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  • 1.
    Berggren, Niclas
    et al.
    Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm, Sweden; Department of Institutional Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Economics in Prague, Czech Republic.
    Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov
    Dalarna University, School of Technology and Business Studies, Economics. HUI Research, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hellström, Jörgen
    Umeå School of Business and Economics, Umeå University, Umeå, Sweden.
    Social trust and central bank independence2014In: European Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0176-2680, E-ISSN 1873-5703, Vol. 34, p. 425-439Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Central banks have become more independent in many countries. A common rationale has been the existence of a credibility (or lack-of-trust) problem for monetary policy. This indicates a possible and until now unexplored link between social trust and central-bank independence. Our empirical findings, based on data from 149 countries, confirm such a link, in the form of a u-shaped relationship. We suggest that two factors help explain this finding: the need for this kind of reform and the ability with which it can be implemented. At low trust, the need for central-bank independence is sufficiently strong to bring it about, in spite of a low ability to undertake reform. At high trust, the ability to undertake reform is sufficiently strong to bring high independence about, in spite of a low need for it. At intermediate trust levels, lastly, neither need nor ability is strong enough to generate very independent central banks.

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