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\textit{Book of Abstracts}

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*Policies for women's empowerment in sport: supportive or demanding*

The purpose of the article is to compare the different political philosophies aimed to empower women in sport, with the emphasis on their practical impact on improving the quality of women's lives. In sports, as a microcosm, we can clearly see the inconsistencies between political goals and the philosophical theories behind them.

The study chronologically traces the emergence of different philosophies for women's empowerment, their transformation into policies and practices to support female athletes.

Special attention is paid to the need for the physical appearance of women and their imposition in society as physically healthy and capable of physical defence and imposition, their empowerment in women's groups and collectives.

Empowered women in sports are some of the best role models for teenagers, so the credibility of their public image and the real improvement of their quality of life is of particular importance.

Keywords: philosophy of sport, women's empowerment in sport, sporting feminism, gender theories, women's sport.
The aim of my paper is to discuss and critique some aspects related to the functional comparative analysis of sport and religion. Proponents of functionalism seek to understand certain socio-cultural phenomena by listing and characterising their functions. In this view, two seemingly different phenomena can be identified with each other if they carry out similar functions in relation to an individual or society. If we consider the functional dimension of religion and sport, it is easy to recognise – as advocates of this approach claim – that both phenomena have the same functions: they provide meaning to human life, are an important determinant of individual and collective identity, consolidate and reproduce shared values, sacralise certain events, places, persons, enable transcending of daily routines, and so on. On the basis of these similarities, the conclusion is drawn that sport constitutes a “religious phenomenon” (E. Bain-Selbo, and D.G. Sapp).

In my presentation, I would like to show that this conclusion is based on a vague and superficial depiction – a “thin description” (C. Geertz) – of the similarities between sport and religion and as such is unwarranted. In particular, I will focus on the thesis propounded by Eric Bain-Selbo that sporting experiences can be considered religious experiences. In criticising Bain-Selbo’s standpoint, I will draw attention to the intentional nature of our experiences. Considering the subject matter of experiences evoked by religion, on the one hand, and by sport, on the other, makes it possible to frame them by means of a “thick description” and thus to articulate the important differences occurring between religious experience and sporting experience.
Why do we need definitions of sport?

In this presentation I will talk about why we need definitions of sport or, perhaps better, what we are going to use them for. One might approach this question by pointing out that providing definitions of things (including activities and practices) is what philosophers do. This is what Socrates was all about. This is the sociology approach. However, not all philosophers provide definitions. A philosopher might take for granted, either knowingly or tacitly, what definitions are supposed to give you – a clear (enough) understanding of what something is and what falls inside and outside the concept of that something – and thus not engage in this side of philosophy. If for example, we all agree on which things count as games and which do not, then we are in a position to investigate whether Wittgenstein’s family resemblance thesis with regard to games is true or not. The same holds for a family resemblance view of sport. If, however, we disagree about that, then thinking about defining sport becomes pertinent, because what you will hold as true about sport in general will depend on which activities and practices you count among the sports. Disagreement about the scope of sport, typically involves disagreement about borderline cases. Do esports like Pac-Man, nature sports like climbing, urban sports like parkour, etc. count as sport? A method for settling this is to set aside the borderline cases and instead concentrate on uncontested paradigm cases of sport or prototypical sports and define sport relative to these. You then extrapolate from the definition of sport you got by thinking about uncontested paradigm cases of sport or prototypical sports to the borderline cases. If a borderline case fit the definition, then it counts as sport, if it does not, then it does not count as sport. In the case, where you agree about what are uncontested paradigm cases of sport or prototypical sports, but cannot provide a definition of sport, then a Wittgensteinian family resemblance view of sport would be justified. In the case, where you cannot agree about what are uncontested paradigm cases of sport or prototypical sports, then you might consider that you are in fact operating with different concepts of sport.
The topic of representation in computer games has been widely discussed in the game studies literature. Still, it is typically analyzed from a critical perspective. In contrast to this dominant approach, I wish to focus on the fundamental, ontological, and epistemological questions related to representation in games.

I start with some of the fundamental methodological questions related to the phenomenon of representation in games. Is there anything specific to games’ representation, or can we use some of the existing representation theories developed in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind? If so, which approaches are applicable the most? Can we discuss the notion of representation without addressing problems related to the status of fiction? More specifically, is the split between ludic and narrative elements of games helpful or harmful when discussing representation?

In my talk I suggest a solution that draws from the discussions on representation in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science and modify them to fit the ontological specifics of digital objects. I list a series of criteria for a successful theory of representation and develop an account of game objects understood as digital toys. Digital toys can be interpreted as "playful models" which enables me to connect the discourses of game studies and philosophy of science. The upshot of these distinctions is that the difference between digital toys and models in science boils down to the direction of fit of their usage. I show that any digital object present in a game can be used as a digital toy or as a model, depending of the needs of the user.
The hypothesis of the paper is that modern sport contains two apparently incompatible elements which are, however, mixed in different ways in each sport discipline: A lusory and an agonistic element. Sport has often been associated with play and games. In the paper, it will be argued that “lusory” is a more adequate term to use about the aspects of play and games present in sport and also about other lusory aspects which are similar, but not identical to play and games. In the same vein, “agonistic” arguably covers certain aspects of measuring prowess in modern sport more adequately than other broader concepts, such as physical competition. The paper presents a critical reflection on how the two elements are combined in modern sport.
Filip Kobiela

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Mind-sports and eSports – two borderline cases

From the viewpoint of the philosophy of sport the most fundamental issue related to the phenomenon of electronic sport (e-sport) and mind-sports is their nature and relation to sport in its conservative (traditional) meaning. The issue is controversial: the spectrum of this relevant position contains both the inclusive view and the exclusive view. Besides the theoretical aspect the controversy also has practical consequences: recognition of electronic sport as a legitimized category of sport is especially important for e-sport organizations.

I offer a map of possible solutions created with use of Venn diagrams for two sets representing the extensions of “e-sport”/”mind-sport” and “sport.” Besides the two above-mentioned opposing solutions (inclusive view and exclusive view) the diagrams allow for the representation of other possible options, most notably the solution being a compromise between inclusive and exclusive view.
Irena Martinkova Parry

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*Eligibility rules in sport*

This presentation discusses the eligibility rules in sport. It is based on Parry’s definition of sport as ‘institutionalised rule-governed contests of human physical skill’, and on the notion of auxiliary rules by Meier. It shows the importance and necessity of the eligibility rules for sport. Eligibility rules prescribe who is going to take part in a specific competition. The presentation discusses different kinds of categories, such as categories based on skill, body characteristics, and on socio-cultural characteristics. It focusses in more detail on the major contemporary categories based on body characteristics, such as skill, age, sex, weight and dis/ability. Last but not least it discusses major eligibility procedures.
Roger Melin
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Tännsjö, sport and contempt for weakness

Thorbjörn Tännsjö once argued that sport is associated with a form of fascistoid attitude. What he meant was that our admiration and celebration of the winner (the Sport Hero) in sport competitions implies an admiration and celebration of strict strength. But, according to Tännsjö, admiring and celebrating the strength of the winner implies that we also have feelings of contempt for those who do not win, those who show their weakness in the sport competition, and hence we have a contempt for weakness which is a fascistoid attitude.

In this article I criticize parts of Tännsjö’s analysis, at the same time as I draw upon his fundamental basic thought that sport somehow bring with it a form of contempt for weakness. In my analysis, I rather find the contempt deeply imbedded in the fundamental sport logic of cultivation of the body and having a good (strong) character, and hence that the contempt for weakness existing in sport is primarily directed towards persons who do not live up to the standard of having cultivated bodies.

Keywords: fascistoid, Sport, weakness, character, Sport logic, cultivation
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Try not to die – (revisiting) free solo climbing from a philosophical perspective

The aim of this paper is to get a better understanding of sporting activities such as free solo climbing. In order to achieve such a broader form of understanding of high-risk sports one might have to take into account the philosophical perspective.

The main focus of my analysis is on the award-winning documentary free solo¹, featuring the free solo climber Alex Honnold, who climbed EL Capitan² in June 2017 without the use of ropes or any other kind of safety gear. The movie literally offers insights into the brain of the athlete. For example, one aspect of this (so to speak) inside view discloses that the athlete suffers from a mild form of autism. A further medical investigation into his head is made with the help of a MRI brain scan. That scan seems to indicate that Honnold is less affected by disturbing pictures than the average person.

However, in this movie – as well as in the mainstream scientific literature on high-risk sports – the focus is often on psychological as well as on medical perspectives, e.g. why are people doing these (seemingly) crazy things? Nevertheless, the philosophical perspective is commonly neglected (examples of positive exeptions cf. Breivik 2003, Breivik 2004, Müller 2008, Martinkova and Parry 2018). I try to complement the picture by the use of existentialist philosophers (for example Heidegger and others).

Key Words: free solo climbing, existential risk, existential philosophy, high-risk sports, death

References:


¹ The documentary won an Academy Award in 2019 in the category Best Documentary Feature.
² El Capitan is a vertical rock formation in Yosemite National Park, USA.
This paper side-steps the question of whether ‘the’ concept of sport exists, or can be usefully analysed. Instead, I try to explain the much more modest aim of exhibition-analysis, which is to seek a description of an actually existing example of some concept of sport internal to a normative position. My example is that of Olympic-sport. I try to set out its logically necessary conditions, which of course are conditioned by its context within a theory that emphasises the values of formal competition, *citius-altius-fortius*, and excellence in contest, as well as rule-based procedural values related to fairness, justice and equality.

In so doing, I readily accept that other kinds of sport can be similarly analysed, and I do not press the normative claims of Olympic-sport.

I begin by offering a stipulation and a definition. I stipulate that what I have in mind, when beginning to think about the concept of sport, is Olympic-sport. And I define an Olympic-sport as an *institutionalised, rule-governed contest of human physical skill*.

The justification for the stipulation lies partly in that it is uncontroversial. Whatever else people might think of as sport, no-one denies that Olympic sport is sport. This seeks to ensure that those who might wish to dispute my conclusion might stay with the argument at least for as long as possible. Secondly, the justification for the stipulation lies partly in its normativity – I have chosen an Olympic conception of sport partly because it seems to me to offer some kind of desirable version of what sport is and might become. The justification for the definition lies in the conceptual analysis offered – an ‘exhibition-analysis’ which clarifies the concept of sport by offering ‘construals’ of the six first-level terms.

Sports Studies departments have to decide what is a proper object of study for them. This is a beginning. What other ‘kinds of sporty’ might also be included, as proper objects of study?
Law and sport are normative and social phenomena that aim to guide the behaviour of the addressees of the rules, whether citizens or athletes. On the other hand, law and sport are dual phenomena in the sense that on the one hand, they are composed of general rules created by legislators, but on the other hand, they incorporate into their institutional system implementing bodies, judges and arbitrators respectively, who have specifically the task of applying those rules to specific cases. And as with law, there have been different ways of conceiving sport (formalism, conventionalism, interpretativeism). In what follows I will try to reconstruct how the Hartian conception of sport could be in two central aspects: a) the institutional character and b) the discretion of the referee.
This paper attempts to analyse anti-Semitic hate speech in European football. In order to do so, it is essential to approach the study of the issue from two different angles.

In the first of these, we will proceed to analyse the events that took place in the run-up to the Second World War and the persecution of the Jewish community carried out by the German Third Reich after the approval of what is known as the Aryan Paragraph.

This persecution undoubtedly had an impact on the world of sport in general, and particularly on football. An example of this was the coining of the concept of Judenklubs, used to designate those clubs and sports organisations that had among their managers, players and fans people who were part of the Jewish community. This association between football and the Jewish community sometimes led to persecution and even deportation to concentration and extermination camps all over Europe.

On the other hand, an exhaustive analysis of the anti-Semitic tendencies detected today will be carried out. Unlike in the 1940s, today it is the fans and clubs traditionally associated with Judaism that experience and suffer these types of incidents in the stands of European stadiums, mainly because of what we consider to be a misuse of human rights such as freedom of expression.

In this line of misuse of the right to freedom of expression, the incidents suffered by footballers and fans of the Muslim religion will also be dealt with, especially since terrorist attacks perpetrated in the name of religion began to take place. The proclamation of the misnamed Islamic State has brought with it an erroneous association between Islam and terrorism that some still insist on taking to the stadiums and even to the social networks.

All of this will lead us to study the solutions that are being put into practice in different sectors. Not only from the world of law and European institutions, but also the important initiatives being implemented by the clubs and football associations.
Maria Zowisło

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On the rhetoric of sports heroism

In modern sport, one of the outstanding phenomena is the universal admiration and almost cult that elite athletes are endowed with. The description and interpretation of this phenomenon is the subject of many sociological, psychological and historical analyses. The paper complements this multi-level perspective with philosophical analyzes in the field of the history of ideas and rhetorical communication.

The premise of the considerations is the thesis that the figure of a sports hero is each time a creation of the communication context, i.e. the message and interpretation that use axio-normative, appealing and persuasive rhetorical devices. In this rhetoric, objective and measurable sports mastery is strengthened and transformed into a communicative image glorifying the moral, social, political, aesthetic, ludic-hedonistic and marketing message embedded in it. The paper's analysis is based on the principle of a hermeneutic fusion of interpretive horizons, the aim of which is to outline a complex portrait of a sports hero and his cultural meanings. Such a fusion here is the confrontation of the ancient myth and ethos of heroism with the image of a modern sports hero. To this end, a sketchy portrait of two athletic heroes will be shown: Achilles and Michel Jordan.

The rhetoric and communication narrative on sports heroism creates a meta-sport reality that functions alongside actual sports practice. In the conclusion of the considerations, it was stated that sports-related rhetoric and sports practice are two sides of the sports coin, stimulating each other, while developing their rules and principles at the intersection of numerous social, political, ethical, economic, technological academic and media influences.
Pregnancy and motherhood among elite athletes are seen as undesirable, incompatible, and potentially career ending, and in line with this, such plans should be postponed until retirement from sport, after the career is over. A "good mother", perceived as fully caring for her offspring, must be someone who is eternally present with her child and who should make personal sacrifices, which is at odds with the role of the athlete. In this respect, the athlete may feel guilty or conflicted because of gender ideologies about what constitutes a good mother. The combination of an athlete's career and motherhood is a topic that is seldom discussed, as though it does not exist. Examples of women who have returned to professional sport after motherhood prove that it is possible to reconcile family life with a career as an athlete. The lack of legislation regulating these issues and the lack of clear guidelines for women make it pertinent to introduce a maternity policy, raising awareness among women of their true rights, in line with those of their country. In recent years, provisions on pregnancy and maternity within FIFA regulations have emerged, bringing the topic to the football community. This presentation is based on two separate studies that illustrate the social aspects of maternity among women footballers and demonstrate what the needs of these players are today.

Key words: education, maternity, women in sport, female footballers, dropping out of sport, social pressure