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Do Different Models of Integration Affect Actual Integration? The Cases of France and Great Britain Revisited

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Abstract

Britain and France adapted two different integration models, namely assimilationist and multiculturalism to integrate their immigrants. These two big models of integration have distinctive characteristics to integrate immigrants. There is a general claim that multiculturalism model is the best for integrating immigrants in terms of actual integration, however, some argue the opposite, that French assimilationist model is 'better off.' This study examines these controversial claims by looking at the level to which immigrants are integrated in economic, social, political, cultural dimensions of integration and attitudes towards immigrants in Britain and France. Within a given theoretical framework, this study compares the overall competency level of immigrants' integration in terms of actual integration between British multiculturalism model and French assimilationist model and validate that both these two big models of integration have reached a comparable level of integration and they do not have any decisive impact on actual integration.

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Chapter I

1. Introduction

Since the World War II, migration has become one of the most vibrant issues in political, socio-economical, and cultural sphere in Europe. Most of the West European countries have been facing massive wave of migration, especially from 1980s onward, as an irrefutable part of the globalization. This significant level of postwar transnational migration to Western Europe from lesser developed areas has serious political implications. Industrial democracies, like Britain and France, have become home to millions of immigrants from the developing world. By the 1980s, this influx had forced immigration to the forefront of European politics.

Migration is, therefore, becoming a growing and permanent part of Europe's future, especially, in the question of integrating or assimilating immigrants into host country. It is generating more public debates and gain more attention to the policy makers now-a-days. Significant economic and cultural benefits are brought by migrants because they come from a wide range of countries with a diversity of languages and cultures. Many migrants are successful in integrating within society of the host country. There are however, according to Spencer (2003: 10);

substantial evidence that many face disadvantages on all the key indexes of integration; legal rights, education, employment and living conditions, and civic participation. Moreover, migrants and the second generation can be well integrated on one index (such as intermarriage), but not on others (such as high unemployment).

European nation-states, therefore, have become more concern about policy formation and restructuring immigration policy because of huge wave of immigrants and the problems of integrating them.

Europe has received 20 million immigrants by the end of 20th century (OECD, 2001) and a significant number of it is belonged to Britain¹ and France, the two main fevered destinations of immigrants across the world. Though, the pattern and history of migration - most immigrants come from their previous colonies - is almost similar in Britain and France, they both have different views on both the goals of integration and the most appropriate strategies to achieve it. The national ‘model’ of integration of immigrants between the two counties, with Britain’s ‘race-relation’ model opposed to French ‘Republican-assimilationist’ model (Todd, 1991) arise series of significant scholarly questions. Whether or not they are successful in integrating their immigrants, and which model is the most successful to incorporate immigrants? In this paper, therefore, my general surge for an answer that is it an accurate claim that ‘big models of integration’ – (assimilationist and multiculturalism) usually distinguished in the literature- have any decisive impact on actual integration? In comparing the level of immigrant integration between the two European neighbouring countries -Britain and France- I want to examine that if these big models of integration have any decisive impact on actual immigrants’ integration or not.

As I have already indicated, Britain and France are similar in many ways. First, they both are old, centralized nation states, and both are capitalist, advanced economies. The immigrant population in both countries are almost the same size and arrived in Europe in the post-war decades and they have come mainly from their previous colonies to make up labour shortage. Finally, immigrants in each country are of post-colonial, extra-European background, and have a large proportion of Muslims, which entails the comparable issue of the relations between states and Muslim organizations (Miles, 1982).

On the other hand, the political cultures of the immigrants of the two countries differ in significant ways. British-Muslim immigrants are more ‘traditional and institutionalized’ than among the North Africans Muslims in France. British immigrants have mainly come from some moderate democratic countries with experience of ‘working-class political

¹ The term Britain used informally in this study to mean the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

movements’, while French immigrants have mainly come from Morocco and Algeria and are hardly democratic (Garbaye, 2002: 556).

Most importantly, however, the differences between patterns of minority incorporation in these two countries are noteworthy. According to Favell (1998: 3-4):

The responses of France and Britain, as befits their respective colonial reputations, appear to be almost reversed mirror images of one other: France emphasising the universalist idea of integration, of transforming immigrants into full French *citoyens*; Britain seeing integration as a question of managing public order and relations between majority and minority populations, and allowing ethnic cultures and practices to mediate the process.

In this respect, both these two countries have different model of integration of immigrants such as Britain follows ‘race-relation’ model, while France incorporate ‘Republican-assimilationist’ model. That is why “Soysal (1984) considers Britain ‘liberal’ because its policies are decentralized and focused on society, and France ‘static’ because its policies are centralized and organized around the state” (Garbaye, 2002: 556, quoted from Soysal, 1984: 37).

Albeit majority of the immigrants of both these two countries came from their former colonies to meet the Labour shortage after World War II and having facing similar problems to integrate immigrants, Britain and France developed different policy path to integrate their immigrants. These different paths are rooted in their historical background, ideological concept and their domestic immigrant politics. In Britain, immigrants are commonly identified with the word ‘ethnic minorities’ or ‘minority ethnic’ while in France they are known much as ‘immigrant’ (Hargreaves, 1995). British policy makers accept ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and they developed ‘race relation’ approach in one hand and their French counter parts deny to categorize ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ and focus much on anti-racism on the other. As theoretical model, Britain developed ‘multiculturalism’ to integrate its immigrants and recognize immigrants’ cultural, religious and social differences from British people. On the other hand, France trust on assimilate immigrants into its society and developed distinct model of integration namely assimilationist model. France even does not

want to give verbal recognition of ethnic identity in fearing of that “the use of such terms [ethnicity] might encourage the entrenchment of ethnic differentiation within French society” (Hargreaves, 1995: 2). Therefore, policy divergence of these two countries differs significantly.

In scientific literatures, there is a general claim that multiculturalism model of integration is best for integrating immigrants (in other word minority or ethnic groups) in the receiving/host society. The commonly cited examples are Australia and Canada. In this sense, GB has accomplished a higher level of actual integration than France as a result. This claim is frequently supported in the British literature as they see British model is liberal, pluralist and anti-racist. However, some other (mainly French scholars) claim the opposite, that France is ‘better off’ and “highlight the secular, egalitarian French model” (Weil and Crowley, 1994: 111).

In this paper, therefore, I want to evaluate these contradictory claims by looking at how actual integration in these countries look like. By measuring integration in a more comprehensive way, I want to see whether these big models of integration actually have any decisive impact or not, and if yes, which model seems to lead to better result, in terms of actual integration.

There has been a surge in interest in ethnic-related immigration politics in European countries in recent years such as Lapeyronnie (1993), Ireland (1994), Bousetta (1997), Rogers and Tillie (2001). But the problem of integration and political processes that underpins the coherence of the society and the degree to which immigrants are integrated in these two countries are still little understood. In particular, there is a lack of comparative study between Britain and France regarding the question of integration of immigrants. Erik Bleich (2003) examines historical evolution of race politics in Britain and France employing race frames in a pragmatic way. Similarly, Patrick Weil and John Crowley (1994) compare France and Britain to examine models of integration and its convergence in practice. In the same way, Roman Garbaye (2002) analyzes ethnic minority participation in some selective British and French cities through an institutionalist perspective. Finally,

in his classic study 'Philosophy of Integration', Favell (1998) focuses on the development and impact of political philosophies and ideologies on citizenship in Britain and France. But all these studies are not a substitute for an overall comparison of these two countries in terms of actual integration. They focus mainly on whether immigrants' political participation in local level or only one sphere of integration, such as socio-economic, cultural or political. Therefore, there are still some unsolved questions, such as which model is the best to integrate their immigrants or have these models of these countries any decisive impact of integrating their immigrants? Consequently, a comparative approach in these matters is important. I therefore, seek to compare the immigrant integration models in France and Britain that do allegedly explain different level of immigrants' integration and I want to answer to the question if these models have any decisive impact on actual integration or not.

Outline of the study

In the first chapter of this study I posit some reflection about immigrants' integration in Britain and France and different models of integration which are followed by them. Later, I engage in an attempt to clarify what I mean by 'integration' and 'immigrant' and focus on the overview of methodology. In chapter two, I will consider the development of contextual argument concerning claims about big models of integration. Later, I will develop a framework within which I will measure the level of immigrants' integration. Chapter three will focus on history and policies of immigrants' integration in Britain and France. Chapter four will measure the level to what extent immigrants are integrated in economic, social, political, cultural dimensions of integration and attitudes towards immigrants in France and Britain. In chapter five, I will compare the overall competency level of immigrants' integration between assimilationist model and multiculturalism model. Finally, in chapter six, I will sum up the findings that I will get in empirical chapters.

1.1 Over View of Methodology

Country choice. Among possible case studies, i.e., all advanced industrial democracies, Britain and France represent extreme models of national identity and minority incorporation. Britain is one of the few "multicultural" countries in the world and France, on the other hand, is highly centralized and has been avowedly assimilationist. To repeat: the pattern and history of migration, as most immigrants come from their previous colonies, is almost similar in Britain and France, they both have different attitudes and goals of integration and different strategies to achieve. Therefore, it is fair to compare France with Britain and find whether or not the big models of integration have any decisive impact on actual integration.

Terminology. In order to clarify my study, it is important to define what I meant by 'integration' and 'immigrant'. 'Integration' is a complex and confusing term since it comprises many distinct ideas. Often it is distinguished from assimilation, acculturation, incorporation and insertion, while sometimes it is used as in the same way as those terms. In addition, the official national documents often differ in terms of definition of integration. According to Council of Europe (1995: 9),

While the term [integration] itself means "joining parts (in) to an entity" its practical interpretation and social connotation may vary considerably: "Assimilation" as well as "multicultural society" may be considered synonyms or descriptions of (successful) integration. Thus, all forms of cultural or social behaviour ranging from completely giving up one's background to preserving unaltered patterns of behaviour are covered by the term of integration.

Whilst the term 'integration' can be used several ways and some scholars distinguish it from assimilation, I employ it in a simple way as the process by which immigrants become part of socio-economical and cultural fabric of the receiving society. Thus, integration implies the selective extension of legal, social, cultural and political opportunities and rights to non-nationals, i.e. immigrants. I use it mainly because to study immigration and ethnicity and use it as a conceptual framework for comparing the level to which immigrants become parts of the receiving society and because "it has been used publicly in both France and Britain to characterize their progressive-minded, tolerant and inclusive approaches to

dealing with ethnic minorities” (Favell, 1998: 28). Since a great deal of my arguments depends on measuring integration, I will elaborate it more thoroughly in theoretical part.

‘Migrants’ is another confusing term. Sometimes, ‘migrants’ and ‘minority’ are used in similar way. A broad distinction can be made between those migrants and their descendants who have acquired nationality of one of these two countries and categorized as Third Country Nationals (TCN) (Geddes, 2000) and who are not. The later do not possess the nationality of the host country and are not usually entitled to benefits. In my study I use the term ‘migrant’ in a broad sense, I incorporate those who have citizenship and those who do not have but residing in the host country for a certain period and desire to acquire citizenship. Also, there is a difference between first and second generation immigrants and their integration level might differ in a significant way. Nevertheless, being pragmatic here, I include both of them in a broad sense due to lack of sufficient data on generation basis that would allow me to distinguish on generation basis. But I exclude asylum seekers and illegal immigrants from this category.

In addition, another clarity should be made here that is national policies of Britain and France reflect different definitions of what is meant by immigrant. In French census, there are three category that tracks nationality, these are; 1) French by birth – this includes the offspring of French citizen who are born either in France or abroad, 2) French by acquisition – who have acquire French nationality by naturalization, 3) Foreigners – this includes individuals who are born out side France and who born in France of immigrants parents and also who resides in France but decided not to acquire French nationality. Therefore, according to French census and INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique de des Etudes Economiques) definition of immigrant is “a person born abroad with a foreign nationality” (INSEE, 1999). On the other hand, in Britain immigrants are recognized as ‘race’ or ‘ethnic minority’. The term ethnic minority generally points at member in the first, second or third generation of the large immigrant community without regarding to his/her status of nationality². This term ‘ethnic’ is officially used in Britain to register statistics regarding ethnic belonging of its inhabitants.

² See “Summary: Final Report the United Kingdom”, Proposal and Models to an Integrated Approach of Reintegrated Refugees of Ethnic Minorities, Who are Returning from EU Member States.

Therefore, it is somehow confusing when we consider immigrants in terms of different definition in France and Britain. However, in this study, I use immigrants in a broader sense and comprise ethnic minority in Britain and foreigners as well as naturalized individuals in France as immigrants.

General Approach. The methodology applied in this study is a Comparative Method but not in the strict sense. I test my argument by looking at two selective cases in comparative manner. I compare overall integration level of immigrants to what extent they are integrated in Britain and France. I take five dimensions of integration and choose some selective indicators to compare and examine the implementations and outcomes of immigration policies which resulting in the different levels of integration. In addition, I focus on the state policies and give extra attention on attitudes towards immigrants in receiving society to measure the level of integration of immigrants.

Data Source. Here, I use mainly census and survey data to measure the level of integration. I utilize INSEE's (Institut National de la Statistique de des Etudes Economiques) data for measuring French immigrants' integration and for British immigrants, I use National Statistics data of Britain. I also use some secondary data from related published books, articles, and statistical year books. In addition, legal documents are also used as well when I discuss particular governmental policies. Finally, some internet sources and e-journals are used for supporting my findings.

Limitations of the Study. It should be noted here that I measure the level of five dimension of immigrants' integration between France and Britain through some selective indicators. All these indicators compare the level of integration between these two countries from a broader perspective. This might provide only a partial explanation of this issue, since every dimension of integration has many indicators that might give different result. Due to lack of time and resources I choose only some selective indicators of each dimension to measure the overall level of actual integration. Moreover, data availability and space of this study prevent me from going into them in empirical detail too much.

In addition, there might be some other causal relations, such as historical background, colonial legacy, and capability of different immigrant groups to integrate them into the host society and so on, which might effect immigrants' integration. This goes beyond the capacity of this study. However, I can draw some conclusion in the last concerning the 'conventional knowledge' about different integration models and their impact. Another limitation is it is not in-depth analysis of each arenas of integration; rather it compares the all dimensions of integration from a broader perspective to get a holistic picture of this issue. I believe it would not be rational to analyze one arena of integration of a country and compare it with that of other to get a general picture because every aspect of integration is inherently interrelated. Therefore, I analyze political, economical social and cultural aspect of integration and attitudes towards immigrants of each country to make it comparable and measurable with another country as a whole.

Finally, I use only some selective data for measuring integration, since France does not keep the racial or ethnic origins' data and makes it difficult for others to do so through its data protection laws. Moreover, there is a wide dissimilarity of finding adequate data in certain field of integration in one specific country. Thus, I had to be very selective about choosing not only indicators but also data. I use only those data which is available in secondary source, which might give me a partial result of this equation.

Chapter II

Theoretical Discourse

In this chapter, at first I discuss what it means by assimilationist and multiculturalism model of integration and the general claim about success and failure of these big models. I analyse the scientific literatures about the theories of integration and how scholars examine the actual integration and to what extend. Later, I concentrate on the frameworks which measure the level of integration. I review the literature and discuss the models that scholars have used to measure immigrants' integration. Finally, I create my own model and operationalize this in theoretical framework. At the end, I discuss the indicators which will be used for measuring the level of integration between these two countries.

France is usually cited as a prototype of assimilationist model. In this model immigrants are expected to assimilate into the receiving society without showing difference in culture and religion in the public sphere. It is a one side process where immigrants have to adapt receiving society's language, culture and norms and "become indistinguishable from the major population" (Muss, 1995: 33). Entzinger and Biezeveld stated, "In French *Jacobin* tradition, the emphasis is on the individual relationship between the citizen and the state, without intermediaries" (2003: 14). In this model, ethnic identity is ignored in official statistics and ethnic identity is erased by the second generation. Immigrants, in this model, have the same right as native citizens have (Weil and Crowley, 1994).

In contrast, according to Castel's (1995) typology, Britain is a prototype of *ethnic minority model*, in other words multiculturalism model. In this model, "immigrants are defined in terms of their ethnic or national origin. They constitute new communities, culturally different from the existing communities and from each other"(Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003: 14). Cultural diversity from immigrants is widely expected in this model and they are encouraged to develop their own cultural identity. Finally, multiculturalists model emphases on peaceful coexistence between native citizens and immigrants through tolerance, diversity and pluralism.

Boswell (2004) discusses German integration model and prefers multiculturalism model as a desirable model of social integration, since

the multicultural “politics of recognition” takes seriously the identity of groups, and attempts to provide space for these to retain their difference without having to pay a penalty of discrimination. It is given practical expression through tolerance of diverse religious symbols and cultural practices, laxer criteria for naturalisation, and robust legislation on anti-discrimination” (Boswell 2004: 3).

Similarly, in analyzing success and failure of republican model of integration, Agnes van Zanten (1997) argues that French republican model of integration has become less effective in promoting social and economical integration and consequently new liberal model of integration might play progressive role. Finally and the most strikingly Bhikhu Parekh, one of the prominent scholars on racial issues, discusses five model of immigrant integration in British perspective and claims that multiculturalism is the best one. He writes:

assimilationism is an incoherent doctrine for it is not clear what the minorities are to be assimilated into. Although the moral and cultural structure of a society has some internal coherence, it is never a homogeneous and unified whole. It is an unplanned product of history and made up of diverse and conflicting traditions; it consists of values and practices which can be interpreted and related in several different ways; and so on (1995: 1).

While the belief that the multiculturalism model is the best for integrating immigrants, scholars like Joppke (1999), Joppke and Morawska (2003) and Brubaker (2001) have recently argue that multiculturalism becomes a less effective model of integration and assimilation emerges as a liberal conception in both theory and practice. Similarly, in analysing International Social Survey Programme 2003, Medrano (2005) shows that Spanish respondents mostly are in favor of assimilationist model. Likewise, Heath and Tilley (2005) demonstrate that British respondents also prefer assimilationist model than multiculturalism.

Both sides of this discourse have some logic but in order to claim that one of these ‘big models’ has any decisive impact on immigrants’ integration, we have to measure the degree to which immigrants are integrated into the receiving society.

According to this argument, we have three possible findings that tell us something about which model of integration is better in terms of actual immigrant integration. These are;

1. If Britain has a higher level of actual integration, the claim made in most studies seems to be valid.
2. If France has a higher level of actual integration, most studies (which claim that Britain has the better model to offer) must be revised. Claim made especially by French authors seem to be justified instead.
3. If Britain and France have reached comparable levels of integration (in a positive or negative sense) than neither claim seems to hold.

Although there is no generally accepted theory of integration within and between disciplines, scholars have been used several theories to measure the level and process of immigrant integration. New Institutionalism, one of the most insightful theories, provides useful tools to analyze integration. In his famous book, *Philosophies of Integration*, Favell (1998) compares the idea of citizenship between France and Britain within the Institutional framework. Ireland (1994), in comparing French and Swiss cities, claims that institutional settings are the main determinant for ethnic identity. Similarly, Garbaye (2002) also take inspiration from Ireland's 'institutional channeling' framework to compare ethnic minority participation in British and French cities.

Similarly, many scholars analyze integration from different point of view and use several theories to measure the level of integration due to the complexity of immigrant issues. Whether they focus on political integration (see, Ireland, 1994; Rex, 1998; Vertovec, 1998), social integration (see, Rey, 1996; Waldinger, 2001) or economic integration (see, Portes, 1995; Reyneri, 1996), all these studies analyze immigration issue from a single specific perspective and claim that integration is an end to a process (Koff, 2002). Most of the studies focus on 'immigrant integration' from socio-economic and political perspective. Only a very few studies examine this issue from a vast inter disciplinary framework. Integration, therefore, is a multidimensional concept and thereby needs a holistic approach to analyze it.

In their insightful study, “Benchmarking in immigrant integration”, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) compare EU member states’ integration level from such a broader framework. They distinguish four dimensions of integration: 1) socio-economic; 2) cultural; 3) legal and political; and 4) the attitudes of recipient societies towards migrants. This model is particularly pertinent for comparing level of integration between two countries.

Koff (2002) offers another important framework for measuring immigrant integration. He uses ‘meso-analysis’ for measuring level of integration between two French and Italian cities. According to him “integration should be viewed in terms of separate spheres of social participation” (2002: 8) and one sphere of participation has significant impact on the level of other sphere of integration. He claims that “a political system entails both the laws and institutions which govern social interaction and the actors who participate in it” (2002: 6) (see, figure I)

Koff claims that ‘micro-analysis’, i.e. focusing only one aspect such as political participation of immigrant, social movement, educational achievement, labour market participation and so on, is insufficient for the comparative study of immigrant integration rather ‘meso-analysis’ is best suited and which “attempts to address the interaction between rationality, institutions, and cultural variables in a coherent explanation of integration” (2002: 8).

Figure.1: Overlapping Spheres of Integration





Figure taken from Koff (2002: 8)

At this juncture, Koff discuss the four dimensions of integration but misses the point of attitudes towards immigrants. It is very important since if immigrants are viewed burden by the native citizens or if they face racism or xenophobia then the actual integration should be differ than what other dimensions of integration suggest. On the other hand, Entzinger and Biezeveld also discuss the four dimension of integration but ignored the separate dimension of social and economic integration and their overlapping tendencies to each other which Koff mentions.

In order to get a holistic picture of this complex issue, I, therefore, combine these two models and create a new one. I borrow the term ‘meso-analysis’ from Koff and use it in my study. Like Koff, I believe ‘meso-analysis’ is best suited for comparing immigrant integration. Since, it gives an overall holistic picture of this kind of complex issues. On the other hand, from Entzinger and Biezeveld I take four dimensions of integration, these are political, economical and cultural and attitudes towards immigrants. But I modify these four dimensions slightly and include social integration as a separate dimension of this model. All these are overlapping each other and I use some selective indicator to measure the degree to which immigrants are integrated. Therefore, my framework will be look like this:

Figure. 2: Overlapping dimensions of integration



Here we see that economic, social, political, cultural dimensions of integration and attitudes towards immigrants are overlapping. Each dimension of integration has some impact on its neighbouring dimension and political integration is interrelated with all of these dimensions.

In this study, I choose some selective indicators for measuring the level of integration to which immigrants are integrated. But it is not easy to measure the level of integration not only for unavailability of adequate data but also for complexity of different dimensions of integration. According to the publication of Council of Europe (1995: 5):

Measuring social behaviour and social phenomena always is a very challenging task. This is especially true when it comes to evaluating the integration of migrants into their host societies, because it means in fact evaluation two social processes: One cannot look at the migrants alone, but also has to take the members of the host society into consideration.

Another major problem is that one indicator alone does not mean anything. In order to be meaningful they have to be comparable with other set of data and also it should be kept in mind that “whether it is really useful to compare the migrants’ characteristics to those of the indigenous population” (Council of Europe: 11).

In this regard, I choose some selective indicators for measuring the degree of integration due to limitation of time, space and resource. For economic integration, I use labour market participation of immigrants which is one of the most classical indicators for measuring economic integration (Marrow, 2005). Scholars use several indicators for measuring social integration, such as housing, level of education, social security and so on. I, however, choose only housing quality and pattern for measuring social integration. Since successful housing is significant in influencing immigrants’ integration and “it helps shape community relations, and affects access to services and opportunities for employment” (Harrison, Law and Phillips, 2005: 85).

Choosing political indicators is slightly less complicated as I choose, frequently used, indicator ‘naturalization’ and I the question of immigrants voting rights. It is one of the most difficult parts of this study to measure the cultural integration because the idea of ‘culture’ incorporates many different things and from one particular point of view it seems almost impossible to measure it. Keeping in mind this complexity, I choose intermarriage and language skill. Intermarriage is one of the most classical indicators of cultural integration. Many scholars used it for measuring cultural integration such as Pagnini and Morgan (1990), Alba and Golden (1986). On the other hand, language skill is important in this sense that without this skill immigrant cannot integrate properly into receiving society and they do not have proper access in the active labour market (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003). Therefore, it is well justified to choose intermarriage and language skill as appropriate indicators for measuring cultural integration.

Finally, it is well known that measuring the attitude of recipient societies towards migrants is really difficult. Some scholars try to measure it through comparing the cases of racism and discrimination. Therefore, racism or discrimination against immigrants could be used

as a pertinent indicator but the difficult thing is not all European countries keep the record of all discriminations cases. Therefore, I rely on the reported cases of discrimination and I use the data from the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia.

In nutshell, for comparing the level of integration between these two countries, I use a framework which I borrow from Koff and Entzinger and Biezeveld and I combined these into a single framework. I choose some selective indicators to measure the level to what extent immigrant are integrated. Empirically, these indicators could give me hints at which argument is valid as I have discussed earlier. Whether British multiculturalism model is better than French assimilationist model in terms of actual of immigrants' integration, or vis-à-vis, or whether both these two model are reached comparable level of integration.

Chapter III

3. Background of Immigrants' Integration

3.1 History and Policies of Immigrants' Integration: France

Since the nineteenth century, France has received a significant number of immigrants from both within and without Europe. Most immigrants came into France during the nineteenth century from its neighbouring countries like Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, and Poland and so on to fill up its labour shortage. By the year 1932, foreign citizens comprise three million in France (Wenden, 1994). The devastation of the two world wars and low birth rates increased labour migration into France from outside the European region. Migration flows get impetus during the wars of liberalization and decolonization in 1950s and 1960s. Particularly after signing the Evian agreement with Algeria, former French colony, absolute numbers of immigrants increase significantly. In 1962, about 350,000 Algerian entered into France and the number of Algerians rose to 470,000 in 1968 and to 800,000 in 1982 (Hamilton, 2004). In the late 1960s and 1970s, this process continued due to family reunification and maturing the post-war baby boom generation. It is something of a paradox that unlike other European countries France began to receive fewer immigrants from Europe and more from its former colonies in North and Sub-Saharan Africa and South-East Asia after Second World War.

Colonialism created most effective channel for immigrants into France. As the major colonial power after Britain, France receives most immigrants from its former colonies, mainly from the Meghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) and South-East Asia. After the Second World War, the Meghrebis became the most significant group of immigrants into France, and Algerian were the vast majority of this group.

Table 1.1 Foreigners by nationality, France, 1999

Nationalities	Total	Percentage
Total	3,258,5392	100,0
European nationalities	1,333,310	40,9
German	76,882	2,4
Belgian	66,927	2,1

Spanish	160,194	4,9
Italian	200,632	6,2
Polish	33,925	1,0
Portuguese	555,383	17,0
Yugoslav or ex-Yugoslav	50,396	1,5
Other	188,971	5,8
Soviets, Russians or ex-Soviets	13,336	0,4
African nationalities	1,417,831	43,5
Algerians	475,216	14,6
Moroccans	506,305	15,5
Tunisians	153,574	4,7
Others	282,736	8,7
American nationalities	80,732	2,5
Asian nationalities	410,293	12,6
Turkish	205,589	6,3
Others	204,704	6,3
Oceanic nationalities and other non-specified Nationalities	3,037	0,1

Source: INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique de des Etudes Economiques), 1999

According to French census in 1999, immigrants comprise 7.4% of total population and 4,310,000 immigrants were living in France. This number has remained consistent since 1975 and while the number of European immigrants decreases, immigrants from North-Africa have increased slightly. This changing pattern affected by the French Immigration policy as Hamilton (2004: 1) says:

Since the mid-19th century, French immigration policy has had two aims: to meet the needs of the labour market by introducing migrant workers, and to compensate French demographic deficits by favouring the permanent installation of foreign families, while ensuring their integration into the national body. On the labor market front, the deepening of French colonial relation in the 19th and early 20th centuries laid the groundwork for steady movements of people between France and its colonies.

After the Second World War, when migration flows became more intensive, France's policy towards immigrants was to assimilate them into French society. The main aim of this policy was to encourage immigrants to adhere to French culture, values and to adjust to

mainstream cultural norms as part of the process of settlement. This policy was abandoned for a short period when the French policy-makers realised that most immigrants refuse to adopt the required values. In consequence, from the mid-1980s France followed an integration policy which requires immigrants to abide by the French laws but can keep their own culture and values. Finally, France has reemphasized previously abandoned assimilationist policy to launch a new action plan for integrating immigrants in 2003. The new law requires immigrants to sign an 'integration contract' as they agree to take language training and adhere to 'values of French society'.

This assimilationist policy has its roots in the pre-revolutionary *ancien regime*. France has welcomed immigrants on a large scale for, demographic or social reasons since the 19th century. The idea of integrating immigrants into the French nation-state derived from the enlightenment and the Revolution as Weil and Crowley (1994: 112) claim, "The Third Republic implemented that particular tradition through strict separation between individual culture and religion (confined to the private sphere) and the secular state which inculcated in both French and foreign children, via the schools, a common civic culture".

The aim of these policies is to turn immigrants into French citizens. Immigrants are enjoying the same rights as French born citizens do. Economically or socially they must have the same opportunity as French citizens have. Ethnic or cultural differences play a less significant role in the French assimilationist model. Immigrants are supposed to show their religious or cultural identities only in the private sphere. Therefore, when immigrants acquire French nationality, they become equal with French citizens at least from the legal point of view.

3.2 History and Policies of Immigrants' Integration: Britain

Britain has a long tradition of accommodating immigrants. For many centuries, a variety of immigrants came into Britain in search of better economic opportunities or to escape from political or religious persecution. The historical episodes that are well known - Huguenots (French Protestants) in the 17th century and Jews in the 19th century settled in Britain. While

immigrants from all over the world have lived in Britain for many centuries, the absolute numbers have generally been small except Irish immigrants until New Commonwealth immigration began in the 1950s. The Irish have formed a substantial part of the population. According to some estimate, the ancestry of 10 per cent of British population is Irish (Mason, 1995).

Before the Second World War, a significant number of Nazi refugees came into Britain in 1930s. The bulk of post-war migration began with Ireland and with its former colonies in South Asia, African and Caribbean (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004). During the late 1940s and 1950s a growing number of black immigrants began to settle in Britain and mainly they came from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. By the 2001, immigrants from South Asian countries (India, and Pakistan and Bangladesh) comprise 3.6 percent of total population (see table 1.1). According to 2001 census, ethnic minority population accounts 7.9 percent of the total UK population and the majority of them (over 2 million individuals) came from South East Asian countries.

As the major colonial power, Britain received most of the immigrants from its former colonies. Until 1962 Commonwealth citizens could enter and settle into Britain without any restriction. In that, year government decided to control the number of immigrants as far as they can absorb and from 1971, entry from all countries is controlled by the Immigration Act 1971.

Table 1.2 Population by ethnic group, Great Britain, 2001

	Number	Per cent
White	54,153,898	92.1
Mixed	677,117	1.2
Indian	1,053,411	1.8
Pakistani	747,285	1.3
Bangladeshi	283,063	0.5
Other Asian	247,664	0.4
All Asian or Asian British	2,331,423	4.0
Black Caribbean	565,876	1.0

Black African	485,277	0.8
Other Black	97,585	0.2
All Black or Black British	1,148,738	2.0
Chinese	247,403	0.4
Any other ethnic groups	230,615	0.4
All minority ethnic population	4,635,296	7.9
All ethnic groups	58,789,794	100.0

Source: 2001 Census, table 15- Office for National Statistics; General Register Office for Scotland; Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency

Labour migration was the main reason of immigration to Britain. “In the year following the end of the Second World War, Britain suffered from a severe labour shortage; especially in unskilled jobs and in service industries such as transport ... these vacancies could only be filled by substantial immigration” (Mason, 1995: 24). And it was also for filling up long term demographic requirements (Weil and Crowley, 1994). For these reasons, Britain did not control the labour migration until 1962. But since the end of World War II, immigrant population of Britain has grown rapidly and for the first time British government had to find out the appropriate paths and policies to control the flow of migration and similarly to integrate immigrants into its multicultural society (Lester, 1999).

However, the British policies have periodically given importance on integrationist strategy; the most important strategy was taken in 1960s. Two notable Race Relation Acts (1965 and 1968) passed to integrate its immigrants in way of equal treatment and allowing cultural diversity as Roy Jenkins, in 1968 defined integration as ‘not a flattening process of uniformity, but cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’(Rex, 1998: 21). 1976’s Race Relation Act was another significant step, which broadens the scope of the 1968 act, to remove anomalies by refining many of its provisions.

These policies, which Britain chose for integrating its immigrants, derived from their 150 years religious and cultural strife at the beginning of the eighteenth century. But the significant change came into forefront when a growing number of black immigrants settled in Britain after Second World War. They developed the race relation approach to deal with its ethnic minorities. British policy makers inspired to take these policies from a study of US institutions to achieve racial equality for black Americans (Rex, 1998). These race relations Acts were aimed at preventing direct and indirect discrimination on racial issues, which is one of the main bases of multiculturalism model that lead immigrants to a greater level of integration into the British society.

Chapter IV

4. Immigrants' Integration

The aim of this empirical chapter is to compare the overall competency level of integration between assimilationist model and multiculturalism model. In doing so, I measure the level to which immigrants are integrated into France and Britain. I consider five dimensions of integration in each country i.e., economic, social, political, cultural and attitudes towards immigrants. I examine each dimension by some selective indicators which indicate to what extent immigrants are integrated into the receiving society.

4.1 Economic Integration

According to Hargreaves (1995: 38), “Economic production sets the material framework within which social structure and individual life opportunities are shaped ... it provides the resources which are indispensable to virtually every other part of life”. Equal economic opportunity is the main basis for successful immigrants’ integration. It provides the links for accessing to all other spheres of integration. If immigrants have equal access to labour market, in terms of wage and job opportunity, their integration process in the host society can be speed up. And eventually, socio-political and cultural integration will be faster. The level at which immigrants enter in the labour market is the key indicator of upward social mobility to which they are being incorporated into the full spread of the receiving society.

France:

Immigrants have always being at the lower end of the socio-economic hierarchy in the French society, like any other immigrants’ host society. Though a major proportion of immigrants were in the active labour market before the end of Second World War and they were involved mainly in the low-skilled jobs and were badly paid. According to the 1946’s census, 60 percent of all foreigners in France were in the active labour market compared to 51 percent of French nationals. After increasing the family reunification process in 1960s, some 48 percent immigrants were in the active labour market compared to 41 percent in French national. This decreasing pattern of accessing into active market has been continued and by the year 1990s, 45 percent of all foreigners were economically active (Hargreaves, 1995).

Table 2.1 Unemployment rates, by nationality and sex, 1990

	% All	% Male	% Female
French	10.4	7.5	14.1
Foreign	19.5	16.3	26.8
EC	11.3	8.6	16.0
Spanish	12.5	10.3	16.3
Italian	12.2	9.3	20.9
Portuguese	10.2	7.4	14.5

Algerian	27.5	23.1	42.3
Moroccans	25.4	20.7	42.5
Tunisians	25.7	22.0	41.7
Other Africans*	27.6	21.5	45.2
S. -E. Asian**	26.8	19.5	38.6
Turks	28.9	23.0	47.9

Source: INSEE 1992. Cited in Hargreaves (1995).

*Ex-French Sub-Saharan Africa ** Ex-French Indo-China

Similarly, unemployment rate has risen sharply among the immigrants. In the post war period, immigrants could easily find the job. But in the last 30 years, immigrants have been faced an unprecedented unemployment risk. In January 1999, there were 2.1 million immigrants in France and they comprised 8.1% of the working population (INSEE, 1999). However, the unemployment rate was 20% among immigrants and foreign nationals in 1990 compared to 10% among French nationals (see table 2.1). Among immigrants, the unemployment rate was 22% in 1999, whereas the average unemployment rate was 13%. Since the 1990 census, the unemployment rate of immigrants has worsened more than that of French national. The unemployment rate has increased about 33%, compared to 18% on average in France in 1999. It is interesting to note that immigrants from European Union are less unemployed than African or Asian immigrants. The unemployment level of EU immigrants is very close to those of French nationals, whereas this rate is three times higher among Africans and Asian immigrants. Likewise, women are more affected by unemployment, about 22% comparing to 20% for men (INSEE, 1999).

It is also notable here that immigrants are generally unskilled and they have low level of education compared to French nationals. Therefore, their unemployment rate should be considered in regard to their competency of employment. As we see from the table 2, some immigrants groups have high unemployment compared to national average. On the gender ground, immigrant women's unemployment rate is much higher than those of immigrant men. Generally, Muslim immigrant women are reluctant to access in active labour market due to some religious traditions. Consequently, their unemployment rate is well in excess

of the national average. It is, therefore, worth of saying that immigrants are generally less well placed in the active labour market than rest of the population and the situation of non-European immigrants are worse, especially women are more affected than men.

Britain

Britain puts strong emphasis on socio-economic integration in its policy instrument. Integration in Britain primarily means integration into its social and economic system. In order to accelerate economic integration, they tried to develop race equality and eliminate racial discrimination from the active labour market. However, “since record began, unemployment differentials between the ‘white’ and ‘ethnic minority’ population have persisted, with recent research suggesting that ethnic minorities have consistently experienced unemployment rates twice that of ‘whites’” (Geddes and Guiraudon, 2004: 337). Like France, therefore, immigrants were always being at the lowest hierarchy in social and economic status. Since they are less educated compared to native citizens and they are needed to fill up unskilled manual labour shortage in Britain.

The post-war migration to Britain was mainly driven by economic imperatives. Britain suffered from a severe labour shortage, especially in unskilled jobs and in service industries and these could not be filled by British population alone. Consequently, Caribbean and the Sub-continental men were invited to fill up these vacuums and they are mainly employed in manual low-paid work (Smith, 1977). According to Third National Survey 1982, while earnings and relative job levels had improved slightly among immigrants compared to white people, they have suffered from high level of unemployment and this has been a consistent pattern over several years (Brown, 1984). Unemployment rate of ‘non-white immigrants’ is at last twice some times more than three times as high as those for white people and it is highest among Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black-Africans. However, among Indian and Chinese immigrants, it is relatively low (see table 2.2).

Generally, immigrants have lower level of economic activity compared to white people. According to Labour Force Survey 1999, 85 per cent of white people (aged 16-64) are

economically active compared with 77 per cent of immigrants. The deference is marked for women with 74 per cent of white women are in the active labour market compared to 56 per cent of immigrant women (Labour Force Survey, 1999). Currently 10 percent of total working age population is immigrant which accounts 3.6 million people (Home Office, 2002).

There is a significant difference of unemployment rate among different immigrant groups. The Chinese, Indian and other Asian are in broad parity with whites; Black Caribbean, Black other and other Asian are somewhat suffered from high level of unemployment, and the Bangladeshis and Pakistanis have extremely suffered from high level of unemployment.

. Table 2.2 Unemployment rates by ethnic group, Great Britain, 1991

Ethnic group	Unemployed (000s)	Unemployment rates		
		Persons (%)	Males (%)	Females (%)
White	2,246.1	8.8	10.7	6.3
Ethnic Minorities	238.4	18.3	20.3	15.6
Black	94.0	21.1	25.2	16.6
Black-Caribbean	53.8	18.9	23.8	13.5
Black-African	26.1	27.0	28.9	24.7
Black-Other	14.1	22.2	25.5	18.3
South Asian	105.0	18.2	19.2	16.5
Indian	51.7	13.1	13.4	12.7
Pakistani	40.1	28.8	28.5	29.6
Bangladeshi	13.2	31.7	30.9	34.5
Chinese and others	39.4	14.1	15.5	12.1
Chinese	7.0	9.5	10.5	8.3
Other-Asian	12.8	13.4	14.2	12.3
Other-Other	19.5	17.7	19.7	14.8

Entire population	2,484.5	9.3	11.2	6.8

Source: Owen, 1993: 7

It is also noted here that immigrants are confined in low-skilled job and their unemployment rate is high because may be “they are returning to their pre-migration occupational levels” (Modood, 1999: 62) and maybe they came from unprivileged groups of their country of origin (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992). Therefore, unemployment rate and job status of immigrants in Britain should be counted on this basis.

In overall comparison, unemployment rate of immigrants in Britain and France was almost similar (18.3 in 1991 and 19.5 1990 respectively) despite some difference, such as female unemployment rate and inter groups difference in a given country.

4.2 Social Integration

Social dimensions are the crucial road towards immigrants’ integration. In the field of social integration, quality of housing and residence pattern is widely used indicators for measuring immigrants’ integration (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003). If migrants have proper housing, it maybe interpreted as the sign of ideal social integration. The quality of housing depends mainly on the employment and income level. Therefore, housing is interlinked with the economic condition of immigrants.

France:

In the last 30 years, housing shortages for immigrants have increased in France due to rise of unemployment and low income capacity of immigrants. The two million immigrants households accounts for 8.4% of the whole household. Most immigrants live in urban areas due to availability of work. Only 8% of immigrants live in rural areas, compared to 27% of

French nationals (see table 3.1). Three quarters of immigrants live in urban areas against less half for the unit of the households. This pattern of housing induced of the difference of the income of the households immigrants. In 1996, average annual income by consumption unit of the household immigrants is 64,800 Frank, it is 22% percent lower than the average income of all households (INSEE, 1996).

Therefore, the housing condition of immigrants is very different from those of the rest of the population. A small proportion of immigrants has owner-occupies housing, they mainly live in public housing, notably in the subsidize housing project, known as HLM (Habitations à Loyer Modéré). Nearly half of the tenant immigrants live in HLMs. In 1975, only 15% of foreign national lived in HLMs housing and by the 1982 it rose 24% and 1990 it stood at 28%, compared to 14% of French nationals (Hargreaves (1995). Generally, immigrants are twice the national average in the waiting list for HLMs housing (INSEE, 1996).

Among the ethnic immigrant groups, Asian and African immigrants are the largest proportion who concentrated in the HLMs housing, compared with European immigrants. “In all, 42 percent Maghrebi-headed households, 43 percent South-East Asian, and 45 percent of Turks live in HLMs, compared with 18 percent European – and 14 percent of French – headed households” (Hargreaves, 1995: 71). It is because, HLMs housing is cheap compare to other type of housing and thus, it is affordable for immigrants and lower middle-class French families.

Table 3.1 Housing –tenure patterns, by percentage, and nationality of head of house hold, France, 1990

	Owner occupier	Private unfurnished tenant	Private furnished tenant	HLM unfurnished tenant	Free housing	Total

French	56.2	23.0	1.2	13.7	5.9	100
Foreign	26.4	34.8	4.2	28.0	6.7	100
EC	39.9	31.6	2.1	18.4	8.0	100
Spanish	38.1	31.1	1.7	20.5	8.6	100
Italians	55.9	22.0	1.2	14.2	6.8	100
Portuguese	28.7	36.1	1.8	24.8	8.6	100
Algerians	14.9	30.9	7.4	43.4	3.5	100
Moroccans	8.7	25.8	4.6	44.3	6.6	100
Tunisians	11.8	45.3	4.2	34.4	4.3	100
Other	9.6	41.4	8.3	36.6	4.2	100
Africans*	19.7	31.4	2.5	43.4	3.0	100
S.-E. Asian**	8.4	41.7	3.2	45.1	1.7	100
Turks	25.6	43.0	6.3	15.3	9.7	100
Others						

Source: INSEE 1992a: Table 33.

*Ex-French Sub-Saharan Africa ** Ex-French Indo-China

The quality of living condition in HLM housing is not favorable compared to other type of estates in France. After Second World War, some immigrant workers lived in hostel type housing provided by their employer. Many lived in cheap lodging houses. The basic living facilities of these type of housing was not sufficient, they were lacked by electricity and water and sewers supply. Hargreaves (1995: 70) says,

Since the mid-1970s, this type of housing has been called increasingly into question, partly as a consequence of growing disquiet over the regimented living conditions....and because of their unsuitability for family occupation..... Even so, almost 100,000 foreigners – virtually all men, and 85 per cent Africans – still lived in hostel accommodation at the time of the 1990 census.

Thus, the actual social dimension of integration in France is far more complex than one would expect from any big model of integration. Immigrants' integration become fully operative only when social needs are fulfilled. In this regard, “while in terms of legal status the current situation is actually an improvement, social integration is in decline” (Weil and Crowley, 1994: 120)

Britain

Britain put a strong emphasis on access in proper housing for immigrants as Harrison and Phillips (2005: 88) noted:

The UK has a stated multi-cultural policy, which aims to respond to cultural diversity through its housing policy whilst widening minority ethnic housing choices. Local government and social housing organisations are statutorily obliged to develop housing strategies which promote race equality and respond to the diverse social and cultural needs and preferences of migrant and minority ethnic groups. Housing providers set out a long-term vision for local minority ethnic communities, set targets for measuring performance and seek to integrate these with regional ethnic minority strategies.

However, after the Second World War, newly arriving immigrants had little scope to access in proper housing. They had to live in poor private rental properties or purchasing cheap terraced housing in deteriorating inner city (Rex and Moore, 1967). But this situation has changed considerably. Immigrants now have access in wide range of housing tenure and their living condition is improved significantly (Karn and Phillips, 1998). According to 1991 census, immigrants are well represented in housing pattern. The Indian were in the good position among immigrants in terms of public housing. They have almost the same access in housing market as British citizens do. On the other hand, this picture is only a half story of the truth. “Ethnic minority groups remains in a worse situation than White in relation to housing quality, over-crowding, concentration in disadvantages areas and levels of segregation” (Karn and Phillips, 1998: 129).

In 1991, owner-occupiers household accounted 66 per cent compared to only 25 per cent in 1945. There was a substantial difference in home-ownership among different immigrant groups. Indian were the top position, stood 82 per cent, while Pakistani 77, Chinese 62, Caribbean 48, Bangladeshi 44 and African 28 per cent. Interestingly, white were in the third position in owner-occupiers housing (see table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Tenure by ethnic group of head of household, Great Britain, 1991

Ethnic group	Owner-Occupiers %	Local authority Tenants %	Housing association Tenants %	Private Landlord Tenants %	Total (100%)
White	67	21	3	7	21,026,565
Black Caribbean	48	36	10	6	216,460
Black African	28	41	11	18	73,346
Other Black	37	34	11	14	38,281
Indian	82	8	2	6	225,582
Pakistani	77	10	2	10	100,938
Bangladeshi	44	37	6	10	30,668
Chinese	62	13	3	17	48,619
Other Asian	54	14	4	24	58,995
Other Other	54	19	6	18	77,908
All groups	66	21	3	7	21,897,322

Source: Owen, 1993a

Across immigrant groups there are substantial differences in housing conditions or tenure patterns. According to English House Condition Survey 1991, one fifth of the total immigrants lived in a 'worst' housing condition (DoE, 1993). Pakistani and Bangladeshi are the most disadvantaged group, 30 per cent of Pakistani and 47 percent of Bangladeshi lived in an overcrowded condition while only 2 percent British citizens do so in 1991 (Karn and Phillips, 1998).

This pattern of housing induced of the difference of the income of the households immigrants. Immigrants household are suffer from low level of income. This is more severe among Pakistani and Bangladeshi households, which is 50 per cent below the national average (Labour Force Survey, 1999).

The quality of housing also differs among different immigrant groups. Indian and Chinese were most likely to live in higher quality houses while Bangladeshi and Pakistanis lived in poorer condition (Karn and Phillips, 1998). The housing quality and ownership of

immigrants is interlinked with employment and income level. In this ground, the earnings of Bangladeshi and Pakistanis were 43 and 32 per cent respectively, compared to earnings of White (Modood, 1999). Therefore, it is well documented that immigrant groups who have low level of income tend to live in poorer housing condition.

In nutshell, there is an evidence of some improvement in terms of quality and pattern of housing, but relative inequalities are still durable. Immigrants in Britain remain in a worse situation than native citizens as Harrison and Phillips noted, “The recognition of housing as a contributory factor in ‘race’ related urban disturbances in the UK in 2001 encompasses an acknowledgement that housing is integral to wider patterns of disadvantage, poverty and social division” (2005: 88).

In overall comparison, some British immigrant group, especially Indian and Pakistanis, have better access in housing market than other immigrants groups in Britain. On the other hand all immigrants groups in France except EU immigrants have reached almost the same level in accessing housing market. However, in all the criteria of proper housing, British immigrants are slightly ahead than French immigrants.

4.3 Political Integration

Political integration is the most crucial road that affects all other spheres of integration and shapes the ethnic identify and citizenship. Generally, political participation of immigrants is seen as a clear indicator of successful integration. Scholars usually measure the level of political integration through naturalization rate. |I want to add to this the question of voting rights.

France:

Compared to other European countries, French immigrants have restrictive scope to participate in civic and political sphere. Immigrants do not have civic rights, such as voting, before their naturalization. Local migrant councils have been introduced in France in 1980s, which are played only consultative role and their main concern is limited to municipal interests (Schuerkens: 2005). Nevertheless, to take part in political process, these migrant councils have been played an important role which led immigrants towards greater political integration. In this respect, naturalization is a key road towards political integration. The reason for this is that after naturalization, immigrants enjoy the same rights as French nationals do that is taking part in all civic and political spheres.

Before 1993's reform, a modest number of immigrants acquired French nationality (see table 4.1). In addition, immigrants who were born in France could obtain French citizenship by a declaration before the mayor, and in addition, French-born immigrants' children acquired French nationality on reaching the age of eighteen without a formal procedure (Hargreaves, 1995). Interestingly, immigrants are often reluctant to take French nationality due to some practical reasons. The most important one is many French states refuse to accept dual citizenship. As a result, immigrants have to forfeiting their country of origin which most immigrants, especially Maghrebis, did not wish to do so. Since, immigrants, such as Algerian or Turkish are strongly inclined with their inheritance and myth of return to ancestor's land (Hargreaves, 1995).

Table 4.1 Naturalizations in 1992 (excluding persons born to foreign parents and acquiring French nationality automatically)

		%
Europeans (inc. ex-USSR)	13,105	22.1
of which EC	9,059	15.3
Africans	32,094	54.2
of which Maghrebis	24,693	41.7
Asians	11,243	19.0
of which S. -E. Asians*	4,894	8.3

Others	2,800	4.7
Total	59,242	100

Source: Decouflé and Tétaud 1993: Tables 3, 5. Cited in (Hargreaves (1995).

* Ex-French Indo-China.

Among immigrant groups in France, European immigrants have steady correlation between naturalization rate and length of settlement. On the other hand, Algerian and other former African colonial countries have low naturalization rate, compared with European immigrants. Finally, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have extremely high naturalization rate (table 5).

In the ground of voting rights, the French position remains in the conception of assimilation of citizenship in a nation-state. However, French law does not prevent foreigners to participate in the public elective organism. They can vote and can be elected in parent association in schools, at social security schemes and they can be member of industrial tribunals, but cannot be elected. In local and municipal politics, the situation is somewhat better for French national of immigrant origin. In 2001 municipal election, 7.6 per cent of candidates were foreign origin (Oriol, 2001).

Table 4.2 Major immigrant groups by status (Census from 1999)

	Immigrants	Naturalized citizens and country of birth	Foreign born Immigrants and country of birth
Total	4,306,094	1,556,043	2,750,051
Total EU	1,629,457	612,089	1,017,368
Spain	316,232	173,128	143,104
Italy	378,649	209,079	169,570
Portugal	571,874	116,026	455,848
Algeria	574,208	157,341	416,867
Morocco	522,504	133,962	388,542
Tunisia	201,561	81,186	120,375
Former African	276,028	97,851	178,177

countries under French administration			
Turkey	174,160	26,228	147,932
Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia	159,750	109,638	50,112
Others	768,426	337,748	430,678

Source: INSEE, 1999

On the other hand, there is a lack of ethnic representation in French National Assembly. Only one immigrant Muslim deputy and two female Maghrebi senators are representing ethnic minority groups. In 2001 municipal elections, immigrants constitute 5.6 percent deputies in local elected assemblies with 3.5 per cent Maghrebi (Freedman, 2004). According to Jane Freedman, it is a sort of exclusion of migrants and he states (2004: 98):

The participation of immigrants in associations is not perceived by the French state as a transition towards full political participation, but as a substitute for full political citizenship... It is argued that participation in such associations provides a real participation in local affairs and this argument is used to justify the continued refusal to grant immigrants the right to vote.

Due to some ideological reasons, such as citizenship and nationality, French policy makers were reluctant to give voting rights to immigrants. They cannot vote in local elections (except EU citizens, after Maastricht treaty) and recently this issue has been gained a great deal of political discourse among the political parties (Schuerkens, 2005).

Britain

Mason (1995: 112) says, “Although in formal terms Britain’s minority ethnic populations are fully incorporated politically - that is they have access to political citizenship rights in Marshall’s terms – it has been common to argue that their needs have not been fully represented in the political system”. Their participation is limited mainly in seeking funds for the party, taking part in strategy meeting, holding public or party office and campaigning for party (Goulbourne, 1995). For historical and structural reasons, immigrants in Britain are lacking behind the real political participation. They are less

disposed to participate in political sphere such as voting, standing as a candidate in local or national level.

However, generally immigrants in Britain have an automatic right to vote, which is constituted a strong resource for political participation. It is estimated that immigrants represents 5% of whole British electorate and their vote is crucial in many urban districts. Generally, electoral registration rate of immigrants is lower than white. But Asians have almost the same rate as British citizens do (Bousetta, 2001).

British immigrants significantly differ from France in terms of political representation in national and local level. It was estimated that immigrants councillor was 2.9 per cent of total councillors in England and Wales. The majority of them (82 per cent) are male, and Asians are dominating in this category (Anwar, 2001). Black immigrant councillor in London accounts 134 seats in 1986 local election and this number has continued to growth in 1990 (Saggar, 1992). In 1991 the number of ethnic minority MPs was six and over time this number has increased modestly (Fitzerald, 1995).

Table 4.3 Grants of British citizenship in the United Kingdom by previous nationality
1999-2003

Previous nationality	Number of persons				
	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
European Economic Area	1,710	2,075	1,680	1,575	2,205
Remainder of Europe	5,575	9,370	9,405	17,755	17,235
Americas	5,415	6,965	7,245	8,035	10,195
Africa	12,865	21,925	29,790	37,560	39,815
Indian sub-continent	14,785	22,145	23,745	26,685	29,715
Middle East	4,715	6,620	5,330	9,440	6,195
Remainder of Asia	6,155	9,150	8,630	15,355	13,335
Oceania	1,525	1,670	1,515	1,740	3,460
Other(3)	2,160	2,290	2,565	1,985	2,150
All grants	54,900	82,210	90,295	120,125	124,315

Source: National Statistics, May 2004.

Naturalization, as a process of acquiring nationality, grows 21 per cent in 2003 than previous year in Britain which accounts 139,315 individuals. Asian and African immigrants accounted 40 and 32 per cent respectively and among them 10.9 per cent were Pakistani and 7 per cent were Indian and Somalis. There was also a steady correlation between length of residence and naturalization rate. Sixty one per cent of total citizenship granted to them who have been residing in Britain more than six years.

In comparison, French naturalization process is more complicated than British process and it affects immigrants' political participation. Similarly, immigrants in Britain have voting rights and they can participate in local and national politics with their ethnic distinctiveness, whilst French immigrants do not have such rights and France does not recognize ethnic distinctiveness in their politics and in their legal events. Therefore, the level of political integration in Britain and France differ significantly and as a result, British immigrants have achieved higher level of political integration than its counter parts French immigrants.

4.4 Cultural Integration

“It is often thought that immigrants who maintain close ties with their country of origin are not well integrated into the recipient society...This is often interpreted as a sign of lacking cultural integration” (Entzinger and Biezeveld, 2003:34). Therefore, it is a crucial indicator for measuring cultural integration.

France

According to the 1990 census, 12 per cent of all couples living in France had at least one immigrant member and 51 per cent were mixed couples (one French national and one Foreigner). The number of mixed marriages is relatively high among young generation of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants. It is also common in second generation of Algerian and Moroccan immigrants. This number is almost negative among Turkish immigrants (Campani and Salimbeni, 2004).

Table 5.1 Marriages in France, by nationality of spouses, 2000

Year Marriage	Total Marriage	Nationality of spouses			
		Two French spouses	Two foreign Spouses	Mixed couples	
				Foreign female spouse	Foreign male spouse
1980	331 377	308 066	5 696	8 323	12 292
1985	269 419	241 497	6 505	8 773	12 644
1990	287 099	247 853	8 703	12 606	17 937
1995	254 651	225 612	5 214	10 545	13 280
1996	280 072	251 158	4 868	10 783	13 263
1997	283 984	254 020	5 237	10 916	13 811
1998	271 361	239 704	5 658	11 604	14 395
1999	286 191	250 252	5 897	13 638	16 404
2000 (p)	305 000	-	-	-	-

Source: INSEE (National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, France). 2000
(p) Interim results

Another important indicator is language skills and it is easier to measure and compare. It determines whether immigrants are able to integrate into host society or not. Generally, immigrants are poorly educated in comparison with indigenous citizens and they have low level of language competency. This fact is particularly true in France (Hargreaves, 1995).

According to joint survey by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) and INED (Institut National d'Etudes Démographiques) immigrants who came from former French colonies have slightly better language competency (see table 5.2). French language skill is significantly low among immigrant's women despite differences between different national groups, and surprisingly 100 percent Turkish immigrant women can speak little or no French. Because generally Muslim women are discouraged to work outside the domestic sphere (Hargreaves, 1995). Therefore, for this language deficiency, French Muslim women do not have proper access in active labour market and consequently that affect other spheres of integration as well.

Table 5.2 French-language competence among immigrants, by nationality, sex and date of arrival in France, 1992

	Average date of	Schooling included	Difficulty in understanding	Speak little or

	arrival in France	some French %	French TV news %	no French %
Portuguese - male	1970	17	14	38
Portuguese - female	1972	20	20	35
Algerian -male	1964	35	10	16
Algerian -female	1972	25	46	57
Moroccans + Tunisians -male	1972	35	26	40
Moroccans + Tunisians -female	1979	29	51	65
Turks -male	1977	10	65	83
Turks -female	1979	0	85	100


Source: INSEE, 1994: 61. Cited in Hargreaves, 1995.

Generally, proficiency in native language is seen as the basis of successful integration. In this respect, French immigrants have reached a moderate level of integration in spite of difference in achieving the language skills in certain immigrants groups.

Britain

According to Labour Force Survey 1991, there is a general propensity of intermarriage among different immigrant groups in Britain. Intermarriage is more common among men than women in immigrant groups with the exception of Chinese and some Asian immigrants. There is a high rate of intermarriage among Caribbean and Africans immigrants than other immigrant groups (figure 3). The mixed couples were mostly in white/West Indian origins though white/Asian mixed couples are also common now-a-days (Coleman, 2004).

Figure 3. Percentage of married people in inter-ethnic marriages, by ethnic group and sex, England and Wales, 2001



Source: Census, April 2001, Office for National Statistics.

According to 2001 census, there were 10.3 million couples in England and Wales and only 2 per cent of total marriages were Inter-ethnic marriage. White and mixed raced immigrants comprised 26 per cent of all inter-marriages and white and other was 15 per cent. White and Caribbean marriages accounted 12 per cent, the largest among immigrants groups, and white and Indian stood 11 per cent (Office for National Statistics, 2001)

In 2001 census, intermarriage rate among Asian immigrants was relatively low except Chinese and Bangladeshi immigrants stood in the bottom in this category. It is because they are inclined to adhere to their own culture and tradition norms³ (Coleman, 2004). Asian people are less likely to marry other ethnic minority people. Only 6 per cent Indian, 4 per cent Pakistani and 3 per cent Bangladeshi married outside their ethnic group.

On the other hand, English language proficiency among immigrants in Britain varies among different ethnic groups. According to Dusmann and Fabbri's (2003) study, which is conducted on the basis of the findings of Family and Working Lives Survey (1994 and 1995) and Fourth national Survey on Ethnic Minorities (1993 and 1994), Afro-Asian are well ahead from other immigrants groups and followed by Caribbean and Indian.

³ Bangladeshis are prone to marriage very early and within their own groups.

Bangladeshis are the bottom of this category. Surprisingly, a significant per cent of immigrant cannot speak English at all, among them Pakistani 16.88, Bangladeshi 16.76, Chinese 12.64, Indian 9.81, and all groups 9.67 respectively.

Table 5.3 Language proficiency Information

	All groups	Caribbean	Indian	Afro-Asian	Pakistani	Bangladeshi	Chinese
Speaking, FWLS*							
Very well	37.81	54.55	50.44	64.77	38.16	25.93	–
Quite well	23.12	13.64	27.43	27.27	26.05	18.46	–
Not well	20.12	18.18	18.14	5.68	21.32	22.82	–
Hardly	11.69	13.64	3.54	2.27	10	18.46	–
Not at all	7.26	–	0.44	–	4.47	14.32	–
Reading, FWLS							
Very well	34.64	40.91	48.67	61.36	33.16	24.07	–
Quite well	21.12	18.18	23.89	26.14	21.58	18.67	–
Not well	15.86	22.73	14.16	7.95	17.11	16.8	–
Hardly	13.19	9.09	7.96	1.14	14.47	17.01	–
Not at all	15.19	9.09	5.31	3.41	13.68	23.44	–
Writing, FWLS							
Very well	32.39	40.91	45.13	56.82	29.47	23.86	–
Quite well	19.2	18.18	21.68	23.86	20.79	15.98	–
Not well	16.61	22.73	15.49	13.64	18.16	16.18	–
Hardly	21.77	4.55	11.06	2.27	13.68	15.15	–
Not at all	19.03	13.64	6.44	3.41	17.89	28.84	–
Speaking, FNSEM**							
Fluent	48.73	86.95	39.98	65.63	25.56	25.97	56.59
Fairly	20.4	9.62	24.37	19.2	25.56	23.02	12.64
Slightly	21.2	–	25.84	11.76	32.00	34.25	18.13
Not at all	9.67	–	9.81	3.41	16.88	16.76	12.64

Source: Dusmann and Fabbri, 2003

* Family and Working Lives Survey (self-assessed)

** Fourth national Survey on Ethnic Minorities (interviewer assessed)

In overall comparison, British immigrants are better than French immigrants in terms of language skills. In contrast, in the field of intermarriage, French immigrants are slightly ahead than British immigrants. Therefore, two different indicators give two different results. Consequently it can be said that both these two country reached a comparable level of cultural integration.

4.5 Attitudes towards Immigrants

Apart from all spheres of integration, a good attitude towards immigrants is very important for actual integration. Integration is not a one-side process; both immigrant and recipient need to take part in this process. In order to feel at home in the new host country immigrants need a good atmosphere and good attitudes from native citizens. In this respect, racism and xenophobia generally provide good tools for measuring attitudes towards immigrants from the receiving society.

France

Racism became a vibrant issue in public and political discourse in France when radical right party, the Front national, was second after first round of presidential election in 2002. An opinion poll that carried out following the success of the Front National indicates that “widespread acceptance of some of the core ideas and values of the Front National ... regarding immigration, 59 per cent expressed the opinion that there were too many immigrants in France” (Feedman, 2004: 41). This kind of opinion shows that a large number of French nationals dislike immigrants and it effects their actual integration.

Table 6.1 indicates that according to French perceptions only European immigrants can be integrated well. This number is very high among West European, especially among Italian, Spanish and Poles. West Indians and Jews are in the middle position among all. Asian and Armenians are in the bottom in terms of positive level of integration. While all African immigrants are in the negative level of integration and Algerians are in the bottom.

Table 6.1 French Perceptions of minority ethnic groups, 1984

Question: Here is a list of communities living in France. For each of them can you tell me whether they are on the whole well or badly integrated into French society?


	A Well %	B Badly %	C No reply %	D A- B
Italians	81	9	10	+72
Spanish	81	9	10	+72
Poles	75	8	17	+67
Portuguese	70	18	12	+52
Pieds-noirs	66	21	13	+45
West Indians	57	20	23	+37
Jews from E. Europe	49	16	35	+33
Yugoslavs	43	20	37	+23
Asians	47	25	28	+22
Armenians	37	28	35	+9
Tunisians	37	42	21	-5
Black Africans	36	48	16	-12
Moroccans	33	48	19	-15

Turks	19	43	38	-24
Gypsies	21	64	15	-43
Algerians	21	70	9	-49

Source: SOFRES opinion poll for MRAP 1984: 22. Cited in Hargreaves (1995).

In the year 2002, an increasing number of threats and acts of racism and xenophobia against immigrants were reported. It is the highest level since 1992. Reported threats have increased significantly, compared with racist acts. Of those, 261 was aggressive in nature and North African population was the principal target, which is the highest number since 1997 (RAXEN, 2005a). In 2004, total number of reported racist, xenophobic acts and threats was 1,565 and of these, 369 were against people and property. Anti-Semitic incidences were the highest in number and anti-Maghrebian was the second in place. In the same year, there were 1, 275 racist and anti-Semitic acts in schools (RAXEN, 2005a).

Figure 4. Trends in Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in France from 1992 and 2002



Total of Racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts (light).

Total of Racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic threats (dark).

Source: RAXEN Focal Point for France, 2005a

Therefore, the perception of French citizens about immigrants is really complicated and its effects on actual integration. It becomes more complicated as Simon (2003) stated,

France's longstanding traditions of secularism in the political sphere and Roman Catholicism in religious life are being tested as the country tries to integrate a growing Muslim population. The construction of mosques, the creation of representative Islamic bodies, and the wearing of religious symbols in schools are just a few of the issues that have sparked vigorous public debate

Britain

The diversity of multi-ethnic society and culture is widely acknowledged by the British media, politicians and policy makers and Britain committed to develop racial equality in its multiculturalism society. However, racism and xenophobia is still a problem in Britain. Immigrants are suffering from a high rate of racist and xenophobic instances as Saggart (1992: 33) noted, “The development of British racial attitudes appears to owe less to the direct face-to-face contact between white Britons and black people and more to an underlying system of values and assumptions about Britain in a period of unique economic expansion”.

Table 6.2 Conceptions of national identity and attitudes towards immigrants

	Agree that number of immigrants should be reduced (%)	Agree that stronger measures should be taken to exclude illegal immigrants (%)	n
Ethnic and Civic	85.0	87.3	439
Civic only	60.3	78.7	300
Neither	64.1	70.6	78
All	74.0	82.6	833


Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2003. Cited in Heath and Tilley, 2005

Heath and Tilley (2005) show that immigrants are not welcoming in Britain. One third of respondents in this survey express the flow of migrants should be reduced since they are not

inclined into British identity. However, they are more liberal about present immigrants and most of them (61.3 per cent) in favour of assimilation of immigrants rather to preserve immigrants' culture. Therefore, the level of integration of immigrant in Britain becomes rather tricky when we consider the attitudes towards immigrants.

Chart 1 shows that racist incidents in Britain increases fiercely. It increases almost five times in 2001 - 02 periods than 1996 -97 periods. Consequently, among the EU member states, Britain stood in the first place with the highest number of reported racist violence in those periods which accounts 53,092 incidents (RAXEN, 2005b). In that year 25,116 incidents were racially aggravated offences. Victim of these racist crimes is highest among South Asians.

Chart 1. Racist incidents



Source: Home office Racist Incidents Reports and CPS Reports 1997 – 2002. Cited in RAXEN Focul Point for the UK. 2004.

It is notable that, “the current UK government has introduced new and innovative legislation and action plans to combat institutional racism and enhance integration. Many of these developments have been progressive, innovative and groundbreaking” (RAXEN,

2004). Nevertheless, Britain is lagging behind the average level of integration in terms of attitudes towards immigrants.

In overall comparison, France and Britain differ significantly. In the period 2001-02, Britain had 42 times higher number of recorded crimes than France and in 2002-03, it was 59 times higher. Similarly, French citizens have better attitudes towards immigrants than British citizens. Therefore, it can be argued that French immigrants have reached a high degree of integration in the field of 'attitudes towards immigrants' than that of British immigrants.

Chapter V

Assimilationist Model Verses Multiculturalism Model: An Overall Comparison

It is impossible to find any country that has succeeded to integrate all its immigrants in all social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of integration. While immigrants in a country achieve satisfactory integration level in one specific sphere of integration, they are lag behind in other spheres of integration. In addition, backgrounds of immigrants vary considerably across ethnicities and regions. For instance, the sense of belonging to the

nation may be much stronger in one ethnic group than others. In addition, different immigrant groups can achieve different level of integration within a given country. Therefore, it is quite complicated to compare the levels of integration between two countries from a broader perspective.

France and Britain are two distinctive countries in Europe in terms of persisting different integration model for integrating immigrants. France is prototype for assimilationist model and Britain is known for its multiculturalism model. These two big models of integration have different features and certain capabilities to integrate immigrants as De Azevedo and Sannino (1995: 42) noted,

The French model aims at turning immigrants into French citizens. Immigrants are granted the same rights as French citizens and equal opportunities. Therefore, in the French model the ethnical or cultural differences seem to play a minor role. Immigrants have to be firmly included in societies with strong national identities. They must have the same opportunities as French citizens in the social and economic field on condition that they adapt their behaviour to the basic values of the host society. Immigrants are supposed to show their different religious or cultural adherence only in the private sphere. Integration in the United Kingdom does not follow a model of assimilation, but of equal opportunities for everyone, irrespective of colour and ethnic origin and of cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. This model is occasionally referred to as "multicultural" or "pluralistic integration.

Therefore, Britain and France differ significantly due their different model of integration. In this paper, therefore, I compare these two different models to examine if any of these big models has any decisive impact on actual immigrant integration or not. I examine three claims, these are, 1) Britain has a higher level of actual integration; the claim made in most studies seems to be valid. 2) France has a higher level of actual integration, and then those claim that Britain has the better model to offer should be revised. 3) If Britain and France have reached comparable levels of integration than neither claim seems to be valid. In this section, I compare overall actual integration of immigrants in Britain and France to examine which claim is validate.

In the ground of 'attitudes towards immigrant', Britain had 42 time higher number of recorded violence than France in the period of 2001- 2002 and it been 59 times higher in the period of 2002 - 2003. Therefore, recorded racist violence is easy to measure and compare. In this sense, assimilationist model achieved higher level of actual immigrants' integration than multiculturalism model. But the perception of majority population towards immigrants is complicated to compare since the data of this field in these two countries, is not similar. However, the overall comparison reveals that French citizens think majority of immigrants integrated well in French society (see table 6.1). In contrast, a large majority of the respondent (74%) believes that number of immigrant should be reduced in Britain (see table 6.2). The underlying cause of this perception of British people is that they assume immigrants are not well integrated into British society and consequently immigrants are not welcomed by British people. On this basis it can be said that in the field of 'attitudes towards immigrants' French immigrants have achieved higher degree of integration than its counter parts Britain.

In the field of cultural integration, it can be argued that in the ground of language proficiency, British immigrants are moderately ahead than French immigrants. However, in case of intermarriage, "up to 40% of West Indians born in the United Kingdom appear to have white partners. The same proportion is reached by young Maghrebians in France". (De Azevedo and Sannino, 1995: 40). But in overall comparison, French immigrants are slightly ahead than British immigrants (see table 5.1 and figure 3). Therefore, two different indicators of cultural integration give different picture to what extent immigrants are integrated and consequently it is really difficult to state that British immigrants have reached higher level of integration than those of France or vis-à-vis.

Political integration of immigrants is difficult to compare between Britain and France since French immigrants do not have right to vote or to elect before naturalization that British immigrants do. Consequently, not all the data are comparable to measure to what extent immigrants are integrated. Albeit, according to our findings it can be conferred that British immigrants achieved higher degree of integration in political sphere. British naturalization process is not complicated as it is in France since a large proportion of immigrants

achieved British nationality when they arrived in Britain and the rest of them born in Britain and they would get it automatically as a consequence. So, in the context of naturalization, British immigrants are fairly ahead than French immigrants. Similarly, in terms of number of immigrant representatives in local and national level and participation in political sphere, such as voting percentage, British immigrants are taking a fair lead over French immigrants.

Housing quality and pattern of immigrants in Britain and France reveals complex picture. Different immigrant groups in Britain achieved different level of social integration through housing condition. For instance, Indian and Pakistanis are well ahead than other group of immigrants in terms owner-occupier housing. However, on the whole British immigrants are moderately ahead than French immigrants in owner-occupier housing. On the other hand, French people accounts 56.2 per cent of all owner-occupiers housing, compared to 67 per cent of British people. Therefore, French immigrants have better scope to live in owner-occupiers housing than British immigrants. In other criteria of quality of housing, such as private and housing association tenants, British immigrants are ahead to some extent than its counter parts French immigrants.

Finally and most critically, it is too difficult to compare the economic integration. The data on this field cannot indicate the real situation all the time since it can easily be happened that a given country was suffering from economic downfall when data was collected and so on. We have, therefore, to be careful when comparing economic integration. The overall unemployment rate of French immigrant was 19.5 in 1990 and it was 18.3 in Britain in 1991 (see table 2.1 and 2.2). But if we consider female unemployment rate, then French immigrants are fairly behind the British immigrants (26.8 per cent compared to 15.6). One reason for this is France has a large proportion of Muslim immigrants than Britain and they are reluctant to work out side their home due to some religious and traditional belief. On the other hand, all French immigrants except EU immigrants were suffering almost the same level of unemployment problem (from 25.4 to 28.9 per cent), while there was a big difference in unemployment rate among British immigrants (from 9.5 to 31.7 per cent). Therefore, one sub-indicator suggest that British immigrants are lead by French immigrants

in one hand, and another sub-indicator suggest that British immigrants are moderately ahead than French immigrants on the other. Thus, keeping all this complexity in mind, it can be conferred that both British and French immigrants have archived almost the same level of economic integration.

This discussion here able we to give a cautious answer to the question whether the big models of integrations have any decisive impact on actual integration or not. In French assimilationist model of integration, immigrants are integrated well in the field of ‘attitudes towards immigrants’ and it can make big difference in other dimensions of integration as I stated earlier. In contrast, though, British immigrants are lag behind in the field of ‘attitudes towards immigrants’ than their French counter parts, they are well ahead in the field of political integration. In the sphere of social integration, British multiculturalism model produces slight better result than French assimilationist model. Finally, in economic and cultural dimensions of integration, both have achieved almost the same level of immigrants’ integration.

Therefore, it can cast severe doubt on so often heard claim that British multiculturalism model has to offer the far better model of immigrants’ integration and similarly, not so often but the claim made by some scholars that, French assimilationist model of integration is better than British model. Rather third claim is seems to be validate that both of these two model have reached comparable level of immigrants’ integration and they do not have any decisive impact on actual integration. Of course, to find a more realistic picture on this issue it needs farther research including more indicators and more variables. There are also many scopes to do in-depth study on this issue and this study might give inspiration to do so.

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Migration issue has been subject to intensive study for decades. The salinity of this issue draws scholars' intense attention to do extensive research in all aspects of integration. It became more vibrant when European nation states have faced a massive wave of immigrants from all over the world after World War II and consequently, faced problems to integrate them. To examine these problems, therefore, scholars are trying to look at the

models which are followed by the European nation states to integrate their immigrants. In this respect, two big models of integration – assimilationist and multiculturalism – which are followed by France and Britain draw a great deal of attention from scholars.

There is a general claim that British multiculturalism model is the best for integrating immigrants, however, some scholars claim that French assimilationist model is better than Multiculturalism model in terms of actual immigrants' integration. In this light, I wanted to examine whether or not these big models of integration have any decisive impact on actual immigrants' integration by looking at the British and French situations in a comparative manner. In an attempt to measure the level to what extent immigrants are integrated in Britain and France, I created a theoretical model and examine immigrants' integration in Britain and France from a broader perspective. I distinguished five dimensions of integration including economic, social, political, cultural dimensions of integration and attitudes towards immigrants. Being pragmatic, I choose some selective indicators of each dimension of integration to measure the level to what extent immigrants are integrated.

By employing my framework empirically, I came up with this conclusion that in the field of 'attitudes towards immigrants', French assimilationist model produced better result while British multiculturalism model is much better in the field of political integration. In the sphere of social integration, British multiculturalism model is slightly ahead than French assimilationist model. Finally, both these two big models are almost in the same situation in economic and cultural dimensions of integration.

Therefore, an overall comparison reveals that these two models have achieved almost the same level of immigrants' integration. According to this findings, it can be argued that neither of these two claim is valid – British multiculturalism model is the best for integrating immigrants in terms of actual integration and vis-à-vis, i.e., French assimilationist model is better than multiculturalism model. The third claim tends to be more valid than the last two ones, as these models have reached comparable level of immigrants' integration and do not have any decisive impact on actual integration.

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