The concept of epistemic injustice, as discussed by the feminist philosopher Miranda Fricker, has helped to discern a distinctively epistemic form of harmful and unjust treatment based on identity prejudices such as those of gender, race/ethnicty, and class. In this essay, I focus on epistemic injustice issues specifically in childhoods and as suffered by children. Children are commonly viewed as irrational or cognitively and morally immature, hence as not fully accomplished epistemic agents and humans. In addition to this, it becomes challenging to conceptualize epistemic injustice in childhoods given that the concept was originally developed to address inequalities in adulthoods. Through the lenses of critical childhood studies and by drawing on findings from my research on child welfare and protection and juxtaposing it with child and youth activism, I discuss applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in relation to children. The essay gives particular consideration to children and young people as agents of social justice and how a recognition of their resistance may broaden the concept of epistemic (in)justice in childhoods.