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How to avoid Copenhagen: An experimental economic approach to climate negotiations
Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.
2011 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor)Student thesis
Abstract [en]

This study got its origin in the failed climate negotiations in the Copenhagen 2009 summit. By conducting a public good game, with participants from China and Sweden, my study indicates that previous studies on public good games can predict the outcome of the game to a quit large extent even though most of my statistical tests came out statistically insignificant. My study also indicates that by framing the game as climate negotiations there were no statistical significant difference on the level of contributions in comparison to the unframed versions of the game. The awareness of the issues with emissions, global warming and other environmental problems are pretty high but even so when push comes to shove gains in the short run are prioritized to gains in the long run. There are however hypothetical willingness to come to term with the environmental issues. The results of the study indicate that the outcome of the Copenhagen summit can be avoidable but would need additional experiments made on cultural differences and behavior.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Borlänge, 2011. , 49 p.
Keyword [en]
Copenhagen 2009, game theory, public good game, prisoner’s dilemma, climate, negotiations
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-5944OAI: oai:dalea.du.se:5944DiVA: diva2:519127
Uppsok
Social and Behavioural Science, Law
Supervisors
Available from: 2011-09-14 Created: 2011-09-14 Last updated: 2012-04-24Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf