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Do audited firms have a lower cost of debt?
Dalarna University, School of Information and Engineering, Microdata Analysis.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2952-7327
2022 (English)In: International Journal of Disclosure & Governance, ISSN 1741-3591, E-ISSN 1746-6539Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The purpose of this study is to investigate if audited financial statements add value for firms in the private debt market. Using an instrumental variable method, we find that firms with audited financial statements, on average, save 0.47 percentage points on the cost of debt compared to firms with unaudited financial statements. We also find that using the big, well-known auditing firms does not yield any additional cost of debt benefits. Lastly, we investigate if there are industries where alternative sources of information make auditing less valuable in reducing the cost of debt. Here, we find that auditing is less important in lowering cost in one industry, agriculture, where one lender has a 74% market share and a 100-year history of lending to firms within that industry. As such, it seems that lenders having high exposure to a certain industry might act as an alternative to auditing in reducing the information asymmetry between the firm and the lender. © 2021, The Author(s).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Palgrave Macmillan , 2022.
Keywords [en]
Agency theory, Audit complexity, Audit reform, Cost of capital, Endogenous switching model, External audit, Private limited firms, Regulation
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:du-39299DOI: 10.1057/s41310-021-00133-1ISI: 000736932300001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85122062262OAI: oai:DiVA.org:du-39299DiVA, id: diva2:1626493
Available from: 2022-01-11 Created: 2022-01-11 Last updated: 2025-10-09Bibliographically approved

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Huq, Asif M

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CiteExportLink to record
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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • chicago-author-date
  • chicago-note-bibliography
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf