A comparative study of immigrants’
political participation in Sweden and the
Netherlands

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of European political sociology

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Abstract

This study deals with immigrants’ political participation in Sweden and the Netherlands. Scholars have recognized low level of political participation of immigrants in Sweden compared to the Netherlands. The main goal of this study is to analyze the institutional influence, mainly from political parties over immigrants’ motivation for active electoral participation. The modified actor-context model uses here as the main theoretical framework. In addition, social capital theory employs to analyze immigrants’ voluntary organizational membership. This study confirms that, Swedish immigrants have the lower participation rate in the political sphere, at lest to a certain extent, than its counterparts the Dutch immigrants. This study also confirms the argument that contextual factors can influence actor’s motivations in integration-oriented action, and similarly it validates the necessity of enlargement of the actor-context model.
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“At a time of great population movements we must have clear policies for immigration and asylum. We are committed to fostering social inclusion and respect for ethnic, cultural and religious diversity, because they make our societies strong, our economies more flexible and promote exchange of ideas and knowledge.”


1. Introduction

The political participation of immigrants in most migrant countries has become an important issue and gained much attention from social scientists over the years. The concept of political participation of immigrants is a relatively new analytical tool that is used by social scientists for all those countries which have relatively high share of immigrant population in order to understand the reality of marginalization and vulnerability of some segments of society as Entzinger (1999: 10) notes,

Over the past decades many countries in Europe, particularly the immigration countries of Western Europe, have become aware of this, and have begun to discuss, therefore, how people of immigrant origin can be given a fair share in the political debate and in decision making processes.

During the last decades most migrant countries have been faced with increasing numbers of immigrants and thereby they have adopted legislations and integration policies in order to meet the challenge of successful immigrants’ integration. In accordance with the integration preferences immigrants in some migrant countries have been granted voting rights at the local level and they can vote or choose their representatives. Despite this fact, however, researchers have recognized the low level of political participation of immigrants and there has been a significant difference between immigrants and the majority population in respect of political engagements. Consequently, in democratic assemblies immigrants are often under-represented (Kalm 2001).

Over the decades, therefore, scholars have been concerned with the impact of under-representation of immigrants in the democratic society. If immigrants are being isolated from the political participation there is a risk of dissatisfaction of some segments of the
society and thereby it could undermine the democratic ideas and political equality (Myrberg 2004). To enhance coherence and integrity in the society, some industrialist democracy, therefore, given the voting rights to the immigrants at least at the local level.

The two Multiculturalist Countries in Europe, the Netherlands and Sweden, who have relatively high proportion of immigrants, have given the voting rights to the immigrants nearly three decades ago. In Sweden, political participation of immigrants has been an important issue for three decades. Immigrants, who had resided in Sweden more than three years, were given the voting rights in local and regional elections since 1976. However, the percentage of voting turnout of immigrants has being lower for every new election from 60% in 1976 to 35% in 2002 (Benito 2005). Therefore, political participation of immigrants in Sweden is considered low and there is a fairly gap between them and native Swedes in representation in different political levels and active political participation (Benito 2005).

In the Netherlands, foreign residents were given the voting rights in local elections in Rotterdam in 1979 and it expanded nationwide in 1985\(^1\). They gave this political right to immigrants hopping that it would help immigrants to integrate in the mainstream of society because the Dutch were concerned with the lack of immigrants’ integration (Togeby 1999). Since then, migrants have become an important issue in local elections. Especially, in the 1986 election, when the leftist parties were actively looking for ‘migrant candidates’ to win the election (Tillie 1998). Subsequently, migrant councilors in the local municipalities have risen sharply and political participation of immigrants still is being relatively high in the local level (Fennema and Tillie 1999).

However, despite the fact that both these countries are very similar in respect of integrating their immigrants and adopting multiculturalism ideas, they belong to the same welfare state regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and they are in the same category in the EU states who have granted full voting rights of non-citizens on the local level ‘when special requirements are fulfilled’ (Cyrus et, al., 2005), but they produced different

results in political participation and representation of immigrants at different parliamentary and municipal levels. Therefore, it is interesting to compare these countries to see if this fact has real validity.

In this paper, I offer a comparative analysis of immigrants’ political participation in two multicultural countries, The Netherlands and Sweden. My main concern is to focus firstly, at the institutions, mainly at the political parties and to a lesser extent other formal institutional set up for immigrants and secondly, immigrants electoral participation and voluntary organizational membership, to see how institutions shape the opportunities and constraints to influence immigrants’ political participation.

There is an increase in the migration literature concerning immigrants’ political participation in electoral policy and their representation in decision–making and parliamentary bodies. There has been a surge in interest in ethnic-related immigration politics in European countries in recent years such as Ireland (1994), Bousetta (1997), Rogers and Tillie (2001). One of the important works on political participation of immigrants in Western Europe has been done by Layton-Henry (1990) by identifying six areas in which the political rights and political participation of immigrants can be recognized. But the problem of political participation of immigrants that underpins the coherence of society and democratic ideas are still little understood, especially, in the case of the Netherlands and Sweden in a comparative manner. The comparative literature on immigration has mainly focused on the national level and been related with explaining policy outcomes. They mainly concentrate on the socio-economic impact of immigrants’ incorporation or assimilation as Minnite et al. state “research has focused largely on the impact of immigration on labor markets and social welfare policies, with less attention paid to the implications of mass immigration for the political process” (1999: 5).

Similarly, scholars analyze immigrants’ integration focusing on the factors influencing immigrants’ incorporation (Soysal 1984; Garbaye 2002; Marrow 2005). Some scholars examine the role of institutions at the local level to measure the level of immigrants’ integration taking political participation as their dependant variable (Ireland 1994;
Waldinger 1996; Boussetta 2000). Ireland (1994), for example, in comparing French and Swiss cities, demonstrates that the differential impact of institutional factors at the national and local levels is the main determinant for ethnic identity and immigrant participation.

Another important field of immigrant political participation, called social capital, has been developed by some scholars arguing that immigrant’ organizational participation has significant impact on their active political participation. Putman (1993) introduced this argument first and later Fennema & Tillie (1999; 2001) developed this theory in the background of immigrants’ political mobilization in the Netherlands. Scholars of social science are paying much attention nowadays to social capital theory and employing it to compare the level of political participation of different immigrant groups, however, none, to the best of my knowledge, employ this theory to compare immigrants’ political participation in Sweden and the Netherlands as a whole. Therefore, it can be interesting to employ social capital theory in the field of immigrant political participation in the Netherlands and Sweden.

Similarly, scholars have paid significantly less attention to different ‘intermediary’ institutions like parties that influence the level of immigrants’ participation and shape the opportunities and constrains for immigrants to integrate in the main stream of society. It is also interesting to see how this intermediary institutions, mainly political parties, influence immigrants’ integration i.e., political participation in these two countries.

Therefore, my research aim is to address this gap in taking Sweden and the Netherlands as a comparative case study. In this paper, thus, the following research questions will be addressed: how do institutions, mainly political parties shape the opportunities and constraints to influence immigrants’ political participation? And, does voluntary organizational membership of immigrants have any relevance to influence the level of immigrants’ political participation in host society? In order to explain these questions more specifically, I will employ ‘actor context model’ which is discussed in the theoretical chapter.
The paper is divided into eight chapters. I give a general introduction and outline of the paper in the chapter I. Later, I posit my research questions which will be followed by the literature review. Afterwards, I engage in an attempt to clarify what I mean by ‘political participation’ and ‘immigrant’ and focus on the overview of methodology. In chapter II, I consider the theoretical overview of this paper and discuss the development of contextual arguments concerning immigrants’ political participation. Chapter III focuses on the historical overview of pattern of immigration and immigration policies in the Netherlands and Sweden. Chapter IV examines the contextual factors that influence immigrants’ political participation. In chapter V, I analyze actor’s factors through immigrants’ electoral participation and voluntary organizational membership. Chapter VI validates the causal relation of contextual factors and actor’s factors and Chapter VII gives a summary of the paper. Finally, in chapter VIII, I conclude with the findings and personal observations.

1.1. Methodological Overview

1.1.1 Terminology

For clarifying my case, it is important to define some terms which will be main variables of this study.

*Immigrant:* ‘Immigrant’ can be a confusing term since it has been used several ways. Entzinger (1999: 14) distinguishes three types of immigrants in terms of entitlements of citizenship and consequently voting rights. The first category is those who ‘have been citizens of the country of residence from the moment of their arrival’ and thereby they enjoy the voting rights. For instance ethnic Germans (*Aussiedler*) who settle in Germany can be categorized in this category that enjoys citizenship rights without any waiting period. The second category is those immigrants who become neutralized and enjoy full citizenship rights as native citizens do. Finally, those who are immigrants but non-citizen and have only limited citizenship rights, for instance voting rights at local or
regional level but never in the national level. In this paper, I consider the second and third groups of immigrants regardless of their country of origin.

**Political participation:** Political participation is also a confusing term. Political participation is regarded here as one of the indicators of incorporation. I follow the general rule that the more active participation of people in the political spheres the more they become incorporated. Political participation often includes “different processes, political activities, institutional behaviors and measures of civic inclusion” (Wong 2002). For the purpose of this paper, I employ it as the process by which immigrants become part of the political fabric of receiving society and thereby have active electoral participation and representation in different parliamentary and municipal councils as Rogers (2004: 4) points, “[by means of incorporation] the extent to which a group is active in political and/or civic life, has obtained descriptive and substantive representation, and has its policy concerns addressed by the system”. In order to analyze the level of political participation of immigrant, I use voting turn out and number of representatives in parliament and municipal councils.

**Institution:** Institution can be defined in many different ways. Since, everything from a societal structure can be included in ‘institution’. Many institutionalist theorists have defined institution, however, they also have been criticized for defining ‘institution’ in ambiguity way. Therefore, it calls for defining institution more precisely. Institution, the word, entails everything from a formal structure to abstract entities. Consequently, institution comprises of formal and informal institutions, conventions, and the norms and symbols embedded in them, and policy instruments and procedures (Armstrong & Bulmer 2000). Similarly, March and Olsen (1984) defines institution as that it is not merely a formal structure but also “as a collection of norms, rules, understanding and routines deriving from the structures in place” ( quoted in Odmalm 2005: 78). On the other hand, Recently, Diermeir and Krehbiel (2001: 78) define institution as “a set of contextual features in the setting of collective choice that defines constrains on, and opportunities for, individual behaviour in the setting”. In this study, I take this definition
of institution since it well fits to my study. However, I limit ‘institution’ only to political parties, some formal governmental organization and their policies.

1.1.2 Rationale for the case selections

A comparative case study of Sweden and the Netherlands can be justified by the fact that there are many similarities between them. First of all, both countries have experienced a large influx of immigrants after the Second World War. Immigrant population consist a high share of total population in both these countries, 15.4 % in Sweden (SCB 2005) comparing to 19.1 % in the Netherlands (Migration Information 2005). They have a similar type of institutional set-up and political system (Odmalm 2005). In addition, they are both following ‘multiculturalism’ in order to incorporate immigrants and ‘made most progress towards multicultural ideas’ within European nation-states. Finally and the most strikingly, the state’s attitude towards immigrants is almost similar in terms of integrating them into both of the countries (Odmalm 2005). Therefore, it is fair to compare immigrants’ political participation between the Netherlands and Sweden.

1.1.3 Methodology

In this study, both qualitative and quantitative methods of research are applied in order to analyze the topic comprehensively. Rather than only relying on one research approach, the combination of these two is needed to increase the scope, depth and power of the research (Punch, 1998). In this way, the particular disadvantages of each of the methods are minimized, whereas the benefits are maximized. Since the early 1980s there has been an increase in the combination of both research methods (Bryman, 2003).

Qualitative research is a strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data. In the study, the constructionist and the interpretive feature of the qualitative analysis is very important, especially in the analysis of immigrant’s political participation phenomena.
On the other hand, the quantitative approach emphasizes quantification and numbers in the collection and in the analysis of data. In very broad terms, quantitative research can be characterized as exhibiting certain preoccupations, the most central of which are: measurement, causality, generalization and replication (Bryman, 2003). In the study, there will be plenty of numerical data concerning the immigrant population, survey results, voting turnout, rate of immigrants’ representation at different levels etc. The evaluation of all of these findings, encompassing their reliability and validity, will be checked in accordance with the quantitative research method.

1.1.4 Research design

In this study, comparative research design is applied since the topic is about comparing the political participation of immigrants through the ‘intermediary’ institution, political parties and migrants’ voluntary organizations in both countries. Hantrais (1995) holds the opinion that comparisons provide an analytical framework for examining and explaining socio-political and cultural differences and specificity. They serve as a tool for developing classifications of social phenomena and for comprehending if the shared phenomena can be explained by the same causes. Different societies, their structures and institutions can be better understood by cross-national comparisons.

Considering Hantrais’ argument, I believe the comparative research design fits very well to my study.

1.1.5 Data collection and analysis of data

Multiple sources of data and data collection will be used in the study. This involves both quantitative and qualitative data collection techniques. Quantitative data to be obtained is mostly comprised of secondary analysis of the data, collected by others and official statistics. Moreover the secondary analysis of comparable data from two or more countries can provide one possible model for conducting cross-cultural research. The challenges that can be encountered in collecting secondary data lie in the fact that they
are sometimes regarded as being too complex. Moreover, data collected by others for their own purposes can lack one or two variables that are needed by the researcher. In this regard, here, I use some survey and field studies result conducted by scholars. In addition, some election results also will be used, particularly, I emphasis general election results of 2006 in both Sweden and the Netherlands.

The qualitative method of data collection will entail primary documents of both these two countries’ institutions in form of treaties, communications, and state official documents. Moreover, the review of existing relevant literature, books, journals and articles are to provide insights into the understanding of immigrants’ political participation in the Netherlands and Sweden. The collection of the qualitative data is also relatively easy to access and in economic terms, it is not an expensive way of data collection.

1.1.6 Limitations of the study

It should be noted here that I analyze only some selective aspect of political participation of immigrants in both countries such as voting turnout of immigrant; percentage of representation in parliament and assemblies and finally membership in voluntary association in the Netherlands and Sweden due to the constraint of time and space. This might provide only a partial explanation of this issue, since political participation of immigrants has many indicators like protest of immigrants through strike, rally on the street and so on that might give different results. Another limitation is that I use only two indicators of ‘social capital theory’ to analyze immigrants’ voluntary organizational membership due to real constraint of finding cross-national comparative data on this issue.

In addition, it would be more comprehensive if I could conduct some interviews and collect some first hand data but due to lack of time and funding I had to rely mainly on secondary data. Finally, data availability and space of this study prevent me from going into empirical detail.
1.1.7 Operationalization of the study

Scholars have attempted to understand political participation in terms of immigrants’ individual characteristics and more recently structural and contextual factors determining their location. Here, I choose two main subfields in order to operationalize my study, these are: immigrants’ electoral participation, and voluntary organizational membership. Therefore, indicators of participation include: for electoral participation - turnout among immigrant voters and representation in local and national parliamentary bodies; for organizational participation - membership in voluntary association (religious, community, etc.). I employ these indicators though qualitative and quantitative data analysis to compare institutional constrain and facilities between the Netherlands and Sweden. Therefore, the operationalization of the study will be to focus on three areas: first, to realize the immigration phenomena and incorporation policies of the Netherlands and Sweden to understand and how their policies developed over times. Second, to examine the contextual factors i.e., institutional settings and policies of political parties as providing opportunities and constrains on immigrants’ political participation through methodological individualistic approach as Odlmalm states,

Migration policies and political participation emphasizes the importance of political opportunity structures to shape immigrant collective behavior, and shows how specific types of policies favor certain kinds of immigrant associations and issues over others (2005: 258).

Third, is to analyze actor’s factors i.e., immigrants’ ‘motivations’ and ‘resources’ for political participation. Actor’s motivation entails the employment quantitative and qualitative findings of immigrants’ electoral participation and representation in different parliamentary and municipal level. Similarly, actor’s resources are examined through social capital theory and it entails the employment of voluntary organizational membership of immigrants. Fourth, is to establish a connection between contextual factors and actor’s factors to examine how political parties and institutional settings influence immigrants’ participation in the Netherlands and Sweden. Finally, I evaluate them within the light of immigrants’ incorporation phenomena.
Chapter II

Theoretical Overview

In this chapter, at first I present the theoretical framework to address my research questions and to operationalize the study empirically. Later, I concentrate on the theoretical approaches guiding my study of immigrants' political participation.

2.1 The Methodological Individualistic Approach

I get inspiration from Diaz (1993) to take Esser’s (1980) methodological individualistic approach to analyse the process of incorporation of immigrants into the host society. This approach widely defined as a “doctrine that all social phenomena (their structures and their changes) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals – their property, goals and beliefs” (Elster 1982: 453). In the field of migration sociology, Esser identifies the problem of application of existing sociological theories and therefore, formulates an action-based individualistic approach. The main thesis of his model can be summarized as Diaz highlights,

[the causal factors that determines assimilation/incorporation of immigrants depend on] the actor’s disposition for preferences and qualities which can or cannot facilitate the adjustment to the new social context … on the other hand, the social context’s conditions which also influence the immigrants’ relations to the new social and cultural environments (1993: 64)^2.

In Esser’s original model, ‘probability of attaining integration’ depends on the four actor-variables and three context variables. Diaz modifies Esser’s model as he limits actor-variables into the three: motivations, costs and resources and context variable into two: barriers and opportunities. This model is presented in diagram 1.

2.1.1 The Actor’s factors

In this model, actor’s actions depend on personal factors as motivations and resources which are determined in specific goal situations. Actors’ action specially decided by “the actors information and cognitive-related expectations about the possibilities of attaining certain goals by performing particular actions” (Diaz 1993: 64). Therefore, actor’s model defines the basic hypothesis of actors’ preferences of acting as,

... the more intensive motives for (assimilative) actions oriented to a certain goal situation, the higher subjective expectations, the greater confidence in the action’s goal attainment potential, the lower costs for action; the more the immigrants tend – *ceteris paribus* – to carry out assimilative actions (Esser 1980: 211)\(^3\)

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\(^3\) Cited in Jose Alberto Diaz. 1993.
2.1.2 The contextual factors

In Esser’s model, individual actions are likely to take place within a specific social environment. In this context, opportunities are the necessary pre-conditions that facilitate integration oriented action. On the contrary, barriers do the opposite of opportunities i.e., hinder the integration oriented action of immigrants. Finally, there is a variable ‘action alternative’ that offers ‘individuals certain alternatives of a non-assimilative’ action. In this case, under specific environment, context creates conditions that change individuals’ preference from assimilative action to non-assimilative action (Diaz 1993). Therefore, the contextual-hypothesis of individuals’ action can be defined as,

… the greater the assimilative action opportunities the host society offer, the lower the barrier against assimilative actions, the fewer the non-assimilative; action alternative; the more – ceteris paribus – immigrants tend to carry out assimilative actions (Esser 1980: 211).

However, in this study, I limit actor’s factors into two as motivations and resources and I do not use the variable ‘action alternative’ because in this study it is not needed. In addition, in Esser’s model integration is a dependent variable and contextual and actor’s factors are independent variables. Importantly, I enlarge Esser’s model as motivation, first variable of actor factors, is dependent on contextual factors. According to my modification, actor’s motivation depends on contextual conditions; the more opportunities contextual factors offer, the more motivations created for actor to perform particular action. ‘Resources’ is an independent variable here and I use ‘density of immigrants’ voluntary organizational membership’ as an indicator of it. Therefore, my hypothesis is –the higher participation of immigrant in elections and the higher density of voluntary organization led to the higher integration.
In this paper, I employ this model, to analyze immigrants’ political incorporation in the Netherlands and Sweden. In my cases, contextual factors are political parties and formal institutional settings and actor’s factors are immigrants’ motivation - active electoral participation - and resources - voluntary organizational membership. From the contextual factors side, I analyze how these factors, i.e., mainly political parties, and to a lesser extend formal institutional settings, influence immigrants’ political participation through providing opportunities or barriers. On the other hand, from the actors’ factors side, I will see how motivation, through political party channels, and resources, through voluntary organizational membership, influence individuals’ preferences to act towards incorporation, i.e., active political participation.

2.2 Social capital

Recently, social capital has been viewed as an important theory for explaining immigrants’ political engagement into the host society (see Fennema & Tillie 1999;
Wolleback, D. & P. Selle 2003). The function of social capital theory for analyzing immigrants’ inclusion in the political arena was first introduced by Fennema & Tillie (1999) in the background of immigrants’ political mobilization in the Netherlands and Sweden. They view social capital as a different kind of social involvement and connection of chosen groups of civic community and impact they have on political participation. In the literature, there is an ambiguity about social capital’s definition.

Coleman (1990) defines it as a resource that facilitates actions and it refers to the social connections between people. Similarly, it can be referred both to association as well as attitudes (Fahmy 2004). Likewise, Putman (1993, 167) defines social capital as “features of social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated action”. Therefore, social capital can entails both social structure and the attitudinal dimension. In this study, I employ social capital as a resource which established connection between people.

Organizational connection and membership have often been regarded as one of the important measures of social capital. Here, I will use this theory to analyze how voluntary organizational membership of immigrants gains social capital which effect their political participation into the host society. Van Heelsum (2002) uses four indicators to measure social capital of immigrants, such as, a) number of organization, b) organizational density, c) the percent of isolated organizations, and d) the network density. However, due to unavailability of cross-national data, I use only first two indicators.

2.3 New institutionalism

Scholars of migration research have been paid much attention to new institutionalist theories to analyze immigrants’ incorporation phenomena. Favell (1998), in his famous book, Philosophies of Integration, compares the idea of citizenship between France and Britain within the Institutionalist framework. Ireland (1994), using institutional settings in French and Swiss cities, argues that institutions are the main determinant for ethnic
identity. Similarly, Garbaye (2002) uses Ireland’s ‘institutional channeling’ framework to analyze and compare immigrants’ participation in British and French cities.

New institutionalist analysis emphasize that common institutions are often more than mere arbiters in the decision-making process, and have actually become key players in their own right. According to Armstrong & Bulmer (2000) the definition of institution comprises of formal and informal institutions, conventions, and the norms and symbols embedded in them, and policy instruments and procedures. Institutions structure the access of political forces to the political process, creating a kind of bias. Thus institutional rules, norms, resources or symbols shape actors' behavior. They can themselves develop endogenous institutional impetus for policy change that exceeds mere institutional mediation. Analytically, “institutions rather than social actors influence and control the use and distribution of power in society”⁴. New institutionalist scholars though make a statement that “outcomes of political processes are strictly influenced but not determined by state and societal institutions”, and that “the impulse for change has to come from outside the institutions”⁵.

Therefore, once the institutions are formed, in a while the original founders are likely to loose control of them and they began to act for their own sake. This very much presents an analogy for the Dutch and Swedish political incorporation process. For example, creation of some institutions in both these countries can experience unintended consequences at the end than it was expected at the beginning. The outcomes of policymaking at the institutional level can be quite different with the initial expectations.

Accordingly, scholars of social science use institutional framework to explain how institutions shape the opportunities and constrains to influence immigrants’ political participation as Odmalm notes, “Institutions … do matter in that an institutional approach helps us to explain differences with regards to macro outputs and outcomes as civil and political rights” (2005: 75). New Institutionalism provides useful tools to analyze

⁵ Op cit.,
integration as many scholars have focused ‘political institutions’ for explaining the different national pattern of migration (e.g., Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 1984; Soysal 1994; as well as Joppke 1997). In this paper, I use institutionalism to analyze how institutions offer opportunities and constraints to influence immigrants’ political participation in Sweden and the Netherlands.
3. Historical Overview of immigrants: Pattern of Immigration & Immigration Policies

In this chapter, it has been discussed how Swedish and the Dutch immigration policy has developed over time. In addition, I include this chapter here to give background information of immigrants in these two countries and to see if both countries are in the same stage in formulating their immigration policy.

3.1 Pattern of immigration in Sweden

Sweden was not used to be a country of immigration until first quarter of 20th century. The 1930s can be marked the new start of Sweden as a country of immigration. In this period population flows began to reverse as net immigration sharply increase with the return of the Swedish-Americans who emigrated from Sweden since 19th century (Petersson 1994). During the Second World War, Sweden kept open its border for war-refugees and accepted a huge influx of refugees mainly from Finland, Denmark, Norway and other Baltic countries (Regerinskansliet 2000).

Considering the migrant groups, after post-war period can be characterised by two main categories, refugees and labour migration, where until the early 1970s, most of the immigrants coming to Sweden were labour migrants rather refugees. However, in contrast to other European countries, Sweden never employed a guest worker system. Though, direct specific labour recruitment has always been in place. These migrants have been considered to be permanent in Sweden and they have been seen as individuals rather than commodities (Hammar 1985). After World War II, there was a short of labour in the Swedish labour market and accordingly Sweden initiated a number of bi-lateral agreements to recruit labour from Mediterranean countries. During the sixties labour migrants increased and they were coming from different countries in Europe and the Mediterranean without any agreement. By the 1970 a total of 75,000 people immigrate to Sweden as labour migrants. Importantly, Sweden had an agreement of freedom of
movement between the Nordic countries in 1954 and it resulted in a large number of Finish immigrants (about a half a million) coming to Sweden. Now 200,000 Finish immigrants are living in Sweden and they are the largest number among immigrants in Sweden (Benito 2005).

On the other hand, before the 1930s, there was not any significant number of refugees coming to Sweden. During the 1930s Sweden started to receive Jewish refugees from Germany, though there was a restriction to accept them. After the Second World War, some big groups of refugees came to Sweden. From 1950 to 1989, a total of 176,000 refugees got permanent residence permit in Sweden (Odmalm 2005). However, by the 1991 the policy has changed and half of the applicants get permission to stay in Sweden while before it was about 80 per cent.

Table 1. Foreign born persons in Sweden by region of origin in 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nordic countries</td>
<td>279 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union –other countries</td>
<td>99 357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe – other countries</td>
<td>250 516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Europe</td>
<td>629 033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>62 339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North and Central America</td>
<td>26 040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>54 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>295 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3 405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants outside Europe</td>
<td>386 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>7 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown country</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total immigrants</td>
<td>1 078 075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population in Sweden</td>
<td>8 975 670</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Central Office, 2005

6 The updated figure of immigrants in Sweden has shown in the following paragraph.
As a whole, by the end of 2006, foreign born population comprise 1,175,200 (12.9%) and nearly half a million people 491,996 (5.4%) are foreign citizens. Swedish Statistics have a special category for second generation immigrants, “born in Sweden with both parents born abroad”. If we add this group then the total number of immigrants goes up to 16.7 per cent. Naturalisation rate have been increased sharply since 2000 from 43,474 to 51239 in 2006 (Statistics Sweden 2006).

3.1.2 The evolution of immigration policy in Sweden

Regarding immigration policy, Sweden had invented its own model as Hammar (1991) points out that Swedish model is based on two traditions, 1) there was a legal tradition where immigrants were treated as individuals not commodity and thereby they were assured the civil rights and they can appeal their cases in the highest administrative authority. 2) Sweden always placing their interest first when ‘scope of immigration’ comes into account.

After the Second World War, Sweden revised its immigration policy and eventually assimilationist ideology has been replaced by multiculturalism (Diaz 1993). The development of Swedish migration policy has gone through into some distinctive changes which can be characterised into four separate periods as Dias (1993) points, 1) Guest-worker policy conception, 2) assimilation debate, 3) Multiculturalism and 4) crisis of multiculturalism.

Firstly, guest-worker policy conception (1964-74), is not an explicit policy program but it’s a conception that is used by the government policy maker in that period. The main thesis of this idea is to clarify that guest-worker phenomenon is purely a temporary nature and they will leave Sweden upon completion their work. The intension of Swedish government was to supply the manpower to the Swedish industries in order to maintain the economic growth as Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander pointed during his visit to Finland,
It is probable that we have been a little clumsy about making ourselves available of the valuable addition of manpower that has come from Finland and other countries. Initially, we believed that this was a purely temporary occurrence. We must now attempt to handle the immigrants not only as additional manpower but also as a permanent element in Swedish society (quoted in Schwarz 1971: 15-16).

Secondly, at the beginning of the 1960s, Swedish economy went through a crisis period and anti-immigrant feeling grew up. Therefore, immigrant regulation and assimilation debate came into forefront. The government policy-makers and researchers engaged in this debate. With the new governmental bill of late 1960s the foundation of ‘Swedish model’ mapped (Schwarz 1971). However, pro-assimilationist view got a strong support from the ‘important member of political establishment’ (Diaz 1993).

Thirdly, the most important step towards migration policy in Sweden was taken in 1968 when government appointed a parliamentary commission on immigrant policy and upon their report Sweden adopted multiculturalism policy. According this multiculturalism policy, it is suggested that the ‘cultural rights’ of immigrants should be granted, educational training other schooling should be conducted in their own language, and most importantly, immigrant’s participatory role in politics should be supported and promoted (Widgren 1982).

Finally, the crises of multiculturalism precipitated in Sweden in recent years due to financial constraints with growing demand to meet welfare needs and preserving immigrants’ cultural identity’. Sverker Åström, a retired government official, wrote an article in a Swedish newspaper in 1990 where the crisis of multiculturalism explicitly evident as Diaz (1993: 35) notes,

The implication of this proposition [Sverker Åström’s view] for immigration policy was simple: those who are not able to be assimilated into Swedish customs and life conditions, should not be allowed to emigrate to Sweden. This statement is quite the opposite of the basic idea of the multiculturalism doctrine, namely respect for co-existence and understanding between individuals of different cultural and ethnic background.
As discussed above, the Swedish migration policies have gone through from some distinctive ideological changes and they are guided by previous experience and historical legacies that lead them towards a new path of policy formation. At the beginning, immigrants, in form of guest-workers have seen as a temporary phenomenon and later having problem from immigrants, governmental institutions have been engaging to formulate new policies to assimilate them into the Swedish society. In this way, multiculturalism ideology have been dominating Swedish immigrant trend for a long time and Swedish model became a symbol of multiculturalist society, albeit, recently it has been criticized by the policy makers and researchers.

### 3.2 Pattern of Immigration in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, one out of six persons belongs to the immigrants category if ‘second generation migrants’ takes into account. But it was not the case until 1961, like Sweden the Netherlands had a negative migratory balance as net emigration exceeded net immigration. Many Dutch migrate to Canada and Australia after the Second World War. As a former colonial power, the Netherlands has received a large number of immigrants from its previous colonies. The first group came from Molucca, who were former employees in the Dutch army and were dismissed from army and had also become stateless in the wake of independence (Smeets and Veenman 2000). In terms of number, the most immigrants came from Suriname. The Dutch government started to dismantle its colonial territories in 1954 and many took this opportunity to migrate to the Netherlands before proper independence was introduced to those territories in 1975 (Thränhardt 2000). The third migrant groups come from Dutch Antilles. Their large scale migration is relatively recent and one estimate says that upon their arrival the number of Antillean and Aruban population increased in the Netherlands from 34,000 in 1984 to over 90,000 in 1992 (Odmalm 2005).

The second category of immigrants come to the Netherlands were ‘guest worker’. Like Sweden, the Netherlands was late to recruit labour migrants compared to other West-
European countries and they come mainly from the Mediterranean (Southern Europe, Turkey and Morocco). The Netherlands signed a number of bi-lateral labour recruitment agreement with Italy (1960), Spain (1961), Portugal (1963), Turkey (1964), Greece (1966), Morocco (1969), Yugoslavia and Tunisia (1970) to meet the labour shortage problem in the post-war period. However, “in contrast to Sweden, these labours were considered to solve temporary labour shortages and were expected to return after their contract expired” (Odmalm 2005: 37). By the 1967, around 75,000 people came to the Netherlands in this category. In the early 1970s, The Netherlands tighten the labour migrates recruiting to control these flows. Nonetheless, migration flows continued to increase and it was mainly for family reunification.

Finally, the third category was the refugees, and mainly they were post-war political refugees, though the number was rather low comparing to Sweden (Entzinger 1985). From 1945 to 1969, 13,000 refugees were admitted while half of them had returned by 1969. Between 1965 and 2001, the 1965 Aliens Act regulated Dutch asylum policy and the Dutch government has been imposing regulatory measures to control the refugee flows as Odmalm points, “Dutch policy with respect to refugees and asylum-seekers has been significantly stricter compared to the more liberal Swedish policy” (2005: 38).

Table 2. Population by nationality in the Netherlands, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>15,676,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU countries (exd. Dutch nationals)</td>
<td>244,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe total (exd. Dutch nationals)</td>
<td>365,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>73,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>40,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>108,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total nationalities</td>
<td>16,357,992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Netherlands, 2007
In terms of number, immigrant population in the Netherlands amounted 3,170,406 which include both first and second generation immigrants as well as naturalised immigrants (Statistics Netherlands 2007). By the 2007 total population statistics in the Netherlands shown in table 2,

3.2.1 The evolution of immigration policy in the Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the number of immigrants has been growing rapidly since the 1970s despite official resistance of acknowledging the Netherlands as a country of immigration. However, until the 1970s there were few immigration regulations in effect since it was supposed that all immigrants would stay in the Netherlands for a temporary basis (Entzinger 1985). The Dutch immigration policy evolution can be distinguished in three distinctive periods as, 1) labour migration, 2) integration and multiculturalism, 3) crisis of multiculturalism.

Firstly, during the early 1970s, the Dutch government maintained an idea that the labour migration is only a temporary phenomenon, upon completion of their work and meet the short-term labour shortage; they will leave the Netherlands (ter Wal 2005). The intention of the Dutch government was clear that labour migrants only fill the gap between labor shortage and industrial needs and consequently, no specific immigration regulation was needed.

Secondly, by the mid 1970s, a number of incidents\(^7\) changed the immigration phenomenon. These violent incidents helped to shift in the official view of temporary migration. The 1979 report by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) recommended that temporary migration strategy should be replaced by the integration policy. This report led to the introduction of a new minority policy which became a Minority bill in 1983 (Odmalm 2005). This law established the Dutch way of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. The main focus areas of this policy were,

\(^7\) The hi-jacking of trains by Moluccan youths, arson attacks on Turkish dwellings.
stability of residency after five years; enlarged participation including easier naturalisation and voting rights for legally residents foreigners in local elections; special programmes for underprivileged minorities such as assistance for self-organization and representation for various groups; and the fight against racism and discrimination (Odmalm 2005: 39-40).

Consequently of this multiculturalism policy, migrant organizations emerged an important player in the Dutch political arena. Since they have been given the rights to preserve their culture and identity and form their organization and most importantly the rights to vote in local elections.

Thirdly, in the 1990s, the perceived failure of ethnic minority policy in the Netherlands directed to a more assimilationist path that replaced partly the multiculturalist ideas (ter Wal 2005). The 1989 WRR report change the term ‘ethnic minority’ with ‘allochtonen (people with non-Dutch origin). According to this new philosophy, the Dutch government introduced some compulsory course on Dutch language, culture and society for new immigrants.

To sum up, post-colonial ties and labour recruitment agreement structured post-war Dutch migration policy path. After the Second World War, attempts were made to close the door for labour migration, but immigration continued and the Dutch government had to cope with it and had to formulate new regulatory measures to control the migration and to integrate them into the Dutch society. As follows, like Sweden, temporary labour migration philosophy changed by multiculturalism ideas and later some assimilationist views shaped the form of Dutch way of multiculturalism.

Chapter IV
4. Political Participation of Immigrants: Contextual Factors

4.1 Formal institutional settings: opportunities or barriers

   a) Sweden

In Sweden, three areas can also be distinguished in institutional settings for immigrants’ political participation, 1) specific settings for participation in political voting, 2) migrant advisory and consultative structure and 3) the funding of migrant organizations.

Firstly, Sweden is one of the pioneer countries who have granted voting rights for immigrants in 1976 for those who have been living in Sweden for more than three years. In municipal elections, immigrants can vote and to be voted but in the national level it is restricted only for them who have Swedish citizenship. On the other hand, the Swedish constitution assures equal right and treatment for everybody regardless of religion, colour, or race. It means that everybody including immigrants has the same right as native Swedish to vote or run for the public offices and they can organize and establish their own associations. There is no need for registration to start an organization for any purpose. Similarly, the Swedish constitution guarantees freedom of speech and right to demonstration for any purpose. Therefore, formal institutional settings in Sweden give opportunity to immigrants and non-nationals to vote or to be elected either in national or municipal elections.

Secondly, according to the Swedish constitution, immigrants can set up their own civic association, as mentioned above, including religious and cultural organisation and they are supported by the state and local municipalities. Several advisory boards have been working in Sweden since 1970s to help immigrant organization through local municipalities. The first municipal immigrants’ service was established in Stockholm in 1966. Some municipalities established ‘immigrant council’ to have dialog with immigrant organization. However, ‘immigrant council’ has not the same status in all
municipalities, there is a big variation, some has consultative power while the other are working as ‘umbrella organization’ dealing migrants’ wellbeing with municipalities (Benito 2005). A new immigrant integration policy was adopted in Swedish parliament in 1997, as a consequence, municipalities started to establish integration bodies instead of immigrant services.

On the other hand, advisory committees for immigrant organizations are working both in the national and local levels in Sweden. However, the problem is that immigrant organizations have to depend on ‘the willingness of municipalities’ in the local level to promote migrant interests and another problem is a huge amount of migrant organizations as Benito (2005: 24) states,

> [Advisory committees in the local levels] have not succeeded in creating a platform for immigrant participation due to the big amount of immigrant organisations. Still, there has been a dialogue with the immigrant population and their representatives through meetings aimed at specific municipal questions.

Finally, according to the Swedish anti-discrimination law and equality right of the constitution, most of the immigrant organizations are financially supported by the state and local municipalities. Especially, cultural organizations get significant governmental support since the new law adopted in the parliament in 2000. This support comes through the National Cultural Board. During the 1970s and 80s it was huge, however, nowadays it has been less or sifted to another direction (Dahlstedt 2005).

To sum up, as we have discussed, the institutional settings for immigrant political participation in Sweden have been evolved according to their immigration and integration policy. Officially, there is no restriction for immigrant and non-nationals to vote and to be elected upon fulfilment of the prerequisites. Similarly, immigrants can establish their own civic association and get governmental support through different institutional settings. However, in some areas, there is a gap in active cooperation between governmental institutions and migrant organizations in the way that migrant organizations profile themselves.
b) The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, like Sweden, three areas can be distinguished in institutional settings for immigrant political participation, 1) specific settings for participation in political voting, 2) Dutch migrant advisory and consultative structure and 3) the funding of migrant organizations.

First of all, for the first time it was possible for non-nationals to vote and to stand for vote in municipal election in 1985 after changing the Dutch constitution in 1983. However, the condition was to reside legally in the municipality for the preceding five years. But in national and provincial elections, only Dutch citizens and naturalized immigrants can vote and stand for vote. Asylum-seekers have no right to vote in either national or municipal elections but ‘accepted refugees’ without Dutch nationality can vote like non-nationals (Jacobs 1998).

On the other hand, according to the Dutch constitutions, everybody should get equal treatment regardless of “the ground of religion, belief, political opinion, race or sex or on any other grounds whatsoever”8. This implies that everybody including immigrants has the same right as native Dutch citizens to vote or run for the public offices and they can organize or create their own associations. The Dutch constitution also guarantees freedom of speech and of demonstration regardless of race or colour. Therefore, formal institutional settings give opportunity to immigrants and non-nationals to vote or to be voted either in national or municipal elections and they can organize their own associations.

Secondly, during the 1980s, the Dutch government encouraged immigrants to establish their own associations in that somebody can consult with them. It resulted,

in a representation of interests of specific ethnic groups as well as umbrella organisations …The consultation culture of the 1980s implied that if local authorities based their policy for migrants in the welfare department, then migrant organisations in order to obtain subsidies had to cooperate

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8 The Dutch Constitutions, Article 1. 1983.
with welfare organisations, even when their basis was perhaps more sensitive to issues formulated in concrete terms of housing, employment and social affairs. (ter Wal 2005: 15).

During the 1990s, different kinds of migrant consultative organizations worked. The Dutch policy was to relate migrants’ organization with the local welfare department, thus migrants’ organization had to cooperate with them in order to get subsidies from the welfare institutions. Similarly, several migrant advisory boards established in various large cities in order to help migrant organizations. However, migrant organizations are not fully involved in decision-making process rather they offer their advice to the advisory boards for wellbeing of immigrants population. In addition, advisory boards are always trying to maintain their control over public institutions and migrant organization. As a result, migrant organizations do have limited influence on them. Therefore, there is a tension between migrant organizations and different advisory boards to establish fruitful cooperation among them as van Heelsum & Pennix (1999) points,

Immigrant organisations often hold quite different views on this strict division of tasks. They often aspire to supply their community with broader services than only religious or cultural activities. Against the claim of professionals of these general institutions (endorsed politically by the district authorities) they claim that they have knowledge of and networks in their communities that enable them to solve for example problems with groups of problematic youngsters much better than the public youth centers do. They claim to understand their problems and they mistrust the “Dutch” way of treating for instance youth issues.

Finally, according to the Dutch constitution’s Article 1, as mentioned earlier, everybody has the same right to access and set up civic organization and according to the Dutch policy, upon maintaining the educational facilities, all organization, including religious orientations, get financial support from the Dutch system. Similarly, other kinds of organizations such as sports and cultural organizations get governmental subsidies as stimulation. Recently, the Dutch policy conviction emphasizes on ‘integration’ of immigrants through funding of the self-organization (ter Wal 2005). Consequently, in order to get funds immigrant organization should be carried out by together migrants and

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9 In the Dutch system, state does not finance religious organization because of the separation of Church and State.
native Dutch. Therefore, it becomes little complicated for migrant organizations to perform actively since this is an obvious constraint for them in the way that they profile themselves.

To sum up, immigrants in the Netherlands have almost the same right as Swedish immigrants have. According to the Dutch constitution everybody, including immigrants, has the same right of equality in all spheres of life. They can vote in the national and local level and can run for public offices, except foreign citizen can vote and to be elected in municipal elections, like Sweden. However, there is a tension between governmental institutions and migrant organizations to control over decision making process and the way that migrant organizations want to profile themselves.

4.2 Political parties: facilitator or constrainer

a) Sweden

Sweden has been known as a country remarkably homogeneous in culture, language and religion. Consequently, its political party system has been extremely stable. The five parties, two socialist and three non-socialists, have been represented in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament) since 1932 (Hammar 1991). However, two new parties, The Green and Christian Democrats, have emerged in the political arena in the last thirty years. Importantly, therefore, Swedish political parties clearly belong to two different class cleavage as Odmalm (2005:103) points,

Initially, the political parties displayed slightly different internal structure. The left-oriented parties by and large emanated from labour movement and were thus structured as large collective organisations, while the conservative bloc more resembled regular parliamentary groupings.

One significant characteristics of Swedish party system is that Swedish political parties get governmental monetary support depending on the number of seats in the parliament or getting more than 2.5 percent of votes in the national election. Therefore, they do not have to rely on the private donations. This system has important impact of formation of party agenda and adopting party policy. Similarly, it supports “the well-established
parties over newcomers and could potentially serve as an additional barrier-threshold for new competitors” (Odmalm 2005:104).

As mention above, the five parties have dominated the Swedish politics since 1932. Among them, the country's largest political party, Social Democratic Party (SAP), has dominated the Swedish politics for most of the last century. Founded in 1888, SAP has long advocated the benefits of a market economy, combined with support for a strong trade union movement and the development of welfare state, albeit initially it had strong Marxist ideology. In the 1990s the prime minister and party leader, Goran Persson, favoring economic pragmatism over ideology, as a consequence, party’s support fell sharply in the 1998 election. Since 2000 the SAP has tended to advocate less austere policies, which is one of the reasons why the party recovered in 2002. Following its historic defeat at the 2006 election, however, the party faces a period of self-reflection.

Table 3. General election results in Sweden
(\% of votes cast unless otherwise indicated)

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Party</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre Party</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal People's Party</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (%)</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>82.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Traditionally, parties in Sweden represent different social class as pointed above. Therefore, political space has been evolving around class based issues. Class interest always dominates party’s policy agenda. The SAP is no exception to this rule. As a consequence, in order to influence the decision making process, immigrants have to
belong any of the social or working classes. For instance, in SAP “… decisions have to be anchored in one of the party’s many sub-branches such as the labour union or labour communes. The situation experienced by the many immigrants is that they are not perceived to be representing any social class or organisation” (Odmalm 2005: 203). However, SAP has been trying to establish effective link with the different migrant organization in that they succeed in achieving migrant vote. Consequently, they have been recognized as the most immigrant favoured political party and got most of the immigrant votes (Widgren 1992). Correspondingly, we have seen this claim in SAP’s Statement, “over the last years the party has more or less taken the migrant groups for granted … during the 60s and 70s a lot of them were labourers and it was natural that the trade unions incorporated them and then Social democracy came in, so they became Socialdemocrats” (Quoted in Odmalm 2005). In the election of 2006, the SAP has failed to promote immigrant issues, to some extent, in the election campaign (The local, 2006). Therefore, their strategies could not give proper impetus to immigrants to take part in the election.

On the other hand, since 1979 the Moderate Party has been the second-largest political party in Sweden. The Moderates' election result in 2006 was its best performance since 1928, the best post-war result of any party except the SAP, and the largest gain (in terms of share of the vote compared with the previous election) of any party in Swedish political history. The Moderates are considered the most right-leaning of those currently represented in parliament. To gain immigrant votes, the conservative Moderate party explicitly made attempt in 1999 in their general congress suggested that immigrants are exploited by the ‘social democratic’ type of social welfare system, thus they should be facilitated in the labour market.

The third largest party in Sweden, the Liberal People’s Party (Folkpartiet), who advocates social liberalism and belongs to the centre-right bloc alliance, has achieved majority in 2006’s parliament election with three other alliance parties. Usually, it has been strongly supported by the middle-class voters. The party has historically been the most pro-immigrant political party in Sweden, however, since 2000, the party has been accused of
trying to attract new voters by adopting right-wing populist rhetoric, specially, anti-immigrant attitude in their political agenda. For instance, Party leader Lars Leijonborg proposed a language test for immigrants who wish to have Swedish citizenship. Similarly, “in February 2005 the integration group of the People’s Party proposed that immigrants who get two or more years of imprisonment shall be expelled from the country” (Benito 2005: 38). Like wise, in the elections of 2002 they proposed that immigrants who wanted to become Swedish citizens should prove that they can speak Swedish. This strategy might help them to gain strong support over the native Swedish voters and consequently they got more than double vote in the 2002 elections (13.3 %) and became the third largest party in Sweden. This per cent is twice as high as the parties result in 1998 parliament election (Statistics Sweden 2007).

In recent years the leading far-right anti-immigrant party in Sweden, the Sweden Democrats, has succeeded in doubling their support in the Swedish parliament election in 2006 than the previous election in 2002. They won dozens of seats in local municipal elections, although it failed to achieve the required 4% of the vote necessary for parliamentary representation at the 2006 general election. It took more than 10% of the vote in a number of municipalities. Therefore, from this trend, it can be predicted that Far-right groups will continue to exploit voters' growing hostility about immigrants and focus on anti-immigrant populism rather than traditional party politics. Similarly, a number of new "special interest" parties have emerged over recent years. They polled a combined 5.7% of the vote in the 2006 general election, but none gained representation in parliament. The largest of these parties is the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats, which received almost 3%, more than double its support from 2002 and got more 170 municipal seats. This entitled the party to receive state subsidies, and it made substantial gains in local and regional elections.

To sum up, traditionally, political parties play a crucial role to influence immigrants’ political participation through adopting significant policy agenda. As we have seen, political parties in Sweden, who have been regarded most favourable for immigrants, like SAP gradually losing its support over the Swedish voters, while anti-immigrant parties,
like Sweden Democrats is rising sharply (see table 3). This trend indicates that the characteristic of political parties in Sweden is changing. One significant relation, between this trend and immigrants’ electoral participation, we may notice here that immigrants’ votes are also decreasing (see graph 1).

Graph 1. Participation among foreign citizens in Sweden in the election to the Municipal Councils 1976-2006 by sex (Voters in percentage of those entitled to vote)

Source: Statistics Sweden. www.scb.se

Of course, SAP and other pro-immigrant parties have lost the election of 2006 by the votes of majority of native Swedish voters. But my intention is to indicate to the relation that pro-immigrant parties could not succeed to offer proper opportunities for immigrants, whilst anti-immigrant parties provided certain kind of barriers and thereby achieve popular support in general elections. This argument led us to this logical conclusion that lack of proper opportunities and intense of barriers from political parties influenced immigrants’ electoral participation in Sweden, at least to some extent. However, I will enlarge this argument in chapter VII.

b) The Netherlands

The political life in the Netherlands has not been that stable as that of Sweden. Unlike Sweden, numerous political parties have dominating the political sphere in the Netherlands and with few exceptions no one party ever gets absolute majority. Therefore, several parties must cooperate to form a coalition government. In 2002, a radical right
wing anti-immigrant party, Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), emerged in the political arena and got 26 seats in the Netherlands’ second chamber Tweede Kamer. However, in 2003 they got only 8 seats and in 2006 election, they didn’t get any seats.

Traditionally, in the Netherlands political discourses have been evolving around class and religious based issues (Odmalm 2005). As we have seen that Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and Labour Party (PvdA) are the two most dominating parties in the Netherlands (see table 4). The Netherlands has a multi-party system and they follow ‘proportional representation’ method in the Second Chamber since 1933 (Andeweg and Irwin 1993). The threshold is 1/150 of the total number of valid vote.

Table 4: The Dutch Second Chamber Election Results

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>29 - 18.3</td>
<td>43 - 27.9</td>
<td>44 – 28.6</td>
<td>41 – 26.5</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PvdA</td>
<td>45 - 29.0</td>
<td>23 - 15.1</td>
<td>42 – 27.3</td>
<td>33 – 21.2</td>
<td>-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>5 - 3.5</td>
<td>9 - 5.9</td>
<td>9 – 6.3</td>
<td>25 – 16.6</td>
<td>+16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVD</td>
<td>38 - 24.7</td>
<td>24 - 15.5</td>
<td>28- 17.9</td>
<td>22- 14.6</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9 - 5.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GL</td>
<td>11 - 7.3</td>
<td>10 - 7.0</td>
<td>8- 5.1</td>
<td>7 – 4.6</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D’66</td>
<td>14 - 9.0</td>
<td>7 - 5.1</td>
<td>6 – 4.1</td>
<td>3 – 2.0</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CU</td>
<td>5 - 3.3</td>
<td>4 - 2.5</td>
<td>3 – 2.1</td>
<td>6- 4.0</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGP</td>
<td>2 - 1.7</td>
<td>3 - 1.8</td>
<td>2 – 1.6</td>
<td>2 – 1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPF/ Fortuyn</td>
<td>-- - --</td>
<td>26- 17.0</td>
<td>8 – 5.7</td>
<td>-- - --</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Collected from different election results in the Netherlands.

Note: Total seats 150, Votes in per cent

As mentioned earlier, the trend of making immigrant policies in the Netherlands has evolved from multiculturalism to assimilation and accordingly political parties have been engaged significantly in political discourse about immigrant integration issues. However, in the 1980s political parties came to an agreement that they resolve immigrant issues through ‘technocratic compromise’ instead of not raising in the political agenda (Rath 2001), while it became a top political issue in 1990s (Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2005). During the 1990s, immigration and asylum issues including Islam and minority matters came to the forefront of political debate and the media paid much attention than in the 1980s. Recently, political parties are like liberal right-wing VVD and others criticising immigrant policy and considered that immigrants are ‘welfare abusers’ (Guiraudon et al., 2005).

The Dutch political sphere dominated by class and more so on religious cleavages. Therefore, political parties and other voluntary organizations are organised along ‘religious and ideological’ lines (Odmalm 2005). The dominant political party in the Netherlands is Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), who belongs to the religious cleavages and promotes Christian ideologies. On the other hand, two other major parties, Labour Party (PvdA) and Liberal Conservative party (VVD) are class based parties and consequently, endorse class interest in their political agenda. The other major political parties in the Netherlands, who are currently represented in the Dutch Second Chamber are, Socialist Party (SP), Green Party [Groen Links] (GL) and Democrats ’66 (D’66).

Since the Second World War, the CDA has been the major political party in the Netherlands. It concentrated on shared norms and values, openly advocated for religion and encouraged active individual involvement in the community. Philosophically, it stands between of the VVD and PvdA. Despite its Christian ideologies, the CDA has Jewish, Hindu and Muslim members in the parliament and it advocates the integration of Muslim immigrants into the Dutch culture and oppose Radical Islam (Bruff 2003). In
2006 parliamentary election, the CDA won 41 seats and currently is the biggest of three party coalition governments.

On the other hand, since the 2003 election PvdA is the second largest political party in the Netherlands. It promotes greater social, political and economic equality for all citizens. Regarding immigration issue, the party advocates the equal treatment for all citizens including immigrants and thereby regarded as the most favoured immigrant political party. For instance, in 1983, when the Ministry of Justice decided to impose restriction to family unification, PvdA along with GL, SP and D’66 strongly opposed this new law in arguing that it will undermine the principle of equality of all citizens (Bruquetas-Callejo et, el., 2005). In 2006 election PvdA won 33 seats and became the second largest party in the Parliament and currently is one of the coalition partners in the fourth Balkenende\textsuperscript{10} cabinet.

The two other dominating political parties in the Dutch political arena are Liberal Conservative party (VVD) and Socialist Party (SP). The former belongs to the right block of political spectrum while the later being in the left side. On immigration issues, the VVD advocates of guaranty of equal treatment which, they believe, will ensure “equal access and chances, and reduce the need for government invention in the integration process” (Keeney-Nana 2007) while the SP focuses on the promotion of democratic values and reduction of minority segregation. In 2006 election, SP and VVD won 25 and 22 seats respectively.

Some far right anti-immigrant political parties have emerged recently in the Netherlands, such as the Party for Freedom (PVV), who split off from VVD in 2004 and won 9 seats in the 2006 general election, making it the fifth largest party in the parliament and third largest opposition party. On immigration issues, the party believes that the Dutch culture should be the dominant culture in the Netherlands and immigrant should adopt accordingly. The party wants to halt immigration from non-western countries.

\textsuperscript{10} The leader of Christian Democratic Appeal party and Current Prime Minister in the Netherlands.
In 2002, a significant change occurred in the Dutch political arena when a radical anti-immigrant party, Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), emerged under the leadership of populist politician Pim Fortuyn. He placed for ‘zero migration’ claiming that ‘the Netherlands was full’ and called for ‘a cold war against Islam’ (Bruquetas-Callejo et, el., 2005). In spite of his assassination before the parliamentary election in 2002, LPF won a landslide victory and got 26 seats in the Second Chamber and became the second largest party in the parliament. “This success changed the political discourse on immigration and integration radically. In fact, the aftermath of the Fortuyn victory compelled most parties to adapt their discourse on these issues” (Bruquetas-Callejo et, el., 2005: 19). However, LPF won only 8 seats in the 2003 election and no seats in the 2006 election. It implies that radical anti-immigrant parties have lost their position among the general voters in the Netherlands.

**Partial Conclusion**

As I have discussed above, contextual factors, political parties and institutions provide certain kinds of constraints and opportunities for political participation of immigrant in the Netherlands and Sweden. Political parties in both these countries clearly belong to two different ideological cleavages, class and religion, as political discourses have been evolving around class and religious based issues (Odmalm 2005). In Sweden, the dominant cleavage has been the class based interest while it has been religion in the Netherlands. Therefore, the threshold for political participation of immigrants in Sweden has been belonging to the particular classes, such as labour or interest groups. On the other hand, in the Netherlands it has been related to mostly with religion. Since World War II, two parties have dominated Swedish politics, Social Democratic Party (SAP) and Moderate party (MP), where SAP regarded as favouring immigrant issues while MP is more restrict on this matter. In the 2006 general election, SAP lost its 30 years majority in the parliament and with the Moderate Party’s leadership, a coalition of four parties who belong to the same political ideological platform as MP, formed the government.
On the other hand, the Dutch case shows the opposite of Sweden. Far right anti-immigrant parties lost the majority seats in the parliamentary election of 2006 and with leadership of Christian Democratic Appeal Party, a moderate right wing party which belongs to the middle on the immigration issues; three parties’ coalition formed the government. Most significantly, the most pro-immigrant political party in the Netherlands, the Labour Party (PvdA) won 33 seats and joined in the coalition government.

Another important aspect is related here that the rising and falling of radical anti-immigrant parties in the political arena. In Sweden, the anti-immigrant parties such as, the Sweden Democrats, has succeeded in doubling their support in the Swedish parliament election in 2006 than the previous election in 2002 while in the Netherlands, the most anti-immigrant party, Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), lost its support among the voters and they could not win any sit in the parliamentary election in 2006.

On her notable studies, Ivarsflaten (2006) examines the rise of anti-immigrant parties and their apparent fail to gain popular support in the general election in Western Europe since 1980s. Here, she includes 40 anti-immigrant parties in sixteen Western European countries, who gain support in the political arena through using anti-immigrant sentiment and adopting restrictive immigration policy during 1980-2005 periods.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Rise</th>
<th>Immigration Policy Score</th>
<th>Immigration Central</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Centrumpartij'86/Nationale Volkspartij Nederlandse Volksunie Lijst Pim Fortuyn Centrumdemokraten</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Ny Demokrati Sverigedemokraterna Det Nya Partiet Nasjonaldemokraterna</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. The parties selected for this study received a score of 9 or above on the 10-point scale measured by the restrictiveness of immigration policies.
2. Immigration Central implies that who has adopted anti-immigrant statement in their party agenda.

Here, we see that Swedish anti-immigrant parties are moderately ahead in ‘Immigration Policy Score’ than their Dutch counter parts, while in the ‘Immigration Central’ they score almost the same. Therefore, it can be inferred from the above analysis that different policies and strategies of political parties in both countries regarding immigrant issues serve different opportunity for political participation of immigrants.

To sum up, the first contextual factor, the institutional set up for immigrants’ political participation is almost the same in both Sweden and the Netherlands and they offer almost the same opportunities and barriers to immigrants. However, the second contextual factor, political parties in the Netherlands offer better opportunities and the fewer constraints, while political parties in Sweden do the opposite i.e., fewer opportunities and intense barriers for political participation of immigrants.
Chapter V

5. Immigrants’ Political Participation: Actor’s Factors

In this chapter, I will analyze immigrants’ political participation and explain how political parties and formal institutions shape individuals’ preference as participating in election through actor’s factors as motivations and resources which are determined in specific goal situations.

5.1 Motivation: electoral participation & representations of immigrants- through institutional channels

a) Sweden

Despite the fact that Sweden is regarded as one of the best models which gives equal right to its immigrants for participating in civil life, scholars have identified a significant gap between the promise of political equality and levels of political participation and influence on Swedish politics (Hammar 1990). Several studies have emphasized the under-representation of ‘immigrants’ in various institutions including political parties, and their low level of political participation (Batsleer & Humphries 2000; Dahlstedt 2005). According to these studies, not everyone gets the same opportunities to take active part in the Swedish politics. Visible and invisible barriers of different kinds appear to make it difficult for immigrants to participate in Swedish politics on equal terms.

Table 6. Election to the Riksdag in 2006. Foreign-born persons: those elected by party and year of latest immigration (number of persons).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years of latest immigration</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m</td>
<td>c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 1967</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968 - 1975</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976 - 1985</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 - 1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 -</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definitions
m=The Moderate Party, c=The Centre Party, fp=The Liberal Party, kd=The Christian Democratic Party, mp=The Green Party, s=The Social Democratic Party, v=The Left Party

From table 6, we see that the highest number of foreign-born citizens elected in the 2006 parliamentary election by the Social Democratic Party (9 candidates) while none has been elected by the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. The total number of foreign-born person elected is 17. However, in 2002 election it was 25 out of 349 parliamentarians.

In the local level, in some municipalities, immigrants have achieved high level of proportional representation, although there is the opposite picture in some municipalities as well. On the other hand, some groups of immigrants are better represented than others depending on what resources behind are them. For instance, one survey shows that in Gothenburg municipality, Iranian and Latin Americans are the highest representative groups among other immigrants (Benito 2005). In 2005, there were six ministers from both first and second generation immigrants in the Swedish government and in 2004’s European Parliament election, one member and six deputy members were elected from immigrants groups (Benito 2005). However, foreign nationals’ influence on the local and national politics has been very low and consequently, their representation in the local level has been also very minimal.

In the same vain, researchers have emphasized on the low level of political participation of immigrants in Sweden. There is a general political trend in society towards reduced levels of confidence in political representatives and established forms of politics. It is more so about immigrants. Between 1976 and 2002, levels of immigrants’ participation in local elections have fallen from 60 to 35 percent, as compared with a reduction from 90 to 78 percent as a whole (Dahlstedt 2005).

Table 7. Participation of Swedish and foreign citizens in the municipal elections 1976-2002
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Swedish %</th>
<th>Foreigners %</th>
<th>Difference %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>-32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>89.0</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>-39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>-41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>-45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>-46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>-44.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Central Office. Internet: www.scb.se.

Table 8. Participation of foreign citizens in the municipal elections of Sweden in 2002
(some selected countries of origin and in percent of electors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>foreign citizens</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain and North Ireland</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From above these tables, we see that electoral participation of immigrants is gradually declining. Table 7 shows that voting percentage of immigrants in municipal elections have declined from 59.9% to 34.4% between 1976 and 2002. In table 8, we see that different immigrant groups have different level of participation, among them Yugoslavian had the lowest rate of participation (15.8%) and the highest rate were
among German immigrants 47.2%. However, in general, compared to Swedish native citizen this rate is significantly lower. Finally, graph 1 shows the general declining trend of electoral participation of immigrants in Sweden (see page 37).

Here, I follow this argument that, lack of opportunity and intense of barrier create lack of motivation and lack of motivation led to lower rate of electoral participation or vis-à-vis. According to (Bhavnani 1990), not voting or low level of voting may express a kind of opposition, however it is silent and unorganized. The choice not to make use of one’s right to vote might convey an important message that is lack of individuals’ motivation or cost-benefit calculation in participating election. In the previous section, we have discussed that anti-immigrant political parties have gain the support in general elections in Sweden. Their political campaign and policies were not favorable for immigrants, for instance, People’s Party leader Lars Leijonborg proposed a language test for immigrants who wish to have Swedish citizenship and similarly in 2005 they proposed that “immigrants who get two or more years of imprisonment shall be expelled from the country” (Benito 2005: 38). This strategy could help them to gain strong support and consequently they got more than double vote in the 2002 elections. Similarly, while the conservatives and the popular party are campaigning for labour immigration again, the other parties are still restrictive and want to accept only refugee immigration and relatives. Consequently, this kind of policy and campaign could hinder immigrants’ motivation to participate in election.

On the other hand, the images of immigrants among political party’s supporter are declining. According to the electoral survey from Gothenburg University in 2004, 50 per cent of Swedes want a more restrictive immigration policy while only 24 per opposes this idea. Most strikingly, the supporter of the Green party, one of the most pro-immigrant parties in Sweden, changed their view and 35 per cent now want tighter control over immigration. About accepting refugees, 63 and 49 per cent of Moderate Party and Social Democratic Party supporters want fewer refugees in Sweden, respectively (The Local, 2004). Logically, the views of party supporter reflect in their political parties’ strategy and policies. Therefore, it can be inferred that immigrants did not get enough motivation
through party channels to participate actively in elections as Bäck and Soininen (1998: 46) note,

The political parties and their affiliated organizations naturally play a direct role in the political system where party organizations, the electoral system, and representative democracy are of central importance … It is especially thought provoking that the political parties present such barriers to immigrants. A native Swedish citizen is three times more likely than a resident alien and twice as likely as a second generation immigrant to be a party member.

b) The Netherlands

As mentioned above, the Netherlands has granted voting rights of non-nationals in municipal election since 1985. However, naturalised immigrants can vote both in national and municipal elections. Scholars have paid much attention to explore the trend of immigrant electoral participation and representations in the Netherlands and its relative impact on their integration (see Heelsum 2005; ter Wal 5005; Rath 2001; van Heelsum & Penninx 1999; Fennema, M. & J. Tillie. 1999). Although, in national level, immigrants’ voting turn out is declining, in some municipalities immigrants have achieved almost proportional representation and even in some cities their number is increasing comparing to native Dutch populations (ter Wal 2005), and to its counter parts Swedish immigrants11.

Table 9. Number of migrants in the council of six Dutch cities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam (45)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam (45)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague (45)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht (45)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eindhoven (42)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (seats) 222</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ter Wal (2005)

11 Note: due to unavailability of aggregated data of immigrants voting behaviour from the bodies that organize election, I have to depend on the exit polls and survey from some selective densely immigrant populated cities in the Netherlands to compare with the Swedish case.
From the table 9, we see that in the main municipal councils in the Netherlands, number immigrants’ seats are increasing from 7 to 33 between 1986-90 and 2002-05. This trend indicates that the more immigrants are participating in the politics actively, at least in the local level.

A research conducted by the Institute for Public and Politics (IPP) in 481 Dutch municipalities in 2002. According to this survey, Rotterdam city council has the most migrant councilors and together with Amsterdam immigrant councilors amounts 20 per cent of total councilors. In addition, it shows that 208 immigrant councilor obtain a seat in the Dutch municipal councils in 2002. This number is increased 38 per cent compared to 1998 and more than double compared to 1994 election. (Michon and Tillie 2003, cited in ter Wal 2005).

Table 10. Political parties represented by the immigrant councilors in 2002 municipal election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Labour Party (PvdA),</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (CDA)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greens [Groen Links] (GL)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other local Parties</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aggregated from ter Wal (2005)

The highest immigrant councilor represented by the Dutch Labour Party with 87 councilors followed by the Christian Democratic Party with 42 councilors. The third was the Greens (Groen Links) with 33 councilors. Local parties provide another 31 migrant council members.

In the national level, there were 16 migrant members in the national parliament out of 150 members in 2005, which accounts 11 % of the total numbers. Among them, five were Turkish and four were Surinamese. PvdA and CDA have the highest immigrant MPs, each has four, followed by the VVD with 3 PMs (ter Wal 2005).

Table 11. Turn out of ethnic minorities at local elections in Amsterdam and Rotterdam
from 1994 to 2006 (in per cent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname/Antilles</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verdians</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total average turnout</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>47.05</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As the table shows, despite the difference in voting turn out results in two cities, generally immigrants’ electoral participation is increasing. The voting turn-out of immigrants was going down between 1994 and 1998 but it has recovered in 2006. One interesting causal relation we might think that in 2006 election, anti-immigrant parties did not get popular support in their campaign as we see in their election results and, importantly, radical anti-immigrant party Pim Fortuyn did not get any seat, on the contrary immigrant favoured parties got support and they won the election and immigrants’ vote reached its highest pick at this time. Therefore, it can be inferred that from party channels immigrants got effective motivation to take part in election in 2006.

Regarding party choice, immigrants tend to vote for left-wing parties such as, PvdA and the Green Left party, on the contrary, usually they nearly never vote for right-wing parties such as VVD, SGP and LPF (Heelsum 2001). According to the Institution for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the University of Amsterdam, the highest, 80 per cent of immigrant voted for Labour party in 2006 election. Among the immigrant groups, 84 and 81 per cent Turks and Antilleans/Surinamese voted for PvdA, respectively. On the other hand, 78 per cent of Moroccans voted for Labour and 12 per cent voted for Green left (Belien 2006).

From the above discussion, we can see that left-wing parties such as PvdA, GL and, to certain extend CDA get immigrant support in the national and local elections in 2006 in Netherlands. On the other hand, generally immigrants’ votes are increasing in local election, with some exception in some cities, and the numbers of migrant municipal council members are also increasing sharply. If one considers the Dutch political parties’
policy regarding immigrants’ issues, then it is clear that PvdA, GL and in some respect CDA favoured immigrants, as Odmalm (2005: 204) points,

If ethnicity does not appear to be a ‘legitimate’ way to approach potential voters, religion and class seems to be more of a winning tactic, especially for the CDA and PvdA, and to a lesser extent the VVD and the D66. The VVD, for instance, have also tried to attract votes from growing number of ethnic entrepreneurs, which ethos the attempts made by the Swedish conservatives.

To sum up, as discussed, immigrants in the Netherlands got effective motivation to take part in the election through party channels. On the other hand, fewer barriers existed as we see anti-immigrant campaign did not get momentum in 2006 election and the most importantly radical anti-immigrant party, Pim Fortuyn, even did not get any seats. On the contrary, in the election of 2002, Pim Fortuyn got 26 seats and immigrant participation was almost per cent lower than the 2006’s election (see table 10). This argument can justify that motivation through institutional channel is an important factor for immigrants’ electoral participation.

5.2 Resources: Voluntary Organizational Membership of Immigrants - Sweden & the Netherlands

Social capital, generally, is an important resource which led people to take part in different socio-political activities as Uslaner (2004: 1) points,

Social capital matters, Putman and others argue, because it brings people together to solve common problem … membership in voluntary associations and informal social connections can lead people to trust each other, to discuss issues of community concern, and to band together for collective action.

Like Almond and Verba draw in The Civic Culture (1963), Putman does the same that the more people are being members in associations the more trust they generate and the more they become politically active. Similarly, Rothstein (2002: 294) states, “A vital aspect of any working democracy is the willingness of its people to spend time and energy in established forms of political activity. One of the central findings in the social
capital approach is that social capital enhances political participation”. Therefore, organizational affiliation can be an important indicator of measuring immigrants’ political participation in the host society.

In this respect, initially, it has been explored from Swedish organizational trends that membership in voluntary organizations has declined during the postwar period, however, comparing to other west-European countries Sweden, and importantly the Netherlands, have the highest score in unpaid voluntary work (Rothstein 2002). One estimate says that immigrants have a high degree of involvement in association. Almost 90% of the naturalized immigrants are a member of an association which is almost the same as native Swedish population (Dahlstedt 2003).

According to Benito (2005), more than 2500 voluntary immigrant organizations was existing in Sweden in 2005 and most of them getting monetary support from Swedish integration board. From the following table, I try to make a connection with immigrants’ organizational membership in voluntary organization and their political participation.

It would be good to mention here that in this analysis, for measuring and comparing immigrants’ organizational membership in Sweden with its Dutch counter parts, I have to depend on some desecrate data, since there is no aggregate data on particular migrant groups in the local as well as in the national level in both countries. For instance, in Sweden there is no collective data on different immigrant groups and their organizational affiliation in local level. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, there is a vast research in local level and consequently, numerous data on immigrants’ organizational participation in local level (see Putman 1993; Fennema & Tillie 1999; and Heelsum 2001) but a very few research in national level. Therefore, it is difficult to compare between Sweden and the Netherlands in the national level due to lack of cross-national comprehensive data on the same issue. For that reason, for the Dutch case, though it might not be fully representative, I have to aggregate data from local level and convert it into national level to make it comparable with its Swedish counter parts.
Table 12. Indicators of civic community and political participation of migrant groups in Sweden,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Swedes</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population*</td>
<td>9.5 mil</td>
<td>112,5700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of organization**</td>
<td></td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org. density (b/a ×1,000)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters turnout in local level (2006)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.1 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Statistics Sweden 2005  
** Benito (2005)  
*** Statistics Sweden 2007

As the table shows, the number of immigrant organizations in Sweden exist is 2500. To compare the organizational density one should divide the number of organization by the number of citizens and it turn out 2.22 organizations per immigrant inhabitants as Putman (1993) indicates. In addition, here I include the percentage of vote turn out of 2006’s election to make connection with the organizational membership.

On the other hand, in the case of the Netherlands, Heelsum and Penninx (1999) mention that “organisations of the larger migrant groups are generally open to and sometimes involve also people from outside the own community. Nevertheless, the voluntary work undertaken by migrants is characterized by a specific form of solidarity with the own group” (quoted in ter Wal 2005: 24). At the national level, the number of government supported migrant organizations has been increasing since 1995. In 2003, there were roughly 3911 different kinds of migrants organization exists in the Netherlands (Heelsum 2004).

Among the ethnic groups in the Netherlands, the three main immigrant groups, Turks, Surinamese and Moroccans, can be distinguished in their size of population and the number of volunteering organizations. The number of organizations of these groups is counted 1125, 881 and 720, respectively (ter Wal 2005). Therefore, it can be justified that to examine these three groups organizational affiliation and convert it into a national perspective to make it comparable with the Swedish case.
Table 13. Indicators of civic community and political participation of migrant groups in the Netherlands, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dutch</th>
<th>Surinamese</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Total (average)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) population</td>
<td>16 mil</td>
<td>308,625</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>319,600</td>
<td>900225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of organization</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td></td>
<td>2701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Org. density (b/a ×1,000)</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters turnout in local level (2006)*</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>44.8 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics.

In the above table, Turks are the largest migrant groups and their organizational density per 1000 inhabitants is 3.44 followed by the Surinamese 2.85 and the lowest is 2.65 among Moroccans. If we convert it into a national representative figure then it becomes 2.98, which significantly higher than the Swedish immigrants’ organizational density (2.22).

From above this discussion, we see that the Dutch immigrants have achieved a high level of organizational engagement comparing to other West European countries as Rothstein (2002) points. Therefore, ter Wal (2005: 46) justify this statement by stating,

Nevertheless the level of institutionalisation of civic activities overall is (or has been) high (for example in advisory boards and consultative structures). A result of this institutionalisation is that today, subsidised national umbrella organisations, and ‘expertise’ and ‘knowledge centres’ channel most of the engagement of ethnic/migrant organisations. These mediating organisations, which are concerted rather than spontaneous, and active political participation do indicate the increasing possibility (and stimulation) of overlaps with mainstream organisations. These emerge for example spontaneously in the field of communication, an initiative such as “Ben je bang voor mij” is linked to mainstream political parties.
Chapter VI

6. Causal Link between Contextual factors and Actor’s Motivation

As discussed in the theoretical chapter, there is a causal relation between contextual factors and actor’s motivation that I explored in the chapter IV and V. In the modified actor context model, it is mentioned that the contextual factors, in this study- political party, have influence over actor’s motivations. Therefore, the context which offers fewer barriers and provide attractive opportunities can influence actor’s action, in my case, active electoral participation of immigrants.

In the Swedish case, we have seen that political parties could not give enough motivations to immigrants to participate in the 2006 elections. Some policies and strategies of some parties did not favour immigrants, for instance People’s Party proposed a language test for immigrants in 2002 who wish to have Swedish citizenship and similarly in 2005 they proposed that “immigrants who get two or more years of imprisonment shall be expelled from the country” (Benito 2005: 38). In the same way, in 2006 election campaign conservatives and the popular party advocated for labour immigration again, while the other parties opposed it. Consequently, this kind of policy and campaign could hinder immigrants’ motivation to participate in election.

As discussed in the chapter 4.2, there is a causal relation between political party’s policies and low level of immigrant’s political participation. We observed from graph 1 (see page 36), that immigrants’ electoral participation has been decreasing very sharply from 60 percent to 37 percent in 1976 to 2006. Consequently, this trend calls for much attention to governmental policy-maker as we see, Kommundemokratikommittén, a governmental commission, presented a report in 2001, in which the committee analyses different reasons why immigrants vote with a lower rate than the native population. One
of the main reasons is that immigrants were not noticed as much by the Swedish parties or society. Therefore, the commission proposes,

the political parties and the society should try to meet a group of people indirectly through persons from the same group. Another idea is to have more immigrants as a pattern in the political parties and in the political practical life …The committee believes that more work has to be done but gives no advice other than the political parties have to work more together in order to be in contact with the immigrant population, especially in the suburbs of the cities” (Benito 2005: 29).

Similarly, Dahlstedt (2005) analyzes immigrants’ involvement and their integration in the Swedish society. He recommends that immigrants’ integration depends much on the involvement in the political parties and decision making position in the community council, parliament and so on. In the same vain, Carl Dahlström and Ulrika Möller have point that “the general policy followed by the state from 1976 to 2002 has been to help immigrants to learn about the Swedish society and how to vote, instead of making immigrants engaged in politics or making general campaigns for the vote in general, also for the Swedish population” (Benito 2005: 30).

Finally, the images of immigrants, in general, portrayed negatively by the Swedish media which influence the policy formation and consequently it effects on the motivation of immigrants to participate on the election as Bäck and Soininen (1998: 9) point,

The fact that the Swedish media debates rarely reflect the actual perspective of immigrants … immigrants is portrayed as a social problem and a drain on resources, and of course immigrant voters cannot identify with such a negative image. That the special issues of a particular group of voters do not gain the attention of political institutions or that they are formulated in a negative way, as is the case with immigrant voters, seems likely to reduce a group’s motivation to participate.

Therefore, it can be inferred that immigrants did not get enough motivation through party channels for active participation in the election of 2006. In other words, it can also be a political apathy and alienation that made immigrant reluctant to participate in the
election. This argument precisely justify by the statement of Bäck and Soninen (1998: 37-38),

The lack of contact with everyday life in Sweden, its routines, people and current political issues makes it difficult for immigrant voters to learn about society and politics. Participation presupposes that one can construct a working model of political life in Sweden, a construction which can only take form through interaction with other members of society … then it is not surprising that many immigrant voters in such a marginalized social position show little interest in politics. Lack of knowledge about and sporadic contacts with society, combined with a feeling of not being able to influence one’s immediate situation create a kind of social citizenship that is incompatible with the social citizen who wishes, knows and believes that he/she is able to influence the political distribution of resources in society.

On the other hand, political parties in the Netherlands showed the different picture than its Swedish counterparts. The pro-immigrant political parties, like PvdA and CDA, promote immigration issues in their policies on one hand and the anti-immigrant parties like PVV could not succeed to promote anti-immigrant issues among the voters in 2006 election. Therefore, in the Netherlands, immigrants offered better opportunity, through party channels, as a result, the greater motivation created for them; consequently the result is the higher voters turn out.

This discussion validates the argument that contextual factors have significance influence over actor’s motivation and it also justifies the necessity of enlargement of actor context model.
Chapter VII

7. Overall Comparison – Sweden & the Netherlands

Sweden and the Netherlands, both these countries are similar in terms of adopting multicultural policies, immigrant policy evolution, institutional set up for immigrants’ political participation and finally governmental attitudes towards immigrants. However, there is a difference in immigrants’ active political participation between these two countries. I employ ‘modified’ actor context model of methodological individualistic approach to operationalize this study. In addition, I use new institutionalism theory to analyze institutions and finally I employ social capital theory as a resource of actor’s factor to analyze immigrants’ organizational participation.

In both these countries, institutional settings, the first variable of contextual factors, provide almost the same opportunities and barriers for immigrants to participate in political life actively. Similarly, governmental support for migrants’ voluntary organizations is nearly the same in these countries. However, the second variable of contextual factors and the main institution in this study, political party, gives a different picture in these two countries. In Sweden, immigrant-favored parties, SAP and GL lost the 2006 elections on one hand, and anti-immigrant parties are rising, such as Sweden Democrats, On the contrary, the Dutch case shows the opposite of Sweden, where immigrant issues gain momentum and they are supported by the winning parties of 2006 elections such as PvdA and CDA. Therefore, in the contextual fields, Sweden offers more barriers and fewer opportunities to immigrants to participate in politics through party channels while the Dutch does the vis-à-vis, i.e., more opportunities and fewer barriers.

In the actor’s factors, consequently, Swedish immigrants get less motivation for active participation in the elections as we show that their electoral participation in 2006 was very low (see table 7, 8 and graph 1). On the other hand, despite the declining trends of electoral participation of the Dutch immigrants, in the election of 2006, immigrants
achieve a high level of electoral participation at least in the local levels (see table 12). Therefore, it can be inferred that, among many other factors, the motivation of immigrants was affected by the political parties, at least to a certain extent, in electoral participation of 2006 election in Sweden as well as in the Netherlands.

Importantly, the causal relation, between low level of electoral participation and political parties’ involvement in immigrant issues, we find here that immigrants in Sweden got very fewer opportunity and intense barriers from political parties, while in the Netherlands, fewer barriers and better opportunities from political parties. Consequently, it resulted, to a certain extent, low electoral participation rate of immigrants in Sweden and than the Dutch immigrants.

The second aspect of actor’s factor is social capital. In this study, the social capital is regarded as a ‘resources’ which can be determinant of immigrant political participation. Immigrants’ organizational membership is an important variable to analyze social capital (Putman 1993; Fennema & Tillie 1999). In Sweden, voluntary organizational affiliation of immigrant is relatively high compared to other European counties, while compared to the Netherlands; it is low, at least to a certain extent. The organizational density of Swedish immigrants is 2.22, whereas it is 2.98 among the Dutch immigrants. Similarly, voters turn out the former groups is 37.1 % and the later is 44. 8 %.

Therefore, it can be inferred that the Dutch immigrants have higher political participation rate, at least in electoral participation and in representation than Swedish immigrants. Of course, it is a partial conclusion, before taking into account this argument, one should consider many aspect and factors behind this issues. Many factors can affect low or high level of immigrants’ electoral participation, including individual and group resources, which scholars of electoral analysts indicate. To give this argument more concrete base, therefore, I consider the actor’s resources that gave us the clearer picture.
Chapter VIII

8. Conclusion

Sweden and the Netherlands have a number of corporatist features, both with regard to general policy-making as well as in the area of integration in which incorporation of immigrants has been dealt with in a corporatist style. This involves the assertion of individual influence through party channels as well as that of group influence via organisations. These settings constitute an institutional framework – driven by the top-down perspective where the government recognises and identifies the needs and rights of immigrants - and provide the context in which immigrants and their interests are organised (Odmalm 2005: 116).

In this study, our point of departure was immigrants’ political participation in Sweden and the Netherlands. Both these countries are similar in many aspects; however they produced different results in active political participation of immigrants. Comparing to the Dutch immigrants, Swedish immigrants have low level of political participation. To analyze this aspect I employed ‘modified actor context model’, in where I enlarged the model as actor’s motivation, for active electoral participation, is depend on the contextual factors, i.e., political parties. In addition, I employed social capital theory to analyze actor’s recourses. The social capital is regarded as a ‘resources’ which can be determinant of immigrant political participation. The analysis of motivation and resources of actor factor, led us to certain conclusion that Swedish immigrants have the lower participation rate in the political sphere, at lest to a certain extent and according to our findings, than its counterparts the Dutch immigrants.

Importantly, political parties in both countries had significant influence on actor’s motivation for active electoral participation. In Sweden, political parties apparently failed to offer better opportunity than constraints, while in the Netherlands, political parties succeeded in offering better opportunities to immigrant. As a result, immigrants voting turn out was lower than the Dutch immigrants. This analysis can justify the argument that contextual factors can influence actor’s motivations in integration-oriented action, and similarly it validates the necessity of enlargement of the actor-context model. However,
to make a certain claim, one should control other variables and offers more in depth analysis, which is beyond the scope of this study. This calls for further researches in this field, especially, to analyze other important variables including actor’s resources i.e., social capital in Swedish perspective. Since, surprisingly, there is no such broad-based research about Swedish immigrants analysing voluntary organizational affiliation and its influence on political participation through social capital theory.
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