Dalarna University's logo and link to the university's website

du.sePublications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Punishment in public goods games leads to meta-stable phase transitions and hysteresis
Michigan State University, East Lansing, United States.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4872-1961
2015 (English)In: Physical Biology, ISSN 1478-3967, E-ISSN 1478-3975, Vol. 12, no 4, article id 046005Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The evolution of cooperation has been a perennial problem in evolutionary biology because cooperation can be undermined by selfish cheaters who gain an advantage in the short run, while compromising the long-term viability of the population. Evolutionary game theory has shown that under certain conditions, cooperation nonetheless evolves stably, for example if players have the opportunity to punish cheaters that benefit from a public good yet refuse to pay into the common pool. However, punishment has remained enigmatic because it is costly and difficult to maintain. On the other hand, cooperation emerges naturally in the public goods game if the synergy of the public good (the factor multiplying the public good investment) is sufficiently high. In terms of this synergy parameter, the transition from defection to cooperation can be viewed as a phase transition with the synergy as the critical parameter. We show here that punishment reduces the critical value at which cooperation occurs, but also creates the possibility of meta-stable phase transitions, where populations can 'tunnel' into the cooperating phase below the critical value. At the same time, cooperating populations are unstable even above the critical value, because a group of defectors that are large enough can 'nucleate' such a transition. We study the mean-field theoretical predictions via agent-based simulations of finite populations using an evolutionary approach where the decisions to cooperate or to punish are encoded genetically in terms of evolvable probabilities. We recover the theoretical predictions and demonstrate that the population shows hysteresis, as expected in systems that exhibit super-heating and super-cooling. We conclude that punishment can stabilize populations of cooperators below the critical point, but it is a two-edged sword: it can also stabilize defectors above the critical point. © 2015 IOP Publishing Ltd.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Physics Publishing , 2015. Vol. 12, no 4, article id 046005
Keywords [en]
cooperation, evolution, hysteresis, phase transitions, game, human, punishment, statistical model, Biological Evolution, Cooperative Behavior, Game Theory, Humans, Models, Statistical
National Category
Evolutionary Biology
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-37182DOI: 10.1088/1478-3975/12/4/046005Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84937574559OAI: oai:DiVA.org:du-37182DiVA, id: diva2:1557847
Available from: 2021-05-27 Created: 2021-05-27 Last updated: 2021-05-27Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(1444 kB)79 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT01.pdfFile size 1444 kBChecksum SHA-512
a7b51dc53c39284783d4a3cca9f511bfc7d712f4b73f1a6a952a1ae9dbd1fd3d5606eeb440052af66a7245aa9b37c4729807a4afadc2391021e3005a2caeddd2
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Authority records

Hintze, Arend

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Hintze, Arend
In the same journal
Physical Biology
Evolutionary Biology

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 79 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 27 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf