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Informal sanctions and conditional cooperation:: A natural experiment on voluntary contributions to a public good.
Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5031-3863
2006 (English)In: Economic Science Association, Nottingham, UK, 2006Conference paper, (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]

In a natural experiment, this paper studies the impact of an informal sanctioning mechanism on individuals’ voluntary contribution to a public good. Cross-country skiers’ actual cash contributions in two ski resorts, one with and one without an informal sanctioning system, are used. I find the contributing share to be higher in the informal sanctioning system (79 percent) than in the non-sanctioning system (36 percent). Previous studies in one-shot public good situations have found an increasing conditional contribution (CC) function, i.e. the relationship between expected average contributions of other group members and the individual’s own contribution. In contrast, the present results suggest that the CC-function in the non-sanctioning system is non-increasing at high perceived levels of others’ contribution. This relationship deserves further testing in lab.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Nottingham, UK, 2006.
Keyword [en]
Informal sanctions, natural experiments, voluntary contributions, conditional cooperation, Allemansr├Ątten
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-2594OAI: oai:dalea.du.se:2594DiVA: diva2:521690
Conference
European Regional Meeting , Nottingham, UK, 7-10 September, 2006
Available from: 2007-03-30 Created: 2007-03-30 Last updated: 2015-11-25Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(149 kB)424 downloads
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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf