Multiculturalism and Policymaking.
A comparative study of Danish and Swedish cultural policies since 1969

Dissertation in partial fulfillment of the Master’s degree of European political sociology

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Abstract

This master’s thesis deals with the cultural diversity policies of Denmark and Sweden within the cultural sector. It attempts at explaining why these two “most-similar” scandinavian countries having in common the same cultural model, “the architect model”, opted for different policies when it came to cultural diversity: Assimilationism for Denmark and multiculturalism for Sweden.

I show that though institutional and power-interest factors had an impact, ideas as “programmatic beliefs” (Sheri E. Berman 2001) or “frames” (Erik Bleich 2003) played the ultimate role. I evaluate their relative importance by analyzing the anthropological dimension of the countries cultural policies since 1969.

The study confirms that at least in the cultural sector, Danish policies have been assimilationist and Swedish ones multiculturalist and proposes a new classification of terms. By investigating immigrants cultures, it fills a gap left by previous researchers working on a common Nordic cultural model.

(Total characters including blanks: 146,422)

Keywords: Assimilationism, Culture, comparative policy, Denmark, integration, multiculturalism, public policymaking, Sweden, Scandinavia, Nordic, immigration.
To Karin, Felix and in the memory of Alex Haley.
Preface

Writing this dissertation was an exciting but arduous task and without external help it would have been almost impossible to complete it. I express my sincere thanks to all those who helped me along the way.

To Mrs Laila Vadum and Jakob Bröder Lind of the Danish Ministry of culture for graciously putting many publications at my disposal.

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And to all the faculty of the department of European political sociology for their support and their ingeniosiy at providing us the best in terms of knowledge.

My greatest debt is to my adviser, Philipp Kuntz whose advices were as many “Eureka” and for the soothing effect his bonhomie and enthusiasm for football had on me at particularly stressful moments.

Yet this work is mine and I bear the entire responsibility for its content.
List of Abbreviations and Terms

Be: Betänkande (Swedish government report)
Betaenking: Danish government report
Christian Democratic Union: Kristen demokratisk samling (Sweden)
Christian people’s Party: Kristeligt folkeparti (Denmark)
Danish Communists: Radical Venster (Radical Left)
Danish Conservatives: Konservative
Danish People Party: Danskfolke Partiet (DPP)
Danish Social Democrats: Social Demokrat
Danish Liberal Party: Venster
Direktiv: Swedish Directive
EEC: European Economic Community
EU: European Union
Folketing: Danish Parliament
INDsam: Danish Ethnic Minority Alliance
KrU: Kultur Utsköttet (Swedish parliamentary committee in charge of culture)
Lov: Law (Danish government bill)
Motion: Motion
Prop: Propositionen (Swedish government bill)
Danish Progress Party: Fremskridtspartiet
Riksdag: Swedish parliament
SCB: Swedish Statistical Bureau
SOU: Statliga Offentligt Utredning (Swedish Independent Commission of Enquiry)
Swedish Conservatives: Moderata sämlingspartiet (Moderates)
Swedish Democrats: Sverige Demokraterna
Swedish Liberal Party: Folkeparti
Swedish Social Democrats: Socialdemokratiska arbetareparti (Social Democratic Workers’ Party, SAP)
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Introduction

1. Background
In January 2006 Scandinavia was thrust on the world stage as a furious controversy followed by violent demonstrations erupted over the publications of caricatures of Prophet Mohamed in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten\(^1\).

The event may have come as a surprise in a region better known for its pristine lakes, social cohesion and egalitarian doctrine but in reality Nordic\(^2\) countries have been facing diversity and its challenges on par with countries such as France and England since the 1970s\(^3\). And after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and other bombings\(^4\) been gripped by the same angst which has forced policymakers to re-evaluate their policies (Bille 2002).

But as Denmark opted for an assimilationist policy, Sweden reinforced the multiculturalism it has adopted back in the 70’s (Benito 2005: 38). In Denmark, the new coalition government between the centrist Liberal Party, the Conservatives and the far-right Danish People’s Party which came to power in November 2001 enforced a strong assimilationist cultural policy; far stronger than at any time.

In Sweden, the long-reigning Social Democrats\(^5\) maintained their generous multicultural policies (Abiri 2000: 2, Ignazi 2003: 159) after their re-election in 2002. They proclaimed 2006 the year of multiculturalism with manifestations planned throughout the country. And when the Swedish Democrats, the country’s main far-right party published some of the Prophet’s caricatures on its website, the government did what has not even been dared in Denmark: its deactivation say for national security reasons\(^6\).

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\(^1\) Danish imams (Muslim priests) criticized the Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen for his refusal to act against the newspaper and later went on an explanatory tour in the Middle East.

\(^2\) The term Nordic is more inclusive with regard to Finland which does not share the same family of language (Scandinavian) but other characteristics. The words are however used interchangeably.

\(^3\) C. W. Watson wrote that “populations have always moved and states dealt with problems arising from the diversity of groups within one polity” (2000: 87) but at no point in the history of the world, has the situation become as challenging as today under the effects of globalization.

\(^4\) The bomb blasts in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in London on 7 July 2005 committed by Muslim extremists; France riots in the Arab and African immigrant suburbs in October-November 2005 and the violence in the Muslim world over the 12 caricatures of Prophet Mohamed.


\(^6\) The Minister of Foreign Affairs Laila Freivalds who took the initiative on February 6, 2001 resigned on March 21, 2006 after being found of lying on her role (See IHT; 22 March 2006).
For two countries considered “most similar” and supposedly with a common Nordic cultural model (Peter Duelund 2003) the difference could not be more striking.

According to Duelund et al. (2003: 18) both countries share the same Nordic cultural model, the “architect model” based on egalitarian goals (equal access to cultural benefits), a large public sector, considerable influence of artist organizations on cultural policymaking, corporative agreement, the construction of national identity and a national monoculture.

Denmark and Sweden are neighbours, constitutional monarchies with the same tradition of government (Arter 1999) and a cradle-to-grave welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1990).

They have witnessed the same migratory trends (Andersson and Wadensjö 2004). Until the Second World War, they were countries of emigration namely to North-America. With the post-war economic boom, workers were recruited en masse from Southern Europe (Italy, Greece, Turkey) and Finland. In the late 1970s labour migration was stopped under the pressure of labour organizations and since then refugees, asylum seekers and family reunification have become the main sources of immigration (Benito 2005:11).

But unlike pre-1970s immigrants, the majority is Muslim, non-Western and face deep-seated prejudices which with harder economic times has led to the creation of ghettos and growing religious radicalization. This anti-system element in particular has reinforced in the larger public the vision of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996) and prompted an intense debate over cultural diversity, immigration and citizenship, three potentially explosive
issues which reinforce each other\textsuperscript{18} and that Will Kymlicka calls the “three legged-tools” (2003).

With all these similarities, the question which comes to mind is why have both countries gone down different policy paths? Precisely why has Sweden stuck to multiculturalism while Denmark leaned towards assimilationism? The fact is not to know which of the two approaches is better in the normative sense or even more effective in dealing with order and diversity but which factors can account for such an outcome and how?

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Year & Western countries\textsuperscript{1} & Non-Western countries\textsuperscript{2} & Total & & & \\
\hline
1995 & 109,431 & 2.1 & 69,028 & 3.2 & 278,459 & 5.3 \\
1996 & 112,515 & 2.1 & 196,208 & 3.7 & 308,723 & 5.9 \\
1997 & 116,327 & 2.2 & 213,965 & 4.1 & 330,292 & 6.3 \\
1998 & 119,738 & 2.3 & 227,795 & 4.3 & 347,033 & 6.6 \\
1999 & 121,700 & 2.3 & 241,722 & 4.5 & 363,422 & 6.8 \\
2000 & 122,791 & 2.3 & 255,371 & 4.8 & 378,162 & 7.1 \\
2001 & 124,225 & 2.3 & 271,722 & 5.1 & 395,947 & 7.4 \\
2002 & 125,708 & 2.3 & 289,623 & 5.4 & 415,331 & 7.7 \\
2003 & 127,282 & 2.4 & 303,407 & 5.6 & 430,689 & 8.0 \\
2004 & 128,960 & 2.4 & 313,076 & 5.8 & 442,036 & 8.2 \\
2005 & 131,532 & 2.4 & 320,563 & 5.9 & 452,095 & 8.4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Immigrants and Descendants in Denmark, 1995-2005.}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{1} Western countries: EU countries (EU15), new EU countries (members as from 1 May 2004), Iceland, Norway, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and the Vatican City State.

\textsuperscript{2} Non-Western countries: All other countries

Source: Statistics Denmark 2005

\textsuperscript{18} The problems of citizenship arise from cultural diversity which in turn stems from immigration.
Figure 1: Cultural distance between Native Swedes and main immigrants groups.

Source: Diversity Barometer, Orlando Mella & Irving Palm, Sociologiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet, 2005.
2. Theoretical frameworks

The research on policymaking has produced a handful of schools of thought of which Institutional and Power-interest theories are the two most prominent. However a new set of theories based on ideas has gained enormous salience during the last decade.

2.1 Institutional theories

Institutional theories claim that institutions influence policymaking and may favour or hinder the crafting of certain policies. Here social factors have little influence. Research has spun a number of sub-theories especially path-dependency, Bureaucracy and Problem-solving.

a) Path-dependency

Path-dependency is part of a group of theories called New institutionalism$^{19}$. It emerged as a counter-theory to the behaviourism of the 1970s and unlike "old institutionalism" does not merely describe institutions (Evans et al. 1985) or study “the formal institutions of government and [define] the state in terms of its political, administrative and legal arrangements”(Schmidt 2005).

Path dependency assumes that the evolution of institutions and their context at the time, their record of past laws and regulations "lock" them in a given path thus the term “path-dependency”. Some policies will be seen as more suitable by a government and once adopted the tendency will be to continue them (Weir and Skocpol 1985). For example the early formation of corporatist institutions of compromise in Scandinavia according to Heclo (1974) and Rothstein (1988) can explain the development of the welfare-state.

Looking at institutions in Denmark and Sweden from a path-dependency perspective one shall thus be able to determine whether the policy difference proceeds from a different policy legacy.

b) Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is composed of "salaried officials who conduct the detailed business of government$^{20}$, advising on policy and applying policy decisions" (Hague et al.1998: 219)$^{21}$. There is no general agreement on its role in policymaking.

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19 New Institutionalism compounds also Rational choice institutionalism and Sociological institutionalism. The first investigates the nature of rational action within institutions. The second thinks of institutions as embedded in a culture and society with its practices, rules and norms. But that puts them at odds because Sociological institutionalism object of inquiry is outside institutions. I choose not to investigate them because they incorporate aspects of bureaucracy, problem solving, power-interest and even ideas in the case of “Discursive institutionalism” which I use in their own right. See Schmidt (2005) for a general presentation.

20 A government is in general made of ministries or departments under the direct control of a minister. The ministry itself is divided into smaller units: division, section or bureau.

21 The layer of high-level government officials is the focus of most research.
Some theorists argue that one can predict the kind of policies which will emerge looking at the way it is organized (Weir and Skocpol 1985) while others such as Meir with his theory of Representative bureaucracy predicate that a civil service recruited from all sections of society will produce policies that are responsive to the public and, in that sense, democratic (Meir, 1993: 1).

Yet Kingsley (1964) found in another study that high-level civil servants in the West pertained mostly to middle or upper-middle class families and were biased against the left. Aberbach et al. (1981) postulated that they had moderate attitudes and Pusey (1991) that the context at the time, the generation of civil servants and the kind of degree they held had an influence.

Other contend that bureaucracies essentially want to extend their turf (Bleich 2003: 20).

In order to evaluate the impact of the bureaucracy on policy outcome, one should find out if cultural institutions in both countries have opposed or favoured a type of policy for instance to ensure their perenity or if minorities are better represented in one bureaucracy than the other.

c) Problem-solving

This approach emphasizes "the development and implementation of policies that serve as solutions to societal problems" (Bleich 2003: 21). The main actors are policy experts, issue networks, advocacy coalitions, policy networks or policy communities who belong neither to the bureaucracy nor to parties and interest groups (Haas 1989; Kingdon 1995).

Unlike partisan bureaucrats, party politicians and lobbyists, problem-solving analysts do not seek to increase their power or personal interests but bring solutions to problems with their knowledge. Scholars view differences between countries in the level or nature of problems encountered (Bleich 2004: 22). Policies may also be adopted because experts were already exposed to them (Donald Winch, 1966 in Berman 1994: 35). Hence the questions: did policy experts influence policymaking in either country and if yes, did they become more aware?

2.2 Power-interest theories

They dwell on power and interest and underline the role of the political system, politicians, political parties and interest groups. Power-interest theories view policymaking as the product of competition for power and compromises between the main actors namely interest

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22 He found that the new generation of Australian high officials in their majority trained-economists favoured neo-liberal reforms in contrast to older generations. See Hague et al. (1998: 222).
23 Some authors do not rank it among institutionalist approaches, Bleich for example. I do it here because of it numerous affinities with the bureaucracy.
24 For a distinction between the concepts see a glossary by Zincone and Caponio (2004).
25 We employ likewise the word “pressure groups”.
groups in one hand and politicians and political parties in the other (Bleich 2004:18). The way power is distributed within and between the political parties may also affect decisions outcome.

a) The political system

The interaction between parties constitutes the party system. The way a party system operates can influence decision making. Downs (1957) distinguished three types of party system: the dominant party system, the two-party system and the multiparty system. In the first case, one party is almost always in power26 and the policy is more or less the same. In the second, two parties dominate the political scene and the victory of one often leads to the reversal of previous policies. In the third, no party usually achieve absolute majority giving way to the formation of coalition governments. Policies are then the fruit of consensus and for that ensues stability over time.

To map this relationship, Anthony Downs (1957) devised a left-right spectrum on which the left end represents government control of the economy and the right end, free market; in other words liberalism and conservatism respectively. To this economic cleavage, Daniel Bell added a socio-cultural cleavage based on issues such as immigration, law and order, abortion…(1996: 332–333 cited by Rydgren 2005:3). Hence, one should expect in both countries that non-socialist parties favour assimilationism and socialist parties, multiculturalism. Besides the duration of each policy should correspond roughly to the term of each kind of government, left or right.

b) Politicians and political parties

Politicians and political parties play a pivotal role in policy formulation and implementation but they can effectively do that only if they are in power. A party’s goal is thus to conquer and secure power. It functions as an agent of interest aggregation by processing the demands emanating from interests into policy agendas or platforms that government can use as directions (Hague et al. 1998: 131).

Most parties27 “have core supporters located in particular segments of the society, which

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26 Most exist in dictatorships or semi-democracies but they can also be present in democracies: e.g. Japan, India before the advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party in 1998, Mexico with the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) until 2000.
27 Maurice Duverger’s (1954) classic study identified two types of parties: Cadre parties which are elitist and Mass parties which rely on a large card – carrying membership. But as Katz and Mair (1995 cited by Hague 1998) demonstrated most of these parties in Western Europe have become Catch-all parties due to the advent of political marketing and “mobilized electorate” which make representation of groups less important than national interest and ideological victory less significant than electoral victory. Recent research has elicited two other types of parties: Cartel parties (Katz and Mair, 1995) which are big parties
provide a solid, long term grounding” (Hague et al. 1998: 134). In return they are a \textit{point of reference for voters} who use them to express their wishes and get a better vision of the world (Sten Berglund & Ulf Lindström 1978: 11; Hague et al., 1998:131). Politicians, the parties “faces” sometimes “search for issues that mobilize voters and show themselves to be “capable governors”, solidify internal party coherence or thwart opposing parties” (Bleich 2004: 20).

With what precedes, one can assume that left-wing parties in Denmark and Sweden found in immigrants an electoral base and right-wing parties, in nationalists, racists and Xenophobes, potential voters. There should be evidence that issues such as immigration, multiculturalism and citizenship were used to win votes.

b) \textbf{Interest groups}

Graham Wilson defines them as “organizations which have some autonomy from government or political parties and …try to influence public policy”(1990 cited by Hague et al. 1998: 113). In general there are two kinds of interest groups: communal and associational\textsuperscript{28}. The first is based on birth and kinship and regroup ethno-cultural groups such as ethnic groups, anti-immigrant associations, and religious institutions. The second relies on voluntary membership and promotes professional or associational interests: Trade unions, business federations (Hague 1998: 115). In our case, they are likely to be: Minorities, immigrants, racists, industries or institutions which use immigrant labour or services.

As Hague et al. (1998) explain, governments and interest groups are in constant communication. The latter provide information and technical assistance to the former and in return obtain an “insider status” which gives them the mean to influence policies. Groups, he adds, can deal directly with the government through their participation in committees, lobbying in parliament or action in judiciary court. They can also influence governments indirectly through the formation of interest parties\textsuperscript{29} or a tacit alliance with a political party, through public media, protest or even violence.

Thereupon one shall look if multiculturalist groups such as minority associations, religious

\textsuperscript{28} Based on these two characteristics, Blondel (1995) developed four subtypes: Customary groups which identify with ethnic or religious matters; Institutional groups such as churches, companies which exert influence; Protective groups which defend the interests of their members (trade unions); Promotional groups which champion some ideas, policies and beliefs. The first two are more often communal while the two others are associational.

\textsuperscript{29} Interest parties are small parties created with the goal of achieving specific goals and bringing them at the forefront not governing; anti-immigrant parties for example. (Hague et al. 1998: 118)
groups or assimilationists ones such as racists groups and interest parties in both countries have pushed for or tried to obstruct the advent of the policies or being associated to their drafting.

2.3 Ideas-based theories

They are relatively new but have grown in popularity. They examine the way actors’ sets of ideas influence their policies. The critique which is often levied against ideas-based theories is that they are difficult to observe and epiphenomenal (the result of other factors) and as such cannot be causal factors (independent variables) themselves (Berman 1994: 41-42). One approach, the "rationalist" posits that ideas are of importance where interest-based theories have proved inefficient.

Berman, one of its proponents wrote that one needs just to prove that an idea held at time T had an effect at time T-1, that "the crux of the matter lies in distinguishing between situations where ideas govern actions and situations where decision makers consciously or unconsciously use the language of ideas to justify policy choices made on other grounds" (1994: 42-44). The other approach, the “constructivist”, purports that material factors are concomitant with views. “Reality is constructed”. In that sense ideas and culture espouse structural factors in (Checkel 1998 cited by Bleich 2003: 30).

In the first situation, ideas shape policy makers—we investigate such a goal. In the second, they are just tools which policymakers use to further their interests. A third conciliatory approach by Bleich enunciates interactivity between ideas and actors.

In any case, ideas used as independent variables are neither ideologies seen as world visions that will explain everything and explain nothing (Berman 1994: 49) nor political culture which encompasses adherence to democratic values, feelings about government and hierarchy (Bleich 5004: 28) but they are a more complex set of ideas.

Sheri E. Berman put forth the concept of programmatic belief from her exploration of the

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30 Sheri E. Berman wrote that ideas-based theories were set aside by social scientists with in mind the ravages caused by the Nazi and Fascist ideologies but that that today they are revisited as memory fades. The other critique is that ideas are difficult to observe and the result of other factors (epiphenomenal. Some argue in that sense that ideas cannot be independent variables as to influence the course of events (1994: 40-42). Schmidt (2005) also attributes its revival to the collapse of communism and the problem of democratic transitions that other theories couldn’t explain.

31 Building on the work of Talcott Parsons (1954: 20) she gives to researchers guidelines when ideas could be explored: 1-Real differences in ideas held by groups and different policies as a result. 2-Connection between differences and decision-makers’ policy choices. 3-Ideas predating policy outcomes. 4-No collinearity in the sense that the content of ideas can be attributed to other variables.

32 They can be for example a weapon in political fights (McNamara 1998 cited by Bleich 2004: 30).
behaviour of social democratic parties’ politics in interwar Europe and Erik Bleich that of frames from his study of race politics in France and Britain. Bleich notes that both frameworks are similar except that his was designed particularly for race policy (2004: 28).

But there is more than one difference or at least a difference in emphasis thus the need to apply both. Berman pinpoints the existence of carriers and focuses on political parties while Bleich underscores the interaction between ideas and actors and highlights discourses.

a) Berman’s “Programmatic beliefs”

Sheri E. Berman defines Programmatic beliefs as: “a complex of ideas which links goals and policies more directly [and which] within their specific domains provide guidelines for activity…furnish normative criteria for evaluating “right” and “wrong” and for analyzing cause-and-effect relationships.” (1994: 49-50).

She claims that “an ideas-based approach argues that—especially in time of crisis—environmental factors, while important, do not determine decisions” (1994:38) and that “in order to be heard in a world where different ideas are calling out for attention, an idea must be adopted by a person or group [carrier] able to make others listen or render them receptive. (1998: 55-56).

The possibility for an idea to be adopted and become prominent in the system increases with the influence of the carrier. He or she will ensure that the idea remains salient by building a consensus around it in the party, mentoring/co-opting like-minded individuals or using it as a common denominator among in-groups. She adds citing Hall (1993) that their “institutionalisation” meaning their inclusion into an institution and organization where it will become acceptable norm for members offer better chances of longitivity The relevant questions to this regard are: who have been the “carriers” in Denmark and Sweden? did they hold different ideas? how were those ideas institutionalized?

b) Bleich’s frames

Framing has spawned a rich literature many on the study of social movements (See for example McAdam et al., 1996: 6; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford 1988: 201).

According to Martin Rein and Donald Schön a frame “provides a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined and problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon” (1993: 146 cited by Bleich 2003: 25).

Erik Bleich defines frames as “a set of cognitive and moral maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere (2004: 26). Cognitive maps being: definitions, analogies, metaphors and

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33 Berman (1994) in particular used the word programmatic to designate cases where ideas induce actions.
symbols and moral maps, the valence-degree of acceptance or refusal-to terms and course of action and the authority one has to speak about a cause.

Thus cultural diversity may be defined in different terms: religion, race, culture *per se* and even geographical origin. Analogies he says help determine the context. The percentage or origins of immigrants for example will be compared to that of another country or previous periods of time to assess the situation and choose policies. And metaphors such as “Ghettos” “crusades” will be used by those who are against multiculturalism to justify assimilationist policies as well as symbols.

The moral map of policymakers in Sweden may lead them to consider the muslim veil as a group right while those in Denmark view it as oppressive towards women. Likewise Islamic organizations and secular associations may feel particularly concerned or called to action on the issue.

Frames are present at individual level but also at groups and social level when people have in common many elements of the same frame. For instance minorities, socialists, conservatives, racists would all have frames in the sense that share elements together.

To detect frames and their influence on policymaking, Bleich (2004: 32-33) recommends the following steps:

1-Examine the statements of actors.
2-Find out if frames precede policies and are present during their formulation.
3-Find out if new policies will be in accordance to the frame.
4-See if Cross-national variation in policy outcomes will be a function of different prevailing frames.

According to him the purpose of looking at actors’ statements is to discover their cognitive and moral maps, to see if frames precede policies one must detect their role in guiding policing and if new policies are in accordance to the frame, one shall expect policymakers to focus on that particular frame. As for cross-national policy differences, frames will simply be dissimilar and be conceptualized in different ways (2004: 32-33)

### 3 Methodology

In this part I define the terms and the method used for the study. I also enumerate the reasons of my choice as well as the sources which I consulted.
3.1 Definitions

a) Multiculturalism/Assimilationism

Though it is buzzword today multiculturalism is hard to define because of its divergent cross-national usages and the controversial debate around it. It is both an overarching term which describes the reality of cultural diversity in the society (Westin 1999, Levy 2000) and the liberal school of thinkers and policies which value diversity and group rights. Therefore Paul Kelly defined it both as a political theory or ideology dealing with the question of equal recognition of cultures and "the fact of societies with more than one culture in the public realm" (2002: 4). Assimilationists oppose multiculturalism in general by advocating individual rights and the integration of minority cultures into the majority culture. Because cultural diversity permeates every aspect of social life, studies tend to cut across many sectors: education, culture, housing, employment, immigration, integration. That makes the topic interesting but also difficult to study so the need to limit its scope.

I investigate the countries cultural policies; cultural diversity being first of all about culture though only one aspect of it. But when necessary I explore the aspects of integration policies which relate to culture e.g language. The term “cultural integration” seems appropriate for me to describe the issues surrounding culture and immigrants.

I use “cultural diversity” to refer to the multiplicity of cultures in real life and multiculturalism/assimilationism when talking about the respective theories and policies they stand for. These distinctions are necessary to avoid the confusion which comes with the polysemic use of the word “multiculturalism”.

b) Culture

The concept has been defined in uncountable ways making a common terminology very difficult. According to Sven Nilsson, “culture” has two dimensions: one as “sector” which refers to artistic productions as well as the institutions, organisations and persons operating

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34 For a historical account of its development see Watson (2000).
35 He defines ideology here as a political theory that is rooted in political practice and experience and not any technical or philosophical claim about the cognitive or epistemological status of political concepts and discourse. He explains culture as a way of life which matters in the person's relations with the society and own existence "self" and equal recognition as equal treatment, egalitarianism.
36 This does not really include national minorities as the Sami, Tornedal Finns, Swedish Finns, Roma/Gypsies and Jews in Sweden and Inuits in Denmark who because of their ancienity are regarded differently by the central authority and benefit of autonomy and affirmative action laws. Cultural diversity can equally refer to pluralism in arts: theatre, dance, film...
within them. Another as “aspect” which has an anthropological overtone and comprises norms, values, ideas (1999:10). I use the latter in this study. Some authors proclaim that it is consonant with ethnic group, religion or race (Michael Azar in Pripp et al. 2004: 54) or power. Duelund affirmed in that vein that “cultural policy reflects…[the] tools that government and other players use in order to promote a certain direction (2003:14) and that they “have plenty of means at their disposal with which to promote a particular policy, regardless of whether they are totalitarian or democratic regimes, modern or pre-modern societies (2003: 20).

c) Policymaking

Policy is what politicians in power or vying for power intend to do: “a more general notion than a decision and it involves a predisposition to respond in a specific way” (Hague et al 1998: 255-256). The policy process per se has four general stages: agenda-setting (recognition of a problem and goal-setting), formulation, implementation and evaluation (correction or continuation) (Hague et al 1998: 262).

Policy-making is situated at the level of formulation. Public policy-making thus is policy formulation at government high-level

37. Studying policymaking in Denmark and Sweden with regard to multiculturalism entails knowing how and why government policymakers have been inclined to formulate a multiculturalist policy in Sweden and an assimilationist one in Denmark.

3.2 General approach

The research is a focused comparison of the two countries. Focused Comparisons are “small N [number of cases] studies which concentrate on the intense analysis of an aspect of politics in a small number of countries” (Rod Hague et al 1998: 280). They are the mainstay of comparative social science. They not only serve well the task of establishing similarities and differences, but associated with qualitative analysis, give the researcher more interpretive flexibility (Ragin 1987: 16-17).

All three theories are tested. The rationale here is that each theory holds only partial currency but combined would give a more plausible account (Heindemer, Heclo and Adams 1990: 9). Besides the nature of the work-a Master’s thesis-didn’t give me enough time to get into details. Therefore by applying all the three theories what is lost in depth is gained in breadth.

The general method is inspired from the Method of Difference first defined in 1843 by the

37 One must distinguish high-level government from other levels of government: regional and municipal. Policies can differ at the local and regional level especially where opposition parties are in power. Yet the general policy is formulated by the national government.
British philosopher John Stuart Mills. It fits both countries as it requires that cases be as similar as possible with divergent outcomes (Skocpol 1979: 36).

Because I acknowledge the partial validity of these theories I am not seeking the single explanatory variable which will explain the difference between the two countries. For reason of clarity the comparison is not thematic meaning the countries are studied one after another but at the end of each chapter, there is a conclusion which compares and sums up the results.

3.3 Sources

I chose the main policy documents published by policymakers. For Denmark they are each Minister of Culture’s policy report. When there is none as with the case of Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen between 1998 and 2001, I use corroborating materials. For Sweden they are the independent commission report of 1972 (SOU 1972/66) and 1994 (SOU 1994/85), the cultural policy bills of 1974 (Prop.1974/28) and 1996 (Prop.1996/97).

For the collection of empirical data, I did interviews by telephone, computer and in person with key policymakers and experts in Sweden and Denmark. These were officials of the ministry of culture in both countries, officials in the agencies in charge of implementing cultural and immigration policies, cadres of political parties, researchers at think tanks, journalists and parliamentarians involved in cultural and immigration matters.

I consulted archives, publications, newspapers articles and audio-visual documents from academic and institutional libraries. Namely the Centre for Multiethnic Research at Uppsala University, the Central Library at Göteborg University, the Multicultural Centre in Botkyrka and the Immigrant Institute in Borås in Sweden; the Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark at Aalborg University, the Nordic Cultural Institute in Copenhagen and the parliament libraries in Stockholm and Copenhagen.

Even though there was not enough funding to travel frequently to Copenhagen, my consolation was the swift loan system between and inside both countries and the impressive amount of digitalized documents available at the click of the mouse. Linguistics problems were offset in part by the fact that a high percentage of Danes and Swedes speak English and documents routinely have an English version or summary.

3.4 Reasons of choice

My interest for Denmark and Sweden as objects of study stems from the passionate debate over multiculturalism which arose in the British press in the aftermath of the London transport

38 My knowledge of Swedish is upper-intermediate. Though Danish presents differences, a speaker of Swedish would not normally have a big problem understanding a text.
bombings in July 2005. As I delved into the subject I found that the terms of the debate were the same as in Scandinavia and by the time I visited the exhibition of Danish photographer Henrik Saxgren on Nordic immigration in Göteborg, in January 2006, I had become totally captivated.

Besides I found that Denmark and Sweden presented two really contrasting cases but that little comparative research has been done on the countries despite their leading role in the region and as well as in the cultural sector, where the topic finds its clearest expression.

The existing comparative studies on immigrants in both countries have mostly been concerned with self-employment (Anderson and Wadensjö 2004) or poverty (Blume et al. 2003) or the far-right (Rydgren 2005) however Rydgren’s work (2005) is of interest particularly the discourse of the Danish People’s Party which is a support-party to the current government coalition.

Those dealing with cultural policy seek above all to establish regional typologies and by and large do not handle the debate over assimilationism and multiculturalism even if they agree that it is a common dilemma and future challenge (Milton C. Cummings and Richard S. Katz 1987; Veronika Ratzenböck 1998; Peter Duelund (ed.) 2003). This work fills that gap.

The diversity policies of Norway and Sweden being viewed as similar (Tomas Hammar 2001: 4) precluded me to use the Method of difference which is regarded as more efficient than the method of Agreement.

Finland and Iceland because of a lower percentage of immigrants did not seem “problematic” enough. The study parallels the period beginning with the end of labour immigration, the first national cultural policies (1969 and 1974 respectively in Denmark and Sweden) and attempts at dealing with cultural diversity until today’s controversies.

The dissertation is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter I try to elicit the concepts of

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39 The showdown over the caricatures will only come as a confirmation.
40 The exhibition “Krig & Kärlek-Om invandring i Norden” (War & Love- About immigration in the Nordic countries) opened in January 2006 in Göteborg, Sweden’s second largest city and industrial hub.
41 There is a plethora of single-country studies to be named here. The most important are referred to in the course of the dissertation.
42 Integration policies can be considered as well but they cut across too many areas: housing, employment, discrimination etc. However I refer to them where necessary.
43 The situation of native ethnic minorities is examined but not that of the population of foreign extraction though they are bigger in numerical terms.
44 Duelund et al. mention the debate over group and individual rights, multiculturalism and assimilationism as one of the five areas where the debate on the future of Nordic cultural policy and new research could start (2003: 524).
45 The Method of Agreement entails that the cases be as different as possible but with a similar outcome. It is less reputable than the opposite, the Method of difference (Skocpol 1979: 36).
46 In the sense that the issue has become public and polemical.
assimilationism and multiculturalism and describe how they translate into each country cultural policy. In the second chapter I examine the relative impact of institutions on policy development in the two countries. The third chapter tackles the impact of coalitional politics and group interests. The fourth analyzes the role of ideas. I conclude with a summary, personal observations and recommendations.
I. Is Denmark assimilationist and Sweden multiculturalist?

1. Multiculturalism or the equal recognition of cultures

According to W.C. Watson (2000), states have always have to deal with the problem of diversity within one state but multiculturalism as a policy was first introduced in Canada, in rejection of cultural assimilation (Arends-Toth et al. 2003).

1.1 Diversity and group rights

Theorists of multiculturalism in general value difference and see the equal recognition of cultures as a group rights in a democratic society (Will Kimlycka 1995, Michael Taylor 1994, Amy Gutman et al. 1994). Will Kimlycka for example explained that minorities’s rights including those of religion and association are best exercised in community and henceforth demand group protection from the liberal state. He argues that unlike religion, the liberal state cannot remain neutral when ethnicity and nationality is implicated thus the need of affirmative action policies.

Still multiculturalists agree to certain limits. In reponse to criticisms by Barry47 (2001: 270) that cultures cannot be equal because they have different values or by Sartori (2000: 69) that if they were, they will loose value, Kymlicka (1995 cited by Joppke 2004: 242) agreed that for immigrants48 the overall goal should be integration into the majority culture. And Bikhu Parekh reflected that if there was a clash between a minority custom and the majority culture, the first be withdrawn (2000: 272 in Joppke 2004: 242).

1.2 A more normative view

With its emphasis on equality, multiculturalism resonates better with democratic values. The EU for example has designated 2008 as the year of multiculturalism. Hartmann and Gerteis writes that “it is difficult for citizens and theorists alike to distinguish conceptions of difference from questions of equality. One variant, “critical multiculturalism” advocates even a policy of economic redistribution and social restructuring in addition to equal recognition (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005: 221).

Walzer stated for instance that “multiculturalism is a program for social and economic

47 Though a liberal thinker, Brian Barry is one of the harshest critiques of multiculturalism.
48 As opposed for example to minorities as Native Americans and African-Americans in the USA who have been historically discriminated against. Joppke sees this as a contradiction.
equality. No regime of toleration will work for long in an immigrant, pluralist, modern, and post-modern society without some combination of these two: a defense of group differences and an attack on class differences” (1997: 111).

Ethnic minorities are more likely to be affected by unemployment, poverty, crime, criminality… some blame multiculturalism for this very fact (Scheffer 2001 on the case of the Netherlands cited by Joppke 2004: 243). While others argue that valuing diversity does not necessitate a redistribution (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005: 221).

1.3 An embattled concept

But since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in particular, the star of multiculturalism has waned. The concept is more likely to be scorned at than lauded as before (Will Kymlicka 1998: 16; Montserrat Guibernau and John Rex 1997: 269). Schlessinger branded it the “disuniting of America” (2001) and Huntington (2004) an attack against american identity with reference to the growing hispanic influence.

Recently Christian Joppke detected a progressive des-involvement by Britain and the Netherlands where multiculturalism has been official as well as a tendency to take multiculturalism as “the description of a society rather than as prescription for state policy” (2005: 253). Thus leaving Sweden as one of the few “pure official” multicultural countries in Western Europe.

The reasons he says citing the cases of Australia, the Netherlands and Britain are: (1) the lack of public support, (2) the continued socio-economic marginalisation and self-segregation of migrants, (3) the liberal minimum newly imposed on the dissenters by the states (2004: 244). For Taylor that recession is mostly linked to increased immigration (2001: 187).

Seen in that vein Swedish cultural policies should be equalitarian with some few exceptions, have a normative aura, have a more generous immigration and integration policies and support for example home language training.

2. Assimilationism or the quest for homogeneity

Assimilationism has permeated policymaking since the days of colonialism49. In the USA, prior to the 1960s, it was “the traditional vision of incorporation” with the concept of “melting-pot”50 (Hartmann & Gerteis, 2005: 226). It found its first academic expressions in the publications of Park (1939), Gordon (1964) and the Chicago School (Hartmann &

49 When powers such as France and Britain tried to impose their cultural models in their newly carved empires (Bleich 2005).
50 The melting pot suppose that immigrants dilute their particularisms in the mainstream anglo-saxon culture.
Assimilationists posit that immigrants must commit to the core values of the state (Arthur Schlesinger Jr. 1991, Roger Brubaker 1996, Christian Joppke 1999) and dismiss the claims of difference. Hartmann and Gerteis state that non-multiculturalists or assimilationists “deny the mediating role of groups… difference is understood as something dangerous, to be rid of or at least minimized. The emphasis is instead on cultural homogeneity and conformity” (2005: 226). Conformity entails mutual responsibility and the connection between the state and the individual goes without the mediating role of groups. People are expected to shed their difference before joining the nation but must do so as individuals not groups.

### 2.2 A more conservative view

Assimilationism is often rated as conservative especially with regards to issues such as immigration and social redistribution. Assimilationists in general oppose immigration that they see as jeopardizing the moral and cultural homogeneity of the society.

Privatisation which stems from the principle of separation between public and private sphere participates of the same. The consequence is that the dominant culture tends not to change (Hartmann and Gerteis 2005: 227). Some authors affirm that private differences as well as immigration may be tolerated as long as core values or the “center” as Edward Shils (1982 cited by Hartmann and Gerteis 2005: 227) labelled it are not eroded.

Thus if Danish cultural policy is assimilationist one will expect it to be anti-immigrant, monocultural and to lay strict requirements for immigrants in terms of language learning and adoption of the danish culture.

### 2.3 Descriptive multiculturalism

In a bid to find a consensus, Levy (2000) proposed to consider the reality on the ground; arguing that the ethnic diversity which today makes up the social fabric of every Western society renders them de facto multicultural. He put forth the concept of “multiculturalism of fear” which asserts that many governments are neither multiculturalists nor assimilationists but instead solve problems as they come with pragmatism.

Erik Bleich (1998: 82-83) in his analysis of multicultural education policies in Britain and France distinguished four patterns: two non-multicultural (preparationism, and assimilationism) and two multicultural (passive multiculturalism and active multiculturalism). Preparationism encourages cultural differences with in mind the expulsion or departure of
cultural minorities. Assimilationism seeks homogeneity through the elimination of cultural differences. Passive multiculturalism allows for a measure of cultural diversity by making certain exceptions for minorities while limiting the effects of change on the majority. Active multicultural policies attempt to create a new national culture which encompasses minority as well as majority cultures and perspectives. In both situations, children will be given the possibility to retain their mother tongue.

**Figure 2: Multicultural and Nonmulticultural Diversity Policies**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Diversity Policies</th>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Multicultural</td>
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<td>Assimilationist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preparationist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Multicultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Passive multicultural</td>
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<td>Active Multicultural</td>
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</table>

In the light of what precedes and with the view that policies and governments change, can one claim indeed that Danish cultural policies towards immigrants have been assimilationist and those of Sweden multicultural?

3. **Danish and Swedish cultural integration policies**

The first cultural policies were drafted at around the same time, 1969 in Denmark and 1974 in Sweden. A period marked by the 1968 youth protests, the end of labour migration and a redefinition of the concept of culture in both countries.

3.1 **Denmark**

a) 1969-1980: Pluralism within the “national straight-jacket”

Cultural policies prior to the 1970s, aimed at the “democratisation of culture” meaning the dissemination of works of arts in the population. The concept was pretty much that of a monoculture (Jeppesen 1999; Duelund 1996: 27). With the introduction of the White Paper 517 in 1969 by the Communist Minister of Culture K. Helveg Petersen, for the first time a national policy with overarching goals was designed and a new concept of culture espousing pluralism adopted (Duelund 2003: 45).

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51 I borrowed this expression from Duelund (2003: 52)
The concept was ushered in under the impulse of the youth movement of 1968 and defined in the anthropological sense\(^{52}\). It emphasized individual self-development and choice of cultural values. A trend that Duelund called “cultural democracy” (2003: 42).

In 1977, the new Social Democratic Minister, Niels Matthiasen reaffirmed the same conceptualization in his policy report: art was rehabilitated as well as international exchanges in the wake of the country’s accession to the EEC (Duelund 2003: 46-47). Yet this new pluralism did not acknowledge immigrants then a growing size of the population but regional differences. Even so as Casper Hvenegaard Rasmussen and Charlotte Lee Høirup explain, there was a discrepancy between the rhetoric and the reality (2000: 20).

b) 1980-1990: Instrumentalism

In the 1980s, policies became instrumental as the country balked under a severe economic crisis. Culture and art were “to solve unemployment problems by attracting tourists, securing highly skilled employees for new advanced companies”(Denmark Cultural Policy 2003: 6). The policy reports of the Social Democrat Lise Østergaard in 1981, the Christian Democrat Mimi Stilling Jacobsen more or less applied that vision and though the Communist Ole Vig Jensen defined culture in its most pluralistic sense: “the whole way of life” (Duelund 2003: 49), none touched upon immigrants’ integration.

c) 1999-2006: Assimilationism

The 1990s marked the incursion of the cultural integration of immigrants in the policy debate\(^{53}\). In 1993 the Social Democrat Minister Jytte Hilden launched a review of all the cultural policies since 1961. The result was published in 1996 in a collection called “The Politics of Culture” and in one of the volumes, “The Multicultural Denmark” she set multiculturalism as the goal (Duelund:1996:3). Her successor the Communist Ebbe Lundgaard gave a rather hard food-for-thought by stating that it is important that Danish cultural policy gives to New Danes (immigrants) the possibility to enjoy their culture but preferably in the form that invite other Danes to a better knowledge of them” (Cultural Policy Report 1997).

In 1999, Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen, another communist minister in the Social-Democratic/Radical Coalition revived the concept of “danishness”. She asserted that it needs to be reinvigorated in the face of globalisation and “the multicultural challenge posed by migration from other cultures” as well as the centralisation of all cultural institutions (Duelund 2003: 54).

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\(^{52}\) The terms refers to norm and values.

\(^{53}\) The first integration law, (Lov 474 of July 1, 1998) was passed in 1998 after having been stalled for 10 years (Olle Hammer and Inger Bruun: 2000: 9).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks, a series of restrictive measures were passed on immigration\(^5^4\) (Think Tank on Integration in Denmark Report 2004: 3) and the conservative Minister of Culture, Brian Mikkelsen adopted a very assimilationist policy (Danish cultural policy 2002). He published in January 2006 a *Canon of the Danish culture*\(^5^5\) meant to show what Danish culture is without any reference to immigrants’ cultures.

### 3.2 Sweden

a) 1974-1996: passive multiculturalism

The country first cultural policy was laid down in 1974 by the government (Prop 1974: 28)\(^5^6\) following the 1972 report *New Cultural Policy* (SOU 1972/66). Though multiculturalism was not a prominent topic at that time the report advocated the preservation as well as the valorisation of immigrants’ cultures (SOU 1972/66 p.179). In its proposal to the Riksdag, the government stated that immigrants because of their insufficient knowledge of the Swedish language and the social environment were socially and culturally isolated and the possibilities for them to maintain their culture limited. And also that they were not benefiting from any public support whereas cultural policy is part of the state’s global objective of creating a society which is marked by equality and give to people the opportunities of having a richer life (Prop. 1974:28, p.293).

These recommendations were adopted in the final bill and provisions made for the promotion of cultural diversity, immigrants participation in cultural life as well as the preservation of their own cultures. However the idea of funding an active programme was turned down pending the results of an ongoing commission of enquiry (KrU 1974:15, pp 36-39). These objectives “took as its starting point the fundamental philosophy of the Social Democratic Party’s cultural policy that have developed in the 1960s (Larsson in Duelund 2003: 207).

In 1990, the Ministry of Research, Culture and Education was created and in 1993 an independent commission of enquiry was set up with the goal of analyzing the demands and challenges laying ahead. The final report, named *Kulturpolitikens Inriktning* (Cultural Policy

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\(^{5^4}\) Only reunification with spouse/cohabitant and minor child is permitted. The age limit for reunification for both spouses has been pushed up to 24, say to limit the number of forced marriages and reduced to 15 for children. Both spouses must now show stronger ties with the country. Foreigners must be able to maintain themselves for 7 years in average to acquire permanent residency and show a bank statement guaranteeing self-support for one year. There is no right to dual nationality and the required period of acquisition is now 9 years.  

\(^{5^5}\) The Canon has become a bestseller, topping nine times the chart (Dagens Nyheter, 19 July 2006).  

\(^{5^6}\) Its objectives were: the broadening of cultural life both geographically and socially, increased funding of regional cultural institutions and extensive investments in amateur and people’s own cultural activities (Tor Larsson in Duelund et al. (2003: 207).
Direction (SOU 1995: 84)\textsuperscript{57} acknowledged that the provisions made about immigrants and national minorities in the 1974 cultural policy have not been achieved.

c) 1996-2006: active multiculturalism

In 1996, the second national cultural policy was adopted with the clair goal of increasing the participation of minorities in the cultural life, encouraging cultural diversity and cultural exchanges (Prop.1996/97: 3; Bet.1996/1997: KrU1; rskr.1996/97: 129)\textsuperscript{58}.

In 1998, a committee named \textit{Forum för Världskultur} (Forum for World Culture) was set up and after 2 years of work published the report \textit{Jag vill leva jag vill dö i Norden} (I want to live, I want to die in the North) (SOU 2000: 118) which recommended among other things the appointment of regional multicultural consultants today present in many Regions\textsuperscript{59} and giving the responsibility of promoting multiculturalism to the Swedish National Council of Cultural Affairs.

In 2003 an independent report \textit{Internationella Kulturutredningen} (International cultural policy direction 2003) reported that Sweden’s cultural diversity would be a catalyst for new cultural impulses and international networking and an advantage on the international scene (SOU 2003:121). The same year, the Minister of culture Marita Ulvsog put up an agenda for the years 2003-2006 with among other objectives: the instauration of a year of multiculturalism in 2006, the increase of knowledge in the population about foreign-born artists and support to help them publicize their works and an enquiry on how multiculturalism is implemented by institutions and other actors. The conclusions of the report \textit{Tid för månfald} (Time for diversity) by Pripp et al. (2004) disclosed that public cultural institutions have made little progress with regard to the implementation of multiculturalism\textsuperscript{60}.

4. Partial conclusion

Denmark’s cultural integration policy has been consonant with assimilationism and that of Sweden with multiculturalism. Both policies became active in the 1990s. Denmark never adopted a real diversity program. To begin with there was a constant opposition between an aesthetic and anthropological concept of culture. And when the anthropological concept

\textsuperscript{57} It was also published as a collection of tables \textit{Kulturpolitik: tjugo års} (20 years cultural policy): 1974-1994 and referred to as SOU 1985: 85.

\textsuperscript{58} See also Olsén and Peldán (2004)

\textsuperscript{59} The region gathers a group of Kommuns (communes). It is the middle administrative level between the national government and the communes.

\textsuperscript{60} The study of Olsén and Peldán indeed showed a discrepancy between the national policy and its application in the cultural sector of Malmö, Sweden third biggest city and also the host of one of the country largest immigrant surburbs: Rosengård. Malmö is also located opposite Copenhagen, the Danish capital, about 40 minutes by bus. According to the same prinicple of decentralization, the ministry is not directly responsible for the application of laws.
started to be applied after 1969 the pluralism it advocated was confined within the limits of a monoculture.

From the 1990s onwards when immigration became a hot topic, policymakers adopted an anti-immigrant and assimilationist policy except under Jytte Hilden (1993-1996). Swedish policies on the contrary have been multiculturalist throughout. But between the 1970s and the 1990s, these policies were passive and in the beginning of the mid-1990s they became active. Significantly the two countries built different cultural institutions and at different periods of time therefore requiring us to see if yes, how these institutional aspects affected their policy choices.
II. Institutional analysis

An institutional analysis compells us to see if the content of past laws and policies (path-dependency), the demographic composition and the organization of the bureaucracy or if problem-solving analysts oriented policymakers towards their respective policies.

1. Path-dependency

   1.1 Denmark: The impact of the mid-1950 Left-right consensus

The foundations of a Danish cultural policy were laid in 1849 with the adoption of the country first democratic constitution. The promotion of art and culture which was hitherto the realm of the monarchy was then transferred to the new civil administration (Denmark Cultural Policy 2003: 4). The period that followed was marked by the bourgeois culture of the landowning class inspired from the philosopher Nikolaj Frederik Grundtvig (1783-1872) writings on the nation-state and religion (Duelund 2003: 33) and with as objective: national enlightenment61 (Engberg 2001).

The rise of labour movements in the early 20th century and the advent of the Social Democrats to power, gave way to a marxist workers’ culture based on international workers’ solidarity and songs. But it was shortlived as Social Democrats including their main thinker Julius Bomholt62 rallied behind an all inclusive national policy focusing on individual citizens (Duelund 2003: 36-37). This paralleled the emergence of an intellectual movement championing freedom of thought and challenging the authority of the state and the church which the Radical party adopted later.

With industrialization and the beginnings of the welfare state, a compromise was struck in the 1930s between the two parties to forge a “higher cultural-policy synthesis” (Duelund (ed.) 2003: 40). In the mid-1950s a coalition between Social Democratic parties and Radical parties led to the implementation of the welfare ideas of “culture for all” and “enlightment of the people”, based partly on the ideas of national identity and the promotion of the Danish cultural heritage, as agreed in the compromise reached in the 1930s” (Bakke 1988, 96,102-104). At the creation of the first ministry of culture in1961 and Julius Bomholt at the helm these ideas were incorporated into policy objectives.

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61 Enlightenment refers to freedom and equality.
62 Bomholt conceived the first Social Democratic cultural policy in his book Arbejderkultur (Worker’s Culture) in 1932.
One factor allow us to posit that the record of past laws have influenced policy choice. The fact that the policy content did not change until the 1990s when the context changed dramatically. It means that the tenets of the policy remained the same. Though there were differences with regards to various political ideologies, as Duelund revealed they “did not have major consequences in terms of content” (2003: 57).

Nationalism, individualism and monoculturalism remained the threads in every cultural policy formulation since 1840; fostered by consensus (1930s, 1950s, 1961 and 2002) which not only had a carry over effect over a long period but are also typical of Danish policymaking (Duelund 2003: 57; Arter 1982). Thus one can argue that in the case of Denmark there was a path-dependency, that the country’s record of policies advocating a national culture and individual freedom were “priors” which guided them towards assimilationist policies.

1.2 Sweden: The influence of Social democracy and the welfare state
As in Denmark, Swedish culture was a mean of legitimisation for the Court and was under the influence of the Church until the demise of absolutism in 1809. In 1844, Erik Gustav Geiger, a liberal intellectual and history professor at Uppsala University against the prevailing monolithic thought postulated that “a new system integration principle, the principle of association would replace the personality principle of the absolutist system of privilege within the framework of the imminent restructurings of economic and social life” (Tor Larsson in Duelund 2003: 188).

But it is not until the instauration of equal and universal suffrage in 1920 and the beginning of a long period of Social Democratic rule in 1932 that Geijer’s idea will gain currency; marking the beginning of a new paradigm. In 1933 the Social Democrat Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, Arthur Engberg whose portfolio included culture set up a commission to rescue the failing Royal theatres. A first in a series of decisions which according to Larsson illustrate the tendency of cultural policy to control and oppose independent cultural productions (Larsson in Duelund 2003: 199).

In the post-war period, the party now sure and confident, the Social Democrats legislated say to repel the country’s cultural policy which was "conservative rather than socialist in their ideas and bound by tradition inasmuch as it constantly looked backwards” (Larsson in Duelund 2003: 199). Regarding immigrants, the Social Democrats called upon the recognition and support of immigrants cultures as a report made by Erik Gamby in 1972 for the commission of enquiry shows (SOU 1972/66, pp. 151-153).

It is not then surprising that when the Riksdag conceives it first national cultural policy in 1974, this one is heavily influenced by the anti-conservatism and communitarianism of

The same policy was by and large reproduced in the second cultural policy, Prop1996/97:3. Pelle Olsén and Ulrika Peldán say that one of the few differences was that for the first time, diversity was formulated as a goal (2004: 8). Peter Curman, the chairman of KLYS (Swedish Joint Committee for Artistic and Literary Professionals)63 a pressure group, stated the following in its reaction to the Cultural committee report Prop.1996/97: kr1:

KLYS considers that the cultural policy goals defined by the Parliament in 1974 have been of much importance for the shaping of Swedish cultural policy…The importance of the fact that these goals are now firmly entrenched is great. KLYS therefore questions whether it is meaningful to replace them with new goals; which in substance do not constitute any manifest change (Curman 1996).

One can then conclude that past laws and policies: a mix of communitarianism and egalitarian ideas, “locked in” Swedish policymakers in the path to multiculturalism. Yet path-dependency doesn’t explain why the respective policies were actively promoted in the 1990s and whether the difference in the way policies were formulated (ministers’ reports in Denmark and commissions of inquiries of Sweden) had any impact or not. It would then be useful to explore a problem-solving perspective namely because of the presence in the independent commissions of enquiry in Sweden of experts and the role of bureaucracy because of its role in the production of ministers’ reports in Denmark. The tables in the following page give an interpretation of the policies and their evolution.

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63 The most influential federation of artists’ organization founded in 1959.
Table 2: Path dependency in Danish cultural policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Goals</th>
<th>Freedom of expression</th>
<th>Equal Access to cultural goods</th>
<th>Independence of artists from commecialism</th>
<th>Preservation of cultural heritage</th>
<th>International exchanges</th>
<th>Cultural Renewal</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
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Legend:

✓ : Yes  o : No

Table 3: Path dependency in Swedish cultural policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Goals</th>
<th>Freedom of expression</th>
<th>Equal Access to cultural goods</th>
<th>Independence of artists from commecialism</th>
<th>Preservation of cultural heritage</th>
<th>International exchanges</th>
<th>Cultural Renewal</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>o (learning)</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend:

✓ : Yes  o : No
2. Bureaucracy

2.1 Denmark: a large and early bureaucracy

The rationale behind the creation of the Danish Ministry of Culture in 1961 was according to Duelund “first and foremost, pragmatic and administrative” (2003: 42). The Ministry of Education which was in charge of culture had grown too big and influential voices such as that of Julius Bomholt saw it as a mean “to improve working conditions for creative and practising artists and to promote cultural opportunities for the population regardless of geographic location and spending power” (Duelund 2003: 42-43). Bureaucracy found its largest expression under the instrumentalist period of the 80s when the Communist Minister Ole Vig Jensen affirmed that the ministry should be able “to deal with everything [and even] serve as a Prime Minister’s office with a variety of sub-sections” (Duelund 2003: 49).

Today the ministry has 10 divisions: Institutions, Economy, Cultural Heritage, Education and Film, Support to the Art, Supervision and Control, Copyright and Sport division, Radio and Television, EU Affairs and Cultural Activities in Denmark. There are 1 permanent secretary and 2 deputy permanent secretaries. Of the 74 staffs listed in the ministry’s phonebook, about 7 (4.9%) have a foreign background if one judges by their patronyms. This is less than the proportion of immigrants in the society in general: 8.9%. The report På vej mod det flerkulturelle samfund (Towards a multicultural Denmark) in 1997 concluded that ethnic minorities were not represented neither in the leadership, the administration nor in the councils boards of Danish arts and cultural institutions (Rasmussen and Hoirup 2000: 21).

Until 2003 when a merger was operated under a single Danish Council of Arts, each art was under the supervision of a council thus the proliferation of small bureaucracies. The minister’s role is to frame the general cultural policy which he publishes in reports with the help of a cultural committee. According to Duelund such a committee has existed since 1961 and been composed of about 25 officials (interview 25 July 2006).

In the light of what precedes one can say that the Danish bureaucracy has had an impact on the policy outcome. The Ministry of culture was bestowed with a big apparatus at its creation in 1961 and bureaucrats helped politicians to craft their policy reports. They played a supporting role for the instrumentalist policies of the 1980s and though a fusion of the different councils occurred in 2003, it just increased as Duelund stated the degree of politicians’ control (2003: 55). Finally the low representation of people with a foreign

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64 It was called Minister for Cultural Affairs from 1961 to 1987; Culture and Communication from 1987-88 and Minister of Culture from 1988 till date.
background at all levels makes it suitably to concur that it also had a prohibitive effect on the adoption of a multicultural policy.

2.2 Sweden: a small and late bureaucracy

In comparison to Denmark, the administration of culture in Sweden has been embryonic. At its debut in 1963, it was a small cultural unit within the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and then its main task was to follow up proceedings in the parliament (SOU 1972/66 p.28). Of the circa 144 employees in the ministry, 20 were assigned to the Unit and only about 15 of them were civil servants (SOU 1972/66 p.31). In 1974, cultural matters were assigned to the Ministry of education and it is only in 1991 that a ministry was created but as part of a Ministry of Education, Research and Culture.

Though policy as in Denmark has remained the remit of the minister and his few political advisers, there is only one permanent senior official, the Secretary at the head of divisions whose role is largely operational such as preparing laws and conveying them to the parliament. In addition, bureaucracies are required to be neutral and principled (Heclo and Madsen 1987).

More significant is the fact that the minister appoints a commission of enquiries, set the framework (time limitations, starting points) and thereafter cannot interfere in their deliberations. The only exception hitherto was the appointment in 1972 of Carl-Johan Kleberg, then in charge of culture in the Ministry of Education at the head of the Independent Commission of enquiry (SOU 1972/66). But according to Kleberg himself his role was mostly administrative (Interview 11 July 2006).

The National Council of Cultural Affairs played a significant role in the formulation of the 1974 cultural policy. It was one of the main proponents of a new cultural policy (Prop. 1974: 28) but after that its influence on policy formulation decreased. Today it functions as an independent institution whose attribution is mainly to support artists and help implement multiculturalism in conjunction with regional councils (Interview with Per Svenson and Marija Milivojevic, 30 June 2006)\(^{65}\). In the end bureaucracy did have a major influence on policy continuity in Denmark but this wasn’t the case in Sweden where independent commissions were the preferred instrument of policy formulation.

\(^{65}\)It provides financial and logistical support to multicultural consultants Per Svenson, Press Secretary affirmed that the Council’s independence varies with governments and Marija Milivojevic, the International Coordinator, added that the Arm’s length principle (non-politicization of funding) goal is to prevent it.
3. Problem-solving

The complexity of issues over immigration and cultural diversity have prompted governments to tap the help of experts, issue networks, policy networks etc.\textsuperscript{66} who belong neither to parties, interest groups nor to the bureaucracy for policy development.

\textbf{3.1 Denmark: the absence of experts and minorities}

In Denmark, the existence of a large bureaucracy tasked with the drafting of White papers precluded the use of external experts in policy development. It is not until 1993 that Jytte Hilden, the Social Democratic Minister of Culture asked the cultural sociologist Peter Duelund to direct a review of Danish cultural policy and make recommendations for the future. The result, a 17 Volumes \textit{Politics of culture in Denmark} advocating multiculturalism

\textsuperscript{66} For a glossary see appendix Zincone, Caponio and Di Gregorio (2004)
was however set aside by the following ministers.

In 2004 a Canon of the Danish culture was commandited by the Conservative Brian Mikkelsen and published in January 2006 under the direction of Jørn Lund. It did not deal with policy but was meant to showcase the works of art representative of Danish culture.

3.2 Sweden: The presence of experts groups and minorities

When the Swedish National Council of Cultural Affairs was given the task by the government to mould a national cultural policy, it put up an independent commission of enquiry. To ensure that the latter will be independent it was inscribed in the terms of agreement that the commission would have no advisory goal, be limited for a specific time under which all the members should be fully dedicated to the task (SOU 1972/66: p.20).

The 14 members of the Commission-more than in the usual commissions-came from various sectors of the world of arts and culture. A total of 20 experts were consulted at any time, a majority of which was university lecturers. The Council contributed 14 participants mostly for administrative duties. 10 of these served in the secretariat and only 4 were Council officials. Testament to the role of experts is the fact that the social goal of the policy differentiering och integrering av kulturpolitiken (differentiation and integration of cultural policy) was written between 1969 and 1970 by a university professor, Torsten Eliasson.

The perspective, he and other members of the Commission offered was that of problem-solving. Immigrants were viewed together with handicapped people and pensioners as social groups who were neglected and needed to be helped (Prop 74: 28, p.293). Help to adapt to the Swedish society but also to uphold their own culture (SOU 1972: 66 p.179). Later on the Cultural Committee of the parliament enjoined that immigrants be consulted whenever matters concerning them are evoked (KrU 1974: 15 p.38).

It became so in the 1990s. 2 of the 5 experts (3 out of a total of 11) of the Forum for World Cultures, the committee which authored the report Jag vill leva jag vill dö i Norden (I want to live, I want to die in the North) had a foreign background (SOU 2000: 118 p.5).

More than half of the authors of “Tid för månfald (Time for diversity) (Pripp et al. 2004), the report commandited by the government and the Swedish National Council of Cultural Affairs (Kulturrådet) had foreign roots.

67 There was a structure of the same name functioning since 1969 but the organization became really operational in 1974.
68 Unlike a previous group appointed between 1963-1968.
69 A fact that Masoud Kamali denounced as a strategy of clientilization (1997).
More eloquent is the description that Fanny Söderbäck does of the participants to the Alby Suburb Festival in 2004 where some 200 stakeholders many of them minorities met in an atmosphere of carnival in preparation of the Year of Multiculturalism 2006 (Agenda for Mångkultur 2006: 61-74). The authors views as translated in the reports but also in the interviews we did are strongly multiculturalist.

The head of the Steering Committee of the Year of Multiculturalism 2006, Yvonne Rock, a theatre director of Jewish extraction with a long experience of multicultural issues explained that in a democratic society all taxpayers need to be represented and their cultures taken in consideration though she admitted that the Swedish culture remains the main framework (Interview 09 May 2006).

4. Partial conclusion

In the end Danish and Swedish governments had dispositions towards respectively assimilationism and multiculturalism. In Denmark the policy reflected the mid-1950s consensus between the left and the right promoting among others nationalism and individual freedom and in Sweden, the permanence of the Social-democratic government in power since the 1930s has fostered a consensus about their project of society: the welfare state and its ideals of solidarity and equality. Once adopted, policies goals changed little but if needed were resisted or reinforced such as in the 1990s.

The presence in Denmark of a big bureaucracy starting with the creation of a fully-fledged ministry of Culture in 1961, composed almost exclusively of native Danes and contributing to the drafting of policy reports helped to maintain an assimilationist orientation. External experts were absents and commissioned only once under the ministry of Jytte Hilden.

In Sweden where a large bureaucracy did not develop-a ministry of Culture was created only in 1991-importance was given to experts and commissions of enquiry in the policymaking process. Most of their recommendations were adopted and in the 1990s the majority of these experts were minorities. It is thus possible to attribute the specific multiculturalist measures taken since the 1990s to the influence of these experts.

Though these factors dovetail with the countries’policy developments yet they do not explain where policymakers got their ideas from, why Danish experts were used between 1993 and 1996, why Swedish politicians resorted to minority experts only from the 1990s onwards and

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70 Swedish Government Website
71 This fact is analyzed in the power-interest chapter.
72 Yet the overall responsibility and final decision belong to the minister.
why multiculturalism was not implemented in the 70s but in the 90s.
Besides the fact that overall responsibility for policymaking depends upon politicians in the ministries (initiation) and within the parliament (final vote) and that their political survival depends also on their electorate and interest groups make it useful to investigate the role of power and interest.
III. Power and interest groups

Power and interest accounts for much of the theory in policymaking in as much as they deal with some of the most important factors in policymaking: the political system, political parties and politicians in one hand and interest groups in the other. A power-interest perspective tries to answer the following questions: did the type of party system influence policy? did political parties use issues to win votes? did interest groups try to influence policymakers?

1. Political system

In a system characterized by a dominant party or multiple parties, policies tend to endure but in the latter more as a result of consensus. Parties which are closer ideologically over issues are likely to coalesce. In a two-party system, the advent of a new government usually leads to the reversal of previous policies (Downs 1957). But many authors (Sten Berglund and Ulf Lindström 1978; David Arter 2003) have posited the existence of a specific Scandinavian political system which is a modified version of the multiparty system.

1.1 A Scandinavian political system

a) An imperfect five-party system

Denmark and Sweden are constitutional monarchies with a unicameral parliamentary system. Berglund and Lindström (1978) found that the Scandinavian political system as it has emerged by 1930 was composed of five main parties divided along a left/right cleavage: Conservative, Liberal and Agrarian on one hand and Social Democratic and Communist parties on the other (1978: 16).

As argued by Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) in their work on party formation in Western Europe and David Arter (2003) each party emerged at a particular time and appealed to a specific segment of the society.

The national revolution engendered the appearance of Conservatives and liberal parties in Denmark and Sweden defending the interest of the bourgeoisie. The Industrial revolution gave rise to middle of the way parties, Agrarian parties, defending farmers and the Proletariat revolution split the labour movement into Social democrats and communist parties (Arter 2003: 51-52).

However since the 1970s, the period that Arter calls the “thawing” (2003: 98), the apparition of new parliamentary parties (protest parties, Christian parties and the Ecologists) during
“Earthquake Elections” have permanently modified the model and modified the political landscape.

b) Minority governments and consensual decision-making

This system has been marked by the regularity of minority governments and the formation of coalitions. In Denmark between 1970 and 2006, 13 governments out of 15 and in Sweden 6 out of 12 were coalitions. The consequence has been longlasting consensus between parties which have become typical of policymaking in both countries (Berglund and Ulf Lindström 1978).

An exemple is the conclusion on 6 June 2006 of an agreement on Danish Media policy for the period 2007-2010 to which all parties whether from the Centre-right government (Liberals, Conservatives), the far-right (Danish People’s Party), the left (Social-Democrats, Socialist People Party) or the far-left (Radical Left) have subscribed. Consensus is also a long tradition in Sweden. Many of the country most important decisions like the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian Union in 1905 were made after an agreement between the left and the right (Hadenius 1999: 174).

The Danish and Swedish political systems have a number of features in common to the point where one can say that they share the same political system. However one can observe a difference in the nature and frequency of these coalitions. In Denmark coalitions have been so regular and diverse that Lars Bille described it as an “oscillating party system” (cited by Arter 2003:100) In Sweden they have been dominated by the left and comparatively less recurrent. This fact bears a certain significance as to the role of politicians and political parties

2. Politicians and political parties

2.1 Consensus over cultural integration.

a) Assimilation in Denmark

According to theorists of cultural integration and Daniel Bell’s social cleavage (1996: 332–333 cited by Rydgren 2005: 3), left-wing politicians and parties in general favour multiculturalism and therefore will have immigrants as potential voters while right-wing parties are reluctant towards it and therefore will find in nationalists and in the case of far-right parties, racists and xenophobes, prospective voters. But with a consensual policymaking,

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ideological frontier between parties tend to blur as policies become the fruit of agreement.

In Denmark the policy goals set at the creation of the first ministry of culture in 1961 was the result of such a consensus across the political spectrum between Conservatives, Liberals, Super-liberal etc. (Duelund 1996: 40). A look at the cultural policies drafted by ministers between 1969 and 2006 reveals that all Ministers showed a leaning towards either assimilationism or pluralism within the national culture when the anthropological concept was promoted\(^{76}\) except Jytte Hilden’s multiculturalist policy under the period 1993-1996.

Irrespective of their political affiliations and the ideological cleavage, Communists (Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen, Ebbe Lundgaard) and conservative ministers (Brian Mikkelsen) alike have staunchly promoted assimilationism since the 1990s when immigration became a major issue.

The case of Jytte Hilden stands out as an isolated case as the events and circumstances surrounding her period explain. First, her policies created such an outcry that her tenure has been described as “one of the most controversial”. None of her predecessors even communist ever set multiculturalism as a goal and after departure, none did. During the 2005 elections, the Social Democrats affirmed that they will not make any significant change to the though immigration and integration policies of the incumbent right-wing government.

Second, the way the policy was formulated was unconventional: the writing of “the Politics of Culture” was as she wrote her “personal cultural policy initiative” (Duelund (ed) 1996: 3) not the product of consultation or consensus within the government coalition. Then it was not customary like in Sweden to involve experts in policy formulation and give them so much leeway. She had a strong and outspoken personality\(^{77}\). A feminist and suffering from depression, she did not hesitate to take up those issues during her term of office (Politiken 7 October 2000).

\(^{76}\) Instrumentalism was promoted between 1980 and 1990 and because it does not carry values, ideas, traditions it is thus neither assimilationist nor multiculturalist.

\(^{77}\) Jytte Hilden (Danish Women Biographical lexicon website, 17 July 2006.)
Table 4  Ministers of culture, coalitions and cultural integration policies: 1968-2006, Denmark.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gvt. Coalition</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Policy report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brian Mikkelsen</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>C+L+DPP</td>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>Assimilationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen</td>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td>SD+RL</td>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Assimilationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ebbe Lundgaard</td>
<td>Radicals left</td>
<td>SD+RL</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Assimilationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jytte Hilden</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD+RL+CHP+CD</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grethe Rostbøll</td>
<td>Christian Democratic</td>
<td>L+C</td>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ole Vig Jensen</td>
<td>Radical Left</td>
<td>RL+L+C</td>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. P. Clausen</td>
<td>Christian Democratic</td>
<td>L+CHP+CD+C</td>
<td>1986-1988</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mimi Stilling Jacobsen</td>
<td>Christian Democratic</td>
<td>CD</td>
<td>1982-1986</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lise Østergaard</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD+L</td>
<td>1980-1982</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niels Matthiasen</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Lind</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>1973-1975</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niels Matthiasen</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>S D</td>
<td>1971-1973</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Helveg Petersen</td>
<td>Radicals left</td>
<td>RV+L+C</td>
<td>1968-1971</td>
<td>Monocultural</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


b) Multiculturalism in Sweden

The initiative of a new Swedish cultural policy in Sweden was taken by Olof Palme then Minister of Education\(^78\) and the bill (Prop 1974: 28) was passed during his first mandate at the head of the government. An ardent defender of civil rights around the world and one of the towering figures of Swedish politics, the slain\(^79\) politician’s views were deeply multiculturalists. The committee of enquiry: SOU 1972/66 which put the foundations of the policy was created by Ingvar Carlsson who later succeeded Palme as Prime Minister\(^80\). At the passage of the bill in the Riksdag the incumbent Minister was Bertil Zachrisson, one of the

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\(^78\) Interview with Carl-Göran Kleberg 10 July 2006.

\(^79\) He became Prime Minister before the publication of the report. He was Prime Minister from 1969 to 1976 and from 1982 until his assassination in February 1986. His murder, one of a few in contemporary Swedish politics has remained unsolved and the subject of controversy.

\(^80\) Three Social Democrats Ministers in charge of Culture: Tage Erlander, Olof Palme and Ingvar Carlsson became Prime Ministers.
bullwarks of the Social Democratic party.

Even more striking, those views were shared to some extent by the entire Swedish political class. In a 1970 review of parties’ cultural programmes carried as part of the 1972 Commission of enquiry, Erik Gamby, an author and antiquarian revealed that all parties had as objective the abolition of the existing geographical, economic and social barriers in the cultural sector (SOU 1972:66 p. 153). The only difference was on which goal the party laid emphasis: Moderates’ stressed on the preservation of cultural heritage, a humane vision and christian values; the Center Party insisted on decentralization, Communists were staunchly opposed to commercialism and Social Democrats requested special efforts in favour of under-privileged groups including immigrants (SOU 1972:66 pp. 151-152).

The debate within the Riksdag’s Cultural Committee in January 1974 was almost eventful except for the Motion 1974:1721:y5 requesting a financial allocation for the promotion of immigrants’ cultures which was denied on the ground that an enquiry was ongoing and it was better to wait for its results (KrU 1974:15 p.38).

The 2nd Cultural Policy which came before the parliament in September 1996 (Prop. 1996/97:3) displayed the same consensus among parties. As the Committee summarized, there was “a relative far-reaching unanimity on the cultural policy goal …the focus on freedom expression, cultural equality and diversity remain” (Riksdagen 1996/97.13 saml. KrU1, p1). The lawmakers even added 2 more goals to the 5 goals submitted by the government namely that of Learning.

Lars Leijonborg who is today the leader of the Liberal Party in the Motion 1996/97:Kr17 proposed that the third goal be worded in the following terms: “to promote cultural diversity, artistic renewal and quality” (Riksdagen 1996/97.13 saml. KrU1, p.16). Carl Bildt who had just stepped down as the only Conservative and non-socialist Prime Minister since 1979 found no objection to the policy objectives.

In Motion 1996/97:Kr216, Pär-Axel Sahlberg and Juan Fonseca both Social Democrats asked the government to help the development of immigrants cultural expressions (Riksdagen 1996/97.13 saml. KrU1, p.21). The Communist Charlotta Bjälkebring emphasized the seventh goal of the cultural policy on internationalisation; not for commercial purposes as in Denmark in the 1980s but as a mean to promote contacts between people from different ethnicities (Riksdagen 1996/97.13 saml. KrU1, p.252).
But it does not mean that there was agreement on all topics. Parties were widely divided on the transfer of the East-Asian, Ethnographic museums from Stockholm to Göteborg (Riksdagen 1996/97.13 saml. KrU1, p1).

In as much as socialist and non-socialist parties and politicians in both countries agreed on the cultural integration objective there is evidence that the traditional left/right cleavage was not relevant.

### Table 5: Ministers of culture, coalitions and cultural diversity policies: 1968-2006, Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minister</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Gvt. Coalition</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Policy report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Leif Pagrotsky</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Pär Nuder</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>2004-2004</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
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<td>Marita Ulvskog</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1996-2004</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margot Wallström</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengt Göransson</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lennart Bodström</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1985-1989</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lena Hjelm-Wallén</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1982-1985</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bertil Zachrisson</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
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<td>1973-1976</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingvar Carlsson</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1969-1973</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olof Palme</td>
<td>Social Democratic</td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1968-1969</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:** Cen: Centre Party, C: Conservative, L: Liberal, Le: Communists, CHD: Christian Democratic, SD: Social Democratic.

### 3. Voters Mobilization

Immigration became an electoral issue in the 1990s both in Sweden and Denmark (Rygren 2005: 9). But in sharp contrast to Sweden there was a strong mobilization of voters spearheaded by a new anti-multiculturalist, anti-immigration party in Denmark: the Danish People’s Party.
3.1 Denmark

a) The emergence of a far-right party and the politicization of immigration

Marie Demker, a Swedish political scientist explained that for a radical populist party to succeed there are three conditions: a non-ideological culture of consensus, extra-parliamentarism and the presence of a charismatic leader (Dagens Nyheter 11 June 2002). All these conditions existed in Denmark for the emergence of the Danish People’s Party. As shown above the country had an “oscillating multiparty political system” which has provided for a non-ideological consensus namely over cultural policies. The party was out of the parliament and its leader, Pia Kjaesgaard was a charismatic lady who has wrought the leadership of the party out of the hands of its founder, Mogens Glistrup.

Under her leadership, the party entered the Folketing gaining 7, 4 % of the vote in 1998, 12 % in 2001 and 13, 2 % in 2005 (Bjorklund and Goul Andersen 2002); principally by portraying immigration as a serious threat against the country’s unique national character/national identity (Rydgren 2005). Since 2001, it plays a crucial role as a support party to the Conservative-Liberal minority government. The DPP gained votes over the Social Democrats, the dominant party as the socio-cultural cleavage gained salience against the old economic cleavage (Rydgren 2005:4) and the working class shifted its vote.

b) The convergence of parties and the fight over the working class votes

Rydgren (2005: 9) says that parties tried not to oppose each other’s issue position but to shift themselves as especially as in 1998, 43 percent of voters agreed that “in the longer run, the Muslim countries are a serious threat against Denmark’s security and…refugees that have been given residence permit […] in Denmark should be sent home as soon as possible” (Andersen 1999b: 17 cited by Rydgren 2005: 11). The result was a… political migration of parties themselves whereby the one at “the left of the Social Democracy has moved towards the cultural liberal position (not the least on multiculturalism), whereas the other mainstream

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81 The Danish Progress Party, the first far-right party won 13.9% of the vote in 1973. At that time its leitmotiv was the fight against bureaucracy and high taxes and it didn’t mobilize against immigration until the late 1980s (Rygren 2005: 2). Its leader Mogens Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud and replaced by Kjaesgaard. Upon his liberation a power struggle broke out between the two with Kjaesgaard eventually having the upper-hand and Glistrup being ditched (Arter 1999: 104-105). Glistrup tried a comeback in 2002 with a harder stance, promising “to have immigrants and asylum seekers, particularly Muslims sent out of Denmark. “Danes criticize immigrant list” (BBC, 22 August 2001).

82 In 2001, she published in a newspaper the list of 5,000 naturalized citizens to show the face of new Danes which according to her are neither European nor Americans (BBC, 22 August 2001).

83 The working class support for the left in Denmark shrank from 81 to 41 percent between 1966 and 2001 (Goul Andersen 2004: 14).
parties have moved in an authoritarian direction (in particular on the issues of immigration,

law and order)” (Rydgren 2005: 14).

One then understands the consensus built by the Ministers of culture during that period over

an assimilationist cultural policy be they Communists or Conservatives except for the Jytte

Hilden’s episode. Karpantschof writes that, as polls showed Social Democrats even more

opposed to multiculturalism than Conservatives, the party became so disoriented and divided

that there was no unanimity even among the party elite (2003: 8 cited by Rygren 2005: 5).

3.2 Sweden

a) The quarantine of the far-right

Despite the emergence of a far-right party during the 1991 elections: Ny Demokrati (New

Democracy), issue voting over immigration never reached the same proportions as in

Denmark. New Democracy gathered 6.7 % of the vote (25 seats), but was disbanded shortly

before the 1994 elections84 where it polled a meagre 1, 2 %. The next in-line, the Swedish

Democrats received only 1, 4 % of the vote in 2002, way below the 4% required to seat in the

Riksdag.

Yet as Rygren stated Sweden had “about as many xenophobic and immigration skeptic voters,

per head of population, as other Western European countries; some 50 percent of the voters

favor taking in fewer asylum-seekers into the country” (2005:17). If one refers to Maria

Demker’s criteria again, though the Swedish Democrats lack a charismatic leader, the most

important reason why they have been unsuccessful seems to be the consensus in the political

elite, among established parties but also in the media against any form of collaboration or

coalition with the far-right that Rygren calls “cordon sanitaire” (2005: 17-18). Even at

communal level, Swedish Democrats councillors have been shunned by other parties

(Sandberg and Wernersson 2004).

Bengt Westerberg, the former chairman of the Liberal party refused to appear on television

together with Ian Wachmeister and Bert Karlsson of Ny Demokrati, on election night in 2001

(Dagens Nyheter, 3 March 2005). When the Danish Government of Anders Fogh Rasmussen

introduced a tough immigration policy in 2002, Mona Sahlin the Swedish Integration

Minister together with her French and Belgian colleagues wrote a letter of protest to other EU

ministers. A feud85 broke out pitting politicians, media and finally the Prime Ministers of both

84 The party was formed only months before the elections by a Count, Ian Wachtmeister and a fairground owner,

Bert Karlsson. Personal and ideological divisions among the party elite led to its dissolution (Arter 1999:106),

85 Pia Kjaersgaard threatened to block the Öresund bridge which links Copenhagen to Malmö in Sweden and

warned factional wars, honour crimes and mass rapes if the current policy continues (Emeli Nilsson 2005:20).

b) The Liberal Party balancing act

During a debate on immigration on Danish television in 2002 with Pia Kjaersgaard the Danish far-right leader, Lars Leijonborg, the leader of the Swedish liberal party tore down a DPP electoral poster which showed a veiled woman with the slogan: “forced marriage, gang crime and women’s oppression”; suggesting that he wanted to keep his liberal values (Nilsson 2005: 20). Unlike their Danish counterparts, the Swedish Liberal Party and its voters have been for many years the most immigrants-friendly and multiculturalists (Holmberg 2000:134).

The party has one of highest proportion of members of parliament with a foreign background and during the 1988 general elections proposed an increased of Sweden’s refugees quota (Diskriminerings Retorik, SOU 2006/52: p 46) but in a move which is difficult to explain if not using issue voting, Lars Leijonborg proposed prior to the 2002 elections (and again in 2006), the introduction of a language test as a condition for citizenship and the deportation of foreigners found guilty of crimes (Metro 28 June 2006).

It resulted at the time in accusations from other parties that the party was riding the xenophobic wave in Europe but also an increase in its electoral support. Leijonborg explains that the language test is a reasonable requirement that is applied by all other Scandinavian countries and that he favours also increasing funding for teaching Swedish to immigrants (Metro 28 Juni 2006: 2). However, according to Mehmet Kaplan, the spokesperson for the Swedish Muslim Council, “the risk is that a harder attitude alienates people” (Metro 28 Juni 2006: 2).

The Liberal Party is so far the only established Swedish party which shows sign of using immigration for getting votes. From being the most immigrant-friendly it has become the most demanding after benefiting of increased electoral vote. Yet its demands are nowhere similar to those agreed upon by the Danish political class and in many other European countries where language and citizenship tests are the order of the day.
Figure 4: The Multicultural society: Voters’s attitude by party, Sweden 1998

Legend: 0: Strongly disapprove; 100: Strongly approve.

Source: Adapted from Holmberg (2000: 134).

4. Interest Groups

4.1 Denmark: the travails of pro-immigrant groups

The report På vej mod det flerkulturelle samfund (Towards a multicultural Denmark) in 1997 lamented the absence of minority groups or those promoting multiculturalism in the cultural sector. One of the few to have ever existed, the Intercultural Network achieved initial success in 2000 when it organized the Conference 1+1=3 in order to foster multiculturalism and published a vade mecum for its implementation in the Danish cultural life. But just a year after, its coordinator Gavin Clarke was engulfed in a virulent controversy that spilled over to the parliament for having declared that Denmark has practiced hitherto a cultural mini-apartheid (Spm. nr. S 2401 - besvaret 18/04-2001).

Today the network is in disarray though new organizations trying to promote an intercultural dialogue between Muslims and native Danes have sprouted in the wake of the Cartoons
controversy. Many of them are led by prominent Muslims politicians such as Bashy Quraishy (POEM)\(^{86}\) and Naser Khader (Muslims Democrats). But as the report *Ethnic minorities and their channels of influence* conducted between 1997 and 2000 by Ole Hammer and Inger Bruun revealed, minority representatives have “few opportunities to influence central immigration policy issues, such as the Aliens Act” because of discrimination. In addition influence has shifted from special organized interests such as the Danish Refugee Council to municipalities. For instance the provision in the Alien Act (2000: 10-12).

Worser many of these organizations have collapsed amid allegations of mismanagement, incompetence and political corruption, tarnishing their image. In 2003, INDsam (Danish Ethnic Minority Alliance), the oldest pro-immigrant organization filed for bankruptcy while being accused by other immigrant organizations and politicians of striking a deal with the Social Democrats for which they have received preferential treatment (Kopenhamn Kommun website 2002). The organization allegedly hired a cook to handle an emergency line for forced marriages (Berlingske Tidende, 30 January 2001). On the contrary, anti-immigrants groups chief among them Den Danske Forening (Danish Association) have achieved considerable success to the point of setting the agenda.\(^{87}\)

4.2 Sweden: multiculturalist pressure groups

In sharp contrast to Denmark, pressure groups played a noticeable role in policymaking in Sweden thanks in part to the system of “remiss”. A ritualistic tradition through which commissions of enquiry, the government and the parliamentarians tap all stakeholders’opinions.

For the making of the first cultural policy in 1974, the Commission of enquiry SOU 1966/72 consulted about 600 key organizations from churches to cooperatives and workers organizations which in turn referred to their member organizations. The following organizations bore upon the section of the policy dealing immigrants.

- Sö (Skolöverstyrelsen) a defunct national School organization; Författarcentrum, an authors’ association; Statens Invandrarverk, the predecessor of the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) accused the National Council of Cultural Affairs of neglecting immigrants and their problems in its proposal (Prop.1974:28, p. 40).

- The Swedish Instute (Svenska Institutet), the international cultural agency; ABF (Arbertanas Bildningsförbund) an educational foundation and KFUK-KFUM a christian youth association

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\(^{86}\) Federation of Ethnic Minority Organizations in Denmark

\(^{87}\) This aspect is taken up again in the next chapter.
made the same observations (Prop.1974:28, p. 41).

Statens Invandraverk argued in addition that the cultural policy goal did not match the efforts made elsewhere in the society for immigrants and requested that resources be funneled into concrete projects. It recommended that support be given to immigrants as soon as they arrive in order to help them safeguard their culture and ethnic identities and that cultural activities within immigrant associations and home language be backed (Prop.1974:28, p. 41).

-Invandrarnas Kultural Centrum (Immigrant Cultural Centre) proposed that efforts at the national, regional and local level should correspond to the percentage of immigrants (Prop. 1974:28, p. 41).

Though the groups’ requests for financial support to immigrants were in the end not successful-parliamentarians preferred to wait for the conclusions of another investigation on the situation of immigrants-they paved the way to many of the measures which will be taken later on in favour of immigrants. Peter Curman, the chairman of KLYS, in the organization’s response to the government proposal for the second national cultural policy regarding immigrants culture said that:

The country has an obligation to show humility and respect… It is KLYS’s opinion that the Commission’s report has shown far too little concern for the cultural circumstances of immigrants. This is to be deplored, since the culture Sweden has received through its new citizens enriches and develops our own cultural creativity (Curman 96).

Thus not only did pressure groups shared the same policy orientation as Swedish policymakers but they were adamant that multiculturalism needed to be reinforced. Though many of these groups are affiliated with LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige) the biggest workers’ organization and an ally to the Social Democrats, neither ethnicity nor political clientelism was at play if one considers that these groups were associational and their criticisms addressed in priority to the ruling Social Democratic Party.

5. Partial conclusion

In as much as the socialist/non-socialist cleavage did not applied in both countries, party identification doesn’t account for the divergent policies. Instead there was a cross-party consensus in general that the system (multiparty) itself favoured. The presence of a successful

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88 LO is the main Swedish trade union. It was created in 1898.
89 They are associational not communal.
far-right party focusing on immigration and one may say the absence of strong multiculturalist pressure groups in Denmark pushed other parties to adopt a similar position in order to win votes.

In Sweden, the opposite took place. A consensus among all the elites effectively quarantined the far-right and hindered the politicisation of immigration to the point where the Liberal party though it toyed with the idea, never crossed the rubicon. Pressure groups were influential and in many cases had an impact on policy formulation but they did not need to be particularly vocal because of the pre-existing consensus.

Yet the fact that policy was reversed in Denmark between 1993-1996 indicates that the role of the political system is not after all indispensable. Then an old question remains: why did Swedish policymakers reinforced multiculturalism and used minority experts in the 1990s? New questions emerge which limit the explanatory significance of power and interest: why did the Swedish political establishment found it so abominable to politicize immigration and the Danish not, and ultimately why did the left/right cleavage didn’t apply though for example the policy was introduced by the Social Democrats in Sweden (SOU 1972:66, p.151)? Without neglecting institutional and political factors, Sheri E. Berman and Erik Bleich put forth, the role of ideas taken as world maps as possible explanations. It may be that actors in each country shared the same way of perceiving things.

Remarkably, the Swedish experts, Erik Gamby, Sven Nilsson, Bendt Lindroth and others who drafted the social chapter of the inquiry report SOU 1972:66, the basis of the 1974 cultural policy were also adamant of the role of ideas. They named the book which summed up their findings Ideer i kulturpolitiken (Ideas in Cultural Policy). Ideas-based theories thus deserve careful consideration.
IV. Ideas-based analysis

To the question why the Danish political class adopted assimilationism and the Swedish one multiculturalism, following Berman (1998: 55-56) it may depend on the presence of an “ideological” carrier and according to Bleich (2004: 32-33), it may come from actors’ “frames” that one can identify in their statements.

1. Berman’s “Programmatic beliefs”

Sheri E. Berman affirmed that “ideas in time of crisis are more likely to determine decisions” (1994:38). The period starting in the mid-1990s and extending into the post-september 11 period was such a time for the majority of Western countries with regard to immigration. The person likely to have played the role of “carrier” in Denmark is Søren Krarup and in Sweden, Marita Ulvsckog. The relevant questions to this regard are: did they hold different ideas? how were those ideas institutionalized?

1.1 Denmark: Søren Krarup, the architect

a) Biography

Looking at people and events in Denmark, no man has come to personify the assimilationist drive more than Søren Krarup. A fierce debator and for many the éminence grise of the far-right, Krarup was born in 1937, the son of a Lutheran priest. He received a Master’s degree in theology in 1966 at the University of Copenhagen and from 1965 worked as a priest for the Lutheran Church.

A prolific writer, he published between 1960 and 2001, 21 books, many of them inspired from the German nationalist philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder preaching “Danishness and christianity (Krarup 2001). From 1984 he was the editor of the religious newspaper Tidhverv and between 1999 and 2001 was a member of the board of Radio Denmark. In 2001 he was elected to the Folketing under the banner of the far-right Danish People’s Party.

b) The adoption of the idea

Søren Krarup’s agency started with an action against a charity event that the Danish refugee Council wanted to organize on 5 October 1986 in favour of refugees in the world. On 21 September 2006, Krarup published an announcement in the Jyllands-posten urging Danes to

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Power-interest and institutional factors.

In 1985, 23% of Danish voters agreed that “immigration is a serious threat against our distinctive national character”, in 1987 they were 47% (Andersen 1999a:3 cited by Rydgren 2005: 9 ). And as Rydgren disclosed, Swedish voters were as much opposed to immigration as those in the rest of Europe (2005:12)
boycott the gathering. In the article entitled “Nej, ikke en kronor” (No, not even a single Kronor) he argued that Denmark cannot save the world and accused the Council of having established a state within the state; dictating the agenda inside the parliament and terrorizing the public debate (Larsen 2001). But according to Larsen (2001), it was part of a strategy whose aim was to repel the 1983 Danish Refugee Act and bring the topic of immigration into the public sphere.

Though at the time, the political class reacted negatively and the press said he was possessed by the devil (Larsen 2001), the elite was in reality confused. Thor A. Bak, the chairman of the Danish Refugee Council himself declared in substance that it was true that people were not happy with waves of refugees coming to Denmark but they could still help refugees out of the country where they lived. Mimi Stilling Jakobsen, a former minister of Culture declared that the collection of fund was not of the same nature as refugees law. A decade later he had become so influential as to feature as a regular columnist for major newspapers such as Jyllands-Posten—which triggered the “Cartoons Controversy”—and Ektra Bladet. Newspapers which have condemned him before. To paraphrase Berman, he “had made others listen” (1998:55-56).

c) Consensus and institutionalisation

From his post as editor of the Tidehverv, Krarup built a small team of like-minded intellectuals often priests like him: Jesper Langballe, a priest and colleague at the newspaper, Dr. phil. Sune Dalgård, an historian and journalist, Olav Lilleør another priest, Steen Steensen a guest columnist at Tidehverv (Larsen 2001). They formed the Komiteen mod Flygtningeloven (Committee against Refugees Law) and later the pressure group Den Danske Forening which today is one of the most influential pressure groups. Their ideas were based on those of Grundtvig: Christianism and “Danishness” (Larsen 2001), which is as we have seen before one of the tenets of the mid-50s consensus. It provided to quote Berman “guidelines” (1998: 52-54) to the Danish cultural policy.

The institutionalisation of his ideas continued within the Danish People’s Party. Krarup and Langballe were elected to the parliament in 2001. And with the party the third largest force, it became a support party to the Centre-right coalition and a power-broker (Rygren 2005:16).

With the terrorist attacks of September 11, another critical juncture, the issue gained even more salience and Krarup was instrumental in introducing the strong restrictions on

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92 The translation is mine. Kronor is the Danish currency.
93 He has been the author of more than 200 feature articles in Ektra Bladet, one of the most read in Denmark (Karpantschof 2002 cited by Rydgren 2005: 10)
immigration. Today he seats “strategically” in the parliamentary committee for citizenship and Langballe in that in charge of the church, research and immigration.

1.2 Sweden: Marita Ulvskog, the Mandarin

a) Biography

The 55 year-old journalist was Minister in charge of Culture from 1996 to 2004, the period during which the second national cultural policy was designed. Much of the active multiculturalist policies initiated then bear her marks (Interview with Yvonne Rock). A former member of the communist youth organization (KFML) and the Movement for Vietnam, she resigned from her work from the right-leaning newspaper Svenska Dagbladet to join the Social Democrats, the day they lost the elections in 1976 because she was shocked that militants have come to “thank the newspaper” for their support (Aftonbladet 11 September 2004). She is quoted to have declared that “it felt like a coup d’état” (Dagens Nyheter 23 February 2006).

Many of her opponents including the former Conservative Prime minister Carl Bildt have termed her as “arrogant”, impetuous and ruthless (Dagens Nyheter 23 February 2006) which otherwise shows the strength of her character. Between 1990 and 1995 she was the editor-in-chief of Dala-Demokraten, a mouthpiece of the Social Democratic Party and from 1994 to 1996, Minister for Civil Administration. Since 2004 she is the leader of the ruling Social Democratic party leader and one of the most influential Swedish politicians.

b) Consensus and institutionalisation

Despite the fact that a firm consensus on cultural integration existed already in Sweden (Duelund, interview 24 July 2006), the decision to turn theory into practice, that is to move from the passive multiculturalism of the 1970s and 1980s to active multiculturalism required someone with a lot of courage and influence. Especially that the context at the time was not particularly favourable.

In the 1990s, Sweden was suffering from an acute economic crisis. Politicians, trying to cope with an unending flux of refugees from the Balkans were talking of the “securitization of migration” (Abiri 2000) and with the end of the Cold War and the first noticeable effects of globalization, it was a time of uncertainties. After the September 11 terrorist attacks, multiculturalism was denigrated everywhere (Faried Zakaria, 2001).

Marita Ulvskog with her radicalism (Norrländska Social Demokraten 30 December 2005) and independence was such a person. She once said that she cannot imagine working without
independence (Aftonbladet 11 Septembre 2004). For institutionalization she used the normal channels: the commission of enquiries but unlike previous governments, she appointed many minority experts and associations who one may say are “natural allies”. The fallouts were the organization in 1998 of the Forum för Världskultur (Forum for world culture) and the setting of a long-term plan for the period 2003-2006 which included the publication of regular assessment reports on the progress made for diversification in the cultural sector and the instauration of the Year of Multiculturalism in 2006.

Indeed Søren Krarup in Denmark and Marita Ulvskog in Sweden were instrumental in the “radicalization” of their countries respective cultural integration policies: assimilationism and multiculturalism. The action was more dramatic in Denmark where Krarup started his mission outside the system and used deftly the issue in a context marked by a general resentment against immigration. In Sweden where the institutional context was favourable but not the social and international environments, Marita Ulvskog relied upon minority experts.

2. Bleich’s “Ideas-frames”

According to Erik Bleich (2004:26), frames are cognitive maps such as definitions, analogies, metaphors and symbols and moral maps such as the valence-degree of acceptance or refusal to terms and course of action. They also involve the authority one has to speak about a cause which guide an actor within a policy sphere. To be valid he (2004: 32-33) argues that these frames should precede policies and be present during their formulation. New policies should in accordance to the frames and if cross-national variations in policy outcomes appear they should be function of different prevailing frames.

2.1 Frames

a) Denmark: invasions and the safeguard of “Danishess”

Cultural pluralism was defined in Denmark from the drafting of the first national cultural policy in White Paper 517 in 1969 in a way which differs with the notion of equal recognition of cultures and minority group rights. Instead it was understood as the peculiarities, the special flavours that regions contribute to the national culture. In the 1990’s with the politicisation of immigration, culture was redefined as to mean “race”, “soul”, “nation” in a similar way as the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (Interview with Peter Duelund, 26 July 2006). Immigrants became the target. The far-right Danish People Party for example until 1995 mobilized against taxe reduction and bureaucracy not immigration (Rydgren 2005: 2)

94 As opposed to what is foreign.
95 The year when according to Rydgren, the DPP finished its mutation (2005)
For these views to sink in people’s mind, actors resorted to frames which had as common denominator: the threat to the Danish nation and culture or “danishness” posed by foreign immigration. A map that goes back to the mid-50s when the followers of Grundtvig made it one of their requirements in reaching a consensus.

- Analogies. Pia Kjaesgaard, the DPP leader stated that it was up to the Swedes to transform their cities into Scandinavian Beiruts with factional wars, honour crimes and rapes (Nilsson 2005: 20). During the Cartoons controversy, Krarup said in a speech to the Danish Parliament full of historical references about the crusades that the Danes will not “capitulate”, have no choice than to resist and fight and if they want to survive in freedom and democracy (Jyllands-Posten, 13 February 2006).

- Metaphors. Mogens Camre, an EU parliamentarian stated that ”[Muslims] cannot obtain world domination military, but they try to do so by flooding the world with people” (Rydren 2005: 20). Elsebeth Gerner Nielsen, a communist Minister affirmed that in an “atomised” world the sense of Danishness should be revitalized (Duelund 2003: 54).

- Symbols. The Canon of the Danish culture published in 2006 was not only meant to define “what Danish culture is and what is not” but also to defend it as the choice of the word underlines.

The moral map of Danish policymakers made them consider immigrants’ cultures and especially Muslim culture as a new threat therefore the call to battle from associations such as Den Danske Forening. But as Bleich predicted these frames were also present at other levels of the society, individual as well as groups. At the individual level, one can cite Queen Margerethe whose constitutional role puts her above parties but who wrote in her biography that “people have to take the challenge of Islam seriously” (BBC, 14 April 2005). The Cartoons Controversy in January 2006 equally showed the prevalence of such frames in the media.

b) Sweden: solidarity, equality and cultural enrichment

In the 1970s policymakers saw immigrants as a disadvantaged group like children, handicapped or pensioners to which solidarity or the concept of Folkhemmet (People’s house) should be extended. In the 1972 commission of enquiry report as well the 1974 cultural policy, they appear under the section “eftersätter gruppen” (neglected group). Their frame was that in order to facilitate their integration into the Swedish society, they should not only be allowed to practice their own culture but the state should also help them to do it.
The second frame was that it was a “democratic” requirement. Analogy was made between cultural equality and economic and social equality (KrU1974:15, p. 2). The third frame was that of immigrants’ cultures as an “enrichment” to the Swedish culture. The analogy used was that of an “additional stimuli” to the Swedish culture at the same time as it increased the Swedes’ understanding of those cultures (SOU 1972/66 p.178). The moral map of Swedish policymakers viewed the equal recognition of immigrants’ cultures as another application of the same principle of People’s house. They viewed it as more important than the achievement of a common culture.

2.2 Frames and policymaking

   a) Denmark

The Danish frames were present before the first Danish cultural policy (White Paper 517). According to Duelund, the country’s enormous loss of territory against Sweden in 1814 and Germany in 1864 led to the revitalization of the concept of “Danishness” and the fixation of what is Danish: one nation, one language, self-determination, self-government and freedom as expressed in the work of Grundtvig (Interview 25 July 2006). As Duelund writes “this national fixation was replicated after World War II during the establishment of the Danish welfare state and a universal Danish cultural policy [when] the social-democratic movement labour movement abandoned the strategy of developing an independent international working-class culture, adopting the national orientation of the social-liberal cultural movement instead” (2003: 31-32).

Since then the preservation of the nation has been the “bowl” of almost every cultural policy as our study of path-dependency showed. Thus even when a pluralistic concept of culture was introduced such as in the 1970s, it was still contained within the frame of the nation.

   b) Sweden

The ideas of solidarity and equality in Sweden also predate the formulation of the first national cultural policy in 1974. Its earliest presence is found in the ideas of Gustav Geiger (1783-1847) with his promotion of association over “the personality principle of the absolutist system of privilege” (Tor Larsson in Duelund 2003: 188). That view was revamped by the Social Democrats upon coming to power in 1832. In the absence of a big bourgeoisie and political upheavals such as the two world wars96 according to Larsson, a stable political order emerged which made the Social-Democratic party as the natural party of government

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96 Sweden stayed neutral during the two world wars and was little affected by the French revolution (Larsson in Duelund 2003: 181).
and enabled it to build the “Swedish model” from the 1930s to the 1970s (Duelund 2003: 181). A model based on equality and solidarity. This view gained acceptance in the population and a review of political parties cultural policy made in 1972 showed the Social Democrats, Communists, Liberal and Conservatives in one way or another upheld the notions of “equality and democracy” (SOU 1972/66, p 150-151). Yvonne Rock, the chairwoman of the Committee for the year of multiculturalism 2006 emphasized the same principle of representation (Interview 09 May 2006). A principle rooted in their tradition and which made Carl-Johan Kleberg, the former head of the 1972 Commission of Enquiry say that Swedes think that “what is Swede is best” (Interview 5 July 2006).

2.3 Cross-national comparison

The frames adopted by policymakers in Denmark and Sweden are dissimilar. Danish policymakers’ frames value the preservation of the country’s integrity thus a certain wariness of all things foreign. The reason why mainstream policymakers socialist or not perceived immigrants’ cultures as a threat and opted for assimilationism. The ideas of Grundtvig exhorting nationalism after the “trauma” of several territorial defeats are at its foundations. In contrast, Swedish policymakers’ frames give enormous importance to equality and solidarity. A principle which spun off Geiger’s communautarian ideas and which with a peaceful and stable environment allowed the Social Democrats to build one of the earliest welfare-states in the world. Swedish policymakers dealt with the cultural integration of immigrants in those terms. These frames explain why assimilationism prevailed in Denmark and multiculturalism in Sweden.

3. Partial conclusion

Ideas as beliefs or frames provide a more comfortable explanation of why Danish policymakers preferred assimilationist policies and Swedish ones, multiculturalism. Berman’s programmatic beliefs through the examination of ideological carriers, give a deeper understanding of the reinforcement of multiculturalism in Sweden in the 1990s. Her theory explains why multiculturalism was activated in Sweden in the absence of a politicization of immigration, why minority experts were used and how the politicization of immigration happened in Denmark and assimilation was reinforced.

Bleich’s frames explain why there has been a consensus on the cultural integration policy which defies the socialist/non-socialist cleavage and why there was a backlash against Jytte Hilden in Denmark when she tried to implement multiculturalism between 1993 and 1996.
Conclusion

1. Summary

The reason why Denmark applied assimilationism and Sweden muticulturalism are primarily to be found in each country politicians’ frames, world maps. In Denmark that frame was buried in the nationalism of a small country which has lost three wars and much territory and since then has sworn to defend its integrity namely culturally. In Sweden it was incorporated in the ”Swedish way”, the manners of a country and a people who have escaped two World Wars and tried to implement with their welfare-state: the ideals of equality and solidarity.

Though there were variations in the strength of these frames especially in Denmark with its more instable political system, during critical junctures (the increase of immigration in the 1990s and the post-9/11 period) policymakers made what Shery E. Berman had predicted: resort to their world maps. A process in which “carriers”: Søren Krarup in Denmark and Marita Ulvskog in Sweden were instrumental.

As Erik Bleich theorized, the cognitive and moral maps found in the policymakers’ discourses were consonant with the respective frames. Indeed a frame which is based on independence, integrity, exclusivity as in Denmark would be more in accordance with assimilationism (homogeneity and individual rights) and one which is based on solidarity and groups equality as in Sweden would rather emulate multiculturalism (equal recognition of cultures and group rights).

The fact that these frames were shared across the political establishment explains why the socialist/non-socialist cleavage was never at play in either country. Why in Denmark, from the Queen to the Communists, every one observed an assimilationist posture and the Jytte Hilden’ multicultural episode was “repressed”. Why in Sweden, a gentlemen’s agreement97 between established parties and the media not to politicize immigration and the quarantine of the far-right were held. And pressure groups such as the LO, the main worker’s organization pushed for a better implementation of multiculturalism whereas it had no direct interest to do it and has opposed labour immigration earlier.

But this is not to say that only ideational factors were pivotal, other factors: political and institutional had an impact either as adjuvants or as obstacles for the emergence of each policy.

97 Yvonne Rock asserted that Swedes ”were more political correct as opposed to Danes” (Interview 09 May 2006).
Firstly the existence of a multiparty political system in both countries favoured the formation of consensus over policies which instead of being reversed by successive governments as in a two-party system, endured. Though the Jytte Hilden’s multiculturalist period shows that it is not an absolute requirement.

In Denmark, the presence of a successful far-right party, the DPP in the late 1990s freed the inhibitions that had prevented established parties earlier to come clearly in favour of assimilationism for normative reason as they found a potential for votes. The weakness or the silencing of pro-immigrants groups such as the Danish Refugee Council and the strength of racist groups such as Den Dansk Forening meant that they were no counter-weights to hinder at least this radicalization in the 1990s. The same can be said of the weakness of Swedish nationalist groups. Political factors as such were the second most important factors. They had an impact on the strength of the movement. They came into play mostly from the late 1990s and more in Denmark than Sweden.

In order to explain where the respective policy orientations and their content came from no perspective has been more useful than institutional. Path dependency showed that the first Danish cultural policy is rooted in the mid-50s consensus between politicians promoting specific ideas: grundtvigian (church and nation), socialist (equality) and liberal (individual freedom). In Sweden, the principle of association promoted by Gustav Geiger over the principle of individualism and which inspired the Social Democrats to build a welfare state upon gaining power in 1932 permeated the first cultural policy in 1974.

Problem-solving showed that experts had little significance in Denmark but the only time they were used, between 1993-1996, they produced a multiculturalist agenda. In sharp contrast, Sweden use them profusely, from the 1990s onwards, the presence of minority experts explains the type and range of measures decided upon by the government. Bureaucracy on the other hand was big and early in Denmark and small and late in Sweden. It played a more important role in Denmark where a team of ministry officials have been helping ministers formulate policies since 1961 but in the absence of minorities as Meir (1993: 1) postulated, that bureaucracy remained assimilationist.

Altogether, path-dependency was evident in both cases. Problem-solving experts did not have an impact in Denmark but in Sweden. The bureaucracy was influential in Denmark but not in Sweden. Institutional factors played a more supportive role in both countries.
2. Observations

Sweden and Denmark which for a long time have been very homogenous have changed demographically as the world itself changed. With today’s globalisation there is no indication as to what the future holds but the reminiscence of a mythic past is probably of little help. Yet the Nordic Cultural Model cannot be complete without a shared frame on cultural integration. The difficulty is that frames are rooted in each country’s experience and these experiences as in the case of Denmark and Sweden can differ. However frames, though longlasting are not eternal; in fact as Berman claimed policymakers judge one alternative against the other. Thus if in the future, new carriers emerged, for instance one who wants to implement multiculturalism in Denmark or assimilationism in Sweden, frames could change.

Afterall the Swedish parliament agreed in 1920 to the creation of the first institute of racial hygiene in the world and some of the racialist policies it produced were borrowed by the Nazis (SOU 2005:155 p.101). Later on it observed a much-criticized neutrality during the Second World War while Denmark stood up against the German invasion. From the role of experts in Denmark one can also posit that their use is more likely to produce normative policies.

3. Recommendations

I suggest first a clarification of terms. The debate will be greatly enhanced if there was a consensus on terms and meanings. I suggest that the term cultural integration be used to refer to policies and theories which debate the cultural aspect of the integration of immigrants as opposed for example to housing, employment etc. The word *multiculturalism* should then be employed uniquely to denote equal recognition of cultures not as a catch-all. *Cultural diversity* should be used to describe real life situations where many cultures cohabitate.

On the theoretical level, I recommend that Bleich’s typology which I find albeit one of the most appropriate be slightly modified. *Active multiculturalism* should qualify a multicultural policy which is effectively implemented on the ground—for instance Sweden since the late 1990s—and not as an attempt to create a new culture which sounds unrealistic. Some minority cultural practices such as female circumcision are really opposed to the norms of the majority culture and hitherto no Western multiculturalist country including Sweden has accepted to give up this “liberal minimum” (Joppke 2004: 244). Even if it as an ideal-type, the benefit again will be a clarification of the debate.
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Ministry of Culture- www.kum.dk/

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Government- www.swe.gov.se

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**Regional**

European Institute for comparative cultural Research-http://www.ericarts.org/web/index.php

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**Interviews**

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Map of Denmark
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