Based on a comparative case study design including Lithuania, Romania, and Finland as a long–lasting case of European semi–presidentialism, this chapter addresses the interaction between executive power and the citizens in the context of accountability. By examining the conditions and implications of ‘going–public’ tactics used by ten presidents in these three countries, the author is especially interested in to what extent the president’s (perceived) popular legitimacy impedes and even outplays formal constitutional power in intra–executive relations between the president and prime minister. A guiding assumption is that the impact of the president’s ‘going–public’ strategies are conditioned by formal constitutional powers, unified or divided government (cohabitation), the president’s influence over his or her party, and by the prevailing norms among the political elites about the president’s role in the political system. The author uses both primary and secondary data on president–cabinet relations and intra–executive conflict, including expert interviews, to examine a number of intra–executive confrontations over the period from the early 1990s until 2019.