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Determinants and effects of central bank independence reforms
Högskolan Dalarna, Akademin Industri och samhälle, Nationalekonomi. Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
2013 (Engelska)Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

This thesis consists of four empirically oriented papers on central bank independence (CBI) reforms.   

Paper [1] is an investigation of why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to control the economy. A new data-set, including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during 1980-2005, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country had been characterized by high variability in inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.   

Paper [2], using a difference-in-difference approach, studies whether CBI reform matters for inflation performance. The analysis is based on a dataset including the possible occurrence of CBI-reforms in 132 countries during the period of 1980-2005. CBI reform is found to have contributed to bringing down inflation in high-inflation countries, but it seems unrelated to inflation performance in low-inflation countries.   

Paper [3] investigates whether CBI-reforms are important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability, using a random-effects random-coefficients model to account for heterogeneity in the effects of CBI-reforms on inflation. CBI-reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average by 3.31 percent, but the effect is only present when countries with historically high inflation rates are included in the sample. Countries with more modest inflation rates have achieved low inflation without institutional reforms that grant central banks more independence, thus undermining the time-inconsistency theory case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI-reforms have contributed to lower inflation variability   

Paper [4] studies the relationship between CBI and a suggested trade-off between price variability and output variability using data on CBI-levels, and data the on implementation dates of CBI-reforms. The results question the existence of such a trade-off, but indicate that there may still be potential gains in stabilization policy from CBI-reforms.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2013.
Serie
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 869
Nyckelord [en]
Monetary policy, institutional reform, central banking, price stability, political economy, delegation, institutional economics, inflation, time-inconsistency, accountability
Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Komplexa system - mikrodataanalys
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-13535ISBN: 978-91-7459-768-4 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:du-13535DiVA, id: diva2:681051
Disputation
Samhällsvetarhuset, sal S 205 h, Umeå universitet, Umeå (Engelska)
Opponent
Handledare
Tillgänglig från: 2013-12-19 Skapad: 2013-12-19 Senast uppdaterad: 2015-08-03Bibliografiskt granskad
Delarbeten
1. Why do politicians implement central bank independence reforms?
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Why do politicians implement central bank independence reforms?
2013 (Engelska)Ingår i: Atlantic Economic Journal, ISSN 0197-4254, E-ISSN 1573-9678, Vol. 41, nr 4, s. 427-438Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why politicians around the world have chosen to give up power to independent central banks, thereby reducing their ability to fine-tune the economy. A new data-set covering 132 countries, of which 86 countries had implemented such reforms, was collected. Politicians in non-OECD countries were more likely to delegate power to independent central banks if their country has been characterized by a high variability in historical inflation and if they faced a high probability of being replaced. No such effects were found for OECD countries.

Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Komplexa system - mikrodataanalys, Allmänt Mikrodataaanalys - övrigt
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:du-13401 (URN)10.1007/s11293-013-9391-1 (DOI)
Tillgänglig från: 2013-12-03 Skapad: 2013-12-03 Senast uppdaterad: 2017-12-06Bibliografiskt granskad
2. Do central bank independence reforms matter for inflation performance?
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Do central bank independence reforms matter for inflation performance?
2011 (Engelska)Ingår i: International Journal of Banking, Accounting and Finance, ISSN 1755-3830, E-ISSN 1755-3849, Vol. 3, nr 4, s. 320-335Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

A difference-in-difference approach was used to investigate whether central bank independence (CBI) reforms matter for inflation, based on a novel dataset including the possible occurrence of such reforms in 132 countries during the period 1980 to 2005. CBI-reforms are found to have contributed to bringing down high inflation rates where those existed, but they seem unrelated to performance in low-inflation countries.

Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Komplexa system - mikrodataanalys
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:du-13536 (URN)10.1504/IJBAAF.2011.043700 (DOI)
Tillgänglig från: 2013-12-19 Skapad: 2013-12-19 Senast uppdaterad: 2017-12-06Bibliografiskt granskad
3. Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Are central bank independence reforms necessary for achieving low and stable inflation?
2013 (Engelska)Rapport (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

Using data on the occurence of central bank independence (CBI) reforms in 131 countries during 1980-2005, we test whether they were important in reducing inflation and maintaining price stability. CBI reforms are found to have reduced inflation on average 3.31% when countries with historically high inflation rates are included. But countries with lower inflation have reduced it without institutional reforms granting central banks more independence, undermining the theoretical time-inconsistency case for CBI. There is furthermore no evidence that CBI reforms have helped reduce inflation variability.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
HUI Research, 2013. s. 36
Serie
HUI Working Papers ; 95
Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Komplexa system - mikrodataanalys
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:du-13537 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2013-12-19 Skapad: 2013-12-19 Senast uppdaterad: 2015-08-03Bibliografiskt granskad
4. Central bank independence and the price-output-variability trade-off
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Central bank independence and the price-output-variability trade-off
(Engelska)Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Abstract [en]

Data on central bank independence (CBI) and implementation dates of CBI-reforms were used to investigate the relationship between CBI and a possible trade-off between inflation variability and output variability. No such trade-off was found, but there might still be stabilization gains from CBI-reform.

Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Forskningsämne
Komplexa system - mikrodataanalys
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:du-13538 (URN)
Tillgänglig från: 2013-12-19 Skapad: 2013-12-19 Senast uppdaterad: 2015-08-03Bibliografiskt granskad

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