questioned for their overly simplistic assumptions about the effects of a particular colonial or authoritarian ruler and for their assumption of causal homogeneity. Recent post-colonial studies, for example, have emphasized that the influence of the same former ruler can produce different effects in different contexts or across different time periods (Simpser, Slater, & Wittenberg, 2018). Heterogeneous effects may, for example, stem from the type of de-colonialization process or struggle (Congleton & Yoo, 2018), from particular pre-colonial political environments (Larcom, 2019), or from the

¹⁵ Schmitter and Karl (1994), and lately Carter, Bernhard, and Nordstrom (2016) argue that the uniqueness of the post-communist region is exaggerated altogether.

influence of particular features (such as the settler mortality rate) on a pre-colonial jurisdiction that then influences subsequent trajectories and interferes with the effects of colonial rule (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2012; Larcom, 2019; Maseland, 2018). Studies of post-communist legacies have, in a similar vein, described diverse legacies. Instead of highlighting the commonalities shared by post-communist countries, Janos (1993) revels in their diversity and the way their heterogeneity is rooted in pre-communist societies. Also referred to as patrimonial communism, the post-Soviet type of post-communist diversity has been traced back to different types of inherent bureaucracies (Kitschelt, 2003), or to different pre-communist levels of trust (Bustikova & Corduneanu-Huci, 2017). Patrimonial communism exhibits “low opportunities for intra-elite contestation and popular interest articulation and low to intermediate rational-bureaucratic institutionalisation” (Kitschelt, 1995:453), anchored in a hierarchical network of patron-client relations (Hale, 2015; Ishiyama, 2015). Such hierarchical networks are known to deter the ability of post-Soviet countries to transform in a more democratic direction (Hale, 2015). All-in-all, there is an increasing awareness that there may be different legacies from the same colonial or communist ruler.¹⁶

One of the major lessons that has been learned is the need to separate the post-communist region into at least two types. A commonly used distinction is the one between the post-Soviet countries (meaning the pre-war members of the Soviet Union excluding the Baltic countries) and the rest of the post-communist region. As suggested earlier, the temporal dimension is a crucial part of the notion of legacy. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017:2018) argue that “the simplest proposition is that people with more years of exposure to the regime ought to be more likely to hold the attitude congruent with the regime’s position than those with fewer years of exposure.” Not only were the post-Soviet states exposed to a longer period of communist rule, they were only to a limited extent ruled by the Habsburg dynasty, whose effects are known to have formed different cultural and institutional legacies than exposure to tsarist rule has done (Becker et al., 2014). This division of the post-communist world is the one adopted in this thesis. Here, separating post-Soviet countries from the general post-communist region captures both

¹⁶ The distinction between a post-communist and post-Soviet legacy is generally seen to depend on the length of authoritarian rule and the inclusion of the state within the former Habsburg empire (Becker et al., 2014; Grosfeld & Zhuravskaya, 2015).

their longer exposure to communist rule and their lesser exposure to democracy-promoting bureaucratic structures (Kitschelt, 2003).¹⁷

As is by now fairly apparent, many semi-presidential regimes are situated in post-colonial settings. The tendency to establish semi-presidential regimes in this particular setting may be caused by the colonial legacy. The many cases of semi-presidentialism in the former colonies of the semi-presidential rulers of France and Portugal may imply that the executive-legislative system were inherited. At the same time, the new semi-presidential regimes in the colonial context are not only found among the formerly French and Portuguese colonies. This suggests that other type of mechanisms may cause the relationship between semi-presidential colonial ruler and semi-presidentialism among former colonies. This thesis, therefore, adopts this nuance within the colonial configuration and tests, rather than assumes, the proposition that former colonial rulers with a semi-presidential regime may have caused the relatively high number of semi-presidential regimes in their former colonies.

2.7.2 Adding nuances to images of history

Scholars of transitional bargaining understand the establishment of regimes as emerging from critical junctures. Such use of critical junctures largely developed out of the inability of the historical institutional tradition to account for institutional origins and change (Pop-Eleches, 2007). A legacy is, instead, mainly studied as long-lasting influences that enable relatively stable trajectories into the future. Still, the perspectives of transitional bargaining and legacies may not be contradictory. Instead, they may simply focus on different kinds of time. Pop-Eleches (2007), for example, finds that historical trajectories may be broken in the turmoil of the transition phase and regime type establishment is more often than not made in such turmoil. History thus consists of long periods of relative continuity, broken by shorter periods of pervasive change. To make the image more complex, it is unlikely that these long and stable periods proceed without *any* change or institutional adaption and, equally, that the actors within a critical juncture experience a complete break with the past and suddenly lose all previous points of reference so that their choices are made on an altogether blank slate. Even if we agree with the assumption that the critical juncture is a period of increased opportunities for institutional reorientation, such reorientation may

¹⁷ The studies also control for potentially different levels of resistance or susceptibility to influence in the form of levels of development.

at least to some extent evolve ‘in the shadow of the past’. This implies that previous experiences may form part of the critical juncture and that certain types of executive-legislative relations may be particularly alluring to actors, depending on their experiences, learning, or nostalgia for the past. In this thesis, the expectations surrounding critical junctures thus includes the possibility that the window of opportunity towards a yet undecided future may be more or less open.

2.8 Unwinding the perspectives

In the accounts of Easton (1967), a political system consists of both an inside and an outside. The inside of the system is related to its environment through the political process. When examining regime type establishment, the transitional bargaining perspective locates the reasons for regime type establishment within the system. Any influences stemming from outside the system are left out of the analysis. If the outside is hypothesized as posing an influence on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes and if the inside is assumed to react to such an influence, limiting the analysis to only the inside of the system is mistaken. In this thesis, the expectations based on the perspectives of diffusion and legacies are used as tools to broaden the study of regime type establishment in ways that re-introduce the potential influence of the larger context. This broader set of influences thus extends both the spatial and temporal dimensions of the potential influences to include legacies of the past and networks of the international context.

As both diffusion and legacies are forms of contextual influence, their effects often seem to stem from the same kind of sources or intermingle in some way. It is particularly difficult to identify the difference between diffusion between members of a shared post-colonial network and the legacy of colonial rule in a former colony. Needless to say, neither example could manifest its characteristics without the impact of a colonial ruler. The similarity of their origins means it is easy to assume they have emerged from an identical cause. However, diffusion can be separated from legacies, first and foremost because of their difference in temporality. A historical legacy performs its long-lasting and stabilizing influence out of a phenomena that has

ceased to operate (Wittenberg, 2015).¹⁸ Diffusion, on the other hand, speaks to influences that evolve out of current relations between countries that are part of the same network (Brinks & Coppedge, 2006; Torfason & Ingram, 2010; Wong & Woodberry, 2015).

Diffusion and legacies also manifest a difference in spatiality. Although a legacy may very well stem from external phenomena such as colonial rule, its effects have been internalized and have taken on a domestic form. For example, the legacy of tsarist Russia should form part of the current bureaucratic institutions of post-Soviet countries in ways that affect their current democratic performance (Kitschelt, 2003). Diffusion is, on the other hand, an influence emerging from the current country-external context whereas a legacy has its origin in the past and has, over time, become part of the domestic context. For example, if a former French colony establishes the French type of semi-presidential regime because, at the time of establishment, the French regime is a respected and seemingly popular regime type, the semi-presidential regime of France has been established through *diffusion* from France (taking the form of emulation). If, however, the same former colony established its semi-presidential regime because the French institutional system had become part of the colony's institutional structure, making local elites accustomed to French forms of executive-legislative power distribution, that regime would be a *legacy* of French colonial rule.¹⁹ Again, the influence of diffusion and legacies is not easily disentangled, but the two dimensions of temporality and spatiality often make it possible to do so. For this reason, the articles in this thesis distinguish between diffusion and legacies.

2.8.1 Connecting the levels

The analytical foci of the three theories discussed so far are situated at different levels. Because transitional bargaining is linked to general developments in the field of rational choice institutional studies, it views different types of institutional origins as the outcomes of elite actor decisions - that

¹⁸ A state's legacy is the long-lasting influence of a cause that has ceased to operate. It can also be held to be separate from the general historical cause. Slavery is, for example, the historical cause of segregation in the current United States. Although the historical cause has disappeared, at least in its original form, the legacy of this racist and contentious past is still in evidence.

¹⁹ Whereas most studies use the term 'legacy', some also use the term heritage. Therefore, the term legacy is used in the thesis while the term 'heritage' is sometimes used in the articles as these are more connected to the articles in which 'heritage' is used.

is, as micro-level phenomena stemming from strategically (or rationally) motivated elite actors. The transitional bargaining perspective on regime type establishment, therefore, sees this process as a micro-level phenomenon. This deviates from the legacy and diffusion perspectives. The legacy perspective is part of a historical institutionalist (HI) type of analysis which emphasizes both the temporal and the macro level dimensions of institutional development. Its early scholars insisted that “social life and action in particular places are shaped by processes, relationships, and forms of interaction” (Katznelson, 1997) and should be studied predominantly from a macro level analysis of the trajectories of modernity (Katznelson, 1997). Therefore, the study of legacies is first and foremost a macro level type of analysis, combined with a temporal awareness. Diffusion, however, prioritizes the international context above all others (Huntington, 1991; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). When it comes to the influences of diffusion, studies have concluded that it evolves through communicative processes in a social context, operating at the international level. Diffusion theory does not overlook the importance of actors, but emphasizes their situatedness within the international arena. Diffusion is thus also seen to be a primarily macro-level phenomenon. Now, since the analysis adopted in this thesis incorporates a micro level and two types of macro level influences (domestic and international), the domestic level will henceforth be treated and termed the meso level as it is situated in between the other two.

In adopting this approach, this thesis is able to move from explanations at the individual, micro level up to the state (through the legacy perspective) and international macro levels (via diffusion) in order to account for a state level (meso) outcome. Not only is it possible to consider causes at different levels, it is also possible to identify the ‘incongruences’ between them. This is because these levels are not isolated from each other (Berg-Schlosser, 2007). Coleman’s (1990) model of theoretical synthesis can be used to trace how the levels hypothetically form an empirical unity that can also form theoretical coherence. Expressed through the structure-agency dichotomy, this is a classic issue and constitutes a well-known dilemma of social studies at large: “[a]re these actors the unwitting products of their context, ...or are they knowledgeable and intentional subjects with complete control over the settings which frame their actions?” (Hay 1995:189). Should we start with the individual and use individual level data to account for social systems or should we assume they are embedded in society and use macro level factors to account for individual behavior?

2.8.2 Contextuality

In the figurative battle between these positions, the basic issue remains: how does man and society coexist? This seemingly innocent question comes with a ready-made assumption: that man and society *do* coexist. Man is not just society and society is not just (hu-)men. To Coleman (1990), social phenomena should initially be studied at the social (macro) level while including, secondly, the way the social level influences the individual and the way individuals, finally, transform these influences and act in order to influence the social level back, thus forming the so-called bath-tub model from macro to micro and back to the macro again. In this way the levels are connected. When relating to the establishment of regime types, we should assume that the macro level of both state and the international context should inform individual decision making (and rationality). The macro and meso level phenomena give context to actor preferences and decision-making. At the same time, the macro level does not make decisions. Actors do. And in the end, their macro level informed choices will change the macro level. As discussed above, therefore, the assumption of this thesis is that the historical context of a country (in other words, its legacy) and its contemporary and internationally determined relationships (established through diffusion), may influence the strategic choices of its political actors. Depending on the national and international context, therefore, individual rationality will take different expressions and inform the macro level in different ways.

This thesis thus takes a contextual approach. It assumes that context matters. “How particular causes operate, and perhaps the entire structure of the causal process, is highly contextual: the causal process varies across context: it is context conditional” (Franzese, 2008:45). In a general sense, context is important because of the issue of multi-causality. This suggests that there can be many reasons behind the same outcome or, because of endogeneity, that a cause of an outcome may also be caused by that outcome. To some extent, this thesis utilizes the bathtub model, which makes actor choice endogenous to a macro level that is affected by their choices, but primarily, it adopts the assumption of context-conditionality - that the causal process varies depending on the context (Franzese, 2008). This context is, as described above, treated as the historical and international context of a country.

In its extreme sense, context-conditionality renders comparative studies useless. If we mean that “processes and outcomes differ uniquely”, with “each specific substantive venue in each place at each time having its own unique processes relating to outcomes” then “any comparison, within or

across cases, times, or venues, would always be unwarranted or unhelpful” (Franzese 2008:45). Instead of this extreme position, therefore, the assumption here is that context matters, but not in an endless way. Similar to the proposition of Lawson (2003), this thesis accepts that the *a priori* assumptions of universal regularity are combined with the potential for ‘social event regularities’. The context in which regularities should appear needs to be specified. Theory should thus be used to stipulate the contexts that may matter and attempt to find out how and to what extent they matter.

The assumption that context matters and that both agency and structure matter have ontological and epistemological implications. First, this thesis is thus neither structuralist, privileging structure over agency, nor intentionalist, “constructing explanations out of the direct intentions, motivations and self-understandings of the actors involved” (Hay, 1995:195). Instead, the assumption is that generally applicable knowledge may be found, but only within a limited terrain.

Furthermore, the contextual approach means that the influence of independent variables may differ not only across space but also across time. In fact, this is part of the basic assumption of the transitional bargaining perspective: the critical juncture is a particular period when individual actors become more influential than in other periods. In Elster’s accounts, the individual may seem less embedded during times of change. Depending on the temporal context, therefore, the level of explanation may differ. Thus, when trying to identify the reasons for regime type establishment, those reasons can be found at both macro and micro levels, assuming that macro level conditions will transfer into micro level preference formation and that both time and place may interfere with these macro-micro relationships.

Apart from the theories presented above, this thesis could have considered additional theoretical perspectives. Both diffusion and legacies stem from the larger field of democratization studies where there are more perspectives that could be of relevance to the establishment of regime types. For example, previous levels of democracy might have been one of the dimensions studied as part of a legacy influence. As part of the research of democratic qualities, civil society might have been examined as an influence on actors’ preferences for a certain regime type. At this moment, however, and due to the intention to introduce the temporal and spatial dimension into the study of regime type establishment as presented above, a line must be drawn. Another promising theoretical perspective not considered here is the ‘incremental reform hypothesis’ (Congleton & Yoo, 2018). This model states that constitutional reforms tend to occur “when the interests of those

with the authority to alter the standing procedures change”. However, this model targets the larger constitutional process, and as knowledge about the establishment of executive-legislative relations has yet to discover whether or not the larger international or historical setting has formed part of the process, these larger issues need to be addressed first. The ‘incremental reform hypothesis’ will no doubt be of value to future studies.

Table 3 is a summary of the way the theoretical perspectives form part of the respective articles.

Table 3: Theoretical application

	Research Question	Theoretical perspectives
Article I	To what extent is regime type establishment influenced by diffusion?	Diffusion
Article II	What do we know about semi-presidential regimes and what does the field say about the establishment of a semi-presidential regime?	-
Article III	Where, when and why do semi-presidential regimes form?	Diffusion Legacies Transitional Bargaining/Contextual uncertainty
Article IV	How does a decision-making process unfold into regime type establishment?	Diffusion Legacies Transitional Bargaining/Recent Independence

3. Research design and method

The aim of increasing knowledge about regime type establishment is approached through comparison. As the research questions stipulate different levels of abstraction and generality, different types of comparative methods are utilized. This creates the need for a common mixed-methods approach, with the different methods united in the intention to study the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

The next section will introduce the particular comparative methods as related to the explanatory ambitions of the study and the nested mixed methods approach. The section will then describe and discuss the methods used in each article and end with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological foundations of the methodological choices.

3.1 Comparative methods

The field of comparative studies has evolved to become a considerable part of the discipline of political science. This thesis forms part of that tradition. As human beings, comparing seems natural to most of us and it has even been stated that “to compare is to be human” (Landman, 2008:4). In this thesis, the comparative approach is used to study why a state chooses to establish a semi-presidential regime. The point of departure is existent conceptual development, the fact that there are many studies exploring the effects of semi-presidential regimes but few of them examining the reasons for their establishment (Elgie & Moestrup, 2016). Many of them also have a narrow theoretical perspective. By testing the applicability of three theoretical perspectives, this thesis looks to make a meaningful contribution to the existing literature. Its general aim is therefore a hypothesis-testing one. That is, the discussion of the three theoretical perspectives in the previous section will form the basis of the hypotheses to be used in this thesis. These hypotheses are part of the thesis’ general contextual model like so:

Contextual conditions → Actors preferences & negotiations → Regime type establishment

Comparative methods will then be used to test these hypotheses. We can separate these methods according to the number of units they investigate: large-N studies compare many cases; small-N studies compare between 2-5 cases (but the number is not definite), and, single case studies examine, obviously, only a single case, although with a comparative purpose. Because

they each come with a distinct utility, method selection is based on the premise that the type of comparison follows the “explanatory aspirations of the researcher and the level of conceptual abstraction contained within a given study” (Landman, 2008:24).

Hypothesis testing inferences are generally formed through variable-oriented large-N studies (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). The virtue of such methods can be seen in the ability to study many variables in many cases at the same time. The larger the sample, the higher the confidence placed upon the applicability of the results and the greater their generalizability (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). Therefore, the first two empirical studies in this thesis consist of statistical analyses of large samples where the results of the relationship between the independent and dependent variables were found to be empirically generalizable.

Studies of many countries imply a high level of conceptual abstraction. By only using statistical analyses, however, a broad leap has to be taken from the concepts being tested to the meaning of the actual phenomenon. Furthermore, whereas large-N studies are capable of tracing the way a number of variables relate to each other, they are not so good at tracing how they form mechanisms and in so doing produce a certain outcome. Thus, at the other end of the spectrum, the close observation of one single case allows for greater levels of detail, lower levels of abstraction and the ability to trace a specific process, while also reducing the potential for empirical generalization (Ragin & Rubinson, 2009). Through such qualitative studies, we can “understand within-system relationships either through comparison over time, across sub-system units, or by nesting of intra-systemic relationships within the overall political and social system” (Caporaso, 2009:67). In attempting to chart the issue of how semi-presidential regimes are established, this thesis also utilizes the qualitative method of process tracing. “The essence of process tracing is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys)” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:1). Its main promise lies in its ability to identify the mechanism that causes an outcome through a process of links that are, together, sufficient for the outcome. For the purpose of this thesis, process tracing enables the tracing of how contextual conditions influence the process and its outcome. In other words, it allows us to study the middle (so far the muddle) of the following model:

Contextual conditions → *Uncertainty* → *Actor preferences & negotiations*
→ Regime type establishment

The need to address different types of aims and the need to capture the whole model is, however, not the only reason for using different methods. As this thesis adopts an assumption of context-conditionality, methods that are apt to capture contextual influences should be chosen.

3.2 Contextuality and method

So, studying regime type establishment, being aware that the process of regime type establishment may differ depending on context, has implications for the selection of relevant methods (Franzese, 2008; Lawson, 2003). The next sections will clarify the way context functions as part of the thesis.

The transitional bargaining perspective assumes that regime type establishment is the outcome of elites' strategic actions in circumstances of uncertainty within the domestic context. The legacy perspective, for its part, looks for influences at the meso- or state level, combined with an awareness of the temporal dimension (Katznelson, 1997; Peters, 2012). From a diffusion perspective, finally, communication within different types of networks at the international level forms the core focus of analysis (Huntington, 1991; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). The analysis adopted in this thesis thus includes micro, meso, and macro levels as well as the temporal dimension. Overall, the methodological approach adopted here follows three theoretical perspectives and three contextual levels.

At its core, comparative methods enable studies that “merge different levels of analysis, and link international, national, and domestic factors in order to explain a particular political phenomenon” (Halperin & Heath, 2017: 213). In this thesis, the large-N comparative methods that are used enable theoretically induced tests of the general applicability of key variables deduced out of diffusion theory and, to some extent, the meso level influences of legacies (Halperin & Heath, 2017). The micro level focus of transitional bargaining, determined by the elites' strategic choices, is only partially and with some difficulty, captured through statistical analysis. Instead, such micro level processes are more easily captured through case-close and qualitative analysis. As the research question also includes the study of *how* semi-presidential regimes are established, the process tracing analysis of regime type establishment is added to the analytical toolbox. Its case-close analysis has the capacity to study elite actions and to trace and disentangle the temporal sequence of the process as well as the contextual origins of the main causes (Article IV). The combination of large-N and single-case analyses thus warrants the fourth type of comparative method: the mixed method.

3.3 A mixed methods approach

A mixed methods approach, much like its name suggests, is one where qualitative and quantitative research techniques are combined (Onwuegbuzie & Collins, 2007) so that the study in question can benefit from their respective virtues.²⁰ This thesis uses methods that are mixed along all three research dimensions: case selection, type of data and data analysis. Articles I and III use a large-N type of case selection, preexistent data from well-acknowledged databases, and statistical methods of data analysis. In contrast, Article IV is a single-case study, utilizing different types of qualitative data and the process tracing analysis. The evident danger here is ending up, not with a synthesis, but in complete eclecticism. It is crucial to have a common denominator, to know *how* the chosen methods form a unity.

3.3.1 Achieving cohesion

The mixed methods approach adopted by a particular study should form a conscious whole. To be sure, there are many ways different research methods can be combined, but the common denominator when building a coherent or ‘integrated’ approach is that each method should be used “for what it is especially good at, and to minimize inferential weaknesses by using other methods to test, revise, or justify assumptions”. Overall, integrated mixed methods’ approaches are used to “substitute strengths for weaknesses” (Seawright, 2016:9). Before discussing the actual methods used in detail, what are the benefits this study achieves by deciding to adopt a mixed methods approach and how has it ensured these methods form a coherent whole?

First, this thesis maintains its coherence through a clear and consistent subject focus: the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.²¹ Although different research questions are asked about regime type establishment, and although the level of abstraction and generality sometimes differ, the general purpose is always the same. This thesis’s core objective is to further knowledge on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

²⁰ Commonly, mixed methods form the analytical strategy of a single study. This thesis deploys it through the combined use of different methods and approaches across four individual articles. See Small (2011) for a description of the standard approach to combining methods in the same research study.

²¹ In Article I, semi-presidential regimes are one of the three regimes studied.

Second, the hypothesis-testing aim of the thesis means that results are meant to relate to theory and thus, to some extent, be generalized. Generalization can, however, be of at least two kinds; empirical generalization and analytical generalization (abstraction) should be considered separately. “Empirical generalization is an extrapolation. Here, knowledge of a limited number of events are claimed to be valid for a larger group. Analytical generalization, on the other hand, is an identification of fundamental or constituent properties in an event or phenomenon” (Lund, 2014:226). The use of an extended number of cases in the first two empirical articles (I and III) thus offers a foundation for an empirical generalization of results (Tsang, 2014). That is, their results can be inferred to other cases of regime type establishment. As the empirical analysis is based on theoretically founded hypotheses, the results may also strengthen or delimit theoretical expectations. The in-depth and context-based enquiry into a single case – the case study – has limited generalizability (Tsang, 2014). On the other hand, the results of a case study may have value for analytical generalizability. In fact, a case study, and especially a longitudinal case study, may, as Tsang describes it, take us from the understanding that winding a clock makes it tick to a study that removes the back of the watch to find out *why* (or how) it ticks (Tsang, 2014). Taken together, the two approaches enable this thesis to engage in both empirical and analytical generalization.

3.3.2 Sequencing

At the start of this endeavor, the statement was made that knowledge on the establishment of executive-legislative structures was scarce and the ability to formulate a definite analytical strategy was limited. Studies of democratic diffusion suggested there were reasons to assume that diffusional influences *could* also have an influence upon the establishment of presidential, parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes. Therefore, the first study tests whether diffusion does have an influence upon regime type establishment. Its results gave an answer to the critical question of whether or not a broadened theoretical approach was needed. The results of the first article demonstrated there was a need to continue to explore the reasons for semi-presidential regime type establishment in particular. The subsequent analytical strategy was therefore centred on this regime type.

Accordingly, this analytical strategy adopted a ‘sequencing’ approach. Sequencing means not just that articles were written one after the other, but that the overall strategy was built incrementally and that data was gathered and analysed successively. In that manner, the results of Article I guided the

research questions, data collection and analysis of, particularly Articles III and IV (Small, 2011).

3.3.3 Nesting

The ‘sequencing’ strategy was, in turn, used to form a ‘nested’ mixed methods approach. Nesting combines large-N (LNA) and small-N (SNA) analyses to increase the over-all results’ payoff. It starts with a preliminary LNA which, if its “model is well specified and the results are robust” (Lieberman, 2005: 436), forms the basis for a model-testing SNA. This means that a nesting approach deploys multiple data from the same entities to test, deepen and, if necessary, rebuild the model. In this way, the choice of case is crucial. If knowing what the case is a case of, the usefulness of the case study is thus extended through the nested approach. First, and due to the in-depth tracing of the causal mechanism, the case study is apt to identify the ‘black swans’. If choosing a most likely case and this case do not illuminate the expected relationship between the variables, such a negative result would form a strong argument for refuting the hypothesis. Second, if selecting a case “that were ‘on the regression line’; cases that were predicted by the model”, the study of a mechanism that is, hypothetically, causing the effects found through the LNA’s, the findings may serve to confirm such effects, but also to “reconsideration of conclusions made on the basis of statistical analyses, if they reveal the presence of intervening or contextual variables in the relation between the explanatory and the outcome variable” (Bäck & Dumont, 2007: 478). Third, since choosing a case from within the previously studied sample of Article III, the single case can aid a further understanding of why and how the causes promoted an outcome. The empirical findings thus say something about the fundamental properties of the causal relation; it can enable analytical generalization (Lund, 2014). In this way, the nested mixed-methods approach is meant to uncover both empirically and analytically generalizable knowledge.

The nested framework of the thesis consists, mainly, of the three empirical Articles (I, III, and IV). The first LNA establishes the applicability of diffusion, but simultaneously identifies the continuing need for further explanations when it comes to semi-presidential establishment. Built on the understanding gained through the review Article (II), the subtypes of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes were utilized as part of the second LNA (Article III) which studied the establishment of semi-presidential regime using both a broader theoretical umbrella and also the estab-

lishment of the two subtypes (premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism). As a result of Article III, a theoretical model on semi-presidential establishment was gained that could subsequently be tested and developed through the SNA (Article IV).

Within a nested mixed-methods approach, the SNA not only offers the advantages of a case-close study in general, its findings can also be utilized in order to assess the results of the LNA. It has the ability to test whether these results “provide strong grounds for believing that the initial theoretical model explained the phenomenon being studied” and whether “all of the most important hypotheses [were] tested and...the results robust/satisfactory” (Small, 2011:439–440). The SNA is thus used to gain knowledge on whether the theories were applicable to the actual process (Small, 2011). To find this out, we must know ‘what the case is a case of’ (Lund, 2014), that it is a most likely case of the core theoretical variables so that it can test the theoretical model (Weller & Barnes, 2013). If such a most-likely-case does not include the causes found through the previous LNA, that would constitute a strong argument for judging the hypothesized causal relationship to be spurious. If the case illuminates the expected variables, the SNA can give a valuable understanding of the process that caused the particular outcome. The SNA is thus used to gain knowledge on how the theories formed part of the process (Small, 2011:442). That is, through a process tracing analysis, results can illuminate not only the fact that different types of variables form part of the same outcome, but also how they do so (Lieberman, 2005). The case examined in Article IV was thus carefully selected. Although it enables only limited empirical generalizability, the selection of this case does allow for analytical generalizability.

This thesis adopts a nested mixed methods approach and, therefore, utilizes different types of comparative methods as well as different numbers of cases, data types and types of data analysis. To illuminate the methodological approach of each article, Table 4 presents the methodological framework of each article and illuminates their common methodological approach.

Table 4: The Mixed-Methods Analytical Strategy

	Article I	Article II	Article III	Article IV
Research question	Does diffusion explain the varying choices of democratic government systems at the time of democratization?	What do we know about semi-presidential regimes and about the establishment of a semi-presidential regime?	Where, when and why do semi-presidential regimes form?	How does a decision-making process unfold into regime type establishment?
Unit of analysis	Regime type establishment (parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential) at the time of democratization (democratic transition or state formation)	Peer-reviewed books and articles centering on semi-presidentialism.	Establishment of semi-presidential regimes and the two subtypes of semi-presidential regimes.	Causal links in one mechanism within one country-case.
No and unit of observation	121 events	327 items	12,000 observations	5 links
Temporal extension	1946–2008	1970–2015	1900–2015	1989–1996
Type of data	Quantitative data from international databases.	Quantitative and qualitative data from an inductive collection.	Quantitative data from international databases.	Qualitative data from archives, historical descriptions and interviews.
Method of analysis	Logistic regression	Structured review	Logistic regression	Process tracing

In sum, the three empirical articles (I, III, and IV) examine the establishment of semi-presidential regimes, but each with a different research design. Articles I and III use extensive designs with different aims. In Article I, the LNA aims to test a hypothesis about regime diffusion as the reason why different government systems are established at the time of democratization. Article III utilizes statistical analyses, instead, to describe the development and test the empirical relevance of several theoretical perspectives to identify conditions that affect the probability of semi-presidential regime establishment. Finally, Article IV also focuses on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes, but uses process tracing in an intensive SNA design to test the relevance of theoretical perspectives as part of the mechanism in one carefully selected case. This means there is a shift, not only on the number of cases studied, but also in terms of temporality from the instances of regime type establishment (in a particular year), to the patterns of establishment, and on to the whole process of establishment. The research strategy adopted in this thesis aims to enable conclusions on diffusion as a cause of regime type establishment, what the causes can be for a large sample of semi-presidential establishment, and how the theoretical influences can form part of one particular decision-making process.²²

3.4 Article I

Article I aims to determine if diffusion influences regime type establishment. To do so, it uses a large-N analysis with the aim to study the first and last part of the thesis' theoretical model of diffusion in order to gain results that can enable empirical generalization. A logistic regression analysis was carried out using 12 cases of regime type establishment, covering the period of 1946-2008. Data was retrieved from a number of different databases.²³

In the article, the three regime types - parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential – are regarded as subtypes of *democratic* regimes. This classification of democratic regimes follows the Democracy & Dictatorship

²² For further discussion of the drawbacks of each theory, see the methods summary of each article.

²³ The Correlates of War Project (COW) (2017), National Material Capabilities (NMC) (Singer, 1987), Quality of Government (QOG) (Teorell et al. 2016), Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) (Coppedge et al., 2015), and World Religion Data (Maoz & Henderson 2013).

(DD) dataset, which is based on the criteria originally formulated by Przeworski²⁴ and updated by Cheibub, Alvarez, and Vreeland (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2012). It categorizes democracy in terms of competition and office (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2012) because it measures them as “regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010: 69). Therefore, both the executive and legislative office must be filled by elections in which there is “an opposition that has some chances of winning office as a consequence of elections” (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010:69).

How to best capture the essence of democracy in a measurement is a debated point. As the measurement used here excludes other possible definitions, such as equality or civil liberties, it leans to the minimalist side. Similar approaches have repeatedly been accused of excluding necessary dimensions of democracy such as the level of suffrage. Suffrage levels are, for example, included in the similarly minimalist measure of Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2012). However, deviations in the level of suffrage among the stipulated democratic countries were largest prior to 1946 and before the data captured by the DD dataset (Boix, Miller, & Rosato, 2012). For Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), minimalist definitions of democracy enable a concrete and transparent way of separating autocratic and democratic regimes through a single critical difference.²⁵ Using the definition adopted here, autocratic regimes simply lack the essential democratic characteristic of political competition that has an effect on the crucial office-holders. This is sufficient to identify the line between democracy and authoritarian rule. A minimalist definition, however, also relates to this article’s focus on the time of democratization as an important factor in regime type establishment. This discussion should not be seen as a suggestion that this measurement captures the full meaning of democracy,²⁶ only that it establishes a useful crossing line. Whereas minimalist measurements may be accused of

²⁴ Przeworski’s criteria consist of: (1) *Ex ante* uncertainty: previously unknown outcomes of elections; (2) *Ex post* irreversibility: the electoral winner actually takes office; and, (3) Repeatability: the two previous criteria occur at regular and known intervals.

²⁵ The use of this border as the critical line between democracy and authoritarian rule does not imply that democracy or dictatorships may not be further differentiated into different types should the research question warrant.

²⁶ There is a risk that minimalist measures exclude attributes that can actually “curb the effective use of the formal right to vote and significantly distort the value of votes” (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002:11).

excluding necessary dimensions, maximalist measurements often face difficulties such as including redundant dimensions or excluding transparent criteria for the combination of indicator values (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).²⁷

Stemming from the recent practice of operationalizing diffusion as a social phenomenon, diffusion has been operationalized as international state networks defined by geographical (global, continental, regional, and neighbourhood) and other terms (linguistic, religious, post-colonial, and post-autocratic).²⁸ The assumption is that regime type establishment will reflect the density²⁹ of a regime type in the different types of networks of a particular country. Although these networks do not illuminate the active mechanism, the relevant networks are assumed to capture the context of diffusion. That is, the state networks can be interpreted as the channels through which diffusion is conducted.

However, different state networks consist of different kinds of contexts that may very well relate to one another. That is, there is an obvious risk of multicollinearity between them. For example, the colonial networks consisting of countries formerly ruled by the same colonial ruler may, besides its obvious political affinities, also exhibit linguistic similarities, as captured in its linguistic networks. Therefore, factor analyses were used to explore

²⁷ Munck and Verkuilen (2002) identify three dimensions of measurement construction – conceptualization, measurement and aggregation – and argue that most measures suffer from weaknesses of some kind. Minimalist measurements often have less of a problem with the aggregation of indicators whereas maximalist measurements often have problems connecting the indicators and how to weigh their relative importance.

²⁸ Geographical networks were sub-divided into global, continental, regional or neighbourhood networks. Cultural and post-colonial networks were also included. Cultural networks included both linguistic and religious networks. As the latter two categories are measured in degrees rather than dichotomous relations, two thresholds were used. For language networks, the percentage of the population speaking the official language was measured, with ‘official’ referring to a language that the majority of the population speaks or a global language that at least 10% of the population speaks. For religious networks, a dominant religion was determined to be the religion of at least 60 % of the population. The latter percentage was used to establish a religion which was obviously in the majority, but not much more so. Post-autocratic networks were measured using the type of ruling elite, be it military, civilian, or monarchy.

²⁹ Density refers to the share a regime type occupies within a particular state network.

possible correlations with the resulting indexes used as independent variables in the subsequent logistic regression analyses.³⁰

As in regression analysis, logistic regression is used to analyse patterns between dependent and independent variables when the dependent variable is binary and the received coefficients do not refer to the value of the independent variable but instead to the odds ratio, comparing the odds (or probabilities) of two (or more) groups (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Logistic regression analysis thus enables a study of the relations between regime type establishment using three dependent variables, index measuring diffusion networks and control variables, where all independent variables are lagged with one year.

Instead of logistic regression, multinomial regression could have been used. However, the hypothesis demands that the density of a regime type in a country's international networks is compared to the probability of the establishment of the same regime type within the same country. Multinomial regression instead means that the same independent variable is used for the establishment of all dependent variables. Furthermore, time series analysis is often used to study temporal developments and to make forecasts of the future development of a phenomenon. The aim of this article was not to construct a forecast, however. The hypothesis targets the instances of regime establishment and not the development of the three regime types.

3.5 Article II

Article II reviews the field of semi-presidential studies in order to capture its main themes, theoretical foundations, types of studies and case bases, as well as underexplored themes. The review includes both a mapping strategy as well as an in-depth analysis of the main themes and research strategies to find out what is and is not known about semi-presidentialism.

The study commenced by using an inductive method to trace the main semantic varieties of the term 'semi-presidentialism'. These were then utilized to search for and catalogue all peer-reviewed articles and books. From the initial 690 items retrieved, 327 were deemed to have semi-presidentialism as their whole or part focus. The items were published between the

³⁰ In addition, controls were made for the influence of socio-economic development, population size, regime legacy (if the country had already experienced the particular regime type), the number of past transitions, concurrent independence/state formation, and colonial legacy (the particular and former colonial ruler).

1970s and 2015. For the purposes of mapping these items, they were categorised according to their main research themes, theories, methods and case samples. The results were summarised using tables and summary descriptions.

Then, using the 327 selected items as a base, the 20 % most cited of these (n=65) were used for an in-depth assessment of the main contributions of the field. As citation-based selection criteria tend to favour older publications, four successive year-based groups were formed and the 20 % most cited items from each group were selected. This method of selection still includes a small bias when it comes to year of publication and for studies covering more than one region or a larger number of cases. Still, this structured method of selection enabled solid and transparent criteria of selection and reliable conclusions to be formed.

Because the study decided to review only publications that were likely to be encountered within the international research community, the sample only included publications in English. It is known that there are publications related to semi-presidentialism in other languages, particularly from the non-English speaking and advanced research communities within semi-presidential countries such as France, Finland and Poland. As some of these are also discussions of early semi-presidential establishment, this methodological approach may have excluded early publications in, for example, Finnish or French.

A structured review often includes some kind of bibliometric analysis. In this case, part of the aim was to study whether the field had a continuing connection to the perspective founded by Linz. Therefore, a small test using the citation of Linz' main publications was conducted. Apart from this, the aim did not include visualizations or descriptions of research networks in any bibliometric sense. Again, the purpose of the review was rather to gain an understanding of semi-presidential studies in general, so that popular and neglected themes could be identified.

3.6 Article III

Article III aims to describe the temporal, geographical and contextual patterns of semi-presidential establishment as well as a theoretically based explanation for those patterns. Its intention is to answer to the following question: *When, where, and why have semi-presidential regimes been established?* The first part uses descriptive analyses to provide a structured overview of when and where semi-presidential regimes, including the two subtypes, have formed. Based on a set of theoretically derived hypotheses from

three different perspectives (diffusion, transitional bargaining, and legacies), the second part utilizes logistic regression to analyse the causes of semi-presidential establishment. This LNA thus tests this thesis' general model of diffusion and finds empirical generalization, but with the restricted aim of studying the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. The analyses are based on country-year observations between 1900-2015, thereby securing the inclusion of the Weimar Republic and Finland, the first semi-presidential regimes, founded in 1919.

The dependent variable - semi-presidential regimes - follows Elgie's definition of semi-presidentialism and the subtype definitions of Shugart and Carey (1992).³¹ Both the general category of semi-presidential regimes and the two subtype categories are based on Elgie's data.³² His dataset includes

³¹ The operationalization utilized in Article III differs from the one used in Article I, which was limited to democratic government types. Whereas Article I is placed in the tradition of democratic diffusion in which the establishment of government types is seen as a subtype of the general process of democratization, Article III targets the establishment of semi-presidential regimes directly. This article follows the tradition of the institutional field of semi-presidential studies in which semi-presidential regimes are studied irrespective of their democratic status. Elgie's (1999) definition, for example, is silent on democratic status and his sample of semi-presidential countries unsurprisingly includes cases from consolidated democracies as well as consolidated dictatorships. Given the taxonomic nature of the parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential categorizations, the definitions do not rest on the democratic status of a particular country. However, the potentially problematic consequence is that whereas we can confidently assume that constitutional content matters in democratic countries, it may not have the same kind of relevance in autocratic countries. In the latter, informal structures of power may be far more consequential. Still, Elgie & Moestrup (2016) argues that this is not yet a known fact, and is still a matter for empirical research. At any rate, this thesis is not aimed to study the performance or effects of semi-presidential regimes but rather why and how they come about. Even so, different operationalizations affect the interpretation of results. If the two articles produce differing results, the discrepancies should be inferred back to the difference in operationalization. Similar results would serve to strengthen the application of a particular theoretical perspective of regime type establishment.

³² In contrast to the purpose of Article I, which forms part of the field of democratic diffusion, this study forms part of the semi-presidential field in which the regime type is not only examined in instances of democratization but rather in all types of situations; that is, in democratic, authoritarian and hybrid regimes. This means, however, that results are not immediately comparable in the sense that the patterns of semi-presidential establishment in Article I may deviate slightly from the patterns of semi-presidential establishment in Article III. For the categorization of particular countries, see Appendix 1 and 2.

over 12,000 observations and 83 cases of semi-presidential regime type establishment. Of the latter figure, 43 are premier-presidential regimes and 47 president-parliamentary regimes.³³

Data on the independent variables were collected from a variety of international databases.³⁴ The indicators of diffusion represent four types of geographical state networks and two other types of networks. These were the geographical networks at the global, continental, regional and neighbourhood level and the post-colonial and alliance networks.³⁵ The networks thus serve as channels for diffusional influences among their members.³⁶ Since these networks may overlap, factor analyses were used to test the occurrence of correlations between the diffusion variables. The outcomes indicated three factors (one for each regime type). An index based on factor scores was thus created for measuring diffusion of each regime type and was used as part of the logistic regression analysis.

Furthermore, two indicators of legacies were included: post-colonial and post-Soviet.³⁷ The expectations of the transitional bargaining perspective rest on the level of uncertainty. Lower levels of uncertainty are expected to lead to a winner-take-all regime (president-parliamentary) whereas higher levels of uncertainty are expected to further a regime where the presidential elections do not make all but the winner into losers (premier-presidentialism). To measure uncertainty, variables were used that captured the occurrence of alternative sources of information, the robustness of civil society, the length of independence, and regime duration.³⁸

³³ There are 10 observations where one type of semi-presidential regime was replaced by another.

³⁴ The measurements of diffusion follow the works of Bunce and Wolchik, 2000; Gassebner et al., 2013; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Leeson and Dean, 2009; O'Loughlin et al., 1998; and Wejnert, 2014. Indicators of heritage have been obtained from the Quality of Government Database and indicators of uncertainty from the V-Dem database.

³⁵ The category of post-colonial networks captured whether the country was a former colony of France or Portugal. Alliance networks were examined as a country's membership in a military alliance.

³⁶ See an extended description in part 2.6.

³⁷ A post-Soviet legacy means the pre-war members of the Soviet Union minus the Baltic States.

³⁸ The measures are retrieved from the V-Dem dataset.

3.7 Article IV

The aim of Article IV is to study the decision-making process that unfolds into regime type establishment in one case. It studies a process that led to the first post-communist constitution of the Ukraine in 1996. Specifically, it studies the process, from its beginnings in 1988 and to trace the mechanism that produced a president-parliamentary regime in 1996. As distinct from the two LNAs, this SNA targets the middle of the base model: the uncertainty, actor preferences and negotiations, and the way these form a common mechanism for the regime type outcome, as illustrated below:

Contextual conditions → *Uncertainty* → *Actor preferences & negotiations*
→ Regime type establishment

The general guidelines of process tracing are employed to capture the mechanism that connects the contextual conditions at the start of the process to the regime type outcome through each link that transferred causal power within that mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2016: 5). A mechanism consists of links that together form a process that is sufficient to cause the outcome in question (Goertz, 2017). In fact, the whole notion of a mechanism is built of links that form “a system of interlocking parts”, implying that the mechanism is perceived as an INUS condition (Mackie, 1980). Within such, each link is necessary for the start of the next link, but insufficient for the outcome. Instead, the whole process is sufficient but unnecessary for the outcome.³⁹ Therefore, the analysis carefully establishes whether the link is a necessary condition for the next link, otherwise it is not, in fact, a link. The main objective of the analysis is thus to trace each link in the mechanism that comes with causal force.

Due to the general hypothesis-testing aim of the thesis and its mixed-methods analytical strategy, the type of process tracing utilized here is the theory-testing version which starts from a theoretically derived mechanism

³⁹ Mackie (1965) uses the analogy of a fire to explain the INUS condition. Instead of the immediate conclusion - that the fire was started by a short-circuit - we should instead specify that a short-circuit “was an indispensable part” of the outcome (1965: 245). Without a number of other conditions, however, the fire would not have started. The short-circuit is therefore necessary but not sufficient to cause a fire. Together with other conjoined conditions, the short-circuit formed a chain of events that together caused the outcome. Together they were sufficient to cause the fire. That not the same as stating that a fire cannot be caused by another set of events. This particular chain is not necessary for a fire to start.

that is, in turn, tested through the empirical analysis of the case (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). To be able to infer results back to theory, the method is used to “evaluate whether evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking X and Y was present and that it functioned as theorized” (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:11). Adopting a theory-testing type of process tracing has several implications. First, it implies that theory can be used for hypothesis formation. Material is therefore purposively selected based on its use as evidence for the theoretically hypothesized mechanism. To construct and carry out such a test, this study took a blend of material, including historical descriptions, preexistent interviews, and a set of semi-structured interviews conducted during the spring and autumn of 2018 (Bennet & Checkel, 2015). These interviews provided additional information from informants selected using positional criteria. They had to represent both the opposition and majority sides of the process (Tansey, 2007). Second, since the theoretical assumptions rest upon the level of uncertainty, this level is specified throughout the process. Furthermore, the uncertainty is expected to form certain preferences among the actors, making it necessary to trace their preferences as well.

A process tracing analysis is sometimes accused of being a narrative that presents only the events that serve as proofs for the stipulated outcome. To avoid this the analysis should carefully describe the connections between “the actors, circumstances, and events” so that a reader could understand why the evidence is, in fact, a solid piece of evidence (Crasnow, 2017:11). Furthermore, counterfactual reasoning is a way to open up the selection of evidence for consideration so that not only the expected pieces were studied or presented (Crasnow, 2017). Article IV, therefore, actively stipulates and discusses the types of evidence that could have pointed in another direction.

Why a study of one case only? Small (2011) recommends a small-N rather than a single-case analysis for the purpose of forming a nested mixed methods approach. Process tracing is, however, appropriate for the aim of this study which includes finding out how a process unfolds. It is, on the other hand, a time-consuming method of analysis that needs to pinpoint the actors, their actions, and the timing of each link in order to sketch the mechanism. For the purposes of this article, three theoretical perspectives were

tested across two distinct periods,⁴⁰ a time-consuming process which really only allows for the analysis of one single case.

The study of one case, however, does have its limitations. First, one case cannot insure against the risk of equifinality. In the context of process tracing, equifinality means the risk that there are “potentially multiple causal mechanisms that produce the same outcome” (Goertz, 2017:52). This study, therefore, cannot exclude the possibility that president-parliamentary regimes are established because of other mechanisms. Indeed, this study is not trying to exclude these other mechanisms, it is just trying to trace the mechanism of one case. Furthermore, process tracing allows for an analysis of the inner parts of the base model. Although an in-depth study of one case could have utilized a general comparative approach or a historical approach, process tracing is particularly good at tracing how the process that formed an outcome, something historical analyses and case-study analyses have recurrently been criticized for not capturing. In this context too, process tracing is a useful method to achieve Article IV’s purpose.

Process tracing is, at its core, a method used to study how a process evolves, implying that the case must feature in the mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). As this analysis features one case only, the choice of case is crucial. Cases should be chosen based on specified criteria. Here, Ukraine is chosen because the process ends in a new semi-presidential constitution, a president-parliamentary one. Using the case of the Ukraine, tests the hypotheses gained from three specific theoretical perspectives. This; meaning that their key explanatory variables should also be present (Goertz, 2017; Weller & Barnes, 2013). A period of regime type establishment is by default characterized by uncertainty (although the level of uncertainty may vary). Therefore, a selection based on the existence of uncertainty is not necessary. The theory of recent independence, instead, means that the case selected must be a case where independence is a relatively recent phenomenon. Diffusion, finally, means that the country should be situated in an international country network with high proportional numbers of semi-presidential regimes. For that purpose, a preliminary analysis of the likelihood of diffusion in cases of recent independence was made.⁴¹ That analysis identified the

⁴⁰ The early period (1988-1991) exhibits considerably higher levels of uncertainty than the later period (1994-1996) does. As a result, these periods have been set apart.

⁴¹ See Appendix 3 for the results of the analysis.

Ukraine among the cases of regime type establishment most likely to exhibit the effects of diffusion.⁴²

Although seemingly counterintuitive, the legacy perspective is not part of the main theoretical perspectives examined in this article. Process tracing traces events within the process and not the influences that preceded it or remained constant throughout it. Legacies, however, affect the process because it shapes its scope conditions. A post-communist legacy thus influences the structure of new and old elites as well as the previous economic and institutional structures. Although the analysis does not study legacies within the mechanism, it is not ignorant of its potential influence. The careful description of scope conditions is also important as they set the boundaries for application and generalizability. The study of regime type establishment in a post-communist context should only be extended beyond the region with great caution, if at all. Even as there are debated divisions within the post-communist context, conclusions should also be extended only cautiously even within those boundaries (Kitschelt, 2003).

The results of Article I, III, and IV will thus be integrated into the thesis' conclusions. In doing so, the results will form the basis for the common results and the unified conclusions and in that way, they will provide an answer to the general research question.

⁴² In Article IV, the method of tracing diffusion differs from that of Articles I and III. This discrepancy depends on the different capacity of the general (quantitative and qualitative) methods. Articles I and III utilize the current measure of tracing the networks in which diffusion is likely to evolve. Still, methodological developments have not yet come to a point where the tracing of mechanisms is possible. The qualitative method of process tracing, however, offers the potential to trace the mechanisms of diffusion. Although these three articles trace different aspects of diffusion, the results build upon each other. Thus, through Articles I and III, the networks of diffusion are captured and through Article IV, the mechanism within diffusion networks is laid out. Together, they extend our understanding of the diffusional influences on regime type establishment.

4. Analyses and Results

This thesis aims to increase knowledge on the establishment of regime types through the four articles. The analyses consist of two LNAs and one SNA that tests three sets of hypotheses derived from different theoretical perspectives. In this section, the results of each article will be described and discussed. It will also conclude with a presentation of the overall result that has emerged through the nested mixed methods approach.

4.1 Article I

Article I examines the establishment of regime types at the time of democratization. It asks to what extent is regime type establishment influenced by the country-external influences of diffusion (or is it primarily a result of domestic influences)?

To reiterate the aim and content of the article, 121 events of regime type establishment, in order to test the influence of diffusion, anticipating that the density of a regime type in the international networks is reflected in the regime types established. The international context was, according to the principles of democratic diffusion, modelled as geographical proximity at the neighborhood, regional, continental, and global level and as linguistic, religious, post-colonial, and post-autocratic networks. The theoretical model tested through the analysis is thus:

International context → actors prefer same regime type as in international state network → The regime type common in the international state networks is established

Through the large-N and statistical type of analysis, however, only the beginning and end of the theoretical model has been tested. The specified cause is, as stated, the density of the particular regime type in the country's international networks:

The density of the regime type in the international state networks → The regime type common in international state networks is established

When the analyses were carried out it produced both descriptive and analytical results. The discussion will therefore begin with a few descriptive results before moving on to the factor and logistic regression analyses.

The descriptive results of Article I show that the establishment of both parliamentary and presidential regimes are more common than the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Parliamentary regimes dominate among the countries of Oceania, Europe, and Asia, whereas presidentialism is the common regime type of the Americas. Semi-presidentialism does not dominate in any single region, but is a common choice in sub-regions such as Eastern Europe, Middle Africa and Central Asia. Apart from the geographical clustering of regimes, the study also identified a temporal pattern of regime establishment. Beginning with the initial post-1945 wave of parliamentary regime setups, the over-all pattern has been for parliamentary waves (1946-1949, 1960-1969, 1970-1979) to be followed by presidential ones (1950-1959, 1980-1989, 2000-2008). Semi-presidentialism has been present in the later waves, but has only been the most frequent choice in the period 1990-1999. Examining the period as a whole, the circumstances of establishment are seen to differ: presidentialism is the most common regime choice in the period after a democratic transition whereas parliamentarism is most common in the aftermath of independence.

The analytical results portray a slightly different picture when it comes to the causes of the three regime types. First, the factor analyses of the diffusion networks illuminate two or three causal factors per regime type. For all three regimes, factor 1 consists of both geographical and social networks.⁴³ These factors consist of, at least, continental, regional, neighborhood, and post-colonial networks. For semi-presidential regimes, global, religious and linguistic networks also form part of factor 1. For presidential regimes, linguistic and religious networks are included.⁴⁴

The indexes were next included in a logistic regression analysis to study their influence, when controlled for the most important potential causes found within the literature on democratic diffusion. The analysis shows that factor 1 (including both geographical and other types of diffusion) has a significant effect on the establishment of all three regime types. When it comes to both semi-presidential and presidential regimes, the density of the regime type within global networks forms part of this factor. The global

⁴³ The indicators of social networks consist of religious, linguistic, post-colonial, and post-autocratic networks.

⁴⁴ Results of the factor analysis show that the different types of diffusion networks correlate and their effects are related. There *is* multicollinearity between different types of diffusion networks.

networks not only illuminate the density of the regime type at the global level, but also have a time-component because the global density of the regime type illuminates the spread of that regime type, not just across space but also across time. As a result, the establishment of presidential and semi-presidential regimes has a stronger time component than does the establishment of parliamentary regimes. When it comes to parliamentary regimes, furthermore, factor 3 is also significant. This factor consists of linguistic and post-colonial networks.

The general results can be taken to suggest the strong effects of diffusion upon the establishment of regime types. In fact, for presidential regimes in the model that includes diffusion factors, none of the control variables is significant. For parliamentary regimes, socio-economic modernization (negative) and the number of democratic transitions also has a significant effect and for semi-presidential regimes, the effect of colonial legacies is also significant. Neither parliamentary nor semi-presidential regime establishment can be explained only with the variables of diffusion. The influence of both socio-economic development and stability upon the establishment of parliamentary regimes shows that parliamentary regimes are also affected by domestic conditions.

Although the effect is reduced in the model including diffusion networks (which in turn includes colonial networks), the establishment of semi-presidential regimes is significantly influenced by their colonial legacies. Semi-presidentialism is thus primarily a regime type that is established through diffusion, but also as a result of legacies. The effect size of the model is, however, lower for semi-presidential regimes than for the other two regime types. The lower explanatory power for the establishment of semi-presidential regimes, as compared to presidential and parliamentary regimes, indicates the need for further studies of the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

The research question of Article I (*to what extent is regime type establishment influenced by the country-external influences of diffusion*) is thus answered: regime type establishment is largely influenced by diffusion. The results also answer the bracketed part of the research question (*or is it primarily a result of domestic influences*): in general, the establishment of all three regimes is influenced by diffusion, an influence that has its origins in the country-external context. Apart from that, the results vary depending on the regime type. For the establishment of parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, one or two of the other control variables also had a significant effect on the resulting regime type. When it comes to parliamentary

and semi-presidential regimes, then, regime establishment is more than just a story of country-external influences.

Compared to the theoretical model of diffusion, the empirical model resulting from this study specifies that both geographical and other types of diffusion networks influence the establishment of all three regimes, a process that can be illustrated like so:⁴⁵

The density of the regime type in the international state networks → The regime type common in international state networks is established

The consequences of the methodological approach needs some clarification. First, the method used in this LNA implies a high level of abstraction in which diffusion is operationalized as the density of a regime type in the international networks of a country. The operationalization is based on the assumption that such networks foster increased levels of communication that makes diffusion more likely. This operationalization does not, however, illuminate the type of mechanism through which diffusion evolves. Therefore, other studies that focus on particular diffusion mechanisms are called for.

Second, this study targets the moment of regime establishment. It does not study or attempt to trace the process of regime type establishment. Therefore, its results cannot illuminate temporal features, such as the fact that there are different periods in one and the same country that are, to different extents, influenced by the same type of variables. For such a study, different methods would be needed.

Third, and although the study includes a set of control variables, its main purpose was not to test the other types of variables. The results, therefore, cannot be used to prove that legacies or transitional bargaining does not pose an influence upon regime type establishment. When it comes to presidential regimes, however, diffusion largely explains their establishment. For parliamentary regimes, a combination of the modernization index and the diffusion index together explains a considerable part of the establishment of parliamentary regimes. In simple terms, not much is left to be explained. The quest for further knowledge on the establishment of regime types thus first and foremost points to the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

⁴⁵ This LNA only traces the first and last part of the model, meaning that its inner parts have been removed from the empirical model.

We have yet to fully understand the nature of semi-presidential regime establishment.

4.2 Article II

This structured review aimed to study the main research questions, methods, theoretical foundations and results of a selection of publications in the field of semi-presidential studies. The research question is: *What do we know about semi-presidentialism and what does the field say about the establishment of a semi-presidential regime?*⁴⁶

The article reports a number of trends and approaches within the field of semi-presidential studies. First, the field grew quickly from 1992 onwards.⁴⁷ Second, the majority of studies target Europe in comparison to other regions and they tend to be either single case or large-N studies. The exclusion of non-English publications may have affected the number of studies examining non-European cases.

Two of the results of this review have a bearing on the subsequent articles of this thesis. First, the semi-presidential field and its research questions have continued to take the seminal contributions of Linz (1990; 1994) as their natural point of departure. That is, not only do most studies still refer to Linz, they also study semi-presidentialism from his perspective, as an explanatory variable that has an effect upon outcomes such as democratic stability, level, and functioning. Although later studies have examined topics such as the level of presidential powers and to a larger extent included the effects of informal institutions, the general focus is still on institutions as a cause and not as an 'effect of'. That is, although the field tends to maintain its early focus on regime type effects for democratic survival and performance, the more recent studies of elections and presidential powers investigates more specified regime type effects. The issue of how the regime type came to be has not and still is not part of mainstream semi-presidential research.

⁴⁶ This is not identical to the research questions of Article II which have a larger scope. The article's research questions aim to study the main research themes and theories of the field, the extent to which changes can be seen in the themes and theories utilized and, finally, which themes are still underexplored. For the purposes of this thesis, only some of the article's aims have been used.

⁴⁷ The exclusion of publications in languages other than English may have resulted in an underestimation of the number of publications prior to this date. The inclusion of foreign language publications may push this date slightly farther back.

Second, while high-profile scholars (Elgie, 2016, Cheibub, Elkins, & Ginsburg, 2011) seem to question the usefulness of regime type categories as the basis for the hypothesis making part of empirical studies, several studies have emphasized the incorporated theoretical content and empirical usefulness of the subcategorization of the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes. In an important study, Shugart and Carey (1992) illuminated the democratic potential of the incentive-building structure of the premier-presidential regime, a potential that has since been empirically corroborated (Moestrup, 2007; Sedelius & Linde, 2018), although not entirely unchallenged. Although the premier-presidential regimes do seem prone to intra-executive conflicts (Gherghina & Miscoiu, 2013; Sedelius, 2008) as well as to cohabitation⁴⁸ (the so-called Achilles heel of semi-presidential regimes), most cases tend to cope with such challenges (Elgie, 2010). Studies have demonstrated that the democratic record of premier-presidential regimes outperforms that of their president-parliamentary counterparts (Elgie, 2011; Sedelius & Linde, 2018). The potential for presidentialization, meaning the concentration of formal and informal powers around the president, furthermore, also seems less detrimental as part of the premier-presidential regime (Samuels & Shugart, 2010). The overall results of this selection of semi-presidential studies show that it is the semi-presidential regime subtypes that reflect distinct theoretical and empirical meanings that can and should be part of future semi-presidential studies.

To conclude, the answer to the research question of what we know about semi-presidential regimes, the review article suggests that we know more about the effects of semi-presidential regimes, particularly when it comes to democratic performance. Much of that knowledge, however, has been gained by examining one or the other of the regime's two subtypes. As these subtypes incorporate different incentive formation and different patterns of power distribution, they may also have different causes. For the study of regime type establishment, this means that a study of the establishment of semi-presidential regimes should operationalize these two semi-presidential subtypes.

⁴⁸ Cohabitation refers to situations when “a president from one party holds power at the same time as a prime minister from an opposing party and where the president's party is not represented in the cabinet” (Elgie, 2010: 29).

4.3 Article III

Article III aims to study the global establishment of semi-presidential regimes. It asks: *where, when and why do semi-presidential regimes form?* Apart from a descriptive analysis of these processes, three sets of theoretically induced variables are used to test potential reasons for the pattern of semi-presidential regime type establishment that has emerged. These theoretical perspectives are transitional bargaining, diffusion, and legacies. As an LNA, the study does not seek to test the middle part of the models, only the first and last parts. The theoretically deduced models tested through Article III are thus:

Diffusion

The density of the regime type in the international state networks → The regime type common in international state networks is established

Legacy

A post-communist or post-colonial antecedent in a state → The established regime type reflects the shared legacy

Transitional bargaining

Context of low uncertainty → A presidential or president-parliamentary regime is established

Context of high uncertainty → A parliamentary or premier-presidential regime is established

The analysis follows two main steps: First, a descriptive analysis presents information about when and where semi-presidential, premier-presidential, and president-parliamentary regimes were formed. Second, the latent constructs of diffusion networks received through factor analyses are used as part of logistic regression analyses that, that in turn, added the indicators of legacies and uncertainty.

The descriptive analysis of the temporal patterns of semi-presidential establishment reveals that semi-presidentialism, as a political system, has been taken up relatively infrequently. Starting in 1919, except for a brief period between 1990 to 1992, when at least eight semi-presidential regimes were established, only one or two new semi-presidential regimes have been adopted each year. The semi-presidential subtypes deviate partially from

this image. The establishment of president-parliamentary regimes reached its peak in the mid-1990s whereas the number of new premier-presidential regimes have continued to increase. These patterns reveal that semi-presidential regimes have been slowly and steadily established since the early decades of the twentieth-century and are not just a feature of third wave democratization.

4.3.1 The contexts of semi-presidential regime establishment

Where were semi-presidential regimes established? Answering this question both geographically and contextually, the analysis found that, when looking at all 83 states under consideration, there are parts of the world where the semi-presidential type of executive-legislative relations has been more popular than others. There are no semi-presidential regimes in North or Central America but clusters of them in Southern and Eastern Europe and in the western, southern and central parts of Africa.

In contextual terms, the analysis found that semi-presidential regimes are common in both post-colonial (56 country-cases) and post-communist (22 country-cases) settings. When the colonial states are further divided into those which have or have not themselves adopted a semi-presidential system, the results show that to a surprising extent, semi-presidential regimes have been established, not only among the former colonies of France and Portugal, but also among those who formerly belonged to Spain, Great Britain and Belgium (16 of 41 country-cases). The contextual analysis also reveals that all president-parliamentary regimes except one have been established in a post-Soviet type of post-communist setting and that most (35 of 41 country-cases) president-parliamentary regimes are found in the post-colonial context.

Further analysis identify the different conditions under which semi-presidential regimes are established. Semi-presidentialism is sometimes adopted during state formation (12 country-cases), but most often adopted when the period of state formation has already ended (65 country-cases).⁴⁹ Similarly, there are fewer cases of semi-presidential regime choice in the circumstances of democratic transition (33 country-cases) than in periods labelled 'no transition' (44 country-cases). The two regime subtypes are present in almost all of these combinations of the dichotomies state formation-consolidate states and democratic transition- none-transition, but premier-presidential regimes adopted during state-formation are only found when there is also a

⁴⁹ All independent variables are lagged by one year.

democratic transition (6 country-cases). However, most premier-presidential regimes (34 of 40 country-cases) as well as most president-parliamentary regimes (40 of 47 country-cases) have formed in existing states.

Whereas some of these temporal, geographical, and contextual patterns may be well known to scholars of semi-presidential regimes, others are more original:

1. There is a considerably higher number of semi-presidential regimes located in post-colonial than in post-communist settings.
2. The most common context for regime establishment is a consolidated state that is not in a democratic transition.
3. Not all semi-presidential regimes in a post-colonial setting are the result of a semi-presidential colonizer. Of the 40 semi-presidential regimes which have emerged from post-colonial settings, as many as 16 country-cases had a colonizer who themselves are not a semi-presidential regime.
4. Judging from the establishment patterns of the two semi-presidential subtypes, the contextual patterns influencing the establishment of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes are surprisingly similar.

4.3.2 Reasons for semi-presidential regime establishment

Why where semi-presidential regimes established? Although the descriptive analysis of semi-presidential regime establishment outlined so far has revealed some rather neat patterns, none of these really speak to the issue of causation. It is the logistic regression analyses, also carried out in this article, that explores this issue and tests the likelihood of semi-presidential (and subtype) establishment using three set of theoretically deduced variables.

In general, the analysis strengthens the assumption of Article I: semi-presidential regimes are established for different reasons. For the establishment of semi-presidential regimes in general, as well as for the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes in particular, all three of the markers of diffusion and both of those for legacies had significant and positive effects. A seminal finding is that both the international context and the legacies of the past have significant effects on the formation of semi-presidential regimes. Notable is that the effects of legacy do not wipe out those of diffusion. Semi-presidential regimes are, therefore, not only a product of

influences from their former rulers, they are also the result of contemporary diffusion networks.⁵⁰

The findings also show support for some indicators emphasized by the transitional bargaining perspective, but the direction of effects are often opposite to those expected. At least one of the markers for uncertainty⁵¹ has had a significant effect on each of the three regime types.⁵² The hypothesis stipulates that the uncertainty level will have a neutral relationship to the establishment of a semi-presidential regime, that a high uncertainty level will favour the establishment of a premier-presidential regime and a low level of uncertainty will favour the establishment of a president-parliamentary regime. Two markers of uncertainty have significant effects on semi-presidential origins, but in opposite directions. That the availability of alternative sources of information has a significant and positive effect upon the establishment of a semi-presidential regime was unexpected, as was its positive effect upon premier-presidential origins. On the one hand, the length of time a state has been independent affects the establishment of premier-presidential regimes in the expected direction. Recent independence tends to favour premier-presidential regimes. On the other hand, and contrary to expectations, president-parliamentary regimes appear more likely when a regime has recently undergone a democratic transition. In general, this study finds that some of the uncertainty markers have a significant influence on the establishment of all three regime types, but, more often than not, in unexpected directions.

First, the most obvious difference between the establishment of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes is found in the effect alternative sources of information has on them. The strong and positive effect information has upon the establishment of premier-presidentialism is not matched by its effect on the establishment of president-parliamentary regimes. As higher levels of alternative sources of information indicate lower degrees of uncertainty, premier-presidential regimes stem from lower levels

⁵⁰ The study examined the following types of diffusion networks: global, continental, regional, neighbourhood, post-colonial and alliance. Although many of these networks reflect relationships that originated in their colonial experiences, they also reveal, for example, the implications of geographical proximity.

⁵¹ In the article this is termed 'contextual uncertainty'.

⁵² For semi-presidential regimes, alternative sources of information and regime duration had significant effects. For premier-presidential regimes alternative sources of information and length of independence. For president-parliamentary regimes, finally, only regime duration had significant effects.

of uncertainty whereas president-parliamentary regimes are not significantly affected by such an indicator of uncertainty.

Second, because the effect of the indicators of uncertainty does not follow the expected pattern and since the effect of alternative sources of information is both strong and significant when it comes to premier-presidential origins, a more elaborate discussion of what this indicator says is warranted. Alternative sources of information can also be understood as an indicator of democratic quality (Dahl, 1971; Teorell, 2010). From a democratic perspective, higher levels of alternative information indicates a higher level of democracy, particularly the idea that citizens are able to see what is taking place inside the regime and are able to respond to its actions and decisions. There are reasons to assume that where media is already respected and free from state intrusion, it may serve as a tool for the populace to exercise checks in a way that strengthens democracy (Teorell, 2010). Higher levels of alternative information imply a more even distribution of power in which the populace is included. That such societies would demand regimes in which the incentives of power are not centralized the way they are in most president-parliamentary regimes is not far-fetched.

The results of Article II emphasized that the two subtypes form different incentive structures and distribute power among the executive-legislative relations in different ways, leading to different expectations of their respective democratic performance (Shugart & Carey, 1992). Such expectations were corroborated by the studies of Elgie (2011) and Sedelius and Linde (2018). The results lead to expectations that their respective natures would also have different causes, a hypothesis that is part of Article III. Neither the descriptive nor the explanatory parts of the article exhibit such clear differences in establishment patterns. Regarding the reasons for their formation, both types are to a considerable extent influenced by diffusion and legacies.⁵³ The most obvious deviation between them is the availability of alternative sources of information. Such results imply that countries with a more even distribution of power among the populace and the state seem more prone to establishing the premier-presidential regime with a more even distribution of executive-legislative relations. There appears to be endogeneity in the reasons for and the consequences of the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Still, firm conclusions require further studies.

⁵³ The establishment of each subtype is effected by the density of its own regime type in the state networks.

The test of the three theoretical models of diffusion, legacy, and transitional bargaining has led to the construction of the following empirical models. The first one demonstrates that the likelihood of semi-presidential establishment is dependent on the influence of international networks:

The density of the regime type in different international state networks →
The regime type common in the international state networks is established

The second empirical model shows how the two variables relating to legacies have a significant effect on the likelihood of semi-presidential adoption:

A post-Soviet or post-colonial antecedent in a state → Increases the likelihood of all three semi-presidential types

The level of uncertainty has a significant effect on the likelihood of semi-presidential adoption, but only when it comes to regime duration and alternative sources of information. Semi-presidential regimes are thus more likely in countries that have only recently adopted democracy and have relatively high levels of established and independent media. As the former speaks to higher levels of uncertainty and the other to lower, the results do not follow the hypothesized outcomes. No empirical model on the effects of the level of uncertainty upon semi-presidential or premier-presidential regimes therefore can be formed. The effects on the establishment of president-parliamentary regimes are contrary to expectations: president-parliamentary regimes seem to emerge in new regimes and thus in a context of higher uncertainty.

Context of high uncertainty → A president-parliamentary regime is established

To conclude, Article III **examines when, where, and why semi-presidential regimes have been established**. The results illuminate temporal and contextual patterns of semi-presidential establishment as well as support for the perspectives of diffusion and legacies. Support for the transitional bargaining perspective is inconclusive and largely contrary to expectations. Both the descriptive and the causal analyses serve to diversify the image of semi-presidential establishment. The establishment of semi-presidential regimes

seems, above all, to be the result of diffusion and legacies and, to some extent, to the presence of an established media and a mature independent and democratic state. Given that the analysis of the indicators stemming from the transitional bargaining perspective was inconclusive, further research into the influence of this perspective should be carried out.

4.4 Article IV

In the fourth article, the perspectives of diffusion and transitional bargaining are used to investigate the process that resulted in the selection of the president-parliamentary regime in the Ukraine in 1996. This study adopted a process tracing method to examine the mechanism through which the factors contributing to the emergence of a new political system come together. The study, therefore, examines how a decision-making process unfolds into regime type establishment.

As the process tracing method is an appropriate way to study micro-level phenomena, the method of Article IV is apt to analyze the way the transitional bargaining perspective potentially forms part of the mechanism. Since the long-term influence of the post-communist legacy is situated within the background conditions which does not alter throughout the process, it is not included in the analysis of the mechanism but used as the scope condition. Diffusion is a macro-level phenomenon whose influence may come and go during the process. Diffusion is therefore included in the analysis of the mechanism.

Diffusion is identified as the process trigger. In the early 1990s, when a political change process got underway, the Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union and subject to the demands from Moscow. The initial impetus to consider political reform, therefore, cannot with any accuracy be described as stemming from abroad. When Gorbachev demanded a constitutional process, it was against the wishes (or preferences) of the Ukrainian communist leadership at the time. The diffusion of ideas which started the Ukrainian reform process was initiated less by learning or a change of constitutional norms, than by coercion.

In the early years, from 1988 to 1992, the level of uncertainty was at its highest. As a result of the Moscow-initiated demands for reform, the national and semi-democratic elections held in 1990 established a new Ukrainian national parliament. It immediately set up a constitutional committee, responsible for drafting a new constitution. The electoral results, however, did not produce an obvious winner but instead created a divided parliament with numerous factions consisting of many new parties and independent

members. This fragmentation, more than anything else, prevented the formation of the constitutional majority necessary for a decision on the regime type issue.

It was the failed coup d'état in Russia that altered the situation. A coup was launched against Gorbachev by a group of Moscow-based communist hardliners, although this discredited them and the Ukrainian hardliners who had supported them. The coup was a failure, but it formed the basis for the Ukrainian Chairman Kravchuk to ban the Ukrainian Communist Party (CPU) and led to the significant erosion of its influence going forward. Wider repercussions from the coup attempt led to further changes in the parliament's structure that enabled both a call for full independence and the decision to add a popularly elected president to the existing constitution. At this point it was diffusion - in the form of demonstration effects - that changed the parliamentary structure in such a way that allowed for a first decision to be taken on the regime type issue.

During the same brief period, Kravchuk came out as supporter of both independence and a strong and popularly elected president, although the reasons for his reorientation have been debated (Solchanyk, 1992). Whether Kravchuk's change of heart came about because of new ideas or just a new strategic environment is debatable but the timing of his change is striking. Nothing else had really changed in the political environment except for the failed coup that had discredited communist hardliners and lost them much popular support. Popular support was now to be found elsewhere so Kravchuk acted to ban the Communist Party, freeze its assets, and thus effect the majority in parliament. In the Ukraine, then, the most apparent change was not a change of ideas on the part of any particular actors but a change in the strategic domestic environment, caused by a change at the core of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine's most relevant international context. The diffusion mechanism is thus emulation in the form of demonstration effects.

Among the parties who supported an amendment that introduced a popularly elected president, a common argument was based on the issue of independence. A president was needed as a safeguard for independence, both against Moscow directly, but also against the Moscow-oriented tendencies still operating within the ruling CPU (Harasymiw, 2001). Although recent independence is one of the criteria for high uncertainty, in the Ukrainian case it seems to have altered the influence of uncertainty in ways not expected by the transitional bargaining perspective. Instead of pushing its leadership towards what might be assumed to be a preference for a premier-

presidential or parliamentary regime, concerns about the security of Ukrainian independence served as a reason to promote a regime with a strong president. Although independence was not the impetus behind the introduction of a president – it was a result of a process of diffusion - it did steer the change process in the Ukraine towards a particular choice: a regime with a strong president.

Modelling the influence of diffusion and recent independence during this first period of Ukrainian political change can be shown as:

Diffusion in the form of coercion → Triggered the critical juncture

Diffusion as emulation/ demonstration effects → Affected the relative distribution of power among elite actors

In the latter stages of the mechanism, the Ukraine already had an active and popularly elected president. After the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1994, the Ukrainian parliament was still divided by the presence of many new parties and a continuing high number of independent members of parliament. This fragmented party structure continued to obstruct the formation of the constitutional majority needed for the adoption of a new constitution and a new regime type. The situation was different in only one respect: the existing president Kuchma acted forcefully, using all of the powers at his disposal (and sometimes more) to push a constitution through. For example, he initially produced a temporary constitution because it required only a simple majority, and not a constitutional one. He then used the threat of a popular referendum (because of his strong popular support) to force parliamentary approval of this temporary solution. The deadline to agree and implement the terms of this document, in turn, put pressure on the parliament to make a decision. When time was running out, Kuchma once again used the threat of referendum to push the parliament into a final acceptance.


Without a constitutional majority in parliament, acceptance of the 1996 constitution would not have been possible had it not been for Kuchma's actions. In this second period of political change, his attempts to imbue the Ukraine's president-parliamentary regime type with comparatively strong powers invested in the president can be seen as a working out of the transactional bargaining perspective. Compared to the initial period of Ukrainian independence, when the political system had not even been decided and when there was no popularly elected president, the level of uncertainty in

this later period was much lower. The fragmented and volatile party structure, the deepening economic crisis and the recent elections meant that the levels of uncertainty were still moderately high. In this context and period, the expectations of the transitional bargaining perspective provide a well-fitting explanation for Kuchman's preferences and actions:

Context of moderately high uncertainty → Actors prefer a regime type of concentrated powers → A president-parliamentary regime is established

The results show that both diffusion and transitional bargaining (and its sub form of recent uncertainty) formed part of the mechanism that brought about the establishment of the president-parliamentary regime in the Ukraine in 1996. Its two periods differ in terms of their uncertainty levels and, therefore, the applicability of each theory varies. The uncertainty levels shifted from very high to moderately high and the theoretical applicability shifts along with them. Figure 1 summarizes the mechanism which the study of the Ukrainian decision-making process suggests.

Figure 1: The mechanism of regime type establishment in the Ukraine, 1996



As described above, the scope conditions were mainly set by the Ukraine’s incorporation in the Soviet Union, a legacy that was, at the start of the process, not yet a legacy but the current situation. Even so, this post-Soviet legacy was reflected in many ways, most crucially in the shape of the political structures occupied by the main elite actors, with the old elites operating within the Communist Party and the new, more fragile elites occupying the emergent parties. The new office of the elected president was not really new, with the position being filled by – the former Chairman of the CPU who himself forms a link to the former regime. The results of Article IV thus demonstrate how the decision-making process in the Ukraine constructed a president-parliamentary regime and how the three theories can explain it. The results show the type of diffusion to be coercion and emulation/ demonstration effects. The simplified theoretical mechanism is illustrated in Table 5.

Table 5: Theoretical implications of the Ukraine mechanism

Scope conditions	Trigger	Link 1:1	Link 1:2	Link 2:1/ 2:2
Post-communist legacy	Diffusion/ Coercion	Recent independence	Diffusion/ Demonstration effects	Transitional bargaining

To summarize, the aim of the article was to study how a decision-making process unfolds into regime type establishment. The Ukraine was chosen because it was a relatively recent case and had a high probability of diffusion. All in all, Article IV demonstrates a theoretical mechanism that includes scope conditions set by the legacy, a trigger of diffusion and causal forces in the form of diffusion, recent independence and transitional bargaining. Its results do not refute the earlier finding - that semi-presidential regimes are established for different reasons. Instead, the process tracing analysis enabled it to be more clearly seen when each theoretical perspective was most influential and how those influences were related. Diffusion and transitional bargaining, as well as the sub form of recent independence, were the most influential. Through the scope conditions in the form of the post-Soviet context, the study illuminates the role played by the old and new elites.

As an SNA, the results of the study have analytical generalizability but only limited empirical generalizability (Goertz, 2017; Lieberman, 2005;

Lund, 2014). The latter limitation stems from the nature of the single-case study: the Ukraine is located within the post-Soviet type of post-communist context and as such, generalizations should only with great caution be applied outside of this terrain. For example, countries operating within this particular context are not only shaped by the general ideological aims of the Soviet Union, but also to a particular type of bureaucracy to which they were subject for an extended time compared to the countries who entered the Soviet Union later on (Kitschelt, 2003). The specific results demonstrated here for the Ukraine may not be applicable to countries in other contexts. This is true even though the legacy is not included within the mechanism, but instead forms the scope conditions of it. Therefore, the results of Article IV cannot measure the effects of the legacy, only discuss the possibility of its influences in a more general sense. Still, the legacy manifests itself in the elites active in the process; that is, in the CPU, the new and fragile parties, and in Chairman Kravchuk who later became the first president of post-communist Ukraine.

Despite the caution which should naturally be extended towards the generalizability of the Ukrainian case, its contextual differences should not be exaggerated. The contextual conditions of the post-Soviet region may not be all that different from the general post-colonial context (Simpser, Slater & Wittenberg, 2018). For example, both contexts share the experience of external rule, so the findings demonstrated here may have a bearing on the establishment of president-parliamentary regimes in post-colonial settings. Such empirical generalizability is, however, only a suggestion and one that would need corroboration through further studies.

When it comes to analytical generalization and the fundamental properties that this study has discovered, it shows not only that diffusion formed part of the process but that coercion triggered it and that demonstration effects set its direction. The study also shows that both uncertainty and one of its constituent subtypes, that of recent independence, had an influence on the direction of events. The process of semi-presidential establishment in the Ukraine was comparatively quite long. This may be a reason for the application of many theoretical perspectives. A shorter process would have given much less opportunity for additional influences to play a meaningful role. Accordingly, this character of the Ukrainian process may decrease the empirical applicability of the results.

Another reason for exercising caution around this particular case study is the risk of equifinality and, as Tsang points out, to separate the relationships “which are generalizable... from the idiosyncrasies associated with the

case” (Tsang, 2014:374). Such risks, at the end of the day, are impossible to control for in a single case study. There may be other, equally sufficient mechanisms that cause the establishment of president-parliamentary regimes but what this study can state is that in the case of the Ukraine as constructed here, the links in the causal mechanism it adopted were sufficient to explain this outcome.

4.5 General results

This thesis employs three theoretical perspectives to study regime type establishment. The overall aim was to answer the question ‘**why and how semi-presidential regimes establish**’ through the use of four secondary research questions:

RQ 1: To what extent is regime type establishment influenced by the country-external influences of diffusion (or is it primarily a result of domestic influences)?

RQ 2: What do we know about semi-presidentialism and what does the field say about the establishment of a semi-presidential regime?

RQ 3: Where, when and why have semi-presidential regimes been established?

RQ 4: How does a decision-making process unfold into regime type establishment?

What do we know now? According to the earliest research carried out into different regime types, parliamentarism evolved as a “historical accident” (Strøm, 2000:263) whereas presidentialism was deliberately engineered with the objective of preserving freedom (Shugart & Carey, 1992). The origins of semi-presidentialism were instead described as a compromise position common within post-colonial and post-communist settings (Wu, 2011).

The sequencing approach, where the research questions and findings of each article rests upon the one that came before it, means that the results of the individual articles are already related. To some extent, therefore, general results are already formed. In addition, the four secondary research questions relate through the common focus set on semi-presidential establishment. That being said, the mixed methods approach stipulates that each study forms part of an additional unity. The discussion below will focus on the results of that unity as well as on the theoretical implications received through it.

4.6 Relating results

The nested mixed method of this thesis uses two large-N (LNA) and one small-N analysis (SNA) to build the analytical strategy. The objective is for these three studies to inform each other, and that taken together, they form a unity which is more than the sum of its separate parts. In general, the purpose of the first LNA is to test the general hypothesis and, if receiving robust support, the SNA can follow. In this thesis, the first LNA tested whether diffusion was one of the main influences on regime type establishment. The results showed that the semi-presidential regime deserved a particular focus. The theoretical insights gained from Article II, demonstrated that the two semi-presidential subtypes incorporate key dimensions of semi-presidential distribution of power. The research question of Article III (the second LNA) accordingly used a narrowed empirical focus as it studied semi-presidential establishment while the two semi-presidential subtypes were used as a specification of potential regime type outcomes. Since the empirical sample used in Article I is a subset of the larger sample used in Article III,⁵⁴ the results from each article can be used to inform the other. By relying on the highly robust results obtained in Article III, the SNA of Article IV can provide an in-depth working out of the findings established in the two LNAs as it traces the way the potential influences form part of and relate to each other in the mechanism of one case of semi-presidential establishment.

4.6.1 Relating the results of Articles I and III

Article I focuses on the potential influence of diffusion upon the establishment of all three regime types whereas Article III studies the effects of three types of theoretically deduced variables upon the establishment of semi-presidential regimes only, with this category further divided into the two subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. Article III also uses four indicators to measure contextual uncertainty and in so doing to capture the applicability of the transitional bargaining perspective. Through the selection of cases in which the cases selected in Article III forms

⁵⁴ Article I examines the establishment of three types of executive-legislative relations. When it deals with semi-presidential regimes, it considers them only when established in circumstances of democratisation or recent independence. The number of semi-presidential country-cases is therefore larger in Article III than in Article I.

part of the cases selected in Article I, the two articles jointly offer an opportunity for empirical generalization and, through their theory-based inquiry, the ability to infer results back to theory.

Empirically, Article I concludes that semi-presidential regimes are most commonly established between 1990-99. Article III specifies that the highest number of new semi-presidential regimes were established between 1990-92. In addition Article I concludes that semi-presidential regimes are, comparatively, most common in central Africa and as well as in the eastern parts of Europe. Article III confirms this regional pattern, but points out that semi-presidential regimes are also common in the western and eastern parts of Africa as well as in the southern parts of Europe. Article III concludes that most semi-presidential regimes are established in states that are neither in a phase of democratic transition nor in state formation, whereas Article I focuses only on the cases established during a democratic transition.

The general theoretical implications are that regime type establishment is the result of both diffusion and legacies. There are a few deviations among the articles that call for attention. First, the indexes of diffusion differ slightly. Due to excessive loss of cases, religious networks do not form part of Article III. Authoritarian networks were also excluded, because they are only applicable to countries moving away from authoritarian regimes. Instead, Article III adds alliance networks as an indicator that forms part of the utilized index for diffusion used in the regression analyses. Still, both indexes operationalize diffusion as state networks and the results are similar; both generate significant results. There are, all in all, good reasons to assume that both geographical and other types of international networks affect the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Through the two LNAs, an empirical model is formed as follows:

The density of the regime type in different international state networks →
The regime type common in the international state networks is established

When it comes to testing the influence of legacies on regime type establishment, Article I controls for the presence of colonial legacies. The results show significant support for its influence on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Article III divides legacies into post-colonial and post-Soviet legacies, with the latter category including only the pre-WWII members of the Soviet Union (except for the Baltic countries). In that, Article III specifies our knowledge on the effects of legacies as both post-colonial and post-Soviet legacies receive significant results along all three types of regimes

(semi-presidential, premier-presidential, and president-parliamentary) and can be modelled in the following way:

A post-communist or post-Soviet or post-colonial antecedent in a state → Establishment of semi-presidential regimes

These types of studies, whose statistical analyses are situated at the macro level, are not good at capturing the micro-level influences expected as part of the transitional bargaining perspective. Even though the analytical approach in Article III is constructed to apply at the macro level, it has attempted to analyse events at the micro level by introducing four indicators of uncertainty: the availability of alternative sources of information, the length of independence, and regime duration. Of these, the results showed that three of them were significant for the establishment of at least one of the semi-presidential, premier-presidential, or president-parliamentary regimes. For the origin of semi-presidential and premier-presidential regimes, the effects did not portray a coherent direction. In spite of some significant effects, the results of the indicators gained from transitional bargaining are thus inconclusive. In spite of that, the significance of these results is enough to argue that it is too early to reject the transitional bargaining perspective altogether.

4.6.2 Relating the results of Articles III and IV

The SNA of Article IV targets the process of regime type establishment in one case. Because this thesis adopted a nested mixed methods approach, the two LNAs carried out in this study enable empirical generalization while the results of the SNA offer of the potential for analytical generalization through its identification of the “fundamental or constituent properties” of the more abstract process that has already been outlined (Lund, 2014:226). In order for the results to build upon each other, the case was carefully selected to reflect the proper dimensions of the phenomenon, that is: the properties of the hypotheses that achieved significant results in the two LNAs. The Ukraine was thus selected because it was a relatively new semi-presidential regime and it was part of the post-Soviet region where there was a high likelihood of diffusional influences. The results of studying the Ukraine in depth strengthen the findings of the previous LNA and show that diffusion and legacies play an important part in semi-presidential regime establishment. The ability of the SNA to trace micro level phenomena means

that it is also able to capture the effects expected by the transitional bargaining perspective.⁵⁵

As expected, the mechanism of regime change examined in this SNA points out the important role of diffusion, but it also demonstrates that diffusional influences took the form of coercion and demonstration effects. It was the process tracing method that enabled the type of diffusion at work in the Ukraine to be specified in the following way:

Diffusion in the form of coercion and demonstration effects → The regime type common in international state networks is established

The application of the transitional bargaining perspective as part of the Ukrainian process is found to alter depending on the uncertainty level of the particular period. The extremely high levels of uncertainty during the independence process seem to obstruct the strategic behavior expected by the transitional bargaining perspective. Instead, actors behaved according to the preference hierarchy expected by the sub perspective of recent independence. As uncertainty was reduced, elite actors once again began to behave according to the expectations of the transitional bargaining perspective. The Ukrainian case demonstrates that the effects expected by the transitional bargaining perspective did not occur in the initial phase of its regime change. As the process evolved and levels of uncertainty became lower, as they did in the second period, the effects of transitional bargaining began to appear. Thus, the analytical generalization that can be made here is that the uncertainty of the context seems to decide which of the uncertainty expectations is the most relevant and that this uncertainty may differ throughout the same process. If this theoretical process holds true for other cases should be tested by further studies.

With the results of Article II, the LNA of Article III utilizes the two subtypes of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism. The influence of uncertainty is assumed to vary between them. High levels of uncertainty are expected to produce premier-presidential regimes whereas lower uncertainty levels are expected to generate president-parliamentary regimes. The findings, to a large extent, contradict such a hypothesis. Instead, as the LNA of Article III shows, it is high levels of established and free media that

⁵⁵ The utility of the method used in this article – a process tracing analysis of one case – comes with certain restrictions. These restrictions are discussed in the methods section, above.

increases the likelihood of premier-presidential regimes. Premier-presidential regimes are also, as the hypothesis predicts, more likely in periods of recent independence. President-parliamentary regimes, the analysis shows, act in opposition to expectations and are more likely in regimes that have recently become democratic. Rather than painting a consistent image of the effects of uncertainty, the results achieved here seem to imply that premier-presidential regimes are established in countries with higher levels of free and established media, which may be deemed a democratic quality, and that president-parliamentary regimes are more likely when democracy is young. All in all, the effect of uncertainty upon the establishment of premier-presidential and president-parliamentary regimes does not differ to the extent expected. Its effect is far from consistent and a conclusion arguing that president-parliamentary regimes are more likely in contexts of lower democracy needs additional empirical support.

According to the study of the Ukraine, it was recent independence that promoted the choice of a strong president. Analytically, the results imply that actors of countries experiencing high levels of uncertainty may be more concerned with the continuation of the independent state than about their own future positions of power. The many semi-presidential regimes formed in post-colonial settings, seen in the descriptive analysis of Article III, as well as the effects of colonial legacy seen in the regression analyses of Article III, point in the same direction: president-parliamentary regimes seem more likely in countries formerly ruled by external powers. No such effect can be found, however, for the influence of recent independence in the results of the regression analysis of Article III. The change of preference, from strategic to state preserving, produced by high levels of uncertainty may even be a reason why the influence of transitional bargaining is difficult to detect through large-N analyses such as the one carried out in Article III (Jung & Deering, 2015). If recent independence alters actor preferences, the actual effects of uncertainty are hidden because the effects of uncertainty caused by recent independence counter the expectations of the original transitional bargaining perspective. In the case of the Ukraine, for example, the effects of independence were spotted prior to or concurrent with the decision on independence, not afterwards. This means that the effects of independence may be at their strongest at an earlier point in time, or at least earlier than the year after independence, as measured in Article III. As the process tracing method is not in itself appropriate for empirical generalizations, such implications are mere suggestions. Whether president-parliamentary regimes are furthered by the high uncertainty of independence and whether

the establishment of president-parliamentary regimes stems from within the independence process rather than from the final act determining a regime type are, again, issues for future studies.

Overall, the case of the Ukraine offers an image of the complexity of the regime type process that conforms with the image conveyed by several theoretical influences that emerged through the LNAs. Furthermore, the Ukrainian case disentangles the way the different types of influences discovered in the two LNAs relate and shows how they form part of a coherent process. Overall, the case study demonstrates how the president-parliamentary regime took shape through the combined influences. This chain of events had its origin in the post-Soviet legacy and evolved through several types of influences, which can be diagrammed as follows:

A post-communist legacy → Structure of elite structure → That respond to coercive diffusion, demonstration effects and the uncertainty of recent independence → Forms partially new elite actor structure → New elites act in strategic manner → President-parliamentary type of semi-presidential regime

The original base model stipulated that contextual conditions effect the regime type outcome. Through the application of the influences expected by the three theoretical perspectives, all situated at different levels of uncertainty, the results of the thesis emphasize that the establishment of semi-presidential regimes is affected by influences at the following levels:

- Macro: international influences based on both geographical ties and social relations (studied as different types of networks).
- Meso: domestic influence of post-colonial and post-communist legacies.
- Micro: individual influences of the level of uncertainty during the critical juncture that effects elite actor preferences.

Article IV, furthermore, demonstrates the varying influence of uncertainty within the domestic context. In particular, influences from international networks are seen more frequently in circumstances of high uncertainty whereas influences when there are medium levels of uncertainty follow the expectations of the transitional bargaining perspective. If such a separation of influences stemming from abroad (diffusion) and the domestic context (transitional bargaining) can be seen to have a general applicability, this should be tested by further studies.

Through the mixed methods approach and the four studies, this thesis produces five main results. **These results together add new knowledge of the reasons for semi-presidential establishment as well as an increased understanding of how a process of semi-presidential establishment can play out:**

1. The establishment of semi-presidential regimes is guided by different influences: legacies, diffusion, and strategic elite actions.
2. The spatial context of semi-presidential establishment operates on several levels. There are the macro level influences of diffusion, the meso level influences of legacies, and the micro level influences of elites' strategic actions.
3. Semi-presidential establishment is not a process guided by domestic conditions only; it is a process affected by the country's international context.
4. The establishment process is not only guided by conditions of the present. It has a broader temporal context which implies that semi-presidential regimes are established in the shadow of the past.
5. Regime type establishment is a complex process, affected by different influences and their intermingling. Exactly how these influences interact is still too early to state, but in the case of the Ukraine, political legacies formed a background condition to a process which was first guided by coercive diffusion, recent independence, and demonstration effects and later by the strategic actions of the country's political elites.

The combined result of this thesis is thus that all three theoretical perspectives identify conditions that affect the process of regime type establishment. In the next section, the results are linked back to these three perspectives.

4.6.3 Diffusion

Both LNAs found that diffusion affects the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. The second LNA found that different types of geographical networks as well as post-colonial and alliance networks are overlapping and that they influence the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. The SNA furthermore demonstrated that diffusional influences in the form of coer-

cion and demonstration effects were an important part of the process leading up to the construction of a semi-presidential regime in general and a president-parliamentary regime in particular. In that way, the SNA extends the abilities for analytical generalization.

Scholars in the field of democratic diffusion have, to a large extent, recognized the limitations of geographical proximity as a proxy for diffusion (Teorell 2010; Wejnert 2006; Weyland 2014). Such measures were argued to disguise the actual diffusion mechanism, but they were also deemed too far from the theoretical understanding of diffusion as a social process. The findings in Article I and III, however, somewhat reclaim the older way in which diffusion is assumed to play out between geographically proximate countries. Four geographical indicators form part of the influencing regime type in general and semi-presidential establishment specifically. Whether the social connections are the causes of diffusion through geographical proximity or whether social connections are fostered by geographical proximity are questions not answered in this thesis. What can be said, however, is that the geographical and social types of networks correlate and their combined influences have an effect.

The SNA revealed that in the case of the Ukraine, diffusion did not only influence the activated process, it also formed the trigger for the whole mechanism and steered the Ukrainian process towards the addition of a strong president to their executive-legislative arrangements. Diffusion's initiatory role in the Ukraine relates to previous understandings of diffusional influences. According to Ginsburg (2012), constitution making often takes place in the aftermath of a dramatic event of international dimensions. Although diffusion is not the sole influence upon semi-presidential establishment, it seems likely it has strong effects upon the start of such a process as well as on the early direction of events. This *may* thus be the reason for the strong effects of diffusion discovered in the LNAs. Such conclusions, however, await further empirical studies.

The LNAs utilize state networks under the assumption that they form channels for diffusional developments. Whereas state networks do not reveal the mechanism of diffusion, the Ukrainian case study does. There, diffusion took the form of coercion and emulation in the form of demonstration effects. First, the trigger took the form of coercion, of forceful demands upon the Ukrainian domestic elite. Post-communist networks as well as a post-colonial legacy have similar origins. They too are frequently the outcome of forceful action. As the LNAs reveal the influence of both post-communist networks and a post-colonial legacy, the findings of Article I and III

point in the same direction as the SNA. The results of the thesis thus emphasize that the influences upon the origins of semi-presidential regime establishment are often of a less than benevolent kind.

Weyland (2014) has argued that the pattern of rapid and thorough changes experienced in the international waves of revolutions, were not moved by rational calculation or learning. Rather, these periodic waves of political turmoil came from the cognitive shock of the dramatic events, thus enabling the involved actors to swiftly reconsider their institutional orientation. A dramatic event in one country can thus create a sudden domestic activity in a related country, especially when the event also forms a precedent which can be borrowed (Congleton & Yoo, 2018). The demonstration effects seen in the case of the Ukraine, as well as in the temporal clusters discovered through the LNAs confirm such argumentation. They imply that semi-presidential establishment is often driven by international events that make swift adjustments in the actors' cognition.

