Dalarna University's logo and link to the university's website

du.sePublikasjoner
Endre søk
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
The Difference Between De Jure and De Facto Central Bank Independence
Högskolan Dalarna, Akademin Industri och samhälle, Nationalekonomi.
2014 (engelsk)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 poäng / 15 hpOppgave
Abstract [en]

In recent decades, many central banks of the world over have been made independent. This paper empirically analyzes the difference between de jure and de facto independence; examining the concept of central bank independence (CBI) and with a focus on social trust, and the effectiveness of these two variables with regard to reducing the rate of inflation. Countries are grouped into four categories in line with Arnone et al’s (2007) index. The categories are i. All countries, ii. Advanced countries, iii. Emerging countries and iv. Developing countries. The results are obtained by simple correlation and the ordinary least square (OLS) regression analysis. The results indicate that both CBI and social trust have a significant effect on inflation in all countries while social trust also has a significant effect on inflation in advanced countries to reduce inflation. It seems social trust plays a more critical role than CBI in affecting inflation. Developing countries with high levels of social-trust usually also have fewer independent central banks, which could be an indication that such countries feel no need to implement CBI-reforms. For more developed countries, it appears trust is not as important for the level of CBI. That being said, in low-trust countries, social trust does not seem to have any effect.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
2014.
Emneord [en]
Central Bank Independence, Reforms, De Jure and De Facto, Inflation, Social Trust, Time-inconsistency, Monetary Policy, Credibility.
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-16325OAI: oai:DiVA.org:du-16325DiVA, id: diva2:762727
Tilgjengelig fra: 2014-11-12 Laget: 2014-11-12 Sist oppdatert: 2014-11-12bibliografisk kontrollert

Open Access i DiVA

Fulltekst mangler i DiVA

Av organisasjonen

Søk utenfor DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

urn-nbn

Altmetric

urn-nbn
Totalt: 2839 treff
RefereraExporteraLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Referera
Referensformat
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Annet format
Fler format
Språk
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Annet språk
Fler språk
Utmatningsformat
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf