Frege’s extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely considered to beproblematic. Interpreters generally assume that the notion of Bedeutung comprises the name/bearer relation as aprototype and that the extension is justified only in so far as the relation of predicate terms to their alleged referents isanalogous to the relation of names to their bearers. However, interpreters have generally paid insufficient attentionto Frege’s own dealing with the issue. By examining the relevant passages in Frege’s writings, I show that thestandard ways of talking about Frege’s ascription of Bedeutung to predicates as optional, less evident than theascription of Sinn, and in need of justification are not in accord with Frege’s own conception of predicate reference.There is no textual evidence that the extension takes place for analogical reasons and, in particular, no evidencefor the claim that the name/bearer relation is used as a prototype. Frege is visibly not concerned with the relationbetween predicate terms and their referents, but applies the notion of Bedeutung for reasons of principle. There isindeed the invocation of an analogy, but if we consider the argument in which it occurs it appears that it does notplay the justificatory role interpreters attribute to it. In sum, Frege’s ascription of Bedeutung to predicates does notimply any mysterious or dubious referentiality of predicate terms.