4.6.4 Legacies

This thesis targets the potential influences of a few types of legacies. Article I examines the influence of post-communist legacies and Article III the influence of post-colonial and post-Soviet legacies. In both articles, these historical legacies have a significant effect on the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. As with diffusion, the findings of Article IV strengthen this conclusion that legacies matter. One of the analytical generalizations to be drawn from the Ukrainian case study is that the post-Soviet legacy manifests itself in the elite structures of the process of institutional reorientation. If the Ukrainian case is anything to go by, historical legacies leave their mark, even on their successor executive-legislative arrangements.

A legacy has its antecedent in a prior period and is not fully explained by contemporary phenomena. This assumption holds true for the legacies studied here. However, post-communist (and its post-Soviet subtype) as well as post-colonial legacies all have their origins in the exercise of an external power. They all stem from the international rather than the domestic terrain and they, commonly, originate in forceful action. In that way, the findings on the effects of legacies emphasize the theoretical implications laid out above: that the establishment of semi-presidential regimes to a large extent stems from forceful actions originating in the international arena. Put together, the influences of both legacies and diffusion determine the influence of the macro level upon the micro level, of foreign influences in the form of long-term effects. As illuminated through Article IV and the application of

the transitional bargaining perspective that surfaced *in* the process and *on* the structures formed by macro level influences, the preferences and strategic actions of actors seem to evolve in a context that was, to a large extent, formed by macro-level influences. So far, the theoretical conclusions therefore follow those of the ‘bath-tube’ model. Macro level conditions seem to form the basis for micro level decisions (which in turn effects the macro level).

4.6.5 Transitional Bargaining

Transitional bargaining is the most common and most established theoretical perspective among the studies of regime type establishment (Jung & Deering, 2015). Yet the significance of both diffusion and legacies, found in all three of the empirical studies carried out for this thesis, questions the sole use of the transitional bargaining perspective for the purpose of understanding the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

At the same time, hypothesizing regime change without any kind of actor influence seems distinctly odd. At least a partial applicability of the transitional bargaining perspective is reached through the findings of Article III and IV. The latter, with its narrow, case study focus is, of the approaches adopted in this thesis, the one most apt to capture micro-level influences and behavior that adheres to the expectations of the transitional bargaining perspective. Such an influence *is* exhibited in the Ukraine’s second period of regime change between 1988-1996. Therefore, this thesis does not question the usefulness of the transitional bargaining perspective as such, but rather questions two of its inherent assumptions.

First, the SNA both demonstrate the applicability of the sub-perspective of recent independence seen in the Ukraine’s first period of regime change and the original version of transitional bargaining seen in its second period. On both occasions, the influence of the level of uncertainty rests upon the elite structures as constructed through the legacies and two types of diffusional influences. These findings may serve to explain the weak and partial support for the indicators of uncertainty used in Article III. Whether this is a normal development of the establishment process is, however, a question for future studies to address. Because of the limited support within the two LNAs, although the results indicate an empirical generalization, they are inconclusive concerning the application of the perspective.

Second, the sole use of the transitional bargaining perspective risks losing track, not only of other influences in general, but also of the none-rational types of explanations. The demonstration effects of the failed coup d’état

identified in Article IV reveal the psychological effect of dramatic international events that are not rationally anchored in any ordinary sense. The consistent effect of legacies, demonstrated by Article I and III, adds to the picture. Actors seem restrained by structures or experiences originating in previous periods. They do not seem able to place equal weight on all regime type alternatives. In summary, this thesis place a question mark over the expectations of either fully rational or strategic motivations behind the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

A broader take on actor motivations may not constitute an obvious break with the transitional bargaining perspective but rather a return to an older version of it. In Elster's early writings (1995), there were three types of human motivation: interests, but also passion and reason. Experiences gained from a state's international networks may thus form part of its actors' knowledge of particular regimes and therefore also have an effect on their regime preference. Emotions may form a useful part of understanding constitution making as they "contain social information, contribute to social coordination, and are culturally regulated" (Sajó, 2010:354). In terms of legacies, an actor's previous experience of a regime type, for example, may shape their emotional inclination towards a particular regime and affect their preferences for the regime. Fuller studies of the way actor preferences originate in interest, passion, or reason must be deferred to future studies, but the findings of this thesis imply that a broader set of motivations are needed to capture those parts of the establishment process.

The main issue this thesis has with the assumptions of the transitional bargaining perspective are the expectations attached to the critical juncture and the assumption that it constitutes a clear break with former historical periods. As mentioned earlier, such an argument is a familiar refrain in early literature on transitional bargaining. Both Lijphart (1992) and Rokkan (1970) assumed that the actors of the process are the domestic elites. In that way, legacies did form part of their perception of the who's of the process. Still, empirical analyses often seem forgetful of such historical influences. The findings of this thesis should be a reminder of the historical constraints and the international influences on a country undergoing regime change. A critical juncture should not be assumed to offer a blank slate on which the political elites can draw a new structure of executive-legislative relations. Rather, it offers only a *relatively* open terrain for institutional reorientation. In the words of Jones Luong (2000:572): "a comprehensive approach to institutional origin and change would incorporate the role that both the immediate-strategic context and structural-historical context play in shaping

actors' preferences, power asymmetries, and strategies." The institutional reorientation that enables semi-presidential establishment is thus made within a frame set by both spatial and temporal constraints. To a large extent, the findings of the thesis reflect the 'bath-tub' model in which macro level influences affects the later micro level influences which, in turn, forms new macro level structures.

4.7 Eclecticism or a matter of when and where?

"Like the blind men in the proverb speculating on the nature of an elephant by touching only one part, a single, specialized theory can illuminate only a fragment of any given social phenomenon" (Suarez & Bromley, 2015: 140).

This thesis has discovered that many perspectives are needed to explain the establishment of semi-presidential regimes. Even so, do they relate to each other or do we simply end up in complete theoretical eclecticism, concluding that 'anything goes'?

The transitional bargaining perspective, in general, forms part of the rational choice type of institutional (RCI) perspective (Jones Luong, 2000). Within RCI, scholars have focused on the influence of elite actors as determining the choice of regime type. Core to the general RCI perspective is that institutions form through strategic bargaining between actors who pursue their own interests. Accordingly, institutions are the result of equilibria gained through strategic bargaining. This perspective has opened up the RCI approach to accusations of producing "static and linear predictions" (Weyland, 2008:282). The historical institutional (HI) perspective, which views institutions as long-term and stable phenomena (Thelen, 1999), has instead focused on 'positive feedback' and 'distributional bias'. This focus has left it open to the critique that it is unable to account for institutional change. As explanations, both RCI and HI have suffered from a number of shortcomings thus prompting a need for theoretical development (Thelen, 1999).

Still, as the HI perspective was interested in the way concrete historical processes produce legacies, scholars of HI also took an interest in the origins of those legacies (Jung & Deering, 2015). The study of critical junctures, therefore, developed as part of the attempt to account for periods of institutional development. Jung and Deering (2015:62) accordingly treat "the concept of critical junctures as a fruitful intersection between historical and rational choice institutionalism". As a combined perspective, it focuses on the moments where actor influences are given extra powers for institutional

reorientation, moments that are set apart from the ‘normal’ situation of general institutional stability.

The development of the transitional bargaining perspective is thus an example of two perspectives used to advance each others agenda (Katznelson & Weingast, 2015). This is possible since their differences may not be foundational or fundamental, but rather represented through the different questions they ask, the different origins of their hypotheses and different levels of their explanation (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005; Thelen, 1999). Still, to use the two perspectives for an ‘advanced agenda’ is not identical to a complete synthesis. The agenda of establishing contact may rather be to find ‘points of contact’ (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005). Thus, when applying the concept of a critical juncture, there must not be an obvious conflict between the expectation that actors will use this particular moment according to their strategic interests and the expectation that in a common situation, actors tend to adhere to the institutionally given incentives. Temporality may thus be key to knowing *when* particular expectations are the most applicable.

On the other hand, the RCI perspective is on the move. Acknowledging the influence of norms and culture upon actor decision making has become an increasing part of the RCI perspective (Thelen, 1999). This trend has also featured within transitional bargaining, which increasingly acknowledges that although actors are driven by their preference for receiving more rather than less, their choice of strategy is also based on values (Jones Luong, 2000). Although actors are still considered to be strategically motivated, their preferences are not free of contextual bias. It is not surprising to read, then, that in the post-communist region, the “overlapping cultural, socio-economic, and institutional legacies significantly shaped the preferences of political actors and the constraints on their choices” (Pop-Eleches, 2007:909). Similarly, historical institutionalists have argued “that choices about feasible alternatives are structured by determinate situations regarding who the actors are and which choices are in fact on offer” (Katznelson & Weingast, 2005: 5). The findings of this thesis thus strengthen the need for an appreciation of a broader set of actor motivations, leaving the sole focus on interests. The findings underline the argument that even in a critical juncture, actor preferences are, to a large extent, constrained by previous phenomena and events in the international context.

The assumption that actor preferences are shaped by their context means abandoning a strict rational choice assumption and emphasizing the embeddedness of actors. The study of critical junctures as a combination of HI

and RCI is, in fact, only possible with a relaxed assumption of actor rationality that says that “actors and their interests are constructed and constituted by their environment” (Suarez & Bromley, 2015: 144). Such expectations are not revolutionary within the RCI field. Scholars such as Samuels and Shugart (2010), for example, take as their point of departure “Madison’s insight that institutions channel political ambition” (Samuels and Shugart, 2010:25). What may be new, instead, is the type of force that plays a constraining role within a critical juncture. As this thesis has pointed out, although the structure of executive-legislative relations is up for grabs, the legacies of colonialism or communism remain to color elite choices.

The development of closer relations between the RCI and HI perspectives still excludes the influence of diffusion. From the studies of democratization we learn that some of the most comprehensive political realignments have occurred in a wave pattern. A wave means that as “one country has charted a striking new course, many others have sooner or later followed the front-runner” (Weyland, 2008: 283). To account for such a pattern, the theories of diffusion in the form of demonstration effects have been most valuable. Obviously, such diffusion mechanisms speak to the macro level influences. They do, however, something more than that. They moderate our assumption of actor rationality because they take us one additional step away from a strictly rationalist argument.

Weyland (2008) argues that the micro foundations of rational choice are mistaken. Instead of having “the unlimited capacity for computation and the cost-free access to information that fully rational decision making would require... human rationality is distinctly bounded” (Weyland, 2008: 286). Institutional functioning reveals a similar story. Instead of a willingness to make continuous improvements and adaptations to changes in the surrounding society, institutional actors tend to be cautious when it comes to implementing changes that will achieve potential gains, but risk-prone when it comes to avoiding loss. Most of the time, therefore, institutional change is disproportional to the problems faced (Weyland, 2008). Such expectations of actor predispositions, combined with the assumption that actors are embedded in an international context, account for phenomena such as the waves of democracy in ways that HI or RCI by themselves cannot. “Given the difficulty of producing viable programs, policymakers [...] pay attention to innovations adopted by other nations. Drastic change in one country often prompts emulation efforts in other nations by calling attention to problems and offering ideas for solutions” (Weyland, 2008: 290). The international context may therefore be particularly influential when it comes to the

ability to shatter a stable domestic path and to set a critical juncture in motion. The diffusion perspective thus adds the meso and macro levels to the analysis of regime type establishment, but it also pushes assumptions of actor rationality further away from the original conception of those favored by RCI. Although such assumptions may place us on the outskirts of the rationality perspective, they still fall within their ambit. While often constrained in their abilities to do so, actors are still assumed to have strategic ambitions and, on some occasions, to be able to act strategically. The second period of the Ukrainian regime change process certainly attests to this.

Where has this discussion taken us? Does it leave us in complete eclecticism? I think (and hope) that it does not. The new perspective which we now can use is founded on the common orientation of ‘bounded rationality’. This means that actors are constrained by “cognitive limitations and high computational costs”, making them susceptible to the influence of the past as well as of international networks. Actors do not “proactively search for information and interpret and evaluate it in a systematic and balanced fashion... Instead, they apply shortcuts that facilitate information processing” (Weyland 2008: 291). In this sense, bounded rationality offers micro foundations for diffusion processes and the way international events may suddenly cause waves of diffusion in ways that relate to the incremental reform hypothesis in the sense that the preferences of domestic actors may be constrained by legacies and by diffusion. Bounded rationality thus forms part of the understanding of why actors are susceptible to international postulates (Weyland, 2014). Events in the international arena may suddenly offer solutions and cause reorientation, as in the case of the Ukraine in the aftermath of the failed coup d’état. When it comes to the vital task of re-establishing executive-legislative relations, countries are likely to reflect the well-known wave-like patterns of international influence.

At the same time, the influence of a particular theoretical perspective differ depending on contextual conditions. First, the critical juncture is a particular period, enabling institutional reorientation to an extent not possible in the normal situation. Within the critical juncture, the level of uncertainty affects the relevance of the perspectives. The case of the Ukraine demonstrates that during the period immediately surrounding independence, for example, uncertainty may reach such high levels that domestic clues become less relevant, making actors more susceptible to international influences than in a critical juncture with lower levels of uncertainty. When uncertainty is lower, actors are instead strategically motivated. Second, the findings of Article IV suggest that the spatial and temporal contexts affect the start of


the process. Legacies affect the structure of the elites active in the process of regime type establishment whereas diffusion forms part of what triggers this process. Accordingly, the findings of this thesis suggest,⁵⁶ not that ‘anything goes’ or that the perspectives should be combined into a completely new one. Instead, the macro and meso level influences are potentially influential early within or even before the process but also if the process is characterized by high levels of uncertainty. In cases where the process is instead characterized by lower levels of uncertainty, it is dominated by elites’ strategic actions.

Coleman’s model of theoretical integration can function as a framework for the macro-, meso-, and micro-level influences studied in this thesis. The micro-level preferences and decisions of elite actors seem to be constrained by the domestic and international contexts. Individual rationality will therefore be expressed in different ways depending on the country’s particular legacies and international state networks. Still, actors make decisions and just as president Kravchuk and president Kuchma differed in leadership style and approach to power, individual actors have their own characteristics and give their own input to the process. Crucially, the overall model does not end when a regime type decision is made. For example, if diffusional influences stem from the density of a regime type in a network, every new regime type decision made by the states of this network will change that density. The relations between the macro⁵⁷ and micro levels that together influence semi-presidential regime establishment can therefore be portrayed as in Figure 2.

⁵⁶ The level of empirical generalization possible here is restricted because of the method used in article IV and discussed further in the methods section.

⁵⁷ In line with Coleman (1990), and to simplify the figure, the macro-level in Figure 2 includes the international context (diffusion) as well as the domestic context (legacy). In other parts of the thesis, the domestic context is labelled as meso-level.

Figure 2: Macro-micro relations in regime type establishment



5. Conclusions

The main aim of this thesis is to increase our knowledge of why and how semi-presidential regimes are established. The limited number of studies on semi-presidential establishment has mainly treated this phenomenon according to the rational choice institutional (RCI) perspective; that is, as the strategic choice of domestic elite actors. The many new regimes established in the context of the third wave of democratization, however, suggests that there is an international dimension to the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regime types. Given the relative lack of research on semi-presidential regimes, this thesis has chosen to focus on them, and to study them using a broader set of theoretical perspectives than has been done previously.

The first article tests the influence of different types of state networks upon the establishment of democratic parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes. Although the results differ among the three regime types, they demonstrate that diffusion within these state networks influences the establishment of all three regimes. From Article I, the conclusion is that regime type establishment is not only a story of domestic influences, but also of diffusion.

Although Jung and Deering (2015) use transitional bargaining to trace the strategic actions of domestic elites in circumstances of uncertainty, the establishment of semi-presidential regimes is only to a limited extent explained by its indicators. Therefore, Article II aims to trace what we know about semi-presidential origins. Its findings emphasize the field's focus on democratic survival and performance, but a relative neglect within that literature of studies of how these regimes are established. Furthermore, many semi-presidential scholars have demonstrated the usefulness of the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary subtypes as part of their empirical studies. That these subtypes incorporate key dimensions of executive-legislative power relations is a finding utilized in the subsequent articles of the thesis.

The third article aims to describe and explain the establishment of semi-presidential regimes in both democratic and non-democratic countries. Through systematic descriptive analyses, semi-presidential regimes were found in both temporal and spatial clusters. Semi-presidential regimes are most commonly found in Southern and Eastern Europe, as well as in the western, southern, and central parts of Africa. The regimes are, in general, most common in post-colonial (56 country-cases) and post-communist (22

country-cases) settings and among already established states (65 country-cases) that are not undergoing a democratic transition (44 country-cases). The regression analyses tests the application of the three theoretical perspectives (diffusion, legacies, and transitional bargaining). With some reservations concerning the application of transitional bargaining, the results show that all three perspectives are applicable to the establishment of semi-presidential regimes.

The fourth article studies the establishment of a semi-presidential regime in one case. The Ukrainian president-parliamentary regime, established over two periods between 1988-1996, was selected because of its post-communist context, contextual uncertainty and the influence of diffusional mechanisms. The study aims to trace *how* the process of regime type establishment shaped the outcome. Through its process tracing method, the study shows that the scope conditions of the Ukraine's post-communist legacy constructed the elite formations active in the subsequent change process. Coercive diffusion triggered the process whereas the first period was itself formed through demonstration effects (diffusion) and the uncertainty of recent independence. The second period was instead influenced by the strategic actions of elites (transitional bargaining). The application of the transitional bargaining perspective seen in the events of the second period furthermore rests upon the post-communist legacy and the changes enabled through the earlier influences stemming from recent independence and diffusion.

The general conclusion that this thesis presents is that semi-presidential regimes are established as a result of diffusion, legacies, elite strategic action and the intermingling of these three influences in the establishment process. The combined results of the mixed methods approach adopted in this thesis emphasizes that regime type establishment is not the outcome of contemporary international influences, previous domestic experiences, or of elite actors who attempt to further their own future position of power. Rather, it is the result of all three of these things. As this general conclusion is corroborated through both LNA's and the process traced through an SNA, such conclusions can be seen as valid for both empirical and analytical generalization among the semi-presidential set of country-cases.

The mixed methods approach enables a further set of five broad conclusions to be made that emphasizes the complexity of regime type establishment:

1. The establishment of semi-presidential regimes is guided by different influences: legacies, diffusion, and strategic elite actions.
2. The spatial context of semi-presidential establishment operates on several levels. There are the macro level influences of diffusion, the meso level influences of legacies, and the micro level influences of elites' strategic actions.
3. Semi-presidential establishment is not a process guided by domestic conditions only; it is a process affected by the country's international context.
4. The establishment process is not only guided by conditions of the present. It has a broader temporal context which implies that semi-presidential regimes are established in the shadow of the past.
5. Regime type establishment is a complex process, affected by different influences and their intermingling. Exactly how these influences interact is still too early to state, but in the case of the Ukraine, political legacies formed a background condition to a process which was first guided by coercive diffusion, recent independence, and demonstration effects and later by the strategic actions of the country's political elites.

Apart from these general conclusions, the findings from this these enable a few additional conclusions to be drawn which form the basis for future studies:

- Article I tests the influence of diffusional networks of different kinds. It finds that diffusion has a strong effect on the establishment of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential regimes but does not fully examine the influence of legacies or transitional bargaining. As the latter articles of this thesis study the influence of a broader set of theoretical perspectives related to the establishment of semi-presidential regimes, there is a continuing need for future studies to test the influence of legacies and transitional bargaining upon the establishment of parliamentary and presidential regimes.
- Article III tests the influence of all three theories on semi-presidential establishment. The results for the influence of transitional bargaining are inconclusive and run counter to the expectation that

president-parliamentary regimes are the result of lower levels of uncertainty. Among the indicators of this perspective, the availability of alternative sources of information was given significant support for the establishment of both semi-presidential regimes in general and premier-presidential regimes in particular. Given that accessibility to free information is an indicator of democratic quality, alternative sources of information may also imply an influence of the previous level of democracy. Further studies should operationalize the way previous levels of democracy affect the establishment of executive-legislative relations.

- Article III, furthermore, suggests that both post-colonial and post-Soviet origins have a strong influence on semi-presidential establishment. It finds that several of the post-colonial semi-presidential regimes do not stem from semi-presidential former rulers. This result is both interesting and bewildering because it implies that former colonies are not simply coerced to apply similar executive-legislative relations as their former ruler and that they do not simply copy these relations from the colonial power. Instead, some other aspect of post-colonial legacies makes former colonies prone to choosing a semi-presidential regime in general and a president-parliamentary regime in particular. The explanation for these results calls for further studies.
- Article IV traces the establishment of a president-parliamentary regime in one case. It emphasizes the way diffusion, recent independence and the post-communist legacy formed the foundations from which, in a later period, strategic elite actions worked to finalize the outcome. Through the careful selection of the case, it is possible to use the results for analytical generalizations. For even stronger conclusions about the process of semi-presidential establishment or *how* the influences of diffusion, legacies and elites' strategic actions combine to create a particular outcome, further studies would add value, especially if considering premier-presidential, parliamentary and presidential regimes.
- Semi-presidential regimes have commonly been established in both post-communist and post-colonial settings. As the Ukraine is situated within the post-Soviet type of post-communist terrain, further

case studies of semi-presidential establishment in the larger post-communist region and particularly within the post-colonial region, would be valuable. In general, the review of the literature on semi-presidentialism illuminated the lack of focused comparisons and theoretical development that was based on cases from non-European settings. This emphasizes the need for studies of semi-presidential establishment in both post-colonial and African cases. Such studies would, at the very least, strengthen the ability to make empirical generalizations of establishment mechanisms and the ability to test the comparability of conventional frameworks in new contexts.

Scholars have described semi-presidential origins as placed within the post-colonial and post-communist settings and the regime as a compromise between the parliamentary and presidential regimes (Wu, 2011). This thesis has demonstrated that semi-presidential regimes are indeed common in these two contexts, president-parliamentarism particularly in the post-colonial context. It has also illuminated that semi-presidential establishment is the result of both diffusion and legacies, of both the current international macro level and the domestic level legacies of previous periods. The case study further deepens our understanding of the complexity of the establishment process and that the uncertainty of the domestic context can influence the relevance of the respective type of influence. Therefore, semi-presidential regimes are not only established as a compromise between elites, but also as an effect of the larger temporal and spatial context. Although the thesis has not constructed one new theoretical perspective out of the three studied ones, it has related them to each other in ways that illuminate that the relevance of their influences also depends on the context of the establishment period. Though all three have relevance for the semi-presidential outcome of a critical juncture, they are not equally influential at any time or in any place. For example, the perspective of transitional bargaining may have less relevance in the high uncertainty at the time of independence and diffusion may have more relevance in the same type of context.

To conclude, Elster et al. (1998) once compared constitution making to the act of 'rebuilding the ship at sea'. It is an image that has since lingered in my mind, perhaps because it seems to be more accurate than my previous picture of regime type decision-making, with secret talks taking place around a round table in a private location by cunning elites looking to make significant decisions on executive-legislative relations.

‘A picture is worth a thousand words’, but is the image of the ship rebuilt at sea ‘a keeper’? Perhaps it is. If the ship bears the marks of previous journeys, if the sailors represent the political elites, and the water the influence of foreign countries and continents taking the ship in a new direction, the image is not far off and may even capture some of the inherent complexity of the establishment process. Regime type establishment is indeed a moving target and the results difficult to foresee, even for those making the decisions. Circumstances for a crew at sea seem to reflect the uncertainty of institutional reorientation.

On the other hand, ‘rebuilding’ the ship might suggest connotations of dangerous work made in difficult circumstances. Repair what is broken or sink with the ship! Such urgency may very well resemble the experiences of many constitution-makers, particularly those who struggle with a new constitution made during the commotion of recent independence. The findings of this thesis note, however, that the weather of regime type establishment is not always that stormy. Sometimes regimes are transformed in stable, established states, not only in the white heat of a democratic transition. But anyone who has been on a boat for longer than an afternoon knows that the weather at sea may change and change quickly. The image of rebuilding the ship at sea is, on reflection, not a bad one.

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Appendix 1: Mixed countries

The Democracy & Dictatorship dataset used in Article I runs from 1946-2008. It utilizes a six-fold regime categorization: 0. Parliamentary democracy 1. Mixed (semi-presidential) democracy 2. Presidential democracy 3. Civilian dictatorship 4. Military dictatorship 5. Royal dictatorship. This means that an autocratic regime is categorized as 4-6 (thus not a mixed regime if not democratic). Table A1 presents countries with mixed democracy.

Table A1: Mixed countries (Democracy & Dictatorship database)

Country	Years
Armenia	1991–2008
Austria	1946–2008
Bangladesh	1986–1990
Brazil	1961–1962
Bulgaria	1990–2008
Cape Verde	1990–2008
CAR	1993–2002
Comoros	1990–1994
Congo (Brazzaville)	1992–1996
Croatia	1991–2008
East Timor	2002–2008
Finland	1946–2008
France	1965–2008
Georgia	2004–2008
Guinea-Bissau	2000–2002, 2004–2008
Iceland	1946–2008
Ireland	1946–2008
Kyrgyzstan	2005–2008
Lithuania	1991–2008
Macedonia	1991–2008
Madagascar	1993–2008
Mali	1992–2008

Mauretania	2007
Moldova	1997–1999
Mongolia	1992–2008
Niger	1993–1995, 2000–2008
Pakistan	1972–1976
Poland	1989–2008
Portugal	1976–2008
Romania	1990–2008
São Tomé e Príncipe	1991–2008
Senegal	2000–2008
Serbia & Montenegro	2000–2005
Slovakia	1999–2008
Slovenia	1991–2002
Taiwan	1996–2008
Ukraine	1991–2008

Appendix 2: Semi-presidential cases

Article III utilizes Elgie's (1999) definition of semi-presidentialism and Shugart and Carye's definitions of premier-presidentialism and president-parliamentarism as captured in Elgie's data on semi-presidential countries.

Sp1 differs from Sp2, however, in that the second coding excludes "cases where the PM and government can be held collectively accountable only through a super-majority vote in the legislature". In both pp1 and pp2, premier-presidentialism is coded as 1 and president-parliamentarism as 2. However, pp1 follows the definition of semi-presidentialism Sp1 and pp2 the coding of Sp2. All first years of semi-presidentialism are included. The end year is 2016.

Table A2: Semi-presidential cases (Elgie)

Country	Sp1	Sp2	pp1	pp2
Algeria 1989–2016	1	0	1	0
Angola 1993–2010	1	1	2	2
Armenia 1996–2005	1	1	2	2
Armenia 2006–2016	1	1	1	1
Austria 1930–1934	1	1	2	2
Austria 1945–2016	1	1	2	2
Azerbaijan 1996–2016	1	1	2	2
Belarus 1997–2016	1	1	2	2
Bulgaria 1992–2016	1	1	1	1
Burkina Faso 1970–1974	1	1	1	1
Burkina Faso 1978–1979	1	0	2	0
Burkina Faso 1991–2016	1	1	2	2
Burundi 1992–1996	1	0	2	0
Cameroon 1996–2016	1	0	2	0
Cap Verde 1991–2016	1	1	1	1
Central Africa Republic 1981	1	1	2	2
Central Africa Republic 1993–2003	1	1	2	2
Central Africa Republic 2005–2013	1	1	2	2
Central Africa Republic 2016	1	0	2	0
Chad 1996–2016	1	1	1	1

Comoros 1979–1985	1	1	2	2
Comoros 1992–1999	1	1	2	2
Croatia 1991–2000	1	1	2	2
Croatia 2001–2016	1	1	1	1
Cuba 1941–1952	1	1	2	2
Cuba 1955–1959	1	1	2	2
Czech Republic 2013–2016	1	1	1	1
Congo (Democratic Republic) 1991–1993	1	1	1	1
Congo (Democratic Republic) 2006–2016	1	1	1	1
Egypt 2007–2011	1	0	2	0
Egypt 2014–2016	1	1	1	1
Finland 1920–2016	1	1	1	1
France 1963–2016	1	1	1	1
Gabon 1991–2016	1	1	2	2
Georgia 2004–2012	1	1	2	2
Georgia 2013–2016	1	1	1	1
Germany 1920–1934	1	1	2	2
Guinea-Bissau 1993–2012	1	1	2	2
Haiti 1987–1988	1	1	1	1
Haiti 1990–2016	1	1	1	1
Iceland 1944–2016	1	1	2	2
Ireland 1938–2016	1	1	1	1
Kenya 2008–2010	1	1	1	1
Kyrgyzstan 1993–1995	1	1	1	1
Kyrgyzstan 1996–2007	1	0	2	0
Kyrgyzstan 2008–2016	1	1	1	1
Lithuania 1993–2016	1	1	1	1
Macedonia 1992–2016	1	1	1	1
Madagascar 1993–1995	1	1	1	1
Madagascar 1996–2009	1	0	2	0
Madagascar 2011–2016	1	0	2	0
Mali 1992–2016	1	0	1	0

Mauretania 1992–2005	1	1	2	2
Mauretania 2007–2016	1	1	2	2
Moldova 1995–2001	1	1	1	1
Moldova 2016	1	1	1	1
Mongolia 1992–2016	1	1	1	1
Montenegro 2008–2016	1	1	1	1
Mozambique 1991–2016	1	1	2	2
Namibia 1990–2016	1	1	2	2
Niger 1993–1996	1	1	1	1
Niger 2000–2009	1	1	1	1
Niger 2011–2016	1	1	1	1
Peru 1980–1992	1	1	2	2
Peru 1994–2016	1	1	2	2
Poland 1991–2016	1	1	1	1
Portugal 1976–1982	1	1	2	2
Portugal 1983–2016	1	1	1	1
Congo (Republic) 1992–1997	1	1	1	1
Congo (Republic) 2016	1	0	2	0
Vietnam (Republic) 1967–1975	1	0	2	0
Romania 1992–2016	1	1	1	1
Russia 1994–2016	1	1	2	2
Rwanda 1991–1993	1	1	2	2
Rwanda 2003–2016	1	0	2	0
São Tomé e Príncipe 1991–2002	1	1	2	2
São Tomé e Príncipe 2003–2016	1	1	1	1
Senegal 1970–1983	1	1	2	2
Senegal 1992–2016	1	1	2	2
Serbia 2001–2003	1	1	1	1
Serbia 2007–2016	1	1	1	1
Slovakia 1999–2006	1	1	1	1
Slovenia 1992–2016	1	1	1	1
Sri Lanka 1979–2016	1	1	2	2

Syria 2012–2016	1	1	2	2
Taiwan 1998–2016	1	1	2	2
Tanzania 1996–2016	1	1	2	2
Timor–Leste 2002–2016	1	1	1	1
Togo 1993–2002	1	0	1	0
Togo 2003–2016	1	0	2	0
Tunisia 1989–2001	1	0	2	0
Tunisia 2002–2011	1	1	2	2
Tunisia 2014–2016	1	1	1	1
Turkey 2008–2016	1	1	1	1
Ukraine 1996–2005	1	1	2	2
Ukraine 2006–2016	1	1	1	1
Yemen 1995–2011	1	1	2	2

Appendix 3: Probability test

Table A3 presents the results (the first ten country-cases) of a probability test of the most likely cases for semi-presidential establishment. The test builds on the models developed in Article III. The table also shows if a semi-presidential regime and a president-parliamentary regime were established in the country that year. The results illuminate that the new semi-presidential and president-parliamentary regime of Ukraine, established in 1996, was the first among the most likely country-case that actually established a new semi-presidential regime.

Table A3: Most likely cases for semi-presidential establishment

Country	Year	Introduction of semi-presidential regime	Introduction of president-parliamentary regime	Likelihood of semi-presidential establishment
Ukraine	2006	No	Yes	0,194
Benin	1994	No	No	0,165
Ukraine	1996	Yes	Yes	0,163
Benin	1997	No	No	0,163
Georgia	2004	Yes	Yes	0,161
Benin	1995	No	No	0,159
Georgia	2013	No	Yes	0,159
Niger	1999	No	No	0,159
Niger	1998	No	No	0,158
Benin	1996	No	No	0,157

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