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Darwinian evolution of cooperation via punishment in the "public goods" game
Keck Graduate Institute of Applied Life Sciences, Claremont, United States.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4872-1961
2010 (English)In: Artificial Life XII: Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, ALIFE 2010, 2010, p. 445-450Conference paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem for evolutionary biology because cooperation is undermined by selfish cheaters (or "free riders") that profit from cooper-ators but do not invest any resources themselves. In a purely "selfish" view of evolution, those cheaters should be favored. Evolutionary game theory has been able to show that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably. One of these scenarios utilizes the power of punishment to suppress free riders, but only if players interact in a structured population where cooperators are likely to be surrounded by other cooperators. Here we show that cooperation via punishment can evolve even in well-mixed populations that play the "public goods" game, if the synergy effect of cooperation is high enough. As the synergy is increased, populations transition from defection to cooperation in a manner reminiscent of a phase transition. If punishment is turned off the critical synergy is significantly higher, illustrating that indeed punishment aids in establishing cooperation. We also show that the critical point depends on the mutation rate so that higher mutation rates actually promote cooperation, by ensuring that punishment never disappears.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. p. 445-450
Keywords [en]
Critical points, Darwinian evolution, Evolution of cooperation, Evolutionary biology, Evolutionary game theory, Free-riders, Mutation rates, Perennial problems, Public goods, Structured population, Synergy effect, Game theory, Profitability, Biological systems
National Category
Evolutionary Biology
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-37198Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84874685978ISBN: 9780262290753 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:du-37198DiVA, id: diva2:1557608
Conference
Artificial Life XII, Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on the Synthesis and Simulation of Living Systems, ALIFE 2010
Available from: 2021-05-26 Created: 2021-05-26 Last updated: 2021-05-26Bibliographically approved

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Hintze, Arend

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